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Feng Shi - Abstract 
Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance: 
A Comparative Study of English and Chinese Law 
 
    As one of the most distinctive characteristics of English insurance law, the duty of 
utmost good faith is essentially stated in sections 17-20 of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906. According to the statutory rules, both of the insurance parties must observe 
utmost good faith before the conclusion of an insurance contract. After one century of 
its application, both the judiciary and academics expressed their concerns in terms of 
its legislative defects and complexity in practice. Some developments have been 
made in recent judicial decisions and in statutory reform, e.g. the English Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, and Recommendations, 
Statutes and Explanations on the Amendments of Chinese Maritime Code of the 
People’s Republic of China. Therefore, debatable issues and law reform programs in 
both English and Chinese law are considered in the main body of this thesis.  
    The examination is essentially based upon, (1) the materiality test of the 
concealed/misrepresented circumstances which can empower the injured party to 
rescind the insurance ab initio; (2) the duration of utmost good faith and specific 
issues; (3) the protective measures related to innocent misconduct; (4) the legal 
status of good faith and its application to fraudulent behaviour; and (5) whether the 
classic English utmost good faith doctrine can be extended to Chinese law.     
    Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive study of 
the current status and developments of the duty of utmost good faith in both English 
and Chinese law, which  is of fundamental importance, not only at the negotiation 
stage, but also throughout the performance and at the claiming stage of an insurance 
ii 
 
contract. After identifying and analysing these crucial issues, this thesis concludes 
with some possible solutions.    
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 INTRODUCTION  
Background 
 
    The principle of ‘utmost good faith’ is a legal doctrine which governs insurance 
contracts. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘good faith’ as: 
‘[A] state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) 
faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) 
absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.’1 
 
    Although this doctrine is not a statutory default rule in contract law, it has been 
construed as a moral requirement for all of the contractual parties at common law.2 
On the one hand, ‘good faith’ is an elusive principle with varied circumstances,3 while 
on the other, some judicial and scholarly statements confer this term with more 
specialized interpretations.4 
    When it comes to insurance contracts, the requirements for good faith are much 
higher. The duty of utmost good faith in insurance, also known as uberrimae fidei, 
requires the contractual parties to act with such good faith during pre-contractual 
negotiations. This doctrine is also well known for distinguishing insurance contracts 
from other general contracts5 since ‘contracts of insurance provide the only true 
example of a contract uberrimae fidei’.6 In English case-law, the duty of utmost good 
                                               
1
 Bryan Garner, et al., Black’s Law Dictionary (9
th
 ed., Thomson Reuters, 2009). 
2
 For example, see Peter MacDonald Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract (3
rd
 ed., 
London: LLP, 2010). 
3
 Roger Brownsword, et al., Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context, (Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1999). 
4
 For example, Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, paras. 1.12-1.28. 
5
 Good faith is the basic moral threshold for the general contractual parties. In practice, for general 
contracts, the law has put the responsibility on the parties to obtain all relevant information 
surrounding the undertaking before entering into the contract, as opposed to entitling them to expect 
such information to be provided to them by the other party. Please see Ibid, para. 1.09. 
6
 Charles Wild and Stuart Weinstein, Smith & Keenan’s English Law (16
th
 ed., Longman, 2010), p. 338; 
Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, para 1.09. 
2 
 
faith was firstly referred to in Carter v Boehm7 by Lord Mansfield, who clarified the 
underlying basis for the principle of disclosure. He ruled, ‘insurance is a contract 
upon speculation…good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately 
knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his 
believing the contrary’.8 This doctrine was further developed in subsequent cases, 
which detailed its contents and imposed limitations, to avoid being abused by 
insurance companies as a technical defence.9 
    Under English law, statutory support was initially provided by the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906.10 With the codification of the MIA 1906, the principle found expression in 
sections 17 to 20: section 17 presents the general duty to observe utmost good faith, 
with the following sections introducing particular aspects of the doctrine, namely, the 
duty of the assured (section 18) and the broker (section 19) to disclose material 
circumstances, and to avoid making misrepresentations (section 20). The MIA 1906 
plays a very important role in the insurance law area, because the House of Lords 
(which was replaced by the Supreme Court in 2009 in the English judicial system) 
has confirmed that sections 17-20 in effect codified this branch of the law, both in 
respect of marine insurance expressly and, by extension, non-marine insurance.11 
The non-discriminatory attitude of the duty of good faith to the type of insurance 
                                               
7
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
8
 Ibid, pp. 109 and 110. 
9
 Container Transport International Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) (CTI) 
[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476; Banque Keyser Ullmann v Scandia [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69; Pan Atlantic 
Insurance Co Ltd and Another v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd (Pan Atlantic) [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101; 
(1993) 2 Re LR 119; [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427, etc.   
10
 Marine Insurance Act 1906 (1906 CHAPTER 41 6 Edw 7). The English codification of marine 
insurance was initiated in 1745 by the first Marine Insurance Act which provided a limited prohibition 
on wagering policies and reinsurance. This was followed by the Marine Insurance Act 1788, which 
required the name of the assured to be inserted in all policies. These Acts were repealed by the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906(MIA 1906). The latter Act, which was codified by Mr Mackenzie D 
Chalmers, heralded a return to the original concept of marine insurance, viz, that it is to protect the 
shipowner or merchant from the risks of maritime adventure and it is this Act which was ultimately 
followed in Australia. 
11
 For academic support, for example, Francis Rose, Marine Insurance: Law and Practice (2
nd
 ed., 
London: Informa, 2012), p. 66. For judicial support, see Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd and Another v 
Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427. 
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concerned has enabled the courts to apply the principle of utmost good faith laid 
down in section 17 of the MIA 1906 and the rules set out in sections 18-20 to cases 
of non-marine insurance, given that the Act is said to have been declaratory of the 
common law.12 At the same time, apart from its application to both marine and non-
marine insurance events, utmost good faith equally applies to primary cover and all 
levels of reinsurance. 13  Therefore in English law, the duty of utmost good faith 
consists of two aspects: the duties of disclosure and representation, which are 
addressed below in chapters one and two respectively.  
    It can be said that the codification of the MIA 1906 actually took this doctrine to its 
culmination. However, this regime seems to be threatened by a variable environment, 
on the grounds that the social, economical and technical changes, and even political 
change, have reversed the unequal positions of the insurer and insured at the 
beginning of their relationship.14 In the view of this author, this factor also seems to 
be strong enough to shake the root of this doctrine. In addition to the enquiries 
regarding its fundamentals, this doctrine has been questioned: on its ‘prudent insurer’ 
test of materiality which requires the non-expert policyholder to act in the position of 
the professional insurer; the overly harsh remedies (avoidance) awarded in cases 
                                               
12
 For academic support, see Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, para 1.32; John Birds, 
et al., MacGillivray on Insurance Law (12
th
 ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2012).  
    For case examples, see Yorke v Yorkshire Insurance Company Limited [1918] 1 KB 662, p. 667 
(per McCardie J); Regina Fur Company Ltd v Bossom [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 466, p. 483 (per Pearson, 
J); Australia & New Zealand Bank Ltd v Colonial & Eagle Wharves Ltd [1960] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 241, pp. 
251-253 (per McNair, J); March Cabaret Club & Casino Ltd v The London Assurance [1975] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 169, p. 174 (per May, J); Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
485, pp. 487, 492-493 (per MacKenna, J); Woolcott v Sun Alliance and London Insurance Ltd [1978] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 629; Highlands Insurance Co v Continental Insurance Co [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 109, p. 
113 (per Steyn, J); Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
427, pp. 444, 452 (per Lord Mustill), 455 (per Lloyd, LJ); Société Anonyme d'Intermédiaires 
Luxembourgeois v Farex Gie [1995] LRLR 116, p. 141 (per Dillon, LJ). 
13
 Howard Bennett, ‘Mapping the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance contract law’ (1999) 2 
LMCLQ, p. 165. 
14
 The establishment of the doctrine of utmost good faith was originally aimed at protecting the insurer 
from the inferior of unbalanced information between the insurer and insured. Currently, most 
insurance companies rely on their own powerful databases, and as a matter of fact, some insureds do 
not have as much information as the insurance companies themselves. 
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where even in relation to trivial mistakes during the assured’s performance; its 
elusive application to post-contract events, for example, amendments and renewals 
to insurance, the held-covered clauses, fraudulent claims and so on. All the 
aforementioned concerns including its continuity in practice and its statutory reform 
are partially addressed in chapters one and two, but mainly expounded in chapters 3 
and 5.15 
    The legal status of an insurance intermediary is changeable in the insurance 
scenario. Principally, he acts on behalf of his assured, however, because of 
commercial complexities, there seems to be a conflict of interest at the claim 
investigation stage, where the insurance broker needs to cooperate with the insurer 
when he is still acting on behalf of the assured. In such cases, should the assured 
bear the liabilities of his broker’s utmost good faith breach, and consequently, should 
the assured be awarded damages from the defaulting broker? In order to clarify the 
insurance broker’s legal position and utmost good faith duty when transmitting 
material information to the insurer, concerns are examined in chapter 7. In the 
meanwhile, in order to avoid the legislative defects at English case law, the Law 
Commission, which is joined by the Scottish Law Commission, started and is 
proceeding with law reforming actions with regard to the insurance legislation, 
including both consumer and business insurance. 16  In consumer insurance, one 
remarkable accomplishment is the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
                                               
15
 The MIA 1906 applies to marine insurance as specified in sections 1 and 2 of that Act, including 
both consumer and business insurance. However, with the statutory reform undergoing in the Law 
Commissions specifically in consumer insurance, MIA 1906 will be limited to business insurance 
(including marine and non-marine business insurance), and the newly launched Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 is anticipated to be fully applied to consumer insurance 
(including marine and non-marine consumer insurance) shortly after one year of its enactment (March 
2012). Compared to the classic MIA 1906, the new Act will make significant alterations to pre-
information events, which are addressed in chapters 3 and 5. In this work, as long as it is not clarified, 
the marine insurance contract will mean one dealing with business insurance.  
16
 Current status of the insurance law reform project is addressed in chapters 3 and 5. 
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Representations) Act 2012,17 which is expected to be fully enforced shortly after one 
year of its enactment. Historic changes in consumer insurance are addressed in 
chapter 3, including the abolition of the consumer’s disclosure, the adoption of a new 
‘reasonable assured’ test and protective manners to protect innocent assureds, and 
so on. At the same time, this author also expresses her understanding of and 
recommendations to insurance statutory reform in the above chapters. 
    Compared to the relatively high system developed in English law, the principle of 
utmost good faith in Chinese law is still uncertain. On the one hand, this duty has 
never been recognized by statutory or judicial interpretations; on the other, the duty 
of good faith is only statutorily recognised. 18  Academics, at the same time, are 
affirmatively trying to transplant this doctrine from common law to Chinese law, which 
is embodied by the Recommendations, Statutes and Explanations on the 
Amendments of Chinese Maritime Code of the PRC (Recommendations).19 This was 
published in 2003 by the project team under the Ministry of Communications of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).20 Under this documentation, section 17 of the MIA 
1906 is suggested to be respected and followed by Chinese marine insurance law in 
the future, which gives rise to massive arguments, which centre chiefly around the 
practicability of a common law model in a civil law country and also around the 
English model’s inherent defects. 
 
 
                                               
17
 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 (2012 CHAPTER 6). 
18
 For example, article 5 of Chinese Insurance Law 2009 (hereinafter referred to as CIL 2009), articles 
42 and 60 of Chinese Contract law, and article 4 of the General Principles of Civil Law, which are 
analysed with depth in chapter 6.  
19
 People’s Republic of China, hereinafter referred simply as PRC. 
20
 The Project of Amendments on Chinese Maritime Code was approved by the Ministry of 
Communications of PRC in 2000. In September 2003, the project team published its product with the 
issue of Recommendations, Legislations Samples and Explanations on the Amendments of Chinese 
Maritime Code (Chinese version). 
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Structure 
    Following this Introduction, in the remaining chapters, the author first introduces 
the current situation of the duty of (utmost) good faith in Chinese law by detailing its 
main contents as implied by leading codes in chapter 4. This is followed by an 
examination of both the pre-contractual and post-contractual duties of insurance 
contract parties in China in the remaining chapter 4 and also in chapter 6. In chapter 
8, the insurance broker’s duty of good faith in Chinese law is discussed. Additionally, 
the difficulties and practicability of the 2003 Recommendations relating to the simple 
duplication of duty of utmost good faith under MIA 1906 in Chinese maritime law are 
evaluated (chapters 4, 6 and General Conclusion). 
Finally, after a detailed examination of utmost good faith in English and Chinese 
law, this author concludes with a comparative study in the General Conclusion 
chapter, which is believed to be based on sound fundamental theories, including 
notable judicial decisions and legislation in both jurisdictions.  
 
Methodology    
Therefore, a comparative study is adopted as one of the main research methods in 
this thesis. In relation to English law, one part of the comparative research briefly 
introduces the concepts and applications of ‘good faith’ and ‘utmost good faith’ at 
common law and in general insurance law. The second part of the comparative study 
is about different degrees of ‘good faith’ in different circumstances, for instance, the 
absence of ‘bad faith’, a standard ‘good faith’, or an extremely high ‘good faith’. The 
statutory support and judicial support are also compared, to strengthen the research 
in respect of the legislative defects underlying insurance legislation, self-regulation in 
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practice and supplementary restrictions derived from consequential judicial decisions, 
in terms of the insurance parties (insurers and assureds), and also the intermediaries. 
In order to reveal a comprehensive picture of ‘good faith’/’utmost good faith’ and its 
historical development, comparisons are made between the current ‘good faith’ and 
‘utmost good faith’ legislation and future statutory reform, as proposed by the Law 
Commissions.    
The comparative law approach is utilised in the chapters regarding Chinese law. 
First of all, characteristics of civil law and common law are briefly summarized, on a 
general scale. Secondly, as another subject interest covered by this research, 
Chinese law is compared with English law, especially in terms of the insurance 
contract parties’ and agents’ duties of good faith on a narrow scale. The comparative 
studies involve ‘good faith’ and ‘utmost good faith’ in Chinese law and English law; 
the use of ‘good faith’ and ‘utmost good faith’ in Chinese codes and insurance 
practice, and the applications in general Chinese law and special laws. A close 
observation is also made between the current Chinese codes, practical regulations 
and the recommendations for reforms in China. Some notable Chinese case 
decisions are also analyzed in these chapters, although there is no binding 
precedent doctrine in a civil law country. 
Apart from the comparisons made between English law and Chinese law (in a 
general sense), and between the essences of the duties of ‘good faith’ and ‘utmost 
good faith’ within English law and Chinese law respectively (in a narrow sense), the 
scope of study is widened to European21 and international legislation and also some 
other countries’ insurance or maritime legislation, 22  to investigate whether the 
                                               
21
 For example, Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL), etc. 
22
 For example, Australian contract law and insurance law, Norwegian marine insurance law, and 
Swedish Insurance Plan 2006, etc. 
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statutory reforms proposed in the UK and China are appropriate and feasible, against 
the backdrop of the global environment. 
When it comes to the evaluation on which one(s) of the various solutions is (are) 
workable and efficient, convergences and divergences of these different elements 
are analyzed and compared in the ‘recommendations’ paragraphs of this thesis, by 
distinguishing the differences and similarities between different types of insurance 
policies, for example, consumer insurance and business insurance, general 
insurance and marine insurance, etc. 
The second approach employed in this thesis is what is commonly referred to as 
the dogmatic method. This method, also referred to as the ‘legal’ approach is a 
method where the law for analytical and explanatory purposes is derived or extracted 
from legal texts and instruments and usually forms the principal basis for legal 
analysis. The source materials used are primarily legal instruments of sorts including 
legislation both principal as well as sub-ordinate, international treaties, customary law, 
learned treatises, case law, legal commentaries and other scholarly works including 
text books and journal articles. Needless to say, regardless of what other 
methodologies may be used, the dogmatic method is one that is used in virtually all 
legal research and writing. 
In the conclusive paragraphs at the end of each chapter and the General 
Conclusion chapter at the end of this thesis, conclusions are made for each special 
issue and also this research as a whole. It is worthwhile to indicate that the 
‘conclusions’ are not confined to law itself, but also based upon various sources 
which are listed in the previous paragraphs. 
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Purpose 
    Due to the very nature of the subject matter, this thesis naturally has multiple aims. 
The principal purpose is to provide a comprehensive study of the current status and 
development of the duty of ‘utmost good faith’ in both English and Chinese law. 
Secondly, this thesis aims at elaborating on the general obligations of ‘good faith’ or 
‘utmost good faith’ and derived special issues, which are not confined to the 
negotiation stage but also throughout the currency and the claiming stage of an 
insurance contract. Thirdly, the research objectives also involve legislative defects 
and possible statutory reforms in both English and Chinese laws, which are 
strengthened by referring to self-regulations in insurance practice. As a result, at the 
end of each chapter and the whole thesis, various recommendations are evaluate 
and feasible solutions are proposed. Last but not least, the future developments of 
‘good faith’ and ‘utmost good faith’ in both English and Chinese laws are analysed by 
referring to lessons provided by each other, to examine whether the doctrine in 
English law could be duplicated in Chinese law. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PRE-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH AND DISCLOSURE IN 
THE UK 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the overall structure of the utmost good faith 
principle, both at common law and English insurance legislation. It establishes a 
coherent framework of principle within which the doctrine and its duties can be 
developed. Therefore, attention is concentrated on the MIA 1906, sections 17 and 18, 
which can be extended to the overriding duty of utmost good faith and the duty of 
disclosure.23 
 
1.2. Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 17: an overriding duty 
    ‘Good faith’ means honesty or sincerity of intention;24 it also connotes a measure 
of honesty and fairness. 25  This is the basic moral threshold for the general 
contractual parties, which means each party should act in good faith because they 
are responsible for each other. In practice, for general contracts, the law has put the 
responsibility on the parties to obtain all relevant information surrounding the 
undertaking before entering into the contract, as opposed to entitling them to expect 
such information to be provided to them by the other party.26 In contrast, contracts of 
insurance are treated differently: section 17 of the MIA 1906 states that ‘a contract of 
                                               
23
 The other duty of representation is addressed in chapter 2. 
24
 Oxford English Dictionary Online. 
25
 Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, para 1.12. 
26
 Ibid, para 1.07. 
11 
 
marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if the utmost 
good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other 
party’.27  ‘Utmost’ is defined to be ‘most extreme’ and ‘greatest’, 28  and this term 
suggests that a high degree of good faith is required to satisfy the insurance contract 
compared with other general contracts. As a result, the ‘utmost good faith’ doctrine 
distinguishes the insurance contract from the general contract as an overriding duty 
because ‘contracts of insurance provide the only true example of a contract 
uberrimae fidei’.29 
    However, section 17 is still too general and gives rise to a series of arguable 
issues: first, how to judge the degree of good faith in practice. In Container Transport 
International Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda), 30  Lord 
Justice Stephenson, despite his reservations whether it was possible to go into 
degrees of good faith, was nevertheless prepared to accept that, ‘it is enough that 
much more than an absence of bad faith is required of both parties to all contract of 
insurance’.31 Although he was reluctant to enter into a discussion on the different 
shades of good faith, he was clear that the minimum standard required something 
more than the absence of bad faith. 32  Undeniably, Stephenson LJ’s judgment 
opened the floodgates to more circumstances of the utmost good faith breach 
examples; thus, apart from the obvious fraudulent acts, an assured’s negligent non-
disclosure or wholly innocent concealment also should be considered. Nevertheless, 
in Banque Keyser Ullmann v Skandia,33 Steyn J remarked that, ‘reciprocal duties rest 
                                               
27
 Section 17, MIA 1906. 
28
 Oxford English Dictionary Online. 
29
 Wild and Weinstein, Smith & Keenan’s English Law, p. 339; and Eggers, et al., Good Faith and 
Insurance Contract, para 1.06. 
30
 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476, CA. 
31
 Ibid, p. 525. 
32
 Susan Hodges, Law of Marine Insurance (Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1996), p. 83. 
33
 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69, p. 93, QB (Com. Ct.).  
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on both parties to an insurance contract not only to abstain from bad faith but to 
observe in a positive sense the utmost good faith by disclosing all material 
circumstances’. 
    The other formidable obstacle is the following: section 17 is ambiguous in respect 
to the duration in which the utmost good faith duties should be observed. It consists 
of three elements: a marine insurance contract is uberrimae fidei; the utmost good 
faith must be observed by either party; the innocent party can avoid the contract if 
the other party fails to observe the duty. However, section 17 has recently been 
treated as a preamble to the following three sections (sections 18-20),34 and their 
respective subsections have been deemed as supplementary contents. The problem 
here is that Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, the draftsman of MIA 1906, only indicated the 
duties before the contract is concluded, viz., sections 18(1) and 20(1),35 and there is 
no notion expressed if the duty can be extended beyond the formation of the contract.  
In addition, section 21 is concerned with ‘when [the] contract is deemed to be 
concluded’, which potentially creates a misunderstanding of the previous contents (at 
least, it seems that sections 17-20 are more about the pre-contractual duties rather 
than the duties after the contract formation).   
    As to whether the doctrine is applicable beyond the formation of the contract, there 
are several controversial arguments. One factor is that Chalmers did not mention this 
point at all, although, this reason is untenable. While it is known that the MIA 1906 
was codified and consolidated from numerous cases in addition to established 
trading customs and practice before its enactment, with all due respect, we cannot 
                                               
34
 Rose, Marine Insurance: Law and Practice, p. 70. 
35
 Section 18(1) stipulates that ‘… the assured must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is 
concluded, every material circumstance which is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to 
know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him.…’. 
Then section 20 (1) notes that ‘[e]very material representation made by the assured or his agent to the 
insurer during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, must be true.…’. 
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deny its limitations. In other words, since the Act is just a guideline for the marine 
insurance contract, nobody can be assured of what Chalmers could have ignored or 
intentionally avoided. Although there is no legal basis to categorize post-contractual 
duties into sections 18-20, they can still fall within the overriding scope of section 17. 
Thus, some authorities argue that the following special sections are not exhaustive36 
and section 17 is extended throughout the formation and currency of the policy.37 
This statement is also approved by Lord Justice Stephenson in CTI.38 Additionally, 
apart from section 17, ‘good faith’ may require varying conduct in response to 
different stages of a contract’s life. Although Lord Mansfield focused on the duty as it 
applies before the contract was made, ‘good faith’ is not only relevant to the making 
of the contract, but also to its performance and treatment of any breach.39 As long as 
this problem is solved, people can continue the discussion about the post-contractual 
duties, which is addressed in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
1.3. Pre-contractual duty of disclosure in the UK 
    The doctrine of utmost good faith is recognized as the fountainhead of a series of 
derivative duties, thus, both disclosure and representation are admitted to be closely 
related to the doctrine of utmost good faith. In the following paragraphs, we continue 
a study of further situations in which a contract may be avoided or affected by non-
disclosure.  
 
 
                                               
36
 For example, Hardy Ivamy, Chalmers’ Marine Insurance Act 1906 (10
th
 ed., London, Dublin and 
Edinburgh, Butterworths, 1993). 
37
 Rose, Marine Insurance: Law and Practice, para. 5.93. 
38
 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476, p. 525, CA. 
39
 Lord Mansfield’s opinion is summarized by Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract. 
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1.3.1. Disclosure at common law and under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
    The highly developed regime of disclosure is one of the most distinctive 
characteristics of insurance law, both within marine and non-marine insurance. On 
the other hand, at common law or in equity, the disclosure duty has never been 
recognized as a matter of general contract law. 40  At common law, principally 
speaking, silence or non-disclosure has no effect except for several circumstances, 
one of which is where the contract is uberrimae fidei (of utmost good faith). 41 
Although recent years have seen scholarly advocacy of the desirability of a general 
duty to disclose material facts, whatever the merits of such a development, there is 
still little evidence of any significant common law movement in that direction.42 Thus, 
the duty of disclosure arises as an incident of the contract of insurance, deriving from 
the historical equitable tradition in English law which is now clothed in statutory 
form.43 
    Section 18(1) of the MIA 1906 imposes the duty of disclosure on the assured 
(initially, this duty was imposed on all assured, including both the business and 
consumer assured; after the enactment and eventual coming into force of the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, this section will be 
confined to business insurance – both marine and non-marine insurance only) – one 
aspect of the overriding duty of the utmost good faith mentioned in section 17.44 
                                               
40
 This argument is supported by Howard Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance (2
nd
 ed., London, 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Wild and Weinstein, Smith & Keenan’s English Law, etc. 
41
 The circumstances include: (a) failure to disclose a change in circumstances; (b) where the contract 
is uberrimae fidei (of utmost good faith); (c) where there is a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
between the parties; (d) where statute requires disclosure; (e) in cases of concealed fraud. For details, 
see Wild and Weinstein, Smith & Keenan’s English Law, pp. 338-339. 
42
 Rose, Marine Insurance: Law and Practice, p. 67. 
43
 Robert Merkin, Marine Insurance Legislation (4
th
 ed., London: Informa, 2010), p. 32. 
44
 Section 18(1) of the MIA 1906 stipulates that, ‘subject to the provisions of this section, the assured 
must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is 
known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary 
course of business, ought to be known by him. If the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer 
may avoid the contract’. 
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Section 18(1) is composed of three elements: the assured must disclose information 
to the insurer before the contract is concluded; it is important to bear in mind that 
only the material circumstances need to be disclosed; if the assured fails to make 
such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract. 
 
1.3.2. When to disclose and mutuality 
    In the non-marine Carter v Boehm case,45 Lord Mansfield clarified the underlying 
basis for the principle of disclosure. In this fundamental English case, on the basis of 
which the MIA 1906’s draftsman consolidated section 17, the defence argued that 
the plaintiff failed to disclose the real function of the insured subject (a fort) to the 
insurer. Lord Mansfield in his judgment stated that ‘insurance is a contract upon 
speculation…good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to 
draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the 
contrary’.46 In that case, the facts led the Court to decide that the defence of non-
disclosure failed. 
    In the first place, the assured must disclose information to the insurer before the 
contract is concluded. What should be clarified here is the timing of disclosure, which 
should be completed before the contract is formed. Thus, the duty will cease on the 
conclusion of the insurance contract. Another noteworthy point here is that disclosure 
must be made voluntarily,47 and not based on enquiries. 
    Moreover, according to section 18(1), it seems that only the assured is obliged to 
disclose material information to the insurer and not vice versa. One reasonable 
conjecture is that the Act did not mean to impose the duties of disclosure falling on 
                                               
45
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
46
 Ibid, pp. 1910 and 1911. 
47
 Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, p. 102. 
16 
 
the insured. This issue relates to the reciprocal nature of the utmost good faith duty 
mentioned in section 17 as well. The mutuality of utmost good faith is based on two 
principal cases Carter v Boehm48 and Banque Financiere de la Cite SA (formerly 
Banque Keyser Ullmann SA) v Westgate Insurance Co (formerly Hodge General & 
Mercantile Co Ltd).49 In Carter v Boehm, in addition to his main judgment in terms of 
an assured’s utmost good faith, Lord Mansfield further noted that ‘good faith forbids 
either party by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, 
from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary’.50 In Banque Keyser 
Ullmann v Scandia, it was revealed that the defendant insurer concealed their 
brokers’ deceit from the banks. Justice Steyn for the High Court explained whether 
reciprocal duties of good faith were owed to one another by an insurer and an 
insured. In his subsequent statement, Justice Steyn explained that: 
‘In other words, reciprocal duties rest on both parties to an insurance 
contract not only to abstain from bad faith but to observe in a positive sense 
the utmost good faith by disclosing all material circumstances….’51 
 
    The reciprocal nature principle was further favoured by Lord Justice Slade’s 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in the same case: 
‘In our judgment, however, there is no doubt that the obligation to disclose 
material facts is a mutual one imposing reciprocal duties on insurer and 
insured.’52 
 
    The reasons for why the Act seems to impact the duty of disclosure specifically on 
the assured are quite practical. On the one hand, the ratio under the reciprocal rule is 
the information asymmetry between the insurer and assured. In particular in the 
                                               
48
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
49
 Also known as Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co. [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69.  
50
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, p. 1910. 
51
 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69, at p. 93, QBD. 
52
 Banque Financière de la Cité SA (formerly Banque Keyser Ullmann SA) v Westgate Insurance Co 
Ltd (formerly named Hodge General & Mercantile Insurance Co Ltd) [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513, CA, p. 
544. 
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previous century, the poor communication and transport measures made people 
believe that the assured would know much more about the insured property than the 
insurer. Nevertheless, after more than one century, with the rapid development of the 
modern communication and transport sectors, the insurer might know much more 
than the assured himself. On the other hand, the supposed mutuality of the principle 
has not been turned into binding authority at common law.53 The MIA 1906 was 
codified from old precedents, but rare cases happened because of the insurer’s 
breach of the duty of disclosure, especially after the loss has been caused by perils 
of the sea. In fact, there seems to be no case in which an insured has rescinded 
because of the insurer’s non-disclosure. Technically speaking, the non-disclosure of 
the insurer is hardly likely to be investigated and revealed if the assured wants to 
enforce a claim under the policy. The root cause is the nature of the insurance 
contract, and that once the contract is made and premium is paid, the advantage, in 
fact, favours the insurer to escape liability. Consequently, the reasonable assured is 
supposed to accept the defective contract and get recovery, rather than choose to 
avoid the whole insurance contract. 
 
1.3.3. Test for materiality – the prudent insurer and actual inducement test 
    The second noteworthy element of the duty of disclosure is the test for material 
information. Section 18(2) further details the requirements for material information, 
which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or 
determining whether he will take risk.54 This clause includes objective and subjective 
                                               
53
 Francis Rose, ‘Information asymmetry and the Myth of Good Faith: Back to Basics’, (2007) 2 
LMCLQ, 181, p. 201. 
54
 Section 18(2), MIA 1906. 
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materiality. The term ‘circumstance’ then is explained by Chalmers to embrace any 
communication made to, or information received by, the assured.55 
    ‘Objective materiality’ requires the information to be capable of influencing a 
prudent underwriter’s judgment. The judicial interpretation of ‘influence’ requires the 
disclosed circumstance to be one which would have had an impact on the formation 
of the insurer’s opinion and on his decision-making process in relation to the matters 
concerned.56 The term ‘prudent’ is stipulated to be ‘acting with or showing care and 
thought for the future’. 57  With regard to the same issue, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines a ‘prudent person’ as ‘[a] hypothetical person used as a legal standard, esp. 
to determine whether someone acted with negligence; specif., a person who 
exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment that society 
requires of its members for the protection of their own and of others’ interests’.58 It is 
further defined that, a reasonable person acts sensibly, does things without serious 
delay, and takes proper but not excessive precautions.59 One must bear in mind that, 
whether the disclosure is material or not is according to the ‘prudent insurer’s 
judgement’, and not the actual or particular insurer. It is supposed to be the reason 
why this yardstick is objective, because from the assured’s view, it is based on the 
other party known as the prudent insurer’s judgement. Obviously, this standard relies 
on a hypothetical basis and it creates a series of problems, one of which questions 
whether there is absolute fairness since the current law requests an assured to act 
from an experienced insurer’s angle. 
                                               
55
 Section 18(5), MIA 1906. 
56
 CTI, CA, p. 492, (per Kerr LJ). 
57
 Oxford English Dictionary Online. 
58
 Garner, et al., Black’s Law Dictionary. 
59
 Black’s Law Dictionary does not provide any direct definition of a ‘prudent insurer’, but defines a 
‘reasonable person’ and ‘reasonably prudent person’, which can be considered similar to a ‘prudent 
person’ by the editors. 
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    Under the alternative test, reliance is placed not on the judgment of a prudent 
insurer, but on that of the reasonable assured. The critical question is whether a 
reasonable man in the position of the insured and with his knowledge of the relevant 
circumstances would have realized that they were material to the risk.60 Although the 
prudent insurer test is questioned to be unfair for imposing challenges to the non-
professional assured in some cases, the leading authority still favours it as opposed 
to that of the reasonable insured.61 
    The definition of ‘subjective materiality’ requires an understanding of the historical 
background of ‘material’. Before the drafting of the MIA 1906, no case had 
demanded a precise definition of materiality. Although the formula in sections 18(2) 
and 20(2) accurately reproduces a number of judicial statements, it should be taken 
into account that this formula has only recently been subjected to detailed scrutiny.62 
It is recognized that the symbolic case with regard to the test for material is Pan 
Atlantic,63 which also established the ‘actual inducement’ test. 
    The subject about the yardstick for ‘material’ was thought to be exclusively 
established by the CTI case.64 At first instance, Justice Lloyd held that, on the true 
construction of section 18(2), a non-disclosed circumstance was material only if its 
disclosure would have led a prudent underwriter either to decline the risk altogether 
or to charge a higher level of premium; the non-disclosure must, therefore, have 
exerted a ‘decisive influence’ on the judgment of the prudent insurer by inducing a 
                                               
60
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, (1982, Australian Law Reform 
Commission 20), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/insurance-contract-law.htm, 
accessed in January 2013, p. 94; Joel v Law Union & Crown Insurance Company [1908] 2 KB 863, pp. 
883-884. 
61
 For example, St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (UK) Ltd. v McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd. 
[1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 116; (the admissibility of the evidence of other underwriters was originally 
denied as pure hearsay); Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905; Campbell v Rickards (1833) 5 B & Ad 
840. 
62
 Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, p. 109. 
63
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd and Another v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101 
64
 [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 178; [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476, CA. 
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‘different decision’ with respect to the risk.65 This is the famous ‘decisive influence’ 
test. The question is whether this test was held to be purely objective without any 
consideration of whether the assured appreciated the materiality of the fact, or 
whether the underwriter in question was actually influenced by it.66 
    This issue was considered again by both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
in Pan Atlantic,67 and the latter finally resolved what it has regarded as a ‘long-
standing controversy’ with a history of more than 200 years.68 The judgment upheld 
CTI on ‘materiality’, confirming the rejection of the pure ‘decisive influence’ test which 
was made in the Court of Appeal judgment of CTI in 1984. According to the leading 
judgment delivered by Lord Mustill (which was agreed by Lord Goff and Lord Slynn), 
the unadorned word ‘influence’ adopted by Parliament should be literally understood 
by its meaning at a mild degree of influence – a mere ‘effect on the thought 
processes of the insurer’, rather than of a phrase such as ‘decisive influence’.69 It can 
be argued that the ‘decisive influence’ test is still too limited to be applied in general 
practice, especially in some cases which focus on the information which is ‘decisive’ 
but ignore ‘something less decisive’. 70  Therefore, attention was unanimously 
                                               
65
 [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 178, p. 187, QBD, Justice Lloyd reasoned that:  
‘It seems to me that this should be the general rule, if only because the defence under s. 
18 is capable of working such great hardship on the assured. Take a case where the fact is 
known to the assured, but not the materiality of the fact. Suppose that the prudent insurer, 
if he had known the fact, would have accepted the risk, but charged a small additional 
premium; suppose further that there is a substantial claim under the policy. In other 
jurisdictions, the assured could enforce the claim, by tendering the additional premium. But 
not so in England. The fairness of the English rule is not at once obvious and hardly seems 
to reflect the duty of utmost good faith under s. 17 which, be it noted, is owed both ways. 
Why, if the insurer would have accepted the risk in any event, albeit at an increased 
premium, should he be able to avoid the claim altogether? Since the English law is so 
favourable to the underwriter in this respect, the least that should normally be expected of 
the underwriter is to show that a prudent insurer would have charged an increased rate.’ 
    Also see Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, p. 111. 
66
 Merkin, Marine Insurance Legislation; and Rose, Marine Insurance: Law and Practice, chapter 5. 
67
 [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101, QBD; [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496, CA; [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427, HL. 
68
 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427, pp. 432 and 442 (per Lord Mustill). 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Malcolm Clarke, Law of Marine Insurance Contracts (4
th
 ed., London: Informa, 2012), para. 23-7A. 
Here, Clarke listed three types of information and three possibilities of degrees of influence: Type A is 
information such that, if the insurer had known it, after due consideration (e.g.: Anglo-African 
21 
 
reversed to inducement.71 In consideration of such rejection, it made the formulation 
of a tenable test to be further required. It was confirmed that there is a need for a 
causal connection between the misrepresentation or non-disclosure and the making 
of the contract of insurance. 72  Thus, the House of Lords rejected the ‘decisive 
influence’ test, and also established the exclusive ‘actual inducement’ test,73 which is 
currently the most appropriate standard for law till now. In the judgment by the House 
of Lords, Lord Mustill stated that ‘if the misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a 
material fact did not in fact induce the contract (in the sense in which that expression 
is used in the general law of misrepresentation) the underwriter is not entitled to rely 
on it as a ground for avoiding the contract’. 74  After conducting a thorough 
examination for the legal position, Lord Mustill concluded that ‘…there is to be 
implied in the 1906 Act a qualification that a material misrepresentation will not entitle 
the underwriter to avoid the policy unless the misrepresentation induced the making 
of the contract, using ‘induced’ in the sense in which it is used in the general law of 
contract’.75 
    In other words, although section 18 makes no mention of inducement, the judicial 
opinion and precedent above prove that inducement is required in insurance law. 
Then the attention is concentrated on its conceptual difficulty at a practical level. In 
general contract law, just the objective materiality is not sufficient to measure 
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misrepresentation, the subjective materiality is also needed.76 When it refers to the 
duty of disclosure in marine insurance contracts, the proposition brought up for 
consideration is establishing the requirement for inducement as a matter of legal 
principle,77 and borrowing the inducement mechanism adopted at common law. The 
reference can be referred to Lord Mustill’s judgment in Pan Atlantic.78 In this case he 
accepted the close connection between misrepresentation and non-disclosure, and 
held that the test for inducement in insurance contract law was the same as that 
applied in general contract law.79 Therefore, the innocent party cannot avoid the 
insurance contract, unless the other party’s concealment and misrepresentation 
induced the contract to be concluded. However, some other difficulty surrounds the 
role of inducement as a causal factor in the general law of contract. There appear to 
be a number of views. First, the general law is concerned with misrepresentations 
(fraudulent, negligent/innocent) and not with non-disclosure, as there is no general 
duty on contracting parties to disclose material facts in negotiations. Secondly, in the 
general law a concept of ‘materiality’ is deployed, but it cannot be too readily 
assumed that its role is analogous to its synonym in insurance law.80 
    We can see that the term ‘material’ is general and inexplicit at the beginning of 
section 18(1) of MIA 1906. But, despite it being clarified in section 18(2), the 
understanding of ‘material’ is still hard to achieve. Policies are negotiated in varying 
circumstances and depend on different considerations. This means that different 
underwriters (irrespective of the prudent, reasonable or actual underwriters) will treat 
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different factors as material.81 These factors create a difficulty for the judiciary to 
consider this term. Therefore, the draftsman added one more clause in section 18, 
clarifying that whether any particular circumstance which is not disclosed, be material 
or not, is in each case a question of fact.82 
 
1.3.4. Information requiring disclosure: physical hazard and moral hazard 
    Subject to section 18(2), the assured must disclose the material information which 
is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance 
which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him. Thus, the 
assured cannot conceal information he actually knows or is presumed to know. Then, 
a practical difficulty is raised which questions, what kind of information is treated as 
the knowledge of the assured? For this enquiry, the most authoritative opinion is 
dividing the ‘knowledge’ into two types: physical hazard and moral hazard.83 
    In the first case, any fact which directly affects the risk insured (physical hazard) is 
material. In other words, physical hazard is used to describe the condition of the 
insured property, which will affect the assessment of the risk. Liberian Insurance 
Agency Inc v Mosse84 is one example in marine insurance law where the assured 
failed to disclose the material information about the shipped cargo described as 
‘enamelware (cups and plates) in wooden cases’. Another example is International 
Lottery Management v Dumas. 85  Here, the insurers were entitled to avoid the 
insurance policy for the assured’s misrepresentation (neither the registration of the 
lottery tickets under Decree 33, nor the necessary documents for legal operations 
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was obtained at the time of effecting insurance), non-disclosure (of the existence or 
the effect of Decree 33), and breach of warranty. In Marine Insurance Legislation, 
Professor Robert Merkin exemplifies several circumstances in which the assured 
must disclose of the insured property: 
‘(a) any physical attributes of the insured subject-matter which render it a 
greater risk than would normally be assumed must be disclosed;  
(b) previous losses and claims may constitute material facts;  
(c) any particular hazards of the voyage constitute material facts if the 
underwriter could not have discovered those facts or if they have been 
misstated;  
(d) the assured must disclose that he has entered into a contract with a third 
party, not found in the ordinary course of commerce, which potentially 
increases the underwriter’s liability or diminishes its right of subrogation in 
the event of a loss.’86 
 
    In the second case, any fact which goes to the ‘moral hazard’ is material. ‘Moral 
hazard’ is a term describing facts which suggest that the proposed insured, by 
reason of his previous experience of matters relevant to the insurance, is not a 
person whose proposal can be accepted in the ordinary course of business and 
without special consideration.87 It is related to information asymmetry, a situation in 
which one party in a transaction has more information than another, especially in 
terms of the facts of the assured himself. It is elementary that one of the matters to 
be considered by an insurance company in entering into contractual relations with a 
proposed assured is the question of the moral integrity of the proposer. In insurance, 
the phrase embraces the human aspects of the risk, related not to any insured 
property but rather to the character and history of the assured and other persons 
relevant to the risk given the position they occupy in relation to the subject-matter 
insured.88  Judicial support is available from the case of Lambert v Co-operative 
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Insurance Society Ltd,89 where the insurance was avoided because of the assured’s 
non-disclosure of her husband’s previous convictions. This case also illustrates the 
problems with the duty to disclose since, as a genuine customer, Mrs Lambert should 
not have noticed the degree of influence of her husband’s previous convictions in the 
absence of inquiries.90 Merkin also provides a moral hazard list: 
‘(a). If the assured has overinsured to an excessive amount, the 
overinsurance must be disclosed, although this is less significant in an 
unvalued policy as the assured is unable to recover more than his actual 
loss.  
(b). Information as to other policies on the same risk is material if it converts 
the risk from genuine to speculative, as is information as to previous losses 
or claims under other policies. 
(c). The master’s qualifications or previous conduct are immaterial unless 
they relate directly to the hazard. 
(d). There is authority for the proposition that the nationality of the shipowner 
or the vessel may be a material fact. 
(e). The assured’s criminal convictions are material. 
(f). General dishonesty on the assured’s part is material, e.g. where the 
assured has fraudulently prepared invoices intended to be used to defraud 
its bankers or has defrauded customers or the tax authorities.’91 
 
    There are several observations which need to be discussed. First, in marine 
insurance, there is a long-established rule that the previous refusals of cover by other 
underwriters are not material and do not need to be disclosed.92 On the contrary, the 
general insurance law has established a rule on the opposite basis that previous 
refusals are held to be material.93 Thus, marine insurance is also distinguished from 
non-marine insurance in respect of previous refusals of cover by other underwriters. 
Secondly, as to the assured’s criminal convictions, the leading tendency now is to 
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hold this kind of information to be material and must be disclosed. This requirement 
is also a long-existing matter of common law that previous criminal convictions of the 
assured are material and must be disclosed, albeit the cases are generally from 
outside the marine context.94 On the issue of disclosing previous convictions, it is 
noted by the judiciary that there is no ascertained determination with regard to the 
materiality of past convictions and the underwriters expressed in evidence a wide 
range of differing views.95 At a practical level, discretion is granted to the judiciary by 
referring to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.96 
    It has been recently held that allegations of misconduct which may not in fact have 
been substantiated have to be disclosed by the would-be assured.97 Furthermore, 
irrespective of whether the would-be assured is guilty or innocent, the charges must 
be disclosed to the would-be insurer. Besides, an apparently well-founded rumour, 
though it turns out afterwards to be incorrect, must be disclosed since ‘mere rumour 
could amount to a material fact even though it was subsequently proved to be 
untrue’.98 
    Of course, the categories of physical hazard and moral hazard are not exhaustive 
and the duties under the disclosure rule are not confined to circumstances which fall 
within these two groups. They are just useful short hands for categorizing the 
material information. There are still some other circumstances relevant to the 
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assessment of risks. Professor Howard Bennett exemplifies several cases in his 
book. One example is provided by circumstances relevant to the insurer’s 
possibilities of recoupment of lost moneys through the doctrine of subrogation. 
Additionally, the potential for materiality of past default on payment of premium99 and 
the scope of materiality affected by the risk the insurer is being asked to accept (for 
instance, in the context of open covers), are also mentioned.100 
 
1.3.5. Limits on disclosure 
    Section 18(3) of the MIA 1906 emphasizes that in the absence of inquiry the 
following circumstances need not be disclosed, namely:  
‘Any circumstance which diminishes the risk; 
Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. 
The insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, 
and matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, 
ought to know; 
Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer; 
Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any 
express or implied warranty.’101 
 
    So, in order to ease the assured’s burden of disclosure, section 18(3) exempts the 
assured from four particular cases in the absence of inquiry. This includes diminution 
of the risk, 102  the assured’s actual and presumed knowledge (including the 
information of general knowledge and special insured subject), 103  waiver by the 
insurer,104 and warranties.105 It should be noticed that the condition precedent to the 
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exemptions for disclosure is the absence of the insurer’s inquiry; in cases where the 
insurer inquires, the limits cannot be relied on any more.106 
    As a matter of fact, each of these exceptions is applicable at common law to both 
marine and non-marine insurance.107 However, some difficulty surrounds the third 
category, that of waiver, which causes the most practical difficulty. Section 18(3) 
provides that in the absence of inquiries, the assured needs not disclose ‘any 
circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer’. This gives rise to the 
first question: must the waiver be express or could it also be implied? A waiver 
formality may be oral, written, or inferred from conduct108 voluntarily, even though the 
provision waived is found in a contract required to be evidenced by writing.109 In 
English law, generally speaking, an insurer seldom expressly waives disclosure. 
Thus, he may be judged impliedly to have waived disclosure of a particular fact. The 
test has been stated as follows: 
‘If the insurer receives information from the assured or his agent which, by its 
content or form, should suggest a doubt to the mind of the reasonably 
prudent insurer and put him on inquiry, then, if he omits to make the check or 
inquiry, assuming it can be made simply, he will be held to have waived 
disclosure of the material facts which that inquiry would necessarily have 
revealed.’110 
 
    In insurance practice, waiver may nevertheless arise in the following ways: 
‘(a). Blanket waiver of all disclosure on the part of the assured; 
(b). Disclaimer by the underwriters of the relevance of the facts at issue, 
particularly by policy terms or by an authorised agent; 
(c). Limited requests by the underwriters for information which excludes facts 
otherwise material, although not all limited express questions amount to 
waiver; 
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(d). Failure by the underwriters to seek further information when alerted by 
existing disclosure. There is no waiver by failure to ask a material 
question.’111 
 
    It can be concluded that, although at common law, the waiver is normally judged 
impliedly, it cannot be easily presumed. Especially that the omission to make inquiry 
is no-waiver if the insurers are not put on inquiry. Furthermore: 
‘[T]here can…be no waiver of material information unless it would and 
should have been disclosed by an inquiry by the underwriter which common 
prudence demanded, and no affirmation of a contract unless the underwriter 
enters into it or carries it out after he has full knowledge of the 
information.’112 
 
1.3.6. Consequences and remedies for non-disclosure: avoidance 
    In accordance with section 18(1), if the business assured fails to make such 
disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract. In addition, even in section 17, the 
consequence of the breach of the overriding utmost good faith duty is ‘avoidance’,113 
although this is not the only one. There are several issues which require observation. 
Firstly, both in section 17 and section 18(1), the avoidance of the contract is not the 
sole consequence. In terms of the MIA 1906, the innocent party may avoid the 
contract if the other party fails to observe the duty. To make it clear, the contract is 
voidable or may be avoided at the innocent party’s option. Therefore, one party will 
have the right to elect whether to avoid the transaction or to affirm it. Thus, in 
business insurance law, the innocent party (normally this is the insurer) can choose 
for the contract to be continued, together with some other requirements to rescue the 
insurance contract, for instance, claim for higher premium from the assured. 
Nevertheless, regarding the breach of disclosure in section 18, the only statutory 
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remedy suggested and codified by Sir Mackenzie Chalmers is avoidance, so the only 
remedy allowed for the innocent party is avoiding the contract from the beginning,114 
which has been criticized for being draconian to an innocent assured who 
unintentionally breached the duty of utmost good faith. 
    Secondly, if the contract is avoided, the consequence is severe. Voidable is 
usually used to distinguish void ab initio from the other rules. Void ab initio is a Latin 
phrase, which means void from the beginning. Therefore, avoidance is a 
retrospective measure, which returns the parties to the position they were in before 
the contract was concluded. In an insurance contract, this favours the insurer to 
select whether to rescind the transaction or to affirm it. However, in practice it is quite 
unjust for the assured, since he does not have any influence of the situation.115 
    Thirdly, is ‘avoidance’ in insurance law equal to ‘rescission’ in general contract law? 
In contract law, rescission is the unwinding of a transaction, which is done to bring 
the parties, as far as possible, back to the position in which they were before they 
entered into a contract. A contract which is rescinded by agreement is completely 
discharged and cannot be revived. 116  One similarity between ‘avoidance’ and 
‘rescission’ is that both of them are discretionary remedies which appear to be self-
rescue measures that do not require judicial interventions. However, the Court may 
still confirm the innocent party’s right to avoid or decline to rescind a contract if one 
party has affirmed the contract by his action, a third party has acquired some rights, 
or there has been substantial performance in implementing the contract. 
Notwithstanding this, there are still some differences between them. The most 
outstanding one is that avoidance is applicable for all the duties under utmost good 
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faith (such as disclosure and representation) as mentioned in section 17, while 
rescission is a remedy at common law in the case of misrepresentation, but not non-
disclosure, since there is no duty of disclosure at common law.117 
In consideration of these factors, is ‘avoidance’ in insurance law equal to 
‘rescission’ in general contract law? When it comes to the theoretical level, the 
situation becomes quite problematic. There are several reasons for this. In the first 
place, for the purpose of the MIA 1906, it is understandable that the MIA 1906 was 
created and codified by Chalmers particularly for marine insurance contracts, and 
therefore undoubtedly the language and terms of the Act are more appropriate for 
marine insurance contracts. Secondly, in the context of marine insurance, ‘avoidance’ 
is not the real ‘rescission or avoidance’ in general contract law. As mentioned earlier, 
avoidance or rescission is considered to be a kind of remedy which returns the 
parties to the position they were in before the contract is concluded at the beginning. 
In cases where the assured has suffered the losses caused by the perils of the sea, 
avoiding the contract does not return the assured to the position he was in at the 
beginning. 118  Finally, as mentioned previously, one fine distinction between 
avoidance in insurance law and rescission in general contract law is that the latter is 
applicable in the case of misrepresentation, but not non-disclosure. This is because 
there is no duty of disclosure at common law, while the former is applicable for all the 
duties under the heading of utmost good faith mentioned in section 17. This is a 
formidable obstacle to the argument which favours that they are the same at the root. 
Till now, it can be concluded that differentiating avoidance in insurance law from 
rescission or avoidance at common law is necessary. Consequently, it can be 
questioned, what the rule is for avoidance in insurance law or the MIA 1906? 
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Therefore, the modern leading authority is considering them the same in practice, but 
only in practice.119 
    In the judgment of the Court of Appeal in HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd 
and Others v Chase Manhattan Bank and Others,120 Rix LJ tried to separate the 
heading of avoidance from rescission. Despite this, he held that: 
‘[A]lbeit that in the insurance context the MIA 1906 uses the verb ‘avoid’, the 
language of avoidance and rescission is often found more or less 
interchangeably within and without that context to describe both the remedy 
for breach of the duty of good faith and the common law response to 
misrepresentation.’121 
 
Rix LJ further held that ‘for the purposes of the MIA 1906 itself the remedy of 
rescission for misrepresentation had in practice been subsumed into the right to 
avoid’.122 And Lord Mustill insisted in Pan Atlantic that this opinion should only be 
favoured in practice.123 
    Finally, avoidance is a self-evident remedy, which does not require judicial 
intervention. The innocent party can avoid the contract when the other party breaks 
the disclosure duty. The avoidance effects at the time it is declared, without any 
intervention from the Court. Of course, when the contractual parties have 
divergences about this point, the Court may use judicial discretion to make the final 
decision. 
 
1.4. Conclusion 
    The question of utmost good faith is always an intriguing one; it promotes 
uncertainty and leaves too much discretion to the court. To date, research in the 
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doctrine of utmost good faith has focused on two sets of concerns: test for materiality 
and issues pertaining to legal effects of breach of duty. 
    In this chapter, I introduced the current situation of utmost good faith at English 
case law, and analysed the theory of the pre-contractual duty of disclosure. 124 
Subsequently, this author compared different situations in insurance and general 
contract law, introduced its duration, the actual inducement test for materiality, 
information requiring disclosure, limits on disclosure, and finally the remedies for 
non-disclosure under contracts of business marine insurance. 125  Till now, one 
problem left undecided is the identification of ‘avoidance’ in insurance law from 
‘rescission’ in general contract law from the prospective of legal evidence. The issues 
regarding the utmost good faith doctrine’s application to misrepresentation and 
extension beyond the conclusion of contracts is stated below.126 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRE-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES IN THE UK: REPRESENTATION 
 
2.1. Introduction 
    In contrast with the duty of disclosure, the duty of making a right representation is 
recognized by common law.127 As another aspect of the duty of utmost good faith, 
the assured’s duty to make exact representations of material circumstances before 
the conclusion of insurance policies is noteworthy. The following discussion includes 
its legal status at general common law and in marine insurance, and also remedies 
available for the assured’s misrepresentation and correspondent criticisms raised. In 
order to ascertain the extent of current knowledge about representing material 
information, a comparison between this concept and the notion of warranty is also 
provided in this chapter. However, with the enactment of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, which is anticipated to be fully enforced 
shortly after one year after its enactment (March 2012), it is revealed that there are 
significant alterations of the consumer’s pre-contract information duties. These relate 
to the abolition of the average consumer’s voluntary duty of disclosure, the adoption 
of a reasonable assured test, the establishment of a two-part categorisation 
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misrepresentation, and the protective manners provided to an honest 
misrepresentor.128 
 
2.2. Misrepresentation at common law 
2.2.1. What is representation? 
    Representation is defined by the Black’s Law Dictionary as:  
‘A presentation of fact – either by words or by conduct — made to induce 
someone to act, esp. to enter into a contract; esp., the manifestation to 
another that a fact, including a state of mind, exists <the buyer relied on the 
seller’s representation that the roof did not leak>. Cf. misrepresentation 
(MISREPRESENTATION)’.129 
 
    At common law, there are three ingredients of a ‘representation’:130 
‘1. There must be a statement.131 
2. The statement is about specific existing and verifiable fact or past 
event.132 
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the Law of Contract (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919, pp. 218, 222). A similar 
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3. The statement must induce the contract.’133 
 
2.2.2. Misrepresentation and actionable misrepresentation at common law 
    In the Black’s Law Dictionary, misrepresentation is defined as ‘[t]he act of making 
a false or misleading assertion about something with the intent to deceive’; or ‘[t]he 
assertion so made; an assertion that does not accord with the facts’. 134 
Misrepresentation at common law is an area of the law of contract, which allows a 
claimant to escape an obligation or claim compensation for losses. A 
misrepresentation can be an outright lie (fraud), an unintentional but careless false 
hood (negligence), or an innocent slip of the tongue (innocent misrepresentation). 
These are sometimes referred to as fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent 
misrepresentation and innocent misrepresentation respectively.  
    (a) Fraudulent misrepresentation is a false representation of a material fact made 
knowing it to be false, or believing it to be false, or recklessly not caring whether it to 
be true or false. 135  Fraudulent misrepresentation is also defined as ‘[a] false 
statement that is known to be false or is made recklessly – without knowing or caring 
whether it is true or false – and that is intended to induce a party to detrimentally rely 
on it’.136 (b) Negligent misrepresentation is a false statement made by a person who 
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had no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true.137 (c) Innocent 
misrepresentation is false statement of fact made by a person who had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the statement was true, not only when he made it but also at 
the time the contract was entered into – the division between possible states of mind 
of the representor. It is also defined as ‘[a] false statement that the speaker or writer 
does not know is false; a misrepresentation that, though false, was not made 
fraudulently’.138 
    Both (b) and (c) are comparatively recent.139 Until the 1960s the only necessary 
distinction was between fraudulent and non-fraudulent (including negligent) 
misrepresentation,140 which is supported by section 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 
1967 and the recent section 5 of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012, regarding the qualifying misrepresentations in consumer 
insurance.141 
    Misrepresentation and a concealment have been distinguished as follows: a 
misrepresentation is a false representation of a material fact, by one of the parties to 
the other, tending directly to induce the other to enter into the contract, or to do so on 
terms less favourable to himself when he otherwise might not do so, or might 
demand terms more favourable to himself, whereas, a material misstatement by the 
assured through misconstruction of his information is a misrepresentation, and the 
unwitting omitting to state a material fact is a concealment.142 This definition almost 
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leads to the conclusion that all misrepresentation is material.143 Therefore, in the 
general law of contract, the principle is that no relief will be given for a 
misrepresentation as such unless it is a statement of existing fact, or of current 
legislation.144 
    Actionable misrepresentation is another concept in English contract law, which 
requires the claimant to establish that the information misrepresented is the 
statement of facts, which has induced the conclusion of a contract between them.145 
This common law concept does not include the cases of the misrepresentor’s opinion 
and statement,146 which are clarified as an individual category of misrepresentation in 
section 20(5), MIA 1906. 
 
2.2.3. Representation in statute law – Misrepresentation Act 1967 
    Prior to the administrative fusion of common law and equity made by the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875, the availability of rescission for 
misrepresentation was radically different at common law and equity. At common law, 
the contracts are only rescinded for fraudulent misrepresentation; while in equity, the 
rescinded situation includes innocent, fraudulent and total failure of consideration.147 
Since the Judicature Acts, the current common law and equitable jurisdictions in 
respect of fraudulent misrepresentation and total failure of consideration remain.148 
However, a duty of disclosure has never been recognized as an element of general 
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contract law, either at common law or equity. But it should be noted that there is still 
a continuing duty to correct the inaccuracy after the statement.149 
    In the Misrepresentation Act 1967, section 2(1) mentions fraudulent 
misrepresentation and section 2(2) discusses non-fraudulent misrepresentation. It is 
mentionable that the latter allows the court to exercise discretion in the event of a 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation, inducing the making of any contract. For example, 
to substitute a remedy of damages in the event the rescission is sought, if the court 
considers that ‘it would be equitable to do so’ taking into account (a) the 
misrepresentation, (b) the loss to each party if the contract was rescinded and (c) the 
loss to each party if the discretion were exercised and the contract continued in 
existence.150 
A possible solution to the harshness of an ‘all or nothing’ remedy for both 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent misrepresentations, might be the extension of section 
2, Misrepresentation Act 1967, to the specialized insurance area. However, it is 
stated that there are few, if any, insurance cases to which this Act has been applied, 
even though damages have been sought by insurers for a misrepresentation 
inducing the insurance contract.151 In contrast to the possibility of introducing this 
provision to insurance, its application to reinsurance is definitely rejected by one 
leading academic.152 
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2.3. Misrepresentation in the MIA 1906 
    In the MIA 1906, section 20(1) provides that the assumed assured or his agent 
must make right representations pending negotiation of contract, before the 
conclusion of contracts.153 The ordinary principle of misrepresentation is confirmed 
by Pan Atlantic, 154  in which it was held (overruling earlier authority) that the 
underwriter himself must have been influenced by the misrepresentation.155 
 
2.3.1. Material misrepresentation 
    Like the duty of disclosure imposed on the assured under section 18 MIA 1906, a 
representation is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in 
fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.156 Hence, the duty to 
avoid making a material misrepresentation is confined to be a pre-formation duty.157 
Similarly, section 20(2) spells out that a representation is material which would 
influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining 
whether he will take the risk. However, the draftsman of the Act did not explain about 
the test for ‘materiality’ here either, and this leaves enough discretion to the courts 
and judges to make decisions.158 
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    There are some fundamental cases which are worth being mentioned here. In Pan 
Atlantic, it was fully unanimously supported by the judges that the subjective 
inducement should apply to non-disclosure as well as misrepresentation.159  Lord 
Mustill alleged that the inducement was applicable to misrepresentation in marine 
insurance: 
‘… I conclude that there is to be implied in the Act of 1906 a qualification 
that a material misrepresentation will not entitle the underwriter to avoid the 
policy unless the misrepresentation induced the making of the contract, 
using “induced” in the sense in which it is used in the general law of 
contract. This proposition is concerned only with material 
misrepresentations.’160 
 
    Therefore, it is suggested that in the first instance, the material test for 
misrepresentation is the same as that for non-disclosure in marine insurance. This 
means the actual inducement test is applicable to misrepresentation as well, 
although the inducement requirement has been created at general common law. 
However, as mentioned above, the ‘prudent insurer’ test of materiality is deemed to 
assign unfair workload to the non-professional assured against the backdrop of a 
prudent insurer, which becomes a strong reason in favour of modifying the law in 
favour of the assured, not just in the UK but also in some other countries.161 
    Furthermore, it is clarified that only a material misrepresentation avoids the policy.  
This factor further appears through the definition that a representation is a statement 
of the existence of some fact, or state of facts, ‘which is likely to induce an 
underwriter more readily to assume the risk by diminishing the estimate he would 
otherwise have formed of it’. 162  Logically, the facts which may reasonably be 
presumed likely to have such an influence on the judgment of a prudent underwriter 
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are called ‘material facts’, and literally, a statement of such facts is called a material 
representation.163 The falsehood of a representation, on the other hand, will produce 
no effect on the insurance policy unless the statement misrepresented is material.164 
Finally, whether a particular representation be material or not is in each case a 
question of fact.165 
    After the materiality of the representation has been determined, then the next step 
of the inquiry is to ascertain whether the representation of circumstances is ‘true’.166 
However, for this, sections 20(4) and (5) in the same Act list different criteria for 
different types of representations. The representation of fact must be substantially 
correct, and the representation of expectation or belief must be made in good faith. 
For this reason, it is required that the ‘prudent insurer test’ has been applied twice. 
The first time, it applies in terms of the materiality of the representation, 167  and 
secondly, in terms of the truth of the representation (especially in the case of 
representing a matter of fact).168 
    In addition to the principles which were firstly confirmed by Pan Atlantic, some 
limitations were further created by subsequent cases. In the first place, a 
misrepresentation must be made by the assured or his agent,169  but not by an 
independent expert appointed by the underwriters to give advice on the risk. In 
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International Lottery Management v Dumas,170 it was held by the Queen’s Bench 
Division that a reliable expert with little knowledge of the significance of material 
information did not satisfy the qualified duty of disclosure. In the second instance, for 
the general meaning of materiality, the post-contractual misrepresentation is 
submitted to be immaterial;171  it is also proposed by a leading academic that a 
fraudulent misrepresentation always gives the underwriters the right to avoid, 
whether or not it is material.172 Thirdly, in regards to the connection to the loss, under 
English law, whether or not the non-disclosure or misrepresentation has a causal 
connection with the loss is immaterial (if it materially affected the risk), the 
underwriter may avoid the policy. However, in the United States the effect of a 
material misrepresentation having no connection with the loss may depend upon 
State Statutes.173 
 
2.3.2. Categorization 
    Section 20(3) of the MIA 1906 lists three circumstances in which the assumed 
assured or his agent must represent. It states that ‘a representation may be either a 
representation as to a matter of fact, or as to a matter of expectation or belief.’174 In 
practice, the distinction between a representation of fact and one of expectation is 
hard to draw.175 In general, an unequivocal statement is likely to be construed as one 
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of fact, whereas a statement as to a matter over which the assured has no control is 
more likely to be construed as a matter of expectation or belief.176 Sections 20(4) and 
(5) then prescribe a criterion for determining whether the representation is true. 
Nevertheless, in general contract law, only false statements of existing or past fact 
are eligible to become an actionable misrepresentation.177 
    However, Templeman argues that there are three categories of representation: a 
representation as simply of a fact, a material fact, and of expectation or belief.178 
Moreover, Arnould holds that statement or misrepresentation may be either: (1) a 
positive affirmation by the assured, as of his own knowledge and upon his own 
responsibility, that the facts represented either do or will exist/positive 
representations, or (2) a mere declaration of his belief or expectation that such facts 
do or will exist/representations of belief, or (3) a mere communication of information 
which he has received from others respecting them/ representations of information. 
The MIA 1906 only recognizes the first two of these classes in section 20(3).179 One 
reason for this understanding might be that the information misrepresented by the 
principal’s broker is tantamount to a misrepresentation committed by the principal 
himself.180 
 
2.3.2.1. Representation of fact 
    As section 20(4) stipulates, a representation as to a matter of fact is true, if it is 
substantially correct. If the difference between what is represented and what is 
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actually correct would not be considered material by a prudent insurer, the 
representation of fact is true.181 Therefore, the representation of fact does not need 
to be the perfect truth. The truth or falsity of a representation is judged by reference 
to the time of conclusion of the contract (or such earlier time at which the [re]insurer 
commits itself to an obligation binding in the eyes of the market to accept the risk on 
certain terms), as is materiality. 182  And, a commercial man may be called as a 
witness to prove the meaning of any commercial statement; for instance, if it is said 
in a letter on a commercial subject that a ship will sail from St. Domingo in the month 
of October, it is generally understood that she will not sail till the 25th of the month.183 
One fundamental case on the subject of misrepresentation is Pawson v Watson,184 in 
which it was represented that the ship carried 12 guns and 20 men while in fact she 
carried only nine guns, six swivels, 16 men, and nine boys. As this was held to be 
substantially correct, the insurer was unable to avoid the contract. 
    Thus, compared to the duty of disclosure, the usage of the ‘prudent insurer’ test in 
misrepresentation is more complex. In cases of disclosure, whether the information 
concealed is material or not, the prudent insurer’s perspective is only made once. 
However, in the situation of making a right representation, the misrepresentation 
must be material from the prudent insurer’s perspective by weighing whether it would 
influence him in fixing premium and whether accepting risks in question. 
Subsequently, the representation of fact must be substantially incorrect compared 
with the real fact, also judged by a prudent insurer. Thus, the ‘prudent insurer’ test 
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has been applied twice in the latter case (especially in the case of representing a 
matter of fact).185 
 
2.3.2.2. Representation of expectation and belief 
    In the general law of contract, only false statements of existing or past fact are 
eligible to become actionable. Nevertheless, in marine insurance, apart from section 
20(3), MIA 1906, about the representation of fact, it is also required that the 
representation of expectation and belief must be true. It has been stated that the 
wording of the MIA 1906 compels insurance contract law to diverge from general 
contact law with respect to such secondary representations.186 
    Furthermore, section 20(5) in the same law states that a representation as to a 
matter of expectation or belief is true if it is made in good faith, which also leads to 
the fine distinction drawn between the statement of fact, and statement of 
expectation and belief. With respect to this, Professor Bennett highlighted three 
principal cases.187 In the leading contract law case of Bissett v Wilkinson,188 a vendor 
of land made a representation regarding its sheep-bearing capacity. Although the 
vendor was a sheep farmer, the land in question had never been used for sheep 
farming, a circumstance the Privy Council regarded as the most material in 
concluding that the statement was one of belief. In Bowden v Vaughan,189 a cargo 
owner’s statement concerning the date of future sailing of the carrying vessel was 
held to be capable of constituting a representation of expectation only, a cargo owner 
having no control over the vessel’s movements. Similarly, in Rendall v Combined 
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Insurance Co of America,190 a statement of ‘estimated travel days’ to be undertaken 
by employees in a proposal for business travel accident insurance was held to be a 
statement of belief.191 
    The case of International Lottery Management Ltd v Dumas192  also reflects a 
practical phenomenon, in which the insurance policy is based on a proposal form, 
and the declaration that ‘the answer given are true and complete to the best of the 
proposer’s knowledge and belief’ is covered as a clause in the proposal.193 In fact, 
this kind of declaration only works within the proposal form, and any other 
misrepresentation made outside of the proposal form is not governed.194 However, 
as viewed by Professor Bennett, there are some problems which need to be clarified.  
According to Bennett, it is clear from the decision of the House of Lords in Pan 
Atlantic195 that section 20 is not to be read as an exhaustive code of the law of 
misrepresentation for the purposes of (marine) insurance contracts. Therefore, he 
suggested that section 20 should be read, if at all possible, in line with general 
contract law.196 
 
2.3.2.3. Fraudulent and negligent /innocent misrepresentation 
    To meet another different classification criteria, in general insurance law (also in 
contract law), it is commonplace to divide misrepresentation into fraudulent, negligent 
and innocent misrepresentation. In this situation, the classification criterion is the 
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notion of representors. 197  In one of the House of Lords cases, a fraudulent 
misrepresentation was finally defined to be one made either knowing that it was false, 
or without belief in its truth, or recklessly careless as to whether it was true or 
false.198 Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides the requirement of a 
negligent misrepresentation, which is that the maker of the misrepresentation cannot 
prove that it is made on an honest belief or reasonable grounds. On the contrary, as 
long as the representor can prove that the misrepresentation is made on his honest 
belief or reasonable grounds, then the misrepresentation can be treated as 
innocent.199 
    Accordingly, different remedies available for different types of misrepresentations 
are provided at common law. A remedy mechanism is supplemented by section 2, 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, granting different types of damages to the injured 
party.200 
    The current consequence of a misrepresentation in business insurance is more 
severe than at common law. It can render the insurance contract to be avoidable, 
irrespective of whether the misrepresentation is fraudulent or innocent (including 
negligent).201 First of all, judging from the literal meaning of the statutory language 
itself, section 20 of the MIA 1906 does not express any intention to touch the 
difference between consequences caused by fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Secondly, it is supported by the judicial precedent of MacDowell v 
Fraser which held that a non-fraudulent misrepresentation rendered a marine policy 
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voidable.202 Also in the other leading case of Ionides v Pacific Fire & Marine Ins.203 a 
cargo policy was held to be vitiated by an innocently made misrepresentation. 
Nevertheless, such division could be changed in the future, since the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 simply identifies two types of 
qualifying misrepresentations, which are fraudulent (with dishonesty) and non-
fraudulent (honest/innocent conducts including negligent and wholly innocent 
conducts) misrepresentations.204 
 
2.3.3. Duration of duty 
    In business insurance, it is provided that every material representation made by 
the assured or his agent to the insurer during the negotiations for the contract, and 
before the conclusion of contracts, must be true.205 Thus, like the duty of disclosure, 
the duty to make right representations is also a pre-contractual duty, and the duty will 
cease on the conclusion of the insurance contract. Finally, the representation can be 
withdrawn or corrected before the contract is concluded.206 
    The new Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 will be 
ideal in its application, although it is limited to consumer insurance only,207 which 
could be a lesson to business insurance legislation. According to paragraphs 2-3 and 
part 2 of Schedule 1, the consumer’s duty of misrepresentation is not limited to the 
negotiations of an insurance contract, but extended to any consequential pre-
variation stages. It is not expressly extended to any reinsurance or renewal. However, 
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in relation to the latter event, the Law Commission implies it as a negotiation of a 
new contract which falls within the pre-contract scope again.208 
 
2.4. Remedies for misrepresentation 
2.4.1. Actionable misrepresentation at common law 
    The general rule is that a misrepresentation generally has no legal effect unless it 
is material. That is, it must be one which would affect that judgement of a reasonable 
person in deciding whether, or on what terms, to enter into the contract without 
making such inquiries as he would otherwise make.209 
    There should be a pre- and post-era regarding the rescission for misrepresentation. 
Before the Judicature Act 1873-1875,210 which administratively merged common law 
and equity, they adopted different manners to govern misrepresentation. At common 
law, the principal doctrine was that a contract could be rescinded for 
misrepresentation only on the ground of fraud, but this requirement of fraud was 
subject to several qualifications. If an innocent misrepresentation became a term of 
the contract, it might give rise to a right to rescind the contract for breach. 211 
Whereas in equity, by contrast with common law, there was a general rule that a 
contract could be rescinded for ‘innocent misrepresentation’, and this phrase covers 
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every misrepresentation which was not fraudulent.212 It is apparent that in current 
marine insurance, the equity approach prevails. In the view of this author, this 
conclusion is committed for the principal reason that each time common law conflicts 
with equity, equity prevails. This is a famous rule which was established by The Earl 
of Oxford’s Case in Chancery213 and subsequently applies to marine insurance.  
    After the Judicature Act 1873-1875, the general case-law rule for rescission for 
misrepresentation is that misrepresentation makes the contract voidable at the option 
of the representee.214 In insurance, the MIA 1906 also adopts the same approach. At 
present, under the English legal system, the effects of different types of 
misrepresentations are distinguished. However, both types of misrepresentations 
(fraudulent and non-fraudulent) can avoid the whole contract. 
    It is submitted that there are five grounds based on which damages can be 
recovered for misrepresentation and the relationship between them.215 First of all is 
fraud. At common law, a person who suffers loss as a result of acting in reliance on a 
fraudulent statement can recover damages based on the tort of deceit. The second 
ground, is negligence. At common law, a misrepresentation is negligent if it is made 
carelessly and in breach of a duty owned by the representor to the representee to 
take reasonable care that the representation is accurate. The third ground is 
fraudulent misrepresentation. The fourth ground, is if the representation became a 
contractual term. The fifth ground, is non-fraudulent misrepresentation under section 
2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Similarly, Rhidian Thomas also suggests that as 
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regards the pre-contractual duty, there may be an award of damages, (a) in the tort 
of deceit, (b) pursuant to the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (as of right if made without 
reasonable grounds or pursuant to the court’s discretion if made innocently), (c) if a 
failure to observe a duty of care can be established, or (d) if a breach of a contractual 
promissory obligation can be proved. 216  Part of Professor Thomas’ opinion is 
supported by the judgment in Banque Keyser v Skandia, which is addressed below. 
    Then, do damages co-exist with equitable rescission in this situation? If damages 
are available on these alternative grounds, it is difficult to see why compensation 
should not be available for a simple breach of the duty of good faith,217 which is also 
concerned regarding the insurance broker’s utmost good faith breach event. 
However, in Banque Keyser v Skandia218 the Court of Appeal held that in insurance, 
damages were not available for a breach of the duty of good faith simpliciter,219 and it 
has been said that the court’s reasons ‘do not stand up to scrutiny’.220 This part of 
judgment was then confirmed by Lord Templeman in the House of Lords in the same 
case.221 The exclusive position of an avoidance remedy in insurance was further 
strengthened by subsequent cases.222 The coexisting authorities and principles still 
cannot keep the insurance remedies mechanism for utmost good faith breach from 
being criticised. Till now, it becomes logical and apparent that when people are 
blaming the draconian remedy for the wholly innocent defaulting parties, in the 
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meanwhile, they are planning to extend the equitable remedy in the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 to insurance. It is still deemed to be strange by some 
leading academics that the lack of a remedy in damages is not accepted as part of 
the background to the duty of good faith.223 
 
2.4.2. Equitable remedy in section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 
In section 2(1), it is stated that if one party has entered into a contract after a 
fraudulent misrepresentation committed by the other party, and as a result he has 
suffered loss, the defaulting party should be liable for damages. 224  A statutory 
proportionality remedy is introduced into resolutions for misrepresentation in the 
general law of contract by section 2(2) in the same Act. It provides that: 
‘Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has 
been made to him otherwise than fraudulently, and he would be entitled, by 
reason of the misrepresentation, to rescind the contract, then, if it is claimed, 
in any proceedings arising out of the contract, that the contract ought to be 
or has been rescinded, the court or arbitrator may declare the contract 
subsisting and award damages in lieu of rescission, if of opinion that it 
would be equitable to do so, having regard to the nature of the 
misrepresentation and the loss that would be caused by it if the contract 
were upheld, as well as to the loss that rescission would cause to the other 
party.’225 
 
    It can be concluded that, in the Misrepresentation Act 1967, the consequence for a 
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, is that the injured party can rescind the 
contract, and claim for damages in tort. On the other hand, the consequence for a 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation (especially the wholly innocent misrepresentation) 
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is that the other party can require rescission of the contract, but, the court is awarded 
the discretion to sentence damages, in lieu of rescission.  
    Therefore, section 2(2) of the Act creates a judicial discretion in cases of non-
fraudulent misrepresentation, to declare ineffective a rescission of the contract (or 
deny the remedy if not already exercised) and instead to effect a financial adjustment 
between the parties through an award of damages.226 However, it should be noticed 
that the statutory discretion cannot be exercised in respect of reinsurance 
contracts. 227  Furthermore, this statutory provision should not be considered as 
removing any residing discretion in the court of equity. It merely gives the court a 
power to award damages in cases of misrepresentation, in lieu of rescission, which it 
did not previously have.228 
    It can be concluded that in English case-law for general contracts, all three types 
of actionable misrepresentations (fraudulent, negligent and wholly innocent 
misrepresentations) may have the whole contract rescinded up to the injured party’s 
option, and in the meanwhile, these three types of misrepresentations could give rise 
to discretionary damages by court.229 Accordingly, at the practical level, in cases of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, the injured party is awarded with a right of contract 
rescission and damages assessed on tort of deceit. In cases of negligent 
misrepresentation, the injured party is usually awarded a right to rescind the contract, 
but the discretionary contract damage might be awarded in lieu of rescission on the 
basis of section 2(2), Misrepresentation Act 1967. At the same time, more damages 
assessed on a tort of deceit basis are also available. In cases of innocent 
misrepresentation, the injured party is usually awarded with the right to have the 
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contract rescinded, but the discretionary contract damage might be awarded in lieu of 
rescission on the basis of section 2(2), Misrepresentation Act 1967.  
 
2.4.3. Remedies for misrepresentation under the MIA 1906 and timing of such 
claims 
2.4.3.1. Remedies for misrepresentation and timing of such claims 
    In section 20(1) of the MIA 1906, the representation must be true, or the insurer 
may avoid the contract. Thus, as with breach of the duty of disclosure, the 
consequence is that the contract may be avoided by the innocent party. Hence 
according to Arnould, on the principles of equity and justice, the non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation by the assured, whether intentional or not, of any facts which if 
truly represented or disclosed would be likely to influence the judgement of a prudent 
insurer and the misrepresentation or non-disclosure of which did in fact influence the 
underwriter in taking the risk or fixing the rate of premium, will give the latter a right to 
avoid the policy.230 
    Nevertheless, by contrast, avoidance could not be justified as the response to 
post-contractual breaches of good faith, where the rewarding could be ‘anomalous 
and disproportionate’.231 In The Star Sea,232 according to Lord Hobhouse’s judgment, 
such remedy would become effectively penal. The MIA 1906 does not mandate the 
time for election in relation to remedies. However, in almost all cases, the fact has 
been that the non-disclosure or misrepresentation by the assured was only 
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discovered after a total loss had become known, or after the insured voyage had 
terminated. 233  In such circumstances, the question of election is of no practical 
importance and has never arisen. However, when the underwriter becomes aware 
that he is entitled to avoid the contract (before the voyage or period insured has 
come to an end), it may make a great difference to the assured whether the 
underwriter makes his election immediately or delays making it. Till now it is still left 
undecided whether the party entitled to elect must do so within a reasonable time, or 
whether he may repudiate the contract at anytime.234 
    Apart from the aforementioned issues, there is another question which is 
noticeable here. Is a ‘materiality’ factor required for fraudulent misrepresentation? At 
this point, the academic scholars and judiciary have reached a consensus. When it 
refers to fraud, materiality should be excluded. 235  Therefore, a fraudulent 
misrepresentation always gives the underwriter the right to avoid, whether or not it is 
material.236 And if a policy be avoided by a mere misrepresentation without actual 
fraud, the assured is entitled to a return of premium. 237  Whereas, a fraudulent 
misrepresentation will deprive the defaulting assured from a return of premium.238 
    In addition to the express affirmation of a policy with knowledge of facts which can 
prevent the insurer from avoiding the policy, Arnould further states that the 
underwriter is also precluded from avoiding the policy if the rights of third parties 
have intervened, or if the assured has altered his position in the belief that the 
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contract was a subsisting one. 239  However, the precondition is that before this 
doctrine can operate, the underwriter must have full knowledge of the facts entitling 
him to avoid the policy.  
 
2.4.3.2. Query in relation to remedies for innocent misrepresentation 
    It has been stated that the legal consequence is too harsh for the party at fault, 
(particularly a party who made a negligent or innocent misrepresentation), since the 
remedy is a standard ‘all or nothing’. 240  Consequently, an inadvertent breach 
resulting from an innocent mistake is as fatal as a calculated concealment. Therefore, 
introducing the ‘proportionality approach’ at common law to the marine insurance 
area is raised as a decisive issue. Reference to this can be found in the Australian 
report, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909,241 and the reports made by Law 
Commissions in the UK.242 
    There are some practical restrictions on the applicability of section 2(2) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 in insurance contract law. First, section 2(2) requires that 
a ‘misrepresentation’ be ‘made’. It has been argued by scholars243 and accepted by 
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the Court of Appeal,244  that this wording should not include pure non-disclosure 
although half-truth should be covered.245 
    Secondly, in Highlands Insurance Co v Continental Insurance Co,246 Justice Steyn 
expressed the view that avoidance should never be denied in commercial insurance 
for fear of undermining the policing function of the remedy in ensuring a fair 
presentation of the risk. It may be argued that the unqualified reference to avoidance 
rights in sections 17 and 20 of the MIA 1906 should not be read as impliedly modified 
by the Misrepresentation Act 1967 since there is no evidence found. 
    Thirdly, and more fundamentally, the question arises of whether the remedy of 
‘avoidance’, as prescribed by the MIA 1906, for failure to act in good faith is the same 
remedy as ‘rescission’ for misrepresentation under section 2, Misrepresentation Act 
1967. As previously discussed in reference to the business assured’s disclosure, if 
avoidance is but another label for rescission, section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation 
Act 1967 will confer a discretion to refuse (to recognize) avoidance of an insurance 
contract in cases of non-fraudulent misrepresentation, albeit not for non-disclosure. If 
it is technically a different remedy, albeit one that operates in the same way as 
rescission, section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 will have no application.  
    In Professor Francis Rose’s work on marine insurance, it is stated that the 
difference between consequences at common law and marine insurance contract law 
is that misrepresentation in general contract law may give rise to a number of 
remedies which can often be cumulative, such as equitable rescission and damages 
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on a contract or tort basis.247 In the context of insurance, the interest of the insurer 
will ordinarily be met if he can reject the claim made, or more generally set aside the 
policy which resulted from the misrepresentation or non-disclosure. This is usually 
termed ‘avoidance’ in the insurance context, in contrast to ‘rescission’ in the general 
law, although it appears no different in practice.248 The dissonance that would result 
from a discretion that extended to misrepresentation but not to non-disclosure 
perhaps suggests that this view is preferable.249 
    Whether the ‘proportionality approach’ in the Misrepresentation Act 1967 can be 
extended to marine policies is always a critical issue. Arnould’s reasons to oppose 
this suggestion are:  
‘(1). [B]eing specifically concerned with marine policies, provisions of the 
MIA 1906 prevail over the 1967 act (Misrepresentation Act 1967); (2). even 
if the 1967 Act is to be regarded as giving the courts jurisdiction to restrict a 
party to a marine policy to a remedy in damages for non-fraudulent 
misrepresentations, it is submitted that having regard to the fact the 
avoidance of the policy has been firmly established as the appropriate 
remedy it is in the highest degree unlikely that a court would regard it as 
equitable so to restrict the rights of the parties. Thus at most the effect of s 
2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, in relation to marine policies, is to 
enable a party who wishes to claim damages as an alternative to avoidance 
of a policy for a purely innocent misrepresentation to invite the court to 
adopt this course.’250 
 
    Bennett has made suggestions about the ‘proportionality approach’ in the 
insurance context. He states that in deciding whether to exercise its discretion, a 
court could take into account the innocence or negligence of the assured’s breach (it 
may be relevant whether responsibility for the breach lies with the assured or with the 
broker who placed the risk), and the relative consequences of denying or permitting 
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allowance.251 So where no loss has occurred, allowing avoidance does not prejudice 
the assured’s benefit and the assured can seek an alternative cover. However, 
where loss has occurred, avoidance will prejudice the assured by denying any 
indemnities. For example, after one year’s enforcement of an insurance contract, the 
premium has been paid appropriately and a claim for a loss covered by the insurance 
has arisen and been paid. However, towards the end of the period, the assured fails 
to observe utmost good faith which discharges the insurer from both his further 
liabilities and that which has gone perfectly properly before.252 
    According to Professor Bennett, in cases where compliance with the duty to make 
right representation would have resulted in merely a higher premium which the 
assured would have paid, the contract could be declared continued subject to an 
award of damages equivalent to that additional premium. In cases where the insurer 
would either have declined the risk altogether or would have insisted on certain 
limitations in the policy, it might be appropriate to allow avoidance or, alternatively, to 
award a more substantial sum by way of damages. Additionally, Bennett also 
suggests that in considering whether to allow avoidance in such a situation, a court 
would have to take into account, not merely the existing losses claimed by the 
assured, but also the prospect and scale for further losses arising under the voidable 
policy.253 In the view of this author, any consequential losses are recoverable on a 
tort basis, as long as the general contract and tort law rules are introduced to 
insurance, which can be described as a big challenge. 
    Additionally, Professor Robert Merkin emphasizes that, in principle, section 2(2) of 
the Misrepresentation Act 1967 ought not to be used in reinsurance cases, although 
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its use in marine insurance remains possible, 254  which is fully supported by 
Thomas.255 This opinion just brings out another pitfall of extending the general rule to 
a specialized insurance area. 
    Reflecting the modifications made to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012, it can be concluded that the harshness is appropriately 
redressed. This is especially significant for the innocent misrepresentor by providing 
a proportionate reduction of claim amount without excluding other possible remedies, 
including avoidance under some circumstances.256 However, for commercial marine 
insurance, whether it will be changed or not, is still under consultation.   
 
2.5. Representation and warranty 
2.5.1. Warranty in contract law and insurance law 
    Sections 33 to 41, MIA 1906, refer to the marine insurance warranty. According to 
general contract law, a warranty is a minor term in a contract, and the breach of 
which is negligible. Therefore, the warranty breach results in a remedy only for 
damages.257 The fundamental cases of Bettini v Gye258 and Poussard v Spiers259 
firstly finalized the main differences between a condition and a warranty term in 
contract law. Under these two leading cases, the performer in question missed the 
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first six rehearsals and another performer missed the first four performances of the 
performance contract. Based on the degrees of importance of the breached terms, 
the first employee was judged to be in a warranty breach, while the second employee 
was judged to be in a conditional breach. According to these two cases, it can be 
concluded that the breach of a conditional term, which goes to the root of a contract, 
may entitle the injured party to a right of terminating the contract and claiming 
contractual damages. On the one hand, a breach of a warranty term, which is 
inessential to a contract, may entitle the injured party to a right of remedy for 
contractual damages only. Meanwhile, in order to deal with the contract term, which 
is hard to tell from its superficial value whether it goes to the root of contract, the 
innominate term was created. It was established in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd260 which also further confirmed that in order to judge the 
remedies available for breach, the effect of such a breach needs to be checked.261 
Therefore, with an absence of clarifications, if the injured party is substantially 
deprived of the whole benefit of the contract, the breach can be treated as a 
conditional breach, so the contract can be repudiated and the injured party can claim 
contractual damages. On the contrary, if the breach is equal to a warranty breach, 
the injured party is entitled to a right of contractual damages only.262 
    Unlike contract law, a warranty in insurance amounts to a major conditional term in 
contract law, the breach of which may discharge the injured party from his liability as 
from the date of the breach of warranty.263 The promissory warranty in insurance is 
divided into two groups: express warranty264 and statutory implied warranty particular 
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to marine insurance.265 In addition to the expressed warranties of neutrality and good 
safety listed by the Act,266 some more examples are provided by current clauses 
subject to English law and practice.267 For example, Clause 1.1 of the ITCH 2009 
stipulates that: 
‘The vessel is covered subject to the provisions of this insurance at all times 
and has leave to sail or navigate with or without pilots, to go on trial trips 
and to assist and tow vessels or craft in distress, but it is warranted that the 
vessel shall not be towed, except as is customary or to the first safe port or 
place when in need of assistance, or undertake towage or salvage services 
under a contract previously arranged by the Assured and/or Owners and/or 
Managers and/or Charterers. This Clause 1.1 shall not exclude customary 
towage in connection with loading and discharging.’ 
 
    In its subsequent clauses, the ITCH 2009 provides more practical examples of 
expressed warranties, such as the classification clause,268 and the disbursements 
warranty.269 
    Sections 39-41, MIA 1906, address examples of implied warranties, such as the 
implied warranty of ship seaworthiness and portworthiness,270 cargoworthiness,271 
                                                                                                                                                  
Steamboat Mutual Insurance Association [1894] AC 72, etc. A warranty can be committed concerning 
matters such as the navigation time and areas, voyage duration and purposes, the number of crew, 
etc.   
265
 Sections 39-41, MIA 1906. 
266
 Sections 36 and 38, MIA 1906. 
267
 Susan Hodges, Cases and Materials on Marine Insurance Law, (Reprint, Routledge, 1999), pp. 
289-290. 
268
 Clause 4.1, ITCH 2009, notes that:  
‘Unless the Underwriters agree to the contrary in writing, this insurance shall terminate 
automatically at the time of 
4.1 change of the Classification Society of the vessel, or change, suspension, 
discontinuance, withdrawal or expiry of her Class therein, provided that if the vessel is at 
sea such automatic termination shall be deferred until arrival at her next port. However 
where such change, suspension, discontinuance or withdrawal of her Class has resulted 
from loss or damage which would be covered by an insurance of the vessel subject to 
current Institute Time Clauses Hulls or Institute War and Strikes Clauses Hulls-Time such 
automatic termination shall only operate should the vessel sail from her next port without 
the prior approval of the Classification Society,…’ 
    For judicial support, see Gandy v Adelaide Marine Insurance Co (1871) LR 6 QB 746. 
269
 Clause 22, ITCH 2009. For judicial support, see Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd v 
‘Gunford’ Ship Co Ltd [1911] AC 529, HL. 
270
 Section 39, MIA 1906.  
271
 Section 40(2), MIA 1906. 
64 
 
and adventure legality.272 However, the time policy is distinguished from the voyage 
policy, by verifying that there is an implied warranty of seaworthiness in a voyage 
policy, but no such warranty at any stage of the adventure in a time policy.273 For a 
voyage policy, section 40(2) provides that an implied warranty of cargoworthiness is 
required for a voyage policy, at the commencement of the voyage.  
    A warranty requires exact compliance, a breach of which leads to the insurance 
policy to be terminated by the injured party. As section 33(3) suggests, a warranty 
must be exactly complied with, and a breach of warranty will discharge the insurer 
from his liability as from the date of the breach of warranty. Therefore, according to 
this Act, if there is any deviation from the warranty term, both trivial and vital, there is 
a breach of warranty in insurance established, and whether there is a causal link 
between the breach and loss does not matter.274 Afterwards, Bank of Nova Scotia v 
Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd275 affirmed that a warranty 
breach might discharge the insurer from his liability from the date of the breach, 
without considering if the defaulting party himself was aware of the breach or not. 
Finally, it is notable that as long as the warranty breach is proved, no further remedy 
is available to have it fixed.276 
 
2.5.2. Representation and warranty in insurance law 
    There are some distinctions between a representation and a warranty in insurance. 
Firstly, representation is a verbal or written statement made by the assured or his 
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agent to the underwriter at the time of the making of the contract. Hence, 
representation only has effect at or before the contract is concluded, and it is not 
inserted as a contract term. However, warranty must be a contract term.  
    Secondly, the test of materiality must be applied to non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation. Since a representation is not inserted into the contract, the 
assured is not tied down to the same rigid and literal compliance with its terms as he 
is in the case of a warranty.277 A warranty must be exactly complied with, whether 
material or not, and even a minor deviation from the term warranted under the 
insurance policy constitutes a breach. 278  It is sufficient that a representation be 
merely substantially correct.279 
    Thirdly, in terms of the nature of remedies under these two circumstances, a 
distinction is drawn below in marine insurance. In cases of an utmost good faith 
breach, including non-disclosure and misrepresentation at the contemplation of 
insurance policies, the whole insurance is avoidable up to the injured party’s option, 
which is described as a retrospective remedy. 280  Nevertheless, in cases of a 
warranty breach, the injured insurer is entitled a right to terminate the contract as 
from the date of the warrant is breached with no extra remedy considered.281 
    Despite the above main distinctions drawn between representation and warranty in 
insurance, it is interesting to find that at the practical level, the assured’s 
representation is capable of being converted into a warranty by adding extra 
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provisions. According to Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin,282 an insurer may add a declaration 
or extra provisions to a proposal form, stating that the consumer warrants the 
answers are accurate. As a result of this declaration, the assured’s representation is 
turned into warranties and even immaterial misrepresentation is considered as a 
warranty breach, which leads to the termination of an insurance contract. However, 
on the basis of the newly enacted Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012, such conversion is prohibited.283 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
    Like the duty of disclosure in marine insurance, the principles to make right 
representations also stem from the fountain of uberrimae fidei in section 17 of the 
MIA 1906. However, such a statement could be changed after the enactment and 
eventually coming into force of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012. The similarities between the duties of disclosure and 
representation in marine insurance are the test for materiality, and also the legal 
consequences of non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Additionally, the ‘actual 
inducement’ test which is finally established by the Pan Atlantic case for material 
non-disclosure is applicable to material misrepresentation as well.284 
    The differences between these two duties are purposes, and thresholds for 
‘materiality’. Just as Dr Susan Hodges summarizes, a representation is not a term of 
the contract of insurance, but a statement made during negotiations to induce the 
insurer to enter into the contract. Its purpose is to persuade the potential insurer to 
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accept the risk, or to accept the risk at a lower premium. On the other hand, non-
disclosure is a concealment of facts which tend to show the risk to be greater than it 
would otherwise appear.285 As to the different threshold(s) for materiality in non-
disclosure and misrepresentation in marine insurance, as discussed above, the 
‘prudent insurer’ test is applied only once in former cases, while twice in 
misrepresentation cases. 
    There are increasing calls for reforms, with regard to the test for materiality 
(prudent insurer or reasonable assured), and the remedies for wholly innocent 
misrepresentation (the opponents allege that ‘rescission’ ab initio is too harsh in this 
circumstance). It is also hoped to extend the concise two-part classification of 
qualifying misrepresentations and the ‘proportionality approach’ in statute law to non-
consumer marine insurance contracts, which has been successfully introduced to 
consumer insurance with the enactment of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012.286  
 
  
                                               
285
 Hodges, Law of Marine Insurance, p. 93. 
286
 This newly launched legislation is focused on consumer insurance only. However, relevant topics 
are expounded in chapter 3. 
68 
 
CHAPTER 3 
UTMOST GOOD FAITH IN ENGLISH MARINE INSURANCE LAW: PRE-
CONTRACTUAL INFORMATION AND THE QUEST FOR REFORM 
 
3.1. Introduction 
As stated in chapters 1 and 2, both duties of disclosure and representation in 
marine insurance stem from the source of utmost good faith addressed in the MIA 
1906 section 17, which distinguishes insurance contracts from other general 
contracts. The key issues include the test for materiality, duration of duty, limits on 
duty, and the controversial avoidance nature of remedies for the breach of duties. 
Recently, the utmost good faith doctrine has been construed to be a continuing duty 
in a contract. 287  The pre-contractual duties in marine insurance include duty of 
disclosure288 and representation289 imposed on both parties,290 and intermediaries if 
appropriate.291 Whether the avoidance remedies would be addressed to the injured 
party292 will be tested if the misrepresented/non-disclosed information has actually 
induced the insurance contract 293  and whether the specified information has 
influenced the prudent insurer’s judgement.294 
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After an observation of the pre-contract information peculiar to marine insurance, it 
is revealed that the utmost good faith regime is considered to be one characteristic of 
insurance contracts which has been standing for more than a century. However, 
there are increasing calls for reform. One reason is that the MIA 1906 was created at 
an early era and some rules are now probably outdated. The most pressing aspects 
for pre-contract information reform require critical examination. Firstly it is questioned 
whether the range of information to be disclosed should be adjusted (since the 
voluntary duty of disclosure is addressed mainly to the assured), and whether the 
‘prudent insurer’ test needs to be changed. Subsequently, criticism of the avoidance 
remedy being too harsh for the party in breach (especially for wholly innocent 
insureds) is analysed. Finally, it is discussed whether the ‘proportionality approach’ in 
statute law (Misrepresentation Act 1967 at common law) can be extended to marine 
insurance.  
 
3.2. Quest for reform 
There are some arguments opposing the reform have been proposed. According 
to Bakes,295 the first concern is that businesses are more likely than consumers to 
get professional advice from brokers and assureds are more likely to be aware of 
their legal obligations. The second argument states that the changes of law will 
weaken the London market’s competitive strength. Thirdly, some people claim that 
the parties are allowed to contract out of the strict legal provisions. 296  These 
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concerns are understandable if the reform will be taking place without adequate 
governmental scrutiny and guidance. Despite these disagreements, the Law 
Commission still launched the first leapfrog step for reform in 2006 with the 
publication of the first Scoping Paper.297 Nevertheless, it must be considered that the 
opponents might be less worried about the post legislative scrutiny, since the law 
revision and supervision task is also complemented by judicial intervention, which 
can adjust the enforcement of legislation appropriately. 
In fact, the reform had been deliberated by the Law Reform Committee even 
earlier in 1957 and the Law Commission in 1980. However, these two reports did not 
result in any change to law. The Law Commission expressed its anxiety for the 
revision of insurance contractual legislation since 2006. According to the issues 
observed by the Law Commission, the current insurance legislation regarding pre-
contract information, warranties, insurable interest, post-contract duty of good faith 
and the requirements for a formal marine insurance policy are worth a closer 
observation and statutory reform.298 Accordingly, correspondent Consultation Papers 
were issued on each topic. These covered the issues relating to pre-contractual 
information and warranties for both consumer and business insurance,299 the issues 
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relating to post-contract duties and other issues,300 and the issues relating to the 
business assured’s duty of disclosure and warranties. 301  The statutory reform in 
consumer insurance peculiar to pre-contract information was jointly completed 
successfully by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, through the 
issue of two main documentations. This included the Reports, with recommendations 
on Consumer Insurance Law, such as Pre-contract Disclosure and 
Misrepresentation,302 and the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) 
Act 2012. It is expected that the latter will be fully in force shortly after one year after 
its enactment (March 2012). 
The main reasons for implementing the insurance law reform in the UK are as 
follows: 
 
3.2.1. Retaining sustainability of legislation 
Most of all, the Law Commission triggered the reform in order to retain the 
sustainability of insurance legislation. Firstly, social, political, economic and 
technological changes influence not only the Law Commission, but the whole 
industry to confront the need to reform. The MIA 1906 was codified by Sir Mackenzie 
Dalzell Chalmers more than 100 years ago. Without any question, it is recognized 
widely that this codified Act started a new era for both marine and non-marine 
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insurance law. However, the contemporary economic and cultural attitudes are 
radically different, and circumstances have inevitably changed in the past century. 
Longmore LJ noted, ‘despite one Member of Parliament (MP) saying rather oddly 
that the Bill (drafted Bill for MIA 1906) was 20 times more complicated than Arnould, 
now, a century later, it is operating as too tight a straitjacket’.303 For instance, the 
primary objective to create the duty of disclosure is to adjust the imbalanced 
information between the insurance company and assureds; however, nowadays, the 
insurance company is not in a weak position anymore. 
Secondly, the disadvantages of codification of law lead legislation to depart 
gradually from real circumstances. On the one hand, the codification of law simplifies 
laws in the common law system. The MIA 1906 was codified through the application 
of relevant judgments and its enactment is deemed as one of the most important 
things that happened in 1906.304 Nevertheless, the codification of law hinders the 
great advantage of the English common law system that the law develops through 
cases and precedent in a controlled fashion.305 Codification is considered as rigid, 
precise, restricted, and even ossified, 306  and is particularly denounced by the 
scholars who favour the common law system. As a matter of fact, even within the 
civil law system, codification does not lead to absolute silence. Based on Longmore 
LJ’s opinion, the best way of celebrating Sir Mackenzie Chalmers’ considerable 
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achievement would have been to have a new Act to mark the centenary of the 1906 
Act so that it might be possible to enact sensible reform for insurance law as a 
whole. 307  And Longmore LJ’s statement is confirmed by the recently launched 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. 
Thirdly, the movement of reform is also aiming at following in the footsteps of the 
European Union (EU); thus, there is the possibility that the European Community will 
take steps to harmonise the law across Europe, or possibly to create a European law 
of insurance contracts which becomes a further reason to review the UK’s insurance 
contract law.308 As a Member State of the EU, all of the British legislation must be 
compatible with EU legislation.309 Otherwise, the British Parliament is responsible for 
revision and amendments. The compatibility with EU legislation is only the minimum 
legislative requirement but not the Law Commission’s ultimate goal. Its eventual aim 
is to sell the up-to-date insurance law regime in the UK as the basis of a European 
regime.310 However, based on the first Consultations Paper,311 the work is being 
conducted by the Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law Project Group 
(‘the Innsbruck Group’), which is drafting the rules of the Common Frame of 
Reference on Insurance Contract Law. The Project Group released their Principles of 
European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) 312  in 2009, and submitted it to the 
European Commission as a Draft Common Frame of Reference of European 
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Insurance Contract Law (DCFR Insurance), which ‘should be integrated into a body 
of European contract law and should be revised and pursued further’.313 
According to the Restatement, the assured is required to perform the duty of 
disclosure when concluding the contract, by informing the insurer of material 
circumstances of which he is, or ought to be, aware on an inquiry basis.314 A flexible 
mechanism is provided by the Project Team to encourage the assured’s good faith 
performance, by proposing both a reasonable variation of the contract and a contract 
termination options (with extra proportionate remedies provided) to the insurer 
providing reasonable notice given, in particularly to protect innocent assureds. 315 
Subsequently, the Restatement also imposes exceptions to the duty of disclosure, by 
excluding obvious incomplete or incorrect answers, immaterial circumstances, 
information which the insurer led the policyholder to believe did not have to be 
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disclosed, and the circumstances which should have fallen within the scope of the 
insurer’s knowledge from the general duty of disclosure. 316  Regardless of the 
protection provided for innocent assureds, the Restatement also shows its zero 
tolerance to fraud, and the avoidance remedy is allowed to be available to the insurer 
for the assured’s fraudulent breaches with reasonable notice given.317 
    Distinguished from the ambiguous manner adopted by the MIA 1906, by leaving 
the alteration of risk issue open to practice, the Restatement has it covered and 
separated from the general pre-contract information of the assured. In the 
Restatement, providing a contract clause agreed to require the assured to notify the 
aggravation of risk to the insurer, a forfeiture of relevant claims is made available to 
the insurer,318 and at the same time, both contract termination and proportionate 
remedies are also available.319 
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It can be said that the harmonisation of insurance contract law is still a distant 
prospect as one component of a single market in the EU, since these Principles 
primarily apply to all types of insurance, excluding reinsurance, but no special rules 
on individual branches have been drafted, which are intended for the future. 320 
However, it is still a good reason to start revision and reform in the UK. 
 
3.2.2. Practical pressures in the insurance industry 
There are also some substantial reasons in insurance fields for reform. Firstly, 
despite the fact that the consumer insurance industry adopts some comparatively 
formal self-regulations, such as Statements of Practice,321  the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) Handbook, 322  the practice of the Financial Ombudsman Service 
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(FOS), and the Association of British Insurers (ABI) Code of Practice,323 there is still 
no sufficient statutory legislation to supervise its operation. On the other hand, the 
existence of different regimes causes substantial difficulties for parties wishing to 
check their rights and obligations, 324  which makes it unacceptably confusing to 
insurance contractual parties.325 What worsens the situation is that the FOS has 
never published its decisions, and this makes the position unclear and inaccessible 
for both the insurers and customers. The Law Commission therefore provisionally 
concluded in its fist Consultation Paper (CP 1) that there should be a clear statutory 
statement of the obligations on consumers to give pre-contract information and the 
remedies available to insurers if they fail.326 This program is realised in its further 
draft Bill 327  in consumer insurance presented to the Parliament. The draft Bill 
received Royal Assent and was enacted as the new Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. Section 10(1) of this Act prevents 
insurers from contracting out of the provisions of the Act to the detriment of the 
consumer (pre-contractual information and remedies for qualifying 
misrepresentations).328 Therefore, the 2012 Act is confirmed to be a set of mandatory 
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rules in consumer insurance, which in the view of this author, are mandated to 
protect weaker positioned average consumers. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of the responses to Law Commission’s review (CP 
1) expressly called for a statutory reform of MIA 1906 relating to utmost good faith, 
for both consumer and business insurance law.329 The areas of insurance contract 
law which could cause concern will be explained and discussed further below. 
However, the arguments concentrate on the consistent defective issues including the 
duty of disclosure (since it becomes the obvious problem that most consumers are 
unaware that they are required to volunteer information)330 and the materiality test.331 
Additionally, the duty not to misrepresent (the MIA 1906’s fairness is questioned for 
denying claims even when the policyholders act honestly and reasonably, but not 
accurately or completely)332 and remedies for insurers (the disproportionate remedies 
for unintentional utmost good faith breach especially for innocent misrepresentations) 
are addressed as well. 
 
3.2.3. Consistent problematic issues in the business context 
The CP 1 found six areas of insurance contract law which could cause concern: 
‘(1). The current duty of disclosure can operate as a trap; 
2). Policyholders may be denied claims even when they act honestly and 
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reasonably. 
3). The law on warranties of past or present facts can also lead to harsh 
results. 
4). Basis of the contract clauses can be used to convert all statements on a 
proposal into warranties. 
5). In the case of warranties of future conduct, the law states that the policy 
is also discharged even if the breach of warranty is later remedied or had 
nothing to do with the loss suffered. 
6). An intermediary can introduce inaccuracies into the disclosures made by 
a policyholder by failing to pass on accurately the information it has been 
given by the policyholder.’333 
 
After analysis, it is found that in business insurance, these six areas of questions 
concentrate mainly on two consistent disputes: the prudent insurer test, and the all or 
nothing nature of the avoidance remedy.334 Currently, the test of materiality is twofold: 
actual inducement and the prudent insurer test. The actual inducement test was 
established in the Pan Atlantic case.335 Whether the non-disclosed/misrepresented 
information has actually induced the conclusion of insurance would be taken into 
account. This pillar is considered as the most appropriate standard till now. As a 
matter of fact, the vast majority of the criticism centres on the prudent insurer test, 
which is used nowadays as the second limb of the materiality test. For example, 
every circumstance which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing 
the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk is material.336 This limb of 
test is criticised because it does not take account of the knowledge of an 
individual/actual insured.337 This problem causes certain unfavourable effects on the 
insured, particularly consumers and small or medium size businesses. For example, 
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see Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. 338  Since the vulnerability of 
consumers has been addressed repeatedly,339 the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure 
and Representations) Act 2012 abolishes the voluntary pre-contractual information 
duty of the customer insured.340 The existence of different sizes of businesses also 
becomes an obstacle during the process of constructing a universal and default 
regime for the business insurance market.341 Taking into account the difficulties and 
the reality being confronted with, the law therefore is expected to start from a default 
position based on generally accepted standards within the industry, so as to meet the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. Automatically, it is deemed to be more 
objective to the business insured’s reasonable expectations than the current law.342 
This would be a radical change to the materiality test and the adoption of this new 
test would give rise to quite different judgments compared to the current one. 
However, the reasonable assured test seems to correspond more closely to the 
principle of common law.343 
The demands for alterations also come from criticisms on the avoidance remedies 
for insurers in cases where they have been induced to conclude the insurance 
contracts based on the ground of concealments and misrepresentations. The 
avoidance remedy is criticized because it is alleged to be overly harsh to the 
innocent insured who acts honestly and reasonably, as a tiny mistake could lead to 
the rescission of the contract. As a result, distinguishing between dishonest and 
                                               
338
 [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 485. 
339
 Ibid. 
340
 Section 2(2), Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. 
341
 The market covers a wide range of parties and risks: some small businesses are in a similar 
position to consumers; some major businesses may be extremely knowledgeable about insurance. 
See British Insurance Law Association, Insurance Contract Law Reform: Recommendations to the 
Law Commission – A Report of the Sub-Committee of the British Insurance Law Association, (1
st
 
September, 2002), part 5, p. 120.  
342
 Ibid, p.121. 
343
 Since the objective reasonable man test is a typical standard used to measure an individual’s 
conduct at common law. 
81 
 
negligent conduct is becoming necessary. The Law Commission therefore 
recommends that the consequences of non-disclosure/misrepresentation should 
depend on the policyholder’s state of mind, or the reasonable assured’s state of 
mind.344 The CP 1 put forward three categories: innocent conduct, negligent conduct, 
deliberate or reckless conduct.345 However, according to paragraph 4 and Schedule 
1, Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, the qualifying 
misrepresentations for which the insurer has a remedy against the consumer include 
deliberate/reckless misrepresentations and careless misrepresentations.346 Judging 
from the definitions provided by the new Act, innocent and negligent 
misrepresentations are under the general name of ‘careless misrepresentation’.   
Different from consumer insurance, with regard to the remedies to marine insurers 
in cases of entirely innocent behaviour, 60% of the authorities agreed, in their 
responses to the Law Commission, to introduce the proportionate remedy.347 With 
regard to careless behaviour, some authorities support retaining avoidance for 
negligent conduct, but the majority (59%) support a proportionate remedy for 
negligent conduct, but not the traditional ‘all or nothing’ remedy.348 
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3.3. Milestones for insurance law reform – pre-contract information 
Reform has been considered in 1957349 and in 1980.350 With regard to the doctrine 
of pre-contractual utmost good faith, both the 1957 and 1980 reports proposed that 
there should be a duty of disclosure of material facts provided that the fact was one 
which a reasonable insured would disclose. Secondly, they proposed that the 
‘reasonable insured’ test should replace the current ‘prudent insurer’ test. However, 
despite the criticism concerning excessive harshness of remedies for honest and 
reasonable assureds, these two reports did not make any recommendations for a 
change regarding remedies, which left people the impression that they are quite 
modest reports.  
However, the Law Reform Committee was finally persuaded that there was no 
practical necessity for reform in 1957.351 The Commission gave careful consideration 
to the 1980 report which made recommendations including a Draft Insurance Law 
Reform Bill.352 Nevertheless, the 1980 report was also rejected, and thus no related 
legislation was enacted afterwards353 because it was proved to be too controversial 
for the insurance industry and government.354 
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Another reason why the Law Commission decided to consider reform again, is the 
report published by the BILA Recommendations to the Law Commission in 2002.355 
In the Letter to the Law Commission appended in this report, the BILA stated that 
they strongly recommended the implementation of reforms on the lines underlying 
the report, and hoped that the delays in the implementation of the Law Commission’s 
1980 recommendations would not be repeated.356 The Sub-Committee also stated 
that the starting point for reform should be the implementation of this Report, and the 
enactment of the draft Bill, with possible alternations.357 
In Longmore LJ’s Saxton Lecture material appended to the 2002 report, there 
were six topics suggested for the Law Commission to consider for law reform. These 
included: whether a doctrine of utmost good faith should be retained and if so, what 
its content should be; the appropriate test for an insurer or reinsurer who wishes to 
defend a claim on the basis of non-disclosure/misrepresentation before formation of 
the contract; the remedies which should be open to an insurer or reinsurer if he 
wishes to defend a claim on the ground of non-disclosure/misrepresentation; the right 
approach to breach of warranty by the insured; the right approach to proposal forms 
and answers given being declared to be the basis of the contract; the question 
whether damages should be payable for insurers’ refusal to pay a valid claim.358 This 
lecture has also been deemed to be one of the remarkable efforts made to trigger 
insurance law reform. 
The BILA report adopted the same basic points as Longmore LJ. In particular, it 
was recorded that the Statements of Practice by the HM (Her Majesty’s) Revenue 
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and Customs were insufficient, and that the role of the Ombudsman did not deal 
satisfactorily with any deficiency in the law. It further stated that ‘the appropriate 
course is to remove unfairness in the law, not simply to alleviate the unfairness’.359 
Thus, the Law Commission launched the insurance contract project through 
publishing a Scoping Paper.360 Furthermore, the Law Commission issued the first 
Consultation Paper,361 which concentrates on misrepresentation, non-disclosure and 
breach of warranty by the insured (this covers the extracts from Issues Papers 1-3). 
In addition to the pre-contract phase, the Law Commission also published Issues 
Papers regarding insurable interest, 362  micro-businesses, 363  damages for late 
payment and the insurer’s duty of good faith,364 post-contract duty of good faith,365 
broker’s liability for premiums,366  requirements for a formal marine policy, 367  and 
Responses for Consultation Paper re both consumer and business insurance.368 The 
issue of a draft Bill369 and the enactment of Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012 regarding pre-contract disclosure and misrepresentation 
becomes the prominent product of this project till now.  
In addition to the actions aforesaid, another noteworthy point is the Law 
Commission’s argument for reforming both consumer and business insurance.370 In 
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the MIA 1906, purchasers of insurance, whether businesses or consumers, are 
obliged to disclose or represent to insurers any information which would affect the 
judgement of a ‘prudent underwriter’ when considering the risk.371 If such duties are 
not fulfilled, the insurer is entitled to avoid the policy ab initio and to refuse to pay the 
claim. It can be said that, for consumers, the Act was effectively bypassed by 
industry codes of practice and guidance notes, the FOS and [original] FSA 
regulations.372 Conversely, the MIA 1906 remains the governing law for business 
insurance, including small/medium size enterprise. However, it is noticeable that 
some of the impetus for law reform flows from understandable concern about the 
vulnerability of consumers.373 
The question of whether marine insurance should be included in the law reform, 
was answered by the Commission’s 1980 report which stipulated that many of the 
reforms proposed applied to both consumer and business insurance, with the 
exception of reinsurance and MAT (marine, aviation and transport insurance) 
because of their unique characteristics. 374  Nevertheless, the Law Commission’s 
Consultation Paper (CP 1) provisionally proposed that the reform proposals for 
business insurance should be equally extended to MAT375 and reinsurance because 
they do not want to set more boundaries to new legislation. 376  Therefore, the 
following analysis concerning marine insurance law reform will be mainly completed 
with reference to business insurance.  
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3.4. Law Commissions’ proposals for reform and accomplishments – pre-
contract information 
It seems that there have been various reports about insurance contract law reform 
since 2006; thus, the Law Commission provides readers a flow diagram, pictured in 
figure 3.1 (on page 87 of this thesis), illustrating the current status of the insurance 
project.  
It can be concluded from the diagram that the reform of insurance contract law 
regarding consumer insurance was successful, as the submission of the final report 
included a draft Bill which received Royal Assent, and was finally approved as the 
new Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. There is still a 
long-term task remaining for business insurance, in addition to the Consultation 
Papers (CP 1, CP 2 and CP 3), since the Law Commission still needs to complete 
the final report for business insurance and submit a draft Bill on business insurance 
to Parliament. 
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Figure 3.1. Diagram showing the current status of the insurance project. (Courtesy of 
the Law Commission)377 
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3.4.1. Proposed reform and alterations of law for consumer insurance 
Although the duty of utmost good faith concerns both contractual parties, it applies 
differently in relation to the different contracting parties, and raises different issues of 
policy. The CP 1, therefore, does not cover the insurer’s duty of good faith,378 but it is 
considered in the CP 2. Meanwhile, the duty of good faith imposed by section 17 
applies not only at the pre-contractual stage but throughout the life of the contract. 
However, its application at the post-contractual stage raises distinct issues, which 
were considered in CP 2 and examined below.379 
The Law Commission made several proposals regarding consumer insurance in 
part 4 of the CP 1. 380  After a three-year consultation process since the Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission set up a joint review of insurance law in 
2006, the Law Commissions drafted a ‘short, targeted bill’381 and presented it to 
Parliament. It was approved by both Houses and received Royal Assent in 2012. The 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 was mandated to 
fix the deficiency of the FOS, codify confusing rules, re-proposition the inappropriate 
roles of the FOS, and also to catch up with European developments.382 Under the 
new Act, the consumer’s duty to volunteer material facts is going to be abolished, as 
the manner previously adopted by the FOS. 383  Instead, consumers must take 
reasonable care to answer their insurer’s questions fully and accurately. As a result 
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of abolishing the duty of disclosure for consumers, inevitably, more issues are raised 
relating to misrepresentation. Therefore, the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012 introduced different remedies for each type of 
misrepresentation. This is the method used by the FOS.384 Although the 2012 Act 
only applies to consumer insurance, an assessment of the selected alterations still 
have value in reference to business insurance cases. 
 
3.4.1.1. Abolishing the consumer’s duty to volunteer information and 
application 
Considering the defects of the MIA 1906 for consumer insurance mentioned above, 
the average consumer’s duty of voluntary information is abolished. 385  Thus, the 
coming into force of the new Act will repeal previous legislation regarding consumer’s 
duties in a consumer insurance contract. However, this is also said to provide 
legislative confirmation for the practices adopted by the FOS before the reform, 
although these decisions have never been published. Yet, it is impossible to say how 
closely the proposals resemble existing practices.386 
It is not the case that all marine insurance contracts will be excluded from the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. As section 2(5) 
provides, a contract of marine insurance, which is a consumer insurance contract, is 
subject to the provisions of this Act. The remaining marine insurance policies are still 
governed by the MIA 1906. In order to distinguish a consumer insurance contract 
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from a business insurance contract, the Law Commission defines the former concept 
as a contract of insurance between –  
‘(a) an individual who enters into the contract wholly or mainly for purposes 
unrelated to the individual’s trade, business or profession, and 
(b) a person who carries on the business of insurance and who becomes a 
party to the contract by way of that business (whether or not in accordance 
with permission for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000); 
‘consumer’ means the individual who enters into a consumer insurance 
contract, or proposes to do so; 
‘insurer’ means the person who is, or would become, the other party to a 
consumer insurance contract.’387 
 
It can be concluded that there are no substantial alterations of legislation in non-
consumer marine insurance, since the 2012 Act only covers contracts of insurance 
entered into by individual policyholders for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to 
their businesses. 388  This includes mixed-use insurance policies (such as an 
individual insuring a home with home office under a consumer insurance),389 rather 
than those policies by a company or other corporate body.390 Meanwhile, the MIA 
1906 still applies to most business insurance events, and specifically marine 
insurance. The most authoritative definition of a marine insurance contract is 
provided by Section 1, MIA 1906, which states, it ‘is a contract whereby the insurer 
undertakes to indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed, 
against marine losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure.’ It can 
be said that both the MIA 1906 and Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012 have the jurisdictions of marine insurance, with the former 
applying to business marine insurance contracts, and the latter to consumer marine 
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insurance contracts (such as insuring a private yacht or small boat). 391  Again, 
because of the uniqueness of mixed-use contracts, the main purpose of the marine 
insurance should be considered when it is bought. 
 
3.4.1.2. The duty to take reasonable care not to misrepresent 
The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 imposes an 
alternative duty on the consumer to take reasonable care not to misrepresent instead 
of disclosing information voluntarily. Section 2 stipulates that it is the duty of the 
consumer to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the insurer, 
and a failure by the consumer to comply with the insurer’s request to confirm or 
amend particulars previously given is capable of being a misrepresentation for the 
purposes of the Act. 392  Section 3(1) further provides that ‘[w]hether or not a 
consumer has taken reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation is to be 
determined in the light of all the relevant circumstances’. This vague provision raises 
another possible issue, such as the extent to which the judges can exercise their 
discretion. Sections 3(3)-(5) give a standard of ‘reasonable care’. Section 3(3) 
provides that ‘[i]f the insurer was, or ought to have been, aware of any particular 
characteristics or circumstances of the actual customer, those are to be taken into 
account’. Section 3(5) also takes into account that some consumers, with greater 
knowledge, may make a misrepresentation by acting dishonestly given his/her better 
knowledge. Effectively, this provides a higher standard for professionals, and in this 
circumstance, dishonesty is always to be taken as showing lack of reasonable care. 
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3.4.1.3. Two-part classification of misrepresentations and remedies 
Section 5(1) of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012 qualifies misrepresentations as being either (a) deliberate or reckless, or (b) 
careless. 393  Although ‘fraud’ is not mentioned in the Act, the Law Commission 
decided to include fraud within ‘deliberateness or recklessness’, because they 
wanted to distinguish this term from criminal fraud.394 
The subsequent sections also give definitions of deliberate and reckless 
misrepresentations. Section 5(2) provides: 
‘A qualifying misrepresentation is deliberate or reckless if the consumer – 
(a) knew that it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether or not it 
was untrue or misleading, and  
(b) knew that the matter to which the misrepresentation related was 
relevant to the insurer, or did not care whether or not it was relevant to the 
insurer.’ 
 
In other words, consumers act deliberately if they act with knowledge and 
dishonestly, and act recklessly if they act ‘without care’.395 Additionally, section 5(3) 
and the Explanatory Notes attached to the draft Bill give the definition of a careless 
misrepresentation: a misrepresentation is careless if it is a qualifying 
misrepresentation according to section 2(2) to take reasonable care, but is not 
deliberate or reckless.396 
Sections 5(3) and (4) stipulate that a qualifying misrepresentation is careless only 
if it is not deliberate or reckless, and the burden of proof is on the insurers. The 
insurers are obliged to prove that the qualifying misrepresentation is deliberate or 
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reckless, otherwise, it is considered as careless, which would invoke a different 
remedy. Therefore, distinguishing a ‘deliberate or reckless misrepresentation’ from a 
‘careless misrepresentation’ is essential to entitle the insurer to claim the appropriate 
remedy. According to Schedule 1, paragraph 2, of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, the insurer is entitled to avoid the 
contract if it is proved that the information misrepresented is deliberate or reckless, 
and the insurer can keep the premium as long as fairness is maintained. Although 
the qualification for a careless misrepresentation is not specific, a proportionate 
remedy can be adopted.397 The reports of the Law Commission reveal that the term 
‘careless’ corresponds to ‘negligent’. The proportionate remedy approach therefore is 
said to resemble the remedy for a negligent misrepresentation currently used by the 
FOS, and that has been the case so far.398 The Appendices attempt to give more 
technical guidance for proportionate remedies which should be applied in the more 
complex cases.399 
Schedule 1, paragraphs 3-8, of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012, introduce the appropriate remedy in relation to a 
qualifying careless misrepresentation in consumer insurance. As the Act suggests, 
the ‘all nor nothing’ remedy is abolished and different remedies are provided: if the 
insurer would not have entered into the consumer insurance contract on any terms, 
the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, but must return the 
premiums paid; if the insurer would have entered into the consumer insurance 
contract, but on different terms (excluding terms relating to the premium), the 
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contract is to be treated as if it had been entered into on those different terms if the 
insurer so requires; and, if the insurer would have entered into the consumer 
insurance contract (whether the terms relating to matters other than the premium 
would have been the same or different), but would have charged a higher premium, 
the insurer may reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim.400 In terms 
of the calculation of a proportionate reduction of the claim, paragraph 8 provides an 
equation, illustrating that: 
‘[T]he insurer needs to pay on the claim only X% of what it would otherwise 
have been under an obligation to pay under the terms of the contract (or, if 
applicable, under the different terms provided for by virtue of paragraph 6), 
where –  
                                 
                        
              
    ’ 
 
 
3.4.1.4. Mandatory rules 
The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 is said to 
favour the assured, not the insurer, since apart from the fact that the burden of proof 
is imposed on the insurer, it is forbidden that the contract be concluded outside the 
parameters of this Act, unless the alternative rights give the consumer greater rights 
than the sections of the Act.401 
This Act covers several pressing consumer insurance issues, but it still seems far 
from the comprehensive statutory stage. However, one tendency which we can 
confirm is that the Law Commissions have entirely abandoned the plans for 
legislation providing comprehensive codification and is pursuing a step-by-step 
journey for better insurance contract law.402 Although the uncertainties in business 
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insurance cannot be finally clarified until the next publication of the draft Bill for 
business insurance, we can still reasonably expect similar proposals in this respect. 
 
3.4.2. Proposed reform for business insurance 
Compared to the achievements obtained in consumer insurance, the business 
insurance division is moving in a slow but orderly fashion. After the publication of 
Issues Papers 1 to 9 and the Responses, the Law Commission launched another 
Consultation Paper 2 (CP 2) in 2011. The CP 2 is mandated at proposing various 
reforms apart from the pre-contractual duties in business insurance. In the CP 1 
several core changes for business insurance legislation are proposed: 
 
3.4.2.1. No separate rules for shipping 
In the CP 1, the Law Commission firstly clarified that they are looking for a default 
regime, which would apply to all business insurance, unlike the 1980 Law 
Commission’s report. They do not suggest separate rules for marine, aviation or 
transport insurance, or for reinsurance,403 since they do not wish to create artificial 
and complex boundaries unless it is strictly necessary to do so.404 However, it is 
interesting to find that the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
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2012 is unlikely to apply to reinsurance issues, 405  which is understandable as 
reinsurance is unlikely to be agreed between common consumers.  
 
3.4.2.2. Retaining the duty of disclosure in business insurance contracts and 
protecting wholly innocent insureds 
Based on the operational routine of the UK market, the CP 1 insists that a duty of 
disclosure should be retained in business insurance contracts.406 Meanwhile, the 
Law Commissioners are considering providing more protection to the innocent 
insured, which has been reflected through the proportionate remedy in the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012.407  In order to remove the 
penalties imposed on an innocent insured, the Law Commission requires two 
changes to the default rules: modifying the duty to disclose; and, the application of 
similar protections to honest and reasonable misrepresentations.408 
 
3.4.2.2.1. Modifying the materiality test 
Nowadays, the insured is required to disclose anything that he/she knows, or 
should know in the ordinary course of business, if it ‘would influence the judgment of 
a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the 
risk’. 409  This test has suffered serious criticisms for a long time since many 
complaints allege that this duty is too onerous on the assured. This defect leads to 
the possibility that an insurer could abuse this duty as a trap for the small/medium 
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sized business which is in a similar position to consumers. The Law Commission, 
therefore, provisionally proposes to simplify the test in section 18(1) of the MIA 1906 
(the prudent insurer test), and alternatively, the duty of disclosure should be limited to 
facts which the business insured knew, or ought to have known (the reasonable 
assured test).410 As a result, in cases of non-disclosure, the burden of proving that a 
business insured should have known a particular fact should be on the insurer.411 
Firstly, the reasonable insured test is construed to fit with the business insured’s 
reasonable expectations. The proposal of a reasonable insured test seems to 
provisionally relieve the pressure from the disagreements which question why current 
law is unaware of what a reasonable policyholder thinks, only of what would 
influence a hypothetical prudent insurer and what his particular insurer would have 
done had it known the full facts.412 Secondly, the Law Commission states that this 
new test is sufficiently flexible to adapt to the many different circumstances in which 
insurance is used and sold to a variety of policyholders,413 particularly the insured 
with professional advisers. Apparently, the actual or individual situation would be of 
considerable importance in individual cases and the practical standard would be 
visualised by the judiciary. Thirdly, the scope of the pre-contract duty is proposed to 
be limited to facts which the business insured knew or which it ought to have known. 
This method is alleged by the Law Commission to be one in which the over-
disclosure phenomenon would be cut down.414 
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3.4.2.2.2. Protecting the honest and careful insureds 
Additionally, the Law Commission proposes that the insurer should have no right 
to reject to pay a claim to the innocent insured who gives information incorrectly, but 
without negligence; this is an approach adopted by many of the continental 
systems.415 However, this default rule is rebuttable by agreements to the contrary.416 
The reason is that the Law Commission hopes this would bring the law into line with 
good market practice and with what they believe business insureds reasonably 
expect.417 The burden of showing that the insured did not have reasonable grounds 
for believing what it said was true, is proposed to be imposed on the insurer.418 
Currently, the two-fold test of materiality adopted by the UK is ‘actual inducement’ 
and ‘prudent insurer’, which have been challenged in the Law Commission’s 1957 
and 1980 reports.419 It seems that the Law Commission has quite a lot of objections 
for this test. In Issues Paper 1, a two-part test was presented which was based on 
inducement and that of a reasonable person.420 However, the latter pillar has been 
modified slightly during the Consultation Paper (CP 1).421 The reasonable insured 
test is proposed by the Law Commission to replace the prudent insurer test. They 
question why current law does not care what a reasonable insured should have 
realised was relevant, but asks what a prudent insurer would want to know, which 
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they think does not fit with the reasonable expectations of the business insured.422 
They also recommend the same test should apply to alleged misrepresentations. 
The reasons why they proposed this test included the flexibility of the market, to 
weaken the expert witness anxious to beat the claim, 423  and to discourage the 
present tendency to inundate the insurer with information.424 The Law Commission 
has therefore concluded that the test of materiality needs to be modified.425 This 
point has been altered in consumer insurance by the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. 
 
3.4.2.3. Distinguishing between dishonest and negligent conduct? 
One might urge making a distinction between behaviour that is dishonest and that 
which is merely negligent in order to distinguish awarded remedies. The Law 
Commissioners are considering if the Business Insurance Bill should follow the 
proposals for consumer insurance by distinguishing these two types of conduct.426 
After a closer observation of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012, it can be said that there are only two types of conduct: 
dishonest (including deliberate/reckless and fraudulent conduct) and honest conduct 
(including careless/negligent and innocent conduct). Accordingly, the compensatory 
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remedy to insurers in cases of negligent conduct is developed, which means the 
remedy would be based on what the insurer would have done had it known the 
information when it applied to negligent conduct in business insurance. 427  After 
consideration, it is found by the Law Commissioners that the continental systems 
examined, all apply a proportional approach to claims that have arisen before it is 
discovered that the insured made a non-fraudulent misrepresentation, in business as 
well as consumer insurance.428 If the proposed law wants to adopt the compensatory 
or proportional approach in business insurance, distinguishing dishonest from 
negligent conduct is inevitable. 
However, several main disagreements are put forward by some respondents 
against changing current law. Firstly, it would be difficult for the insurer to prove that 
an insured acted dishonestly. Secondly, it would be difficult to show what an insurer 
would have done if it had known the true position. The changes would lead to both 
insurers and insureds spending large sums on expert witnesses, who simply 
contradict each other. Finally, there should be strong incentives to encourage an 
insured to act carefully.429 The final decision is still being considered by the Law 
Commission. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter briefly introduced the pre-contract information (disclosure and 
representation) in current marine insurance law, historical and practical reasons for 
reform, milestones of insurance law reform since the first documentation, and the 
proposals presented by the Law Commissions and provisional achievements in both 
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consumer and business insurance reform. It has been found that the tendency of 
new legislation is to provide more protection to an innocent insured and a 
compensatory and proportionate remedy to insurers in cases of negligent non-
disclosure/misrepresentation. Additionally, the duty of disclosing information before 
the conclusion of the insurance contract is retained in business insurance. The Law 
Commission also proposes to modify the materiality test and a reasonable insured 
test is recommended to replace the current prudent insurer test.   
With a one hundred year old statute, and a leading position in the worldwide 
shipping industry, the UK is competent to pioneer the reform of insurance, especially 
within the marine insurance industry. Although there are still some voices against 
reform and huge changes in practice, the government expresses a determination in 
reforming since the first launch of the Scoping Paper in 2006. Without any doubts, 
this is a distant and tough task for both legislators and insurance practitioners.  
However, people must not underestimate the powers of both judicial precedent and 
the insurance market in the context of post-legislative revision. A revolution in marine 
insurance law seems inevitable. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PRE-CONTRACT UTMOST GOOD FAITH IN CHINESE MARINE INSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS AND PRACTICE IN 
ENGLISH LAW 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The origin of Chinese legal system can be dated back to customary law in Xia and 
Shang Dynasty. It was further developed in the Western Zhou Dynasty, the Spring 
and Autumn Period, the Qin Dynasty, the Han Dynasty, the Three Kingdoms, the 
Two Jins and Northern and Southern Dynasties, Sui and the Tang Dynasty, the Song, 
Liao, Jin and Yuan Dynasties, the Ming Dynasty, the Qing Dynasty, and the Chinese 
People’s Democratic Temporary Regime.430 The early format of the new Chinese 
legal philosophy was not formed until the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949. 431  Scholars with consensus consider China as a civil law country. 432 
However, after a closer observation of the political and social factors in China, it can 
be concluded that the current Chinese law is one type of Socialist law.433 But, all in 
all then, Chinese law is still considered to be in the civil law system, which is mainly 
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influenced by Roman law, and this also leads to the main divergences between the 
legal systems in the UK and China.434 
In China, the insurance industry was not really opened to the international market 
till 1992, with the return of foreign investments.435 Especially after the entry into the 
World Trade Organization in 2001, there was a dramatic increase in the number of 
foreign investment insurance companies emerging in the Chinese market, which 
shaped the national competition market. Accordingly, a systematic and 
comprehensive insurance legislation with international standards (including 
international conventions and practice) is desired. In the modern history of Chinese 
maritime law, with the promulgation of the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1992, 436  Chinese marine insurance law was finalized as one special 
chapter.437 
On the basis of the marine insurance articles of CMC and relevant general laws, it 
is revealed that the duty of ‘utmost good faith’ has never been recognized by statutes 
or judicial interpretations. However, the duty of ‘good faith’ is statutorily 
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recognised. 438  Despite this, the leading academic still states that there is no 
substantial difference between these two terms.439 Meanwhile, other academics are 
affirmatively trying to transplant this doctrine from English common law to Chinese 
law. This is embodied by the Recommendations, Statutes and Explanations on the 
Amendments of Chinese Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China 
(Recommendations), published by the project team under the Ministry of 
Communications of the PRC in 2003.440 Under this documentation, section 17 of the 
MIA 1906 is suggested to be respected and followed by Chinese marine insurance 
law in the future, which raises debates on the practicability of a common law model in 
a civil country, and also of the English model’s inherent defects.               
Firstly, this chapter introduces the current situation of the duty of (utmost) good 
faith in Chinese law by detailing its main contents as implied by leading codes. 
Secondly, it examines the pre-contractual duty of disclosure imposed on the insurer, 
including the insurer’s duty of lawful operation, pre-contract disclosure and 
explanation. Thirdly, it examines the assured’s pre-contract duty of disclosure and 
application in practice. Fourthly, it examines legal consequences and remedies of 
good faith breach in Chinese law. All these issues are observed against the backdrop 
of English law, although a comprehensive comparative study is provided in the 
concluding chapter. Additionally, for the sake of providing a more comprehensive 
analysis of the duty of utmost good faith in Chinese law, several notable common law 
and Chinese maritime law cases will be referred to where appropriate. 
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4.2. Duty of utmost good faith in Chinese law 
4.2.1. Chinese maritime law – leading codes 
In China, marine insurance contracts are mainly governed by Chapter XII of CMC. 
Chapter XII, titled as the Contract of Marine Insurance, is one essential component of 
the CMC, which was drafted with reference to relevant international legislation, 
especially the MIA 1906 in the UK and a combination of international and Chinese 
marine insurance practices. Chapter XII of CMC consists of 41 articles in 6 sections, 
including the General Provisions; Conclusion, Termination and Assignment of 
Contract; Obligation of the Insured; Liability of the Insurer; Loss of or Damage to the 
Subject Matter Insured and Abandonment; and Limitation Period for claims. 
Apart from the CMC, the other statutory legislation, such as the Insurance Law of 
the PRC 2009 (CIL 2009), 441  the Contract Law of the PRC (Chinese Contract 
Law),442 and the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC 1986 (General Principles 
of Civil Law) shall be applied in marine insurance disputes in cases where there is no 
such provision in the CMC.443 Since there is no individual branch of marine insurance 
law, the superiority order of the statutes can be questioned. Originally, scholars could 
only find traces through some particular pieces of legislations and make deductions 
on the basis of legal science. In practice, the legal effect of CMC, CIL 2009, Chinese 
Contract Law, and the General Principles of Civil law is in a descending order. 
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Firstly, according to article 147 of the CIL 1995 (article 184 of the CIL 2009), marine 
insurance contracts should be governed by the relevant provisions of CMC. The 
matters which are not provided by the CMC shall be governed by the relevant 
provision of the CIL 2009. Secondly, compared to the other statutes, the CMC is 
construed as a special law in cases of marine issues, and therefore CMC has 
primacy. Nevertheless, the CMC and CIL 2009 were passed to resolve special 
issues in insurance, but are not sufficient to deal with general issues in contract law 
and civil law. Thus, Chinese Contract Law and the General Principles of Civil Law 
shall be invoked as a further resort. Despite the lack of legislation to regulate the 
enforcement of these main statutes in marine insurance area, it has been widely 
recognized that the legal effect of CMC, CIL, Chinese Contract Law, and General 
Principles of Civil law is in a descending order.  
Superiority was finally clarified with a promulgation of the Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues about the Trial of Cases Concerning 
Marine Insurance Disputes in 2006 (Supreme People’s Court Provisions 2006),444 
which stipulates that the trial of cases involving the disputes regarding marine 
insurance contracts shall be governed by the Maritime Law. If there is no such 
provision in the Maritime Law, the Insurance Law shall apply. Furthermore, if there is 
no such provision in the previous two statutes, the Contract Law and the other 
relevant laws shall apply.445 As a matter of fact, article 1 of the Supreme Court’s 
Provisions is legalizing the practice adopted in China through further statutory 
legislation. However, the announcement of these Provisions is still deemed to occupy 
a decisive position during the reforming process of marine insurance legislation. 
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Subsequently, the revised CIL 2009 reaffirms the enforcement order of these leading 
laws.446 
Nevertheless, some commentators have expressed their concerns regarding the 
enforcement of these statutes in practice.447 Most issues revolve around the issue as 
to whether it is appropriate to extend the general law to special matters. In particular, 
uncertainty in law lies in whether general Chinese insurance law can deal with the 
special marine insurance disputes sufficiently in cases where the latter involves more 
international and foreign elements.  
 
4.2.2. Duty of utmost good faith in Chinese law 
Distinguished from the MIA 1906, there is no principal provision expressed about 
the duty of utmost good faith in the CMC or the other leading laws in China. However, 
traces of ‘good faith’ can be found in the provisions of CIL (both 1985 and 2009), 
Chinese Contract Law, and the General Principles of Civil Law. Article 5 of CIL 2009 
stipulates that the principle of ‘good faith’ must be observed by the parties to an 
insurance contract. Additionally, articles 42 and 60 of the Chinese Contract Law also 
clarify this principle. On the basis of article 42, a party shall be liable for damages 
caused by bad faith under the pretext of concluding a contract during the negotiation; 
concealing a material fact relating to the conclusion of the contract, or supplying false 
information intentionally; or, any other conduct which violates the principle of good 
faith. Article 60 of the same law further provides that the parties shall observe the 
duty of good faith during the performance of their obligations which primarily include 
notification, assistance, and confidentiality. Moreover, article 4 of the General 
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Principles of Civil Law also notes that in civil activities, the principles of voluntariness, 
fairness, making compensation for equal value, honesty and credibility shall be 
observed.  
Despite the absence of statutory evidence, for providing the legal position of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith in China, it is still widely recognized by some Chinese 
scholars and judiciary that it is one of the basic principles of insurance contracts, and 
one of the important distinctions between insurance contracts and other general 
contracts.448 One seminal Chinese case referring to the concept of utmost good faith 
duty is The Tony Best,449 in which the Guangzhou Maritime Court expressed its 
confirmation of the said principle.  
This is a case concerning the renewal of an insurance contract. In this case, the 
assured failed to disclose vital defects of the insured vessel (Tony Best): it lacked 
spare facilities; the ballast system was so heavily rusted that it could not release 
water; only one generator was working in the engine room; and, the remaining 
facilities were heavily worn since the commencement of the first insurance contract 
covering 1992. All these defects had been reported to the ship manager before the 
negotiation of the first contract covering 1992. Because of this undisclosed 
information, Tony Best grounded five times during her voyages, and finally sank 
because the engine room flooded with sea water. All these losses occurred under the 
renewed contract covering 1993. The judgement held that the assured definitely 
breached the duty of utmost good faith, and the insurance company had the right to 
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avoid this contract and deny the liability under the insurance contract. Nevertheless, 
this case occurred before the enforcement of the CMC 1992. The judgement was 
made, therefore, to a large extent based on the contractual clauses which stated that 
the disputes concerning this contract should be governed by English law, including 
the MIA 1906. This judgment has also been considered to have been made 
according to article 7 of the Regulations of the PRC on Contracts of Property 
Insurance, which stipulates that any non-disclosure, concealment or 
misrepresentation by the insured of the material circumstances would cause the 
insurer to be entitled to rescind the contract of insurance or disclaim liability. 
This statement is subsequently supported by the Recommendations. Clause 313 
of the Recommendations proposes that ‘if either party does not observe the duty of 
utmost good faith, the contract may be avoided by the other party’, which is much 
identical to section 17 of the MIA 1906. One reason why there is a tendency to 
introduce this doctrine to China is the massive influence of English maritime law on 
the global marine industry. However, some other scholars question whether the 
English utmost good faith doctrine is compatible with the Chinese legal system.450 
This is analysed in the concluding chapter. 
In short, the duty of utmost good faith has no legal position in Chinese law unless 
it is recognized by judicial interpretations issued by the People’s Supreme Court of 
the PRC, or by new law.  
 
                                               
450
 Zuoxian Zhu and Dong Li, ‘Should the Principle of Utmost Good Faith be adopted in CMC?– 
Theoretical Recommendations on the Principle of Utmost Good Faith in the Marine Insurance Law’ 
(Chinese version), (2003) 14 ACML, pp. 55-68. 
110 
 
4.2.3. Duty of disclosure in Chinese law – both marine and non-marine 
insurance 
In accordance with the articles under Chinese law analysed previously, the duty of 
disclosure is imposed on both parties to an insurance contract in China. Considering 
its reciprocal and continuing nature, one might ask whether it is voluntary or not in 
both marine and non-marine insurance areas as well. 
The nature of the duty of disclosure in Chinese law can vary. In marine insurance, 
article 222 of the CMC adopts a similar clause to section 18 of the MIA 1906, 
stipulating that all the material circumstances should be disclosed to the insurer 
before the contract is concluded.451 The similarities between these two provisions 
contribute the first reasoning to deduce that the duty of disclosure is also an 
unlimited voluntary obligation in Chinese insurance law. Further, the second 
paragraph of article 222 confirms this assumption listing certain exceptions in which 
some information does not need to be disclosed in the absence of inquiry.452 One 
might have the view that the exceptions only exist logically with the precondition that 
the duty of disclosure is one unlimited voluntary duty; otherwise, they would become 
redundant under the circumstance of an inquiring duty mechanism.453 
As to the nature of this duty in general insurance law, article 16(1) of CIL 2009 
provides a clear and certain answer to this question. In accordance with the 
language in this clause, an insurer may raise questions concerning relevant details of 
the insured subject matter, or of the assured, and the proposer shall truthfully inform 
                                               
451
 Paragraph 1, article 222 of CMC stipulates that before the contract is concluded, the insured shall 
truthfully inform the insurer of the material circumstances which the insured has knowledge or ought to 
have knowledge of in his ordinary business practice and which may have a bearing on the insurer in 
deciding the premium or whether be agrees to insure or not.  
452
 Paragraph 2, article 222 of CMC notes that the insured need not inform the insurer of the facts 
which the insurer has known of or the insurer ought to have knowledge of in his ordinary business 
practice about which the insurer made no inquiry. 
453
 The inquiring duty of disclosure in general Chinese insurance law is also supported by Jing Zhen, 
‘Insured’s duty of disclosure and test of materiality in marine and non-marine insurance laws in China’, 
(2006) Oct JBL, pp. 681-704, at p. 688. 
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the insurer of such details. On this basis, in general insurance law in China, the 
insured is required to observe an inquiring duty of disclosure.454 This can be said to 
be quite similar to the current circumstance after the statutory reform achieved from 
the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 in English 
law.455 
 
4.2.4. Relationship between the duty of disclosure and good faith in Chinese 
marine insurance law 
Under Chinese law, the duty of utmost good faith seems to have been formulated 
by the statements of some courts and scholars with the absence of legislative 
support. Despite this essential difference between the duty of good faith and utmost 
good faith in two countries, the relationship between the duty of disclosure and 
utmost good faith seems to be identical as well.  
In the current English law, and specifically in terms of sections 17-20 under the 
MIA 1906, the doctrine of utmost good faith consists of voluntary disclosure and 
truthful representation. As a result, the subsequent discussions and theories 
regarding this doctrine are based on this premise. 456  However, the duty of 
representation is not separated from the duty of disclosure clearly in Chinese law. 
One obvious factor that contributes to the distinctions between English law and 
Chinese law concerning this dispute is the statutory language itself. All the previously 
discussed Chinese statutes are drafted and enacted in Chinese, which leads to the 
                                               
454
 Zhen, ‘Insured’s duty of disclosure and test of materiality in marine and non-marine insurance laws 
in China’ in JBL, p. 682. 
455
 Section 2, Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. In terms of the 
detailed comparisons between these two jurisdictions, see the General Conclusion chapter below. 
456
 However, at common law or in equity, disclosure duty has never been recognized as a matter of 
general contract law. Also see Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance. After the full coming into force 
of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, the assured’s duty of 
disclosure will be applied to business insurance but abolished in consumer insurance. For details, see 
chapters 3 and 4. 
112 
 
shortage of an official or authorised English version. This also raises difficulties in the 
matter of comparative research. However, one leading Chinese scholar states that in 
relation to the manner adopted by the MIA 1906, the duty of disclosure in the CMC 
actually covers both the duties of disclosure and representation in English law.457 
 
4.3. Pre-contractual duty of disclosure in Chinese maritime law 
Currently, articles 222 and 223 of CMC address the duty of disclosure in China, 
detailing its main contents.458 As mentioned earlier, in addition to the CMC, article 5 
in CIL 2009, articles 42 and 60 in Chinese Contract Law, and also article 4 in the 
General Principles of Civil Law, can be invoked in a descending order in cases where 
there are no such provisions in CMC. In order to provide a more comprehensive 
analysis of the disclosure regime in China, the following paragraphs are divided into 
topics. These are, the duration and legal nature of pre-contractual disclosure, 
information requiring disclosure and limits imposed, consequences and remedies for 
non-disclosure.      
                                               
457
 Wang, The Law of Marine Insurance, p. 81. 
458
 Article 222 of CMC stipulates that: 
    ‘Before the contract is concluded, the insured shall truthfully inform the insurer of the 
material circumstances which the insured has knowledge or ought to have knowledge of in 
his ordinary business practice and which may have a bearing on the insurer in deciding the 
premium or whether be agrees to insure or not.  
    The insured need not inform the insurer of the facts which the insurer has known of or 
the insurer ought to have knowledge of in his ordinary business practice if about which the 
insurer made no inquiry.’ 
    Article 223 of CMC stipulates that:  
    ‘Upon failure of the insured to truthfully inform the insurer of the material circumstances 
set forth in paragraph 1 of Article 222 of this Code due to his intentional act, the insurer has 
the right to terminate the contract without refunding the premium. The insurer shall not be 
liable for any loss arising from the perils insured against before the contract is terminated; 
    If, not due to the insured's intentional act, the insured did not truthfully inform the insurer 
of the material circumstances set out in paragraph 1 of Article 222 of this Code, the insurer 
has the right to terminate the contract or to demand a corresponding increase in the 
premium; 
    In case the contract is terminated by the insurer, the insurer shall be liable for the loss 
arising from the perils insured against which occurred prior to the termination of the 
contract, except where the material circumstances uninformed or wrongly informed of have 
an impact on the occurrence of such perils.’ 
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4.3.1. Duration of the pre-contractual duty of disclosure 
In accordance with article 222 of CMC, before the contract is concluded, the 
insured shall voluntarily truthfully inform the insurer of the material circumstances 
which the insured has knowledge of or ought to have knowledge of in his ordinary 
business practice. This may have a bearing on the insurer’s decision regarding the 
premium, or whether he agrees to insure or not. First of all, the end of the duty of 
pre-contractual disclosure in Chinese law is analogous to the manner adopted in 
English law. For English marine insurance law, section 18(1) of the MIA 1906 
provides that all the material circumstance must be disclosed before the conclusion 
of the contract. Section 20(1) of the same statute echoes that all the material 
representations must be made by the insured or his agent, during the negotiations for 
the contract, and before the contract is concluded. The duty of pre-contractual 
disclosure therefore ceases on the conclusion of the contract in both Chinese law 
and English law unless the contract otherwise provides. 
Secondly, apart from the analogous phrases adopted by both provisions, the 
implied practices concerning the duty of disclosure in two countries are similar as 
well. In English law, it is an essential condition of the policy of insurance that the 
insurers shall be treated by the insured with utmost good faith during the steps taken 
from the beginning of the negotiation to the conclusion of the insurance contract.459 
In Chinese law, it seems that CMC has no such express provision clarifying the 
duration of the duty of disclosure, but it is recognized that this duty should be 
observed during the whole negotiation process.460 To sum up, in both English and 
                                               
459
 Sections 18-20, MIA 1906. 
460
 Wang, The Law of Marine Insurance, p. 79. 
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Chinese law, the duty of disclosure can be considered in two stages: the pre- and 
post-contractual duty of disclosure.461 
Therefore, increasing practical disputes lie in applying the duty of disclosure to 
some post-contractual areas, for instance, whether the material and fundamental 
changes should be informed to the insurer before accepting an offer of renewal. But 
in practice, the additional duty of disclosing significant changes to the subject matter 
of the contract is written into the contract itself, to warn the policyholder of the need 
to protect their positions by keeping the insurer informed.462 Apart from applying the 
renewal of insurance, the post-contractual duty of disclosure is also applied when 
considering cover for reinsurance, when a vessel intends to enter an additional 
premium area under a trading warranty, when tendering a change of voyage 
endorsement, and when required by a held covered clause and, possibly, a 
cancellation clause.463 The application of the duty of disclosure especially the post-
contractual duty to the aforesaid specific issues is elaborated on below. 
 
4.3.2. Legal nature – mutuality 
Again, exactly as in section 18 in the MIA 1906, the duty of disclosure appears to 
be imposed on the insureds, solely based on the literal meaning of articles 221 and 
222 of CMC.  
                                               
461
 For English law, see the following cases regarding the continuing duty discussion: Black King 
Shipping Corporation v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437; Bank of Nova Scotia v 
Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (The Good Luck) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 514; [1989] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 238; [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191, HL. 
462
 Rob Thoyts, Insurance Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2010), p. 37. In English law, the 
Explanatory Notes of the Draft Bill for the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012 confirms that although there is no explicit reference to renewals, renewals are covered as in law 
these are regarded as new contracts, see the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 
Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Joint Report with Draft Bill), 
p. 149. 
463
 Hodges, Cases and Materials on Marine Insurance Law, p. 218. 
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However, in English law, section 17 of the MIA 1906 and the subsequent cases 
are used as an aid to fix the defects left by the codification.464 In addition to the Act 
itself, some precedents also reaffirm the mutual legal nature of this duty. 465  In 
Chinese law, there is no such provision concerning the duty of disclosure’s mutual 
nature in CMC itself. One Chinese judge thus alleges that in marine insurance law, 
the duty of disclosure is unilateral and only the insured is obliged to disclose material 
information.466 But, its mutuality is confirmed in some other Codes regarding general 
insurance contracts and general contracts, such as, article 5 of CIL 2009. 467 
Additionally, article 6 of Chinese Contract Law provides that the parties shall observe 
the principle of honesty and good faith in exercising their rights and performing their 
obligations. Article 60 of Chinese Contract Law and article 4 of the General Principles 
of Civil law also impose a general good faith requirement for the performance of a 
contract.468 All these provisions abovementioned provide powerful statutory evidence 
that the duty of disclosure and even good faith is also mutual in Chinese law.  
Apart from the statutory evidence, in the practice of admiralty trials in China, it has 
been held that the insurer should abide by the duty of disclosure as well.469 In Ying 
Zhilong v China Pacific Insurance Company Hangzhou Branch,470 the first instance 
court stated that because the insurer did not disclose the exclusion clauses to the 
insured before the conclusion of the insurance contract, the insurer was judged to be 
                                               
464
 Section 17 of MIA 1906 stipulates that the duty of utmost good faith needs to be observed by either 
party otherwise the contract is avoidable, confirming the mutuality of this duty. 
465
 For example, Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, p. 1910, per Lord Mansfield; Banque Keyser 
Ullmann v Scandia [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69, p. 93, per Steyn J. See chapter one above for detailed 
discussions. 
466
 Zhangjun Li, ‘Comparative Study on the Duty of Disclosure between China and England’ (Chinese 
version), (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law, 2003) issue 5 JCL, p. 18. 
467
 See § 4.2.2 above. 
468
 Li, ‘Comparative Study on the Duty of Disclosure between China and England’ in JCL, p. 18. 
469
 Ibid. 
470
 Ibid. 
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in breach of the duty of explanation,471 and therefore should be responsible for the 
indemnification of the damages caused.472 
 
4.3.3. Contents of insurer’s duty of disclosure and recommendations 
Compared to the regime of duty of utmost good faith in English law, the insurer’s 
duty in Chinese law is distinctive. Firstly, in Chinese law, the insurer’s duty of good 
faith introduces the duty of lawful operation, which is not specified as such by the 
MIA 1906. In doing this, the legislator provided the maximum protection to the 
assured during the insurance transactions. In other words, the insurer’s duty of good 
faith in Chinese law can be divided into the duty of lawful operation and disclosure, 
among which the latter is mainly embodied by the duty of pre-contractual duty of 
disclosure, duty of explanation and post-contractual duty of disclosure. Secondly, 
according to articles 222 and 223 of the CMC, the duty of disclosure is only imposed 
on the assured. Inevitably, these two provisions transfer a false image that this duty 
is not applicable to the insurer. Given this, other general provisions referring to the 
insurer’s obligation of good faith and disclosure should be introduced in this part, 
especially the provisions under CIL 2009 and Chinese Contract Law.  
 
                                               
471
 The duty of explanation is specified as one aspect of the insurer’s duty of disclosure, which is 
discussed below.  
472
 Although this judgment was withdrawn by the High People’s Court of Zhejiang later in the appellate 
case on other grounds, it still can be concluded that the reciprocity of the duty of disclosure is not 
challengeable in Chinese law.  
    In the High People’s Court judgment, the legal reasoning for rejecting the first instance court 
judgment is that the insured had known that the Vessel was unseaworthy at the commencement of the 
voyage but failed to perform contractual obligations. This led to the loss caused by the preventable 
incident afterwards, and the insured used unseaworthiness as a defence to claim that the exclusion 
clauses were not foreseeable. The High People’s Court judges’ stated that the insured breached the 
duty of utmost good faith and thus should not be awarded the damages caused. 
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4.3.3.1. Duty of lawful operation 
4.3.3.1.1. Legal management in Chinese law 
The status of the duty of lawful operation is not stipulated by any clause in the 
CMC but implied by provisions of CIL 2009 as a principal provision applicable to the 
insurance industry in the entirety of China.  
In the CIL 2009, the general duty of lawful operation by the insurer is dispersed in 
most chapters.473 Firstly, the general provisions require that the contractual parties 
should conduct insurance activities complying with laws, administrative regulations, 
social moralities, public interests,474 and the duty of good faith.475 The insurance 
industry should be supervised by the insurance regulatory department under the 
State Council of the PRC. 476  In addition to the general concept of this duty, 
subsequent subsections provide further demands for the insurance company, 
detailing its establishment and registration, legal structure, 477  management and 
supervision,478 and legal obligations.479 
 
4.3.3.1.2. Statutory and regulatory management in English insurance industry 
In English law, section 41 of the MIA 1906 only imposes a statutory obligation to 
perform the implied warranty of legality on the assured in order to ensure the insured 
adventure is carried out in a lawful manner. At common law certain types of contracts 
are considered to be illegal or void because they are against public policy, 480 
                                               
473
 Chinese Insurance Law 2009 consists of eight chapters, chapters 1, 3, 4, 6-8 all refer to the 
insurer’s duty of lawful operation. 
474
 Articles 4, 6, CIL 2009. 
475
 Article 5, CIL 2009. 
476
 Article 9, CIL 2009. 
477
 Chapter 3, CIL 2009. 
478
 Chapters 3, 4 and 6, CIL 2009. 
479
 Chapter 7, CIL 2009. 
480
 MacIntyre, Business Law, pp. 168-169. 
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although there is no express specialized provision regarding the lawful management 
of an insurance company. In doing this, it seems that the insured is put in a 
disadvantageous position in statutes.     
Apart from the MIA 1906, in English business and insurance industry, some other 
self-regulations are established to scrutinize the management of general business 
and enable customers to settle disputes without going to court, such as, the 
Statements of Practice, the original FSA Rules, 481  the FCA Handbook, 482  FOS 
scheme, and ABI Code of Practice. Actually, the inappropriate role of this soft-law 
scheme is still a controversial issue, since the Law Commission has strongly 
criticized the use of self-regulation rather than statutory reform. This is because the 
former’s voluntary nature (especially the Statements of Practice), would lead them to 
be ignored.483 However, another authoritative institution, the ABI, alleged that the 
greater degree of flexibility provided by the original FSA solutions and FOS 
statements should not be stifled by reform by way of primary legislation.484 
The Statement of General Insurance Practice was issued by the British Insurance 
Association (BIA, predecessor to the ABI) and Lloyd’s in 1977. This was followed 
later in the same year by the Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice. They were 
then amended and strengthened in 1986. In the year of 2005, the 1986 General 
                                               
481
 For example, the original FSA Handbook: the Perimeter Guidance Manual, Statements of Principle 
and Code of Practice for Approved Persons, Fit and proper Test for Approved Persons, Threshold 
conditions, Principles for Businesses, Senior Management Arrangements Systems and Controls, 
Supervision Manual, New Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook, Prudential Sourcebooks 
relevant to insurers, General Prudential Sourcebook, Prudential Sourcebook for Insurers, Interim 
Prudential Sourcebook for Insurers, Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual, the Fee Manual. 
482
 The FCA Rules include: the Glossary, High Level Standards, Prudential Standards, Business 
Standards (especially the ICOBS), Regulatory Processes, Redress, Specialist sourcebooks, Listing, 
Prospectus and Disclosure, Handbook Guides, and Regulatory Guides. 
483
 The Law Commission, Insurance Law: Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty, pp. 27-29, cited by 
the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract 
Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Joint Report with Draft Bill), p. 19.    
484
 ABI’s Response to the English and Scottish Law Commission’s Issues Paper on Micro-Businesses 
(July 2009), cited by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Insurance 
Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Joint Report with Draft Bill). 
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Insurance Practice was withdrawn.485 Nevertheless, it is still an influential document 
because the FOS has created its own approach based on it. On the basis of the text 
of both Statements, 486  it is found that they are silent in respect to the lawful 
management of an insurance company. However, the clauses regarding non-
disclosure and misrepresentation are discussed below.  
The FOS was established by Part 16 and Schedule 17 of the Financial Services 
and Market Act 2000 (FisMA 2000) and section 59 of the Consumer Credit Act 2006 
to replace eight existing dispute-resolution mechanisms as a single complaints-
handling body. The FOS is considered by the Law Commission to offer the only 
realistic method and a free opportunity of redress to most consumers.487 Otherwise, 
according to the Law Commission’s report, the courts would be forced to apply the 
unfair law to deal with referred disputes.488 Additionally, the FOS approach to non-
disclosure and misrepresentation is described to go further than the other regulations 
(the original FSA rules and Statements of Practice) because it abolishes the duty to 
disclose and invokes proportionate remedies for acts for negligent misrepresentation, 
which is discussed in chapters concerning the duty of disclosure and correct 
representation.489 The rules setting out how the FOS should handle complaints were 
published in a part of the FSA’s book, in the section called Dispute resolution: 
complaints. 490  Since these rules are created to guide the FOS’s resolutions to 
                                               
485
 For a history of the Statements of Practice, see the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission (July 2007), A Joint Consultation Paper, Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach 
of Warranty by the Insured (CP 1), Appendix A. 
486
 Full text can be found in Appendices B and C of the Issues Paper 1, the Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission, Issues Paper 1, Misrepresentation and Non-disclosure. 
487
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract 
Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Joint Report with Draft Bill), p. 21. 
488
 Ibid. 
489
 It is found that the approach adopted by the FOS in consumer insurance is finally strengthened by 
the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, which is expounded in chapter 3.  
490
 Available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook, accessed in January 2013. This site is no 
longer updated. 
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referred disputes against the insurer and intermediary, it is not worth outlining its 
main provisions in this chapter. 
Principally, FisMA 2000, the Financial Services Act 2012 and related regulations 
are trying to modify the whole operation of an insurance company from the 
authorisation phrase, its ownership and management, to scrutinise the performance 
of controlled activities. In order to carry on insurance business in the UK, 
authorisation is required. First of all, based on Parts 1 and 2 of the Financial Services 
Act 2012 and Parts III and IV of FiSMA 2000, there are two main routes for 
authorisation to carry on a regulated activity.491 These are, applying through the 
regulated persons (FCA, PRA and a European Economic Area operator) to get a 
permission;492  besides, the applicant must satisfy certain threshold conditions.493 
Otherwise, a person who contravenes the general prohibition could be guilty of, and 
liable on a criminal offence, which is discussed below. In addition to the general 
authorisation requirement, the original FSA rules, Financial Services Act 2012, 
FiSMA 2000, FCA’s online resources and FCA Handbook also provide detailed 
application and authorisation process.494 
Originally, the ‘approved persons’ regime was developed by FiSMA 2000 to 
regulate the ownership and management of insurance companies. This Act 
                                               
491
 The list of regulated activities requiring authorisation is contained in Chapter III of The Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001. Based on article 10, effecting and 
carrying out a contract of insurance are specified as regulated activities. Besides, Chapter XIII lays 
down three kinds of activities in relation to Lloyd’s, including advice on syndicate participation at 
Lloyd’s (section 56), managing the underwriting capacity of a Lloyd’s syndicate (section 57), and 
arranging deals in contracts of insurance written at Lloyd’s (section 58).          
492
 For the current FCA Handbook, see section 9H, Part 1A, Part 1 of the Financial Services Act 2012. 
For the original FSA Handbook, see James Bateson, ‘Authorisation of UK, EEA and Overseas 
Insurance Companies’, in John Young, et al., A Practitioner’s Guide to the FSA Regulation of 
Insurance (3
rd
 ed., City & Finance Publishing, 2008), p. 46.   
493
 See section 55B, Chapter 3, Part 4A, Part 2, and Schedule 6 of the Financial Services 2012. For 
the original FSA rules, see Bateson, ‘Authorisation of UK, EEA and Overseas Insurance Companies’, 
in Young, et al., A Practitioner’s Guide to the FSA Regulation of Insurance, p. 47. 
494
 For example, Chapter 1H(8)b, and section 55K, Chapter 3, Part 4A, Part 2 of the Financial 
Services Act 2012; section 51(3) of FiSMA 2000; and Appendix 2.12 of Supervision (SUP) of the FSA 
Handbook. 
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introduced an entirely new system compared with the previous regime under the 
Insurance Companies Act 1982. According to FiSMA 2000 and the original FSA 
Handbook, those who want to carry on regulated activities must be approved by the 
authority individually (initially this is FSA).495 Besides, section 13, Chapter 3, Part 4A, 
Part 2 of the Financial Services Act 2012 and Part V of FiSMA 2000 regulate the 
performance of regulated activities, which include the issue of a prohibition order to 
prohibit the individual from performing a specified function by the regulators if it 
appears that this individual is not a fit and proper person to perform this controlled 
function, 496 and the approval details of authorisation. 497  Additionally, some 
circumstances are stated which an authorised person could be sued by the injured 
                                               
495
 For details of the original FSA rules, see Katherine Coates and Hilary Evenett, ‘Ownership and 
Management of Insurance Companies’, in Young, et al., A Practitioner’s Guide to the FSA Regulation 
of Insurance, p. 111. 
496
 According to section 13, Chapter 3, Part 4A, Part 2 of the Financial Services Act 2012, (f)or 
subsection (1) substitute –  
‘(1) The FCA may make a prohibition order if it appears to it that an individual is not a fit 
and proper person to perform functions in relation to a regulated activity carried on by –  
(a) an authorised person, 
(b) a person who is an exempt person in relation to that activity, or 
(c) a person to whom, as a result of Part 20, the general prohibition does not apply in 
relation to that activity. 
(1A) The PRA may make a prohibition order if it appears to it that an individual is not a fit 
and proper person to perform functions in relation to a regulated activity carried on by –  
(a) a PRA-authorised person, or 
(b) a person who is an exempt person in relation to a PRA-regulated activity carried on 
by the person.’ 
Section 56 of FiSMA 2000 stipulates that: 
‘(1). Subsection (2) applies if it appears to the Authority that an individual is not a fit and 
proper person to perform functions in relation to a regulated activity carried on by an 
authorised person. 
(2).The Authority may make an order (“a prohibition order”) prohibiting the individual from 
performing a specified function, any function falling within a specified description or any 
function. 
(3) A prohibition order may relate to –  
    (a) a specified regulated activity, any regulated activity falling within a specified 
description or all regulated activities; 
    (b) authorised persons generally or any person within a specified class of authorised 
person.’  
497
 Based on section 14, Chapter 3, Part 4A, Part 2 of the Financial Services Act 2012, and sections 
59(1) and (2) of FiSMA 2000, an authorised person must take reasonable care to ensure that no 
person performs a controlled function under an agreement entered into by this authorised person (or a 
contractor of the authorised person) unless the appropriate regulator approves.    
122 
 
party who suffers loss caused by this individual’s misconduct, 498  which will be 
discussed below. 
In respect to the supervision of insurance companies, Part 2 of the Financial 
Services Act 2012 first of all confirms the regulatory position of the FCA and PRA,499 
listing their general duties,500 objectives,501 corporate governance,502 arrangements 
for consulting practitioners and consumers, 503  reviews 504  and right to obtain 
documents and information. 505  The Financial Services Act 2012 lists out FCA’s 
objectives as being the protection of consumers, integrity, competition, strategy,506 
combined with the overall principles applying to general business and insurance 
industry set out by the FCA Handbook. 
After being nominated as the single rule-maker of the financial services industry, 
the FSA issued the FSA Handbook to guide and regulate firms. Afterwards, the FSA 
stated its intention to shift its Handbook towards principles-based regulation. Firstly, 
PRIN set out the high-level principles with which all authorised firms must comply.507 
A couple of them can be discussed combining with the duty of good faith and lawful 
management, for example, principle 2 required the firm to conduct its business with 
due skill, care and diligence. Principle 3 requested the firm to take reasonable care to 
organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk 
management systems. High-level principles 6 and 8 demanded that the authorised 
firms must pay due regards to the interests of its customer and treat them fairly, and 
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 See sections 13 and 14 of Chapter 3, Part 4A, Part 2 of the Financial Services Act 2012 and 
sections 56(6), 59(1) or (2), 71, FiSMA 2000. 
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 Section 1A, Chapter 1 and section 2A, Chapter 2, Part 1A, Part 2, Financial Services Act 2012. 
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 Sections 1B; 1M, Chapter 1; 2H, Chapter 2, Part 1A, Part 2, Financial Services Act 2012. 
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 Sections 1C-F, Chapter 1, Part 1A, Part 2, Financial Services Act 2012. 
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 Available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook, accessed in January 2013. This site is no 
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manage the conflicts between different parties. Principle 11 required the firm to deal 
with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and disclose to the FSA 
appropriately anything relating to the firm of which the FSA would reasonably expect 
notice.  
In addition to the high-level principles in PRIN applied to all authorised firms, the 
FSA Handbook also set out some detailed rules for high-risk products, such as, the 
Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS) which was designed for all 
general insurance business, for example, car insurance. The ICOBS is continued by 
the FCA handbook subject to some corrections. Currently, ICOBS 2.2.2R requires 
the insurance firms to communicate information to a customer or other policyholder 
in a clear, fair and not misleading way. Besides, chapter 4 of ICOBS deals with the 
communication of the information about the firm, its services and remuneration. For 
example, firms are required to provide the customer with at least its status disclosure 
(including its name and address), scope of service, and fee disclosure. In respect to 
a general insurance contract, the firms are expected to disclose the law applicable to 
the contract, the arrangements for handling policyholders’ complaints concerning 
contracts prior to the conclusion of an insurance contract,508 and the right to cancel a 
policy.509 Chapter 8 also stipulates that the insurer must handle claims promptly and 
fairly and not unreasonably reject a claim.510 
The ICOBS of the FCA Handbook is mainly dealing with non-investment 
insurance.511 ICOBS 1 Annex 1 modifies its general application rule according to the 
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type of firm, its activities and its location.512 Additionally, special circumstances such 
as large risks, 513  reinsurance contracts, 514  and pure protection contracts 515  are 
limited and exempted from the general application rule. 
Combining with FiSMA 2000 (especially section 21), ICOBS regulates the insurer 
and intermediary’s behaviour in effecting and carrying on an insurance contract.516 
For instance, ICOBS 2.2 requires a firm to communicate information and approved 
financial promotion to a customer or other policyholder in reasonable steps, and to 
communicate it in a clear, fair and not misleading way.517 Echoing the High-level 
principle 8, ICOBS 2.3 requires a firm to manage conflicts of interest fairly between 
different parties.518 
In addition to the abovementioned sections requiring the firm to be managed with 
good faith and in a lawful manner, ICOBS imposes further requirements of duty of 
good faith on the insurers and insurance intermediaries. Chapter 4 of ICOBS is 
dealing with the disputes with respect to information about the firm, its services and 
remuneration.519 Nevertheless, this chapter only applies to insurance intermediaries 
but not insurers. ICOBS 5 requests the firm to take reasonable steps to ensure that 
                                                                                                                                                  
policyholder's health deteriorates to the extent that he cannot live independently without 
assistance and that is not expected to change; and 
(b) under which the benefits are capable of being paid for periodically for all or part of the 
period that the policyholder cannot live without assistance; 
where ‘benefits’ are services, accommodation or goods necessary or desirable for the 
continuing care of the policyholder because he cannot live independently without 
assistance.’ 
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the customer only buys a policy under which he is eligible to claim benefits,520 and 
explain the material circumstances and the effects of breaching the duty of disclosure 
to the customers.521 Furthermore, chapter 6 obliges the insurers to produce, and an 
insurance intermediary to provide, required information (such as price and 
cancellation right) to a customer. In doing this, the customer can make an informed 
decision. ICOBS 8 finally requires the insurer to handle claims promptly and fairly, 
provide reasonable guidance and appropriate information to help a policyholder 
make a claim, to not unreasonably reject a claim, and to settle claims promptly once 
settlement terms are agreed.         
 
4.3.3.1.3. Lawful operation and warranty of legality 
Combined with the implied warranty of legality obliged by section 41 under MIA 
1906, the duty of lawful operation and warranty of legality mean two different things. 
The former is applicable to general insurance, and stipulates that the establishment, 
registration and management of an insurance company must be legal from the root, 
while the latter only exists in marine insurance.522 
The duty of lawful operation embodies one aspect of the insurer’s duty of good 
faith. Furthermore, this is also a typical substantive obligation imposed by law in 
order to protect the insured’s legal benefits. In contrast, if the insurance companies 
are formed and managed without sufficient administrative or legal supervision, for 
instance, if founded on illegal purpose or if they deny the indemnification without any 
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rational reasoning, the insured’s economic benefits would be threatened and 
subsequently, the whole insurance market would suffer.523 
  
4.3.3.2. Insurer’s duty of pre-contractual disclosure 
As stated earlier, the false impression transferred by article 222 of CMC that the 
duty of disclosure is imposed on the assured only misleads both parties to neglect 
the insurer’s duty, which further causes this duty to give unprincipled support to the 
insurer.524 Therefore, the provisions in general law must be invoked so as to provide 
more control on the insurers.  
Firstly, article 42(2) of Chinese Contract Law stipulates that the party shall be 
liable for damages if he deliberately conceals important facts relating to the 
conclusion of the contract, or if he provides false information during the conclusion of 
a contract, thus causing losses to the other party. As one provision clarified by a 
general Chinese Contract Law, it undoubtedly applies to the specialized insurance 
area. However, Chinese Contract Law only covers the fraudulent concealment but 
not the non-fraudulent non-disclosure situation. Until now, the ambiguity with regard 
to the certain scope and contents of material information needed to be disclosed by 
the insurer persists in Chinese law, and we await further judicial interpretation in this 
issue. In the view of this author, since the shipping industry is becoming more world-
wide in China, international trading custom and practice should be taken into account. 
Although there is no binding precedent doctrine within the Chinese legal system, 
judgments still contribute a lot to law reform.  
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Secondly, articles 116 and 131 of CIL 2009 also impose the duty of disclosure on 
the insurance company and its employees. Based on article 116, an insurance 
company and its employees shall not conceal any material information relating to the 
marine insurance contract from the applicant. Article 131(1) and (2) of the same law 
also specify that the insurance broker, agent and some other employees shall not 
conceal any material information relating to the contract from the applicant or 
beneficiary. Furthermore, they must not hinder or deceive the applicant or beneficiary 
from performing the duty of disclosure stipulated in this law. Otherwise, the 
wrongdoer would be responsible for administrative or criminal liabilities.525 
 
4.3.3.3. Duty of explanation and recommendations 
4.3.3.3.1. Duty of explanation 
In addition to the general requirement of disclosing material information to the 
applicant and beneficiary before the conclusion of a marine insurance contract, one 
extra duty is imposed on the insurer in Chinese law, which is known as the duty of 
explanation. Due to the loophole left by CMC regarding the insurer’s duty of 
explanation, the following articles also theoretically apply to specialized marine 
insurance contracts. 
Article 17 of CIL 2009 makes the point that in cases where the insurer decides to 
adopt the standard form, the insurer shall attach the standard form to the policy, and 
explain the contract terms and conditions to the applicant. The same article further 
states that if there are any exclusion clauses imposed by the insurer, then the insurer 
shall provide sufficient notice of the existence of such exclusion clauses in the 
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proposal form, insurance policy or the other insurance documentations and give 
specific and clear explanations of this exclusion clause written or orally to the 
applicant when concluding the insurance contract. Otherwise, such clauses shall not 
be enforceable. 
Article 17 of CIL 2009 further imposes the insurer to fulfil the voluntary duty of 
explanation to the applicant. This is deemed as a remarkable advantage compared 
to the former legislation.  
In addition to specialized legislation in insurance, article 39 in Chinese Contract 
Law also requires the insurer to perform the duty of explanation under general 
contracts. This point is also the second element that distinguishes the insurer’s duty 
of disclosure in Chinese law from the statutory legislation in English law, especially 
MIA 1906. This article states that where standard terms are adopted at the time of 
concluding a contract, the party supplying the standard terms shall define the rights 
and obligations between the parties abiding by the principle of fairness. According to 
the same article, meanwhile, the clause proposer shall inform the other party to note 
the exclusion or restriction of its liabilities in a reasonable way and explain the 
standard terms upon request by the other party. The insurer’s duty to explain the 
standard form contract is not as strict as that in insurance law, at least, it is not a 
voluntary explanation now, but an inquiry duty. Even if the parties have any disputes 
over the understanding of any clause of the contract, the true meaning shall be 
determined according to the language, relevant provision, purpose, and transaction 
practices of the contract, as well as the principle of good faith.526 
In the view of this author, the duty of explanation should not be a mandatory rule 
in business marine insurance, but should only apply in cases where there are some 
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particularly problematic clauses or consumer insurance contracts. The reason for not 
setting the insurer’s duty of explanation as a mandatory rule in general marine 
insurance is that the majority of marine insurance applicants are experienced or 
supported by specialists. This renders them more knowledgeable when compared to 
the other individual customers who plan to buy their first life or property insurance. 
More importantly, the high efficiency and massive volume of information transferred 
during the marine transactions do not permit the insurer to explain everything to the 
applicants. In this situation, a duty of explanation seems to be generally redundant in 
marine insurance and it should not be required in all events. This opinion is also 
supported by some British leading scholars527 who express their reasons that in 
English law, in the absence of constraints violating contracts,528 the law treats parties 
to a contract as equals who deal with each other at arm’s length, disregarding 
differences in economic, social or political standing and strength.529 Therefore, in 
English law the insurer is generally not required to explain to the assured the terms 
of the insurance contract 530  since the assured is assumed to appreciate the 
consequences of dealing with an insurer. Under the second circumstance where the 
individual customer wants to procure a boat insurance for himself, the duty of 
explanation should be welcomed. 531  Actually in current English law, the marine 
insurance contract which is bought by an individual unrelated to business, mainly or 
wholly, is defined as consumer insurance.532 
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Yet, there is no absolute model answer for this issue because of the complexity 
and globalization of the marine industry. For instance, if one shipowner in China 
decides to effect an insurance policy at Lloyd’s in London, apart from the first 
obstacle in language, the differences between shipping practices in China and UK 
become the other barrier. In this situation, explaining the Lloyd’s standard form terms 
and exclusion clauses to the international client turns out to be necessary and crucial, 
otherwise, the misunderstanding would turn into a huge problem as long as disputes 
emerge.   
 
4.3.3.3.2. Recommendations 
Inevitably, the vexed question has been raised in China regarding the duty of 
explanation and its enforcement in the general insurance area. Most enquiries have 
questioned certain criteria of ‘clear explanation’ and insufficient sanction imposed on 
the wrongdoers. Actually, these insufficiencies are understandable. In the view of this 
author, one possible excuse might be the future burden left on the alleged applicant 
to prove that the explanation made by the insurer is not clear enough, and that the 
unclear part influences the applicant’s final decision.533 
The first obstacle is the ambiguity left regarding the exact meaning of ‘clear 
explanation’. In the view of this author, an objective ‘reasonable insured’ test can be 
introduced in this respect. In other words, insurer’s explanation can be considered to 
be clear enough for the applicant if a reasonable applicant in this individual situation 
can understand the contract terms.  
Furthermore, Chinese statutes’ silence and weakness as to the legal 
consequences of the insurer’s breach of duty of explanation may indicate that the 
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legislator intends to force the assured to bear a heavier burden than the insurer. On 
the basis of CIL 2009, the insurer’s failure of explaining the standard form contracts 
seems to have no legal consequence, and the failure of explaining the exclusion 
clauses only leads to them being avoided.534 This needs future judicial interpretation 
issued by the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC.    
One might have the view that the duty of explanation imposed on the insurer in 
both general insurance area and consumer contract in marine insurance, before the 
conclusion of the insurance contract, is a reasonable requirement. There are several 
reasons. Firstly, the wide range of would-be insureds results in irregularity in the 
basic knowledge levels. This fundamental concern happens to the individual insured 
in consumer insurance contracts. Most of the individual applicants do not buy 
insurance with sufficient specialized advice from their brokers or agents. As a result, 
the understanding of contractual terms is connected to their background and 
inevitably, including education levels, experiences, incomes, and so on. In this 
irregular situation, it is unrealistic to anticipate each applicant to understand, or 
potentially understand, the specialized contract terms and conditions. Although in 
practice, the contractual insurance parties generally are taken to understand the 
language of insurance, and the respective rights and obligations which the 
relationship entails, 535  requesting the insurer to explain the contractual terms 
especially the exclusion clauses to the applicant should be a welcome mechanism to 
reduce any potential disputes. 
Secondly, in contrast to the duty of explanation of the insurer, it is inordinate to 
overload the duty of understanding to the individual assured impliedly under the 
circumstances abovementioned. The reasons have been discussed partially in 
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previous paragraphs. In addition to the irregularity of applicants, the duty of equality 
is also another reason. There is no doubt that the doctrine of utmost good faith in the 
MIA 1906 was founded initially on the imbalance of information between the insurer 
and insured because of the lack of communication and the incipient level of science 
and technology. However, in reality the situation is radically different at present. In 
this situation, imposing a stricter duty of disclosure on the insureds solely is obviously 
unfair because it impositions them, in particular the individual applicants (both marine 
and non-marine) and small/ medium size businesses, in a disadvantageous position 
compared to the professional insurance companies. In performing the duty of 
explanation, the insurer would take more responsibilities during the negotiation of an 
insurance contract, so as to reach an agreement with more transparency and 
confidence.  
Thirdly, in the view of this author, a certain legal statute would reduce the disputes 
between the involved parties. It is easier for both parties to check their rights and 
obligations during a transaction. Some people may express their concerns about the 
disadvantages of codification, one of which is its limitations and rigidness. However, 
it is still better than nothing. Additionally, a common law country should not be 
concerned with the legislative approach in a civil law system since the precedent 
system still can conclusively clarify the law afterwards. In  contrast, the adoption of 
the duty of explanation imposed on the insurer would protect the insured’s basic right 
to sufficiently understand the contractual terms and conditions, particularly the 
insurance contract, which is considered as one contract of unique specialized 
knowledge.    
Finally, in accordance with the long history of the Lloyd’s market, it can be seen 
that a marine insurance contract is usually based upon standard form contracts, and 
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the insurance clauses in the contract are generally drafted by insurers unilaterally.536 
In actuality, this phenomenon is not unique but quite common in business 
transactions, for example, landlord and tenant agreements. The standard form 
contract is mainly used because of its fast speed and low cost. On the other hand, it 
has to be admitted that the use of a standard form contract may encourage the 
draftsman to abuse this convenience and injure the other party. Unfortunately, 
English contract law pays inadequate attention to the efficacy of standard form 
contracts. Although, the fact that ICOBS537 requires the insurer to explain the duty of 
disclosure to the customer may be deemed as a great concession to the individual 
assured compared to the traditional view held by English law (which states that the 
insurance contractual parties should be treated equally), this paragraph in ICOBS is 
inadequate. In explaining the contractual terms and exclusion clauses to the 
applicants, specifically to common consumer assureds, it is not hard to anticipate 
that more applicants would be attracted by increasing transparency and confidence 
in this industry.        
 
4.3.4. Insured’s duty of disclosure 
Article 222 in the CMC first provides that the insured shall truthfully disclose the 
material circumstances to the insurer. On the basis of article 222(1) in CMC, the 
circumstances which are known or ought to be known to the insured in the ordinary 
course of business, and which would influence the judgement of an insurer in 
deciding the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk, are defined to be 
material. The fact is that, apart from this principal provision regarding ‘material 
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circumstances’, there is currently no other statute or judicial interpretation clarifying 
the legal position in respect of the materiality test in Chinese marine insurance law. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this topic could be extended through the 
reasonable insured test, decisive influence test, and inducement. 
 
4.3.4.1. Prudent insurer test 
The test of materiality is always a controversial issue in different countries 
because the difficulty lies in balancing the rights and obligations of both parties to the 
insurance contract. On the one hand, the legislation should oblige the insured to 
truthfully disclose the information of the insured subject, providing sufficient 
protection and guarantee to the insurer. But on the other hand, the legislation also 
should prevent the insurer from taking advantage of the duty of disclosure as a 
technical defence in order to escape from liable indemnification. 
In China, some scholars538 suggest that since the key term relating to the test is, 
‘would influence the insurer’s decision’ (which to a large extent, is a copy of section 
18(2) of the MIA 1906 with slight differences), the test of materiality could be 
determined as a ‘prudent insurer’ test, which is the same as the test adopted by 
English law particular to marine insurance. Actually this statement is confirmed by 
the announcement of the Reply to the questions of Commercial and Admiralty Trial 
Practice involving foreign elements by the Supreme People’s Court in 2004.539 Article 
158 in this document states that every circumstance is material if it would influence a 
prudent insurer’s decision, and the material circumstances should be disclosed to the 
insurer before the conclusion of an insurance contract.  
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As a matter of fact, at present, the pressure for reforming insurance law is 
continuing to mount in the UK.540 In the view of this author, this enquiry is forceful. 
The proposal of these queries and some other factors triggered the starting of 
revision and reforming of insurance law in the UK, which is likely to cause further 
changes in insurance in the near future.541 In the reports, Draft Bill and the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 542  for consumer insurance 
released by the Law Commission, the famous hypothetical ‘prudent insurer’ test is 
proposed to be replaced by a ‘reasonable insured’ test from start to finish, which 
echoes the voice of the insurance industry.543  One reason provided by the Law 
Commissioners is, that the ‘reasonable insured’ test is deemed to be more objective 
to the business insured’s reasonable expectations than the current law.544 
At the same time, some Chinese authorities recommend a ‘reasonable insurer’ 
test instead.545 In the view of this thesis, the ‘reasonable insurer’ test is ideal. There 
are two main reasons. Firstly, the ‘reasonable insurer’ test is more objective than the 
‘prudent insurer’ test adopted by English law. For English commercial marine 
insurance, the definition of ‘prudent insurer’ test was raised by section 18(2) in the 
MIA 1906, which is interpreted as a circumspect or judicious insurer in his 
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dealings.546 This stated ‘objective’ criterion has been heavily criticised because of its 
irrationality for an insured.547 It seems that this strict test overestimates the insured’s 
capability of thinking over what would influence a hypothetical prudent insurer and 
even what his particular insurer would have done had it known the full facts.     
Secondly, these two test criteria are not basically opposed to one another. 
Underlying a ‘prudent insurer’ test or a ‘reasonable insurer’ test, one common feature 
is that they have an objective standard. This opinion is supported by some Chinese 
academics as well.548 Strictly speaking, the ‘reasonable insurer’ test in Chinese law is 
suggested to be enforced by reference to the insurer’s average level of insurance 
knowledge, career experiences and abilities, but not a particular situation. 549 
According to the leading law dictionary, there seems no substantial difference 
between the explanation of a ‘prudent person’ and a ‘reasonable person’.550 
 
4.3.4.2. Decisive influence test 
The other pillar of the materiality test in Chinese law is the degree of influence to 
the final decision caused by non-disclosed information. Chinese law adopts a 
‘decisive influence’ test, to the effect that only the circumstance which would 
influence the decision of the prudent insurer decisively is material. This point is also 
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the standard used by the courts to rule if the avoidance remedy can be awarded to 
the injured party. 
In English law, the history of the ‘decisive influence’ test can be dated back to the 
CTI case551 in which Justice Lloyd held that, on the true construction of section 18(2) 
of the MIA 1906, a non-disclosed circumstance was material only if its disclosure 
would have led a prudent underwriter either to decline the risk altogether or to charge 
a higher level of premium. The non-disclosure must, therefore, have exerted a 
‘decisive influence’ on the judgment of the prudent insurer by inducing a ‘different 
decision’ with respect to the risk. 552  However, the ‘decisive influence’ test was 
overruled by the Court of Appeal in the same case.553 The decision of the Court of 
Appeal regarding this aspect was upheld by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic.554 
In Chinese law, according to the language of article 222 of the CMC, there is 
nothing to provide for a detailed test of materiality in marine insurance law. What 
worsens the situation is the lack of an authoritative judicial interpretation of this part. 
In spite of the ambiguity in statutory legislation, many Chinese academics favour the 
‘decisive influence’ test.555 In the view of this author, there are several considerations 
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worthy of discussion here. Firstly, it is indisputable that the ‘decisive influence’ test is 
objective, but it tends to favour the insurer. This test was held to be purely objective 
without any consideration of the situation if the assured appreciated the materiality of 
the fact, or whether the underwriter in question was actually influenced by it. The only 
relevant point is whether a prudent underwriter would have been interested in the 
information.556 In other words, according to Lord Goff, the decisive influence test 
ignores the fact that it is the duty of the assured to disclose every material 
circumstance which is known to him, with the result that the question of materiality 
has to be considered by the assured before he enters into the contract.557 
The second consideration is that the adoption of the ‘decisive influence’ test leads 
to the insured to undertake a heavy burden to decide the elements which would 
affect the result of a hypothetical prudent insurer’s decision. It appears that a full 
disclosure is the safest option for the insured, but this may be an extreme imposition. 
This opinion is supported by the Court of Appeal in CTI.558 According to Stephenson 
LJ, there were two considerations preventing him from adopting the ‘decisive 
influence’ test:  
‘The first, stressed by my brethren, is the practical difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of deciding what factors would affect the result of a 
hypothetical prudent insurer's consideration of a risk, whether to accept it 
and on what terms; whereas there is no great difficulty in answering the 
question whether any particular factor would be one which he would want to 
know and take into consideration in determining whether to accept a risk 
and on what terms, without having to decide whether he would ultimately 
disregard it altogether or give it much or little weight. The second 
consideration is the overriding duty of utmost good faith imposed by s. 17. 
That duty seems to require full disclosure and full disclosure seems to 
require disclosure of everything material to the prudent underwriter's 
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estimate of the character and degree of the risk; and how can that be 
limited to what can affirmatively be found to be a circumstance which would 
in fact alter a hypothetical insurer's decision?’559 
 
The concern about overloading the assured to make full disclosure of everything 
which might influence the mind of an underwriter was also expressed by Justice 
Blackburn in Ionides and Another v Pender,560 where it is stated that it is too much to 
put on the assured the duty of disclosing everything which might influence the 
insurer’s decision and in doing so, business could hardly be carried on if this was 
required. The over-disclosure phenomenon caused by uncertainties of the range of 
information requiring disclosure has been laid on the table by the English Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission in their first Consultation Paper,561 on 
the grounds that applicants often provide insurers with more information than they 
are able to process. Just as one experienced insurance lawyer put it, the commercial 
brokers are tending to walk into underwriters with three CDs and tell them, ‘it's all in 
there’.562 
Additionally, some other factors could influence the conclusion of a contract 
decisively as well, such as, the market fluctuations, economic aims and political 
elements. In practice, it is doubted that the insurer would rather lose a key account, 
but not make an option to continue this transaction with the knowledge that the 
insured has non-disclosed or misrepresented some information. To this regard, the 
standard of a ‘decisive influence’ is radically different and the universal standard 
does not apply any more.    
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4.3.4.3. Actual inducement 
In English law, the ‘actual inducement’ test is known as the second layer of the 
test of materiality in marine insurance, which entitles the injured party to declare the 
avoidance of an insurance contract. This test was finally laid down by the famous 
Pan Atlantic case,563 which required the insurer to prove that the non-disclosed or 
misrepresented information has actually induced the conclusion of the insurance 
contract. In Chinese marine insurance law, there is no such provision clarifying 
whether the insurer must prove this reality. However, the other general statutes 
provide a brief concept, thus, it is still an attractive topic.  
First and foremost, the ‘actual inducement’ factor is not adopted by Chinese 
marine insurance law as an element of materiality. Alternatively, a causal link is built 
up impliedly between the non-disclosure and the conclusion of contracts by the 
establishment of a ‘decisive influence’ test. In fact, the ‘decisive influence’ test 
already covers causation between the concealment or misrepresentation and the 
prudent insurer’s decision. On this basis, a circumstance is material if it would 
influence the mind of a prudent insurer decisively in his final decision, and if this be 
proved, it is superfluous to establish that the mind of the particular insurer has been 
induced. This opinion was put forward by MacKinnon LJ in his judgement in the early 
case of Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co. Ltd. v Morrison,564 where 
it is clearly pointed out that: 
‘Under the general law of insurance an insurer can avoid a policy if he 
proves that there has been misrepresentation or concealment of a material 
fact by the assured. What is material is that which would influence the mind 
of a prudent insurer in deciding whether to accept the risk or fix the premium, 
and if this be proved it is not necessary to prove that the mind of the actual 
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insurer was so affected…’565 
 
The ‘decisive influence’ test has been overruled by both the Court of Appeal in 
CTI566 and the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic.567 In the view of this author, these 
judgments provide a convincing explanation of the redundant status of the actual 
inducement factor with the ‘decisive test’ given before Pan Atlantic, which is 
analogous to the present situation in Chinese law. 
In spite of that, as a general law compared to the special CMC, article 54 of the 
Chinese Contract Law deals with the inducement between fraud, coercion, or 
exploitation of the other party’s unfavourable position and the conclusion of contracts, 
by referring to the revocation of contracts.568 This article empowers the injured party 
to petition the court or arbitral institution to modify or rescind the contract in cases 
where the contract is concluded opposing to his true intention because of the 
defaulting party’s fraud, duress or taking advantage of his vulnerability. This article is 
also construed to be able to apply to marine insurance law as a provision concerning 
the ‘actual inducement’ test. The first possible reason is that, from the wide sense of 
legal science, if there is no contrary provision in a special law (CMC) referring to a 
special issue (marine insurance contracts), the provision in a general law (Contract 
Law of the PRC) can apply to it. But, inevitably, one should be concerned about its 
blind application from the general area to insurance specialist works.  
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The second reason should be founded on the origins of the duty of disclosure 
(unequal positions of the insurer and assured). The situation that there are 
inequalities of knowledge between insurer and insured has been changed and this is 
also why the English Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission successfully 
abandoned the consumer assured’s duty of disclosure.569 Although the Draft Bill for 
commercial insurance has not been released yet, and the duty of disclosure in 
marine insurance has been expressively announced to be retained,570 academics are 
still glad to see that the insurer is not considered to be vulnerable. In the view of this 
author, the duty of disclosure in most marine insurance transactions should be 
abolished as well, since currently most insurance companies have their independent 
databases. 
In conclusion, in Chinese marine insurance area, the non-disclosed information is 
material if it would influence a prudent insurer’s decision decisively, and has actually 
induced the conclusion of the insurance contract, which is different from the tests 
established by Pan Atlantic in English law.571 
 
4.3.4.4. Information requiring disclosure – actual knowledge and deemed 
knowledge 
As stated by article 222 of CMC,572 sections 18(1) and 19(2) of the MIA 1906, the 
marine insured or his agent is required to disclose the material information within the 
scope of his actual knowledge, or knowledge deemed to have been known in the 
ordinary course of business. Therefore, in respect of the material information 
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requiring disclosure before the conclusion of an insurance contract, the scope of 
information in Chinese law is the same as the one in MIA 1906.  
In English law, combined with sections 18(3),573 the insured’s actual knowledge 
must be disclosed regardless of whether the insurer could have expected the 
assured to have such knowledge and what the source of the knowledge is.574 For 
instance, if the assured has arranged an investigation in respect of the subject-matter 
insured, the results of that investigation must be made known to the insurer, whether 
or not the insurer could have expected the assured to make the investigation. This 
approach is adopted by Chinese law as well. In Chinese law, the actual knowledge 
must be disclosed regardless of its source.575 As to the knowledge deemed to have 
been known by the assured, some Chinese scholars state that if it is established that 
under certain situations a reasonable assured (who carries on the same kind of 
business as the actual assured does) will make inquiry and know the material 
circumstance thereby, the actual assured is deemed to know it as well.576 
 
4.3.5. Limits on disclosure 
In both English law and Chinese marine insurance law, the insured’s duty of 
disclosure is not absolutely unlimited, otherwise, the insurer would become too 
passive to make reasonable investigations during the negotiation process. At the 
                                               
573
 As provided by section 18(3) in MIA 1906, in the absence of inquiry the following circumstances 
need not be disclosed, namely: 
‘a. Any circumstance which diminishes the risk; 
b. Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The insurer is 
presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, and matters which an 
insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, ought to know; 
c. Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer; 
d. Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any express or implied 
warranty.’ 
574
 Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, para. 7.105. 
575
 Wang, The Law of Marine Insurance, p. 81. 
576
 Wang, ‘The duty of disclosure and the legal consequences of its breach’ in ACML; Chen, ‘The duty 
of disclosure of the assured in marine insurance law’ in ACML, p. 186. 
144 
 
same time, the assured would be overloaded with an infinite duty to make full 
disclosure of every information he knows or he is deemed to know. The occurrence 
of over-disclosure would be caused subsequently without any doubt.577 
In Chinese law, the one principal provision which mentions the exception where 
the insured does not need to perform the duty of disclosure is where the insurer has 
known of the information, or ought to have knowledge of in his ordinary business 
practice, and made no inquiry.578 Apart from this, there is no more detailed legislation 
with respect to the interpretation of the exceptional circumstances. However, 
according to the ordinary meaning of this clause, one objective criterion introduced is 
the insurer’s reasonable enquiry test, which has been adopted by section 18(3) of the 
MIA 1906. Thus, it can be concluded that the premise for this exception for 
disclosure applies in the absence of the insurer’s inquiry. In cases where the insurer 
does inquire, the limits cannot be relied on anymore. 
In the view of this author, the situations exemplified by sections 18 MIA 1906 are 
worth being referred to in future Chinese marine insurance law reform. As provided 
by sections 18(3) in MIA 1906, the assured is released from four particular cases in 
the absence of inquiry, including diminution of the risk, the insurer’s actual and 
presumed knowledge, waiver by the insurer, and warranties. It appears that the CMC 
only covers the case of the insured’s actual and presumed knowledge.         
 
4.3.6. Consequences and remedies for non-disclosure 
The following paragraphs are aimed at elaborating on the legal consequences 
caused by the insurer and assured’s breach of the duty of dislcosure. In the 
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meanwhile, relevant Chinese codes are introduced, in the light of developments and 
practice in English law.  
  
4.3.6.1. Insurer’s breach of duty 
In Chinese law, as indicated in earlier paragraphs, the legal consequences caused 
by the insurer’s non-dislcosure can be mainly divided into two aspects, for example, 
the insurer’s duty of lawful operation and the duty of explanation. Therefore, logically, 
the following paragraphs are expounded depending on these two topics. 
 
4.3.6.1.1. Consequences and remedies for the breach of lawful operation 
4.3.6.1.1.1. Chinese law 
As pointed out earlier, in Chinese law, the insurance contract is required to be 
performed according to the doctrine of good faith. Meanwhile, the insurance 
company is required to operate legally. First of all, anyone who violates the 
provisions of this law by establishing an insurance company, an insurance asset 
management company or agency without approval, or conducts insurance 
transactions illegally, would be banned by the insurance regulatory department. If 
there are any illegal gains obtained, they will be confiscated and a fine shall be 
imposed of not less than one, nor more than five times of the illegal gains.579 In 
cases where serious violations or failure of correcting within time limits, the insurance 
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company would be ordered to cease operating or would have its licence 
withdrawn.580 
Furthermore, anyone who changes information and details without the insurance 
regulatory department’s permission would be ordered to make rectification and 
improvement, and fined between RMB 10,000581 and RMB 100,000.582 
Articles164-166 and 175 of CIL 2009583  also exemplify several circumstances 
under which the insurer company would be ordered by the insurance regulatory 
department to make rectification and improvement. In the meantime, it would be 
imposed with a fine between RMB 50,000 and RMB 300,000. In cases of severe 
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violations of law, the insurance company would be ordered to restrict its scope of 
business and cease accepting new business, or have its licence withdrawn.584 
During the management of business, the insurance company also needs to follow 
articles 170-172 in CIL 2009, to make sure that the insurance transactions are legal. 
According to articles 170 and 171, any insurance company that endorses, leases, or 
lends its business licence, or non-discloses information required by the provisions of 
this law, shall be ordered to cease business and/or be fined between RMB 10,000 
and RMB 100,000.585 In addition to this, article 172 in the same law further provides 
that anyone who submits false reports, statements, documents and information, or 
refuses to accept or hinders lawful examination and supervision, or fails to adopt 
approved insurance clauses and premium rates as required, shall be ordered to 
make correction, and fined not less than RMB 100,000 nor more than RMB 500,000. 
In case of severe violations the regulatory department can restrict its scope of 
business, order it to cease business, or revoke its business license.  
In conclusion, anyone who violates the duty of lawful operation under the CIL 2009 
in China would be responsible for the civil liability,586 administrative liability,587 and/or 
even criminal liability where severe violations constitute a crime.588 
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4.3.6.1.1.2. English law 
To highlight distinctions from Chinese Law, English law and some other general 
business regulations in relation to its authorisation, management and supervision of 
an insurance company are worth being referred to. 
First of all, if a person contravenes paragraph 3, Schedule 9 of the Financial 
Services Act 2012 which requires him to be authorised to carry on a credit-related 
regulated activity, such as, insurance, according to the this Act, the authorised 
person could be guilty of and liable on a summary conviction, to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding the applicable maximum term or a fine not exceeding the 
statutory maximum; or on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years and/or a fine. 589  Apart from the commission of a criminal 
offence, paragraph 5, Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act 2012 and section 26 
of the FiSMA 2000 provide that an agreement concluded by an authorised person in 
the course of carrying on a credit-related regulated activity in contravention of the 
general prohibition is unenforceable against the other party, who is entitled to recover 
any money or property paid or transferred by him under the agreement, and have 
compensation for any loss sustained by him as a result of having parted with it. 
Secondly, the ‘approved persons’ regime590 is developed and adopted by FiSMA 
2000, the Financial Services Act 2012, the original FSA Handbook, and the FCA 
Handbook to control the performance of regulated activities. If an individual appears 
to be an unfit or inappropriate person to perform regulated activities, both the FCA 
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and PRA can issue a prohibition order to prohibit this individual from performing a 
specified function.591 Additionally, according to section 13, Chapter 3, Part 4A, Part 2 
of the Financial Services Act 2012, and section 71 of FiSMA 2000, if a person 
contravenes section 56(6) which requires a person falling within in subsection (3A) to 
take reasonable care to ensure that no function of his, in relation to the carrying on of 
a regulated activity, is performed by a person who is prohibited from performing that 
function by a prohibition order, or section 59(1) or (2), 592  this misconduct is 
actionable at the suit of the injured party who suffers loss caused by this 
contravention. 
 
4.3.6.1.2. Consequences and remedies for the breach of pre-contractual 
disclosure 
Article 116 of CIL 2009 provides that an insurance company and its employees 
shall not commit any of the acts in the course of its business operation, including 
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deceiving the insured or beneficiary, concealing material information, preventing or 
inducing the insured from fulfilling a duty of disclosure, and faking and altering the 
insurance contract without any approval.593 Subsequently, based on article 162 of the 
same law, the defaulting insurer is subject to the insurance regulatory department’s 
discretion and fined between RMB 100,000 and RMB 300,000. In cases of a serious 
breach, the insurance company’s licence would be withdrawn.594 
Furthermore, any insurer or insurance company concealing information shall be 
subject to the insurance regulatory department’s discretion for correction, or imposed 
with a fine between RMB 10,000 and RMB 100,000.595 Despite the typical examples 
abovementioned and some other articles in chapter 3 of CIL 2009,596 articles 179 
and 181 of the same law further provide that any practitioner who severely breaches 
laws or administrative regulations shall be barred from entering insurance 
transactions. Furthermore, any illegal conduct constitutes a crime and shall be 
subject to criminal proceedings. In short, disobeying the duty of disclosure would 
lead the defaulting parties to be imposed with not only civil sanctions, but also 
administrative and/or criminal sanctions. 
Nevertheless, the CIL 2009 is also silent regarding the remedies awarded to the 
innocent insured in cases where the insurer is in a breach of the duty of disclosure. 
The integrity of remedies mechanism is finally completed by articles 42 and 54 in 
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Chinese Contract Law. Combining these articles, it is found that the rescission or 
alteration remedy, and damages, are all available for an injured assured in Chinese 
law, which is different from the provisions in English marine insurance law.597 In 
accordance with article 42(2) of Chinese Contract Law, the party shall be liable for 
damages if he deliberately conceals important facts relating to the conclusion of the 
contract, or provides false information thus causing losses to the other party. 598 
Besides, the contract may be avoided or altered if it is proved that it is concluded 
against the injured party’s intention.599 However, the alteration or rescission remedy 
is not automatic and its awarding is totally based on the injured party’s petition sent 
to the court or arbitration institution. 
In conclusion, the alteration, rescission and/or damages remedies are all available 
in Chinese law for the injured assured in cases of breach of the duty of disclosure. In 
the view of this author, the system adopted by Chinese law is practical and feasible. 
It is not difficult to imagine that if the insurer’s concealment of material information is 
found before the occurrence of the accident, the assured can choose to alter or 
rescind the insurance contract. If the injured assured suffers losses because of the 
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insurer’s breach he shall be awarded damages as well. In this situation, it is not hard 
for the insured to make a decision to declare the insurance contract rescinded since 
there is no loss for him except for loss of time, if he can reclaim the paid premium. 
However, if the insurer’s breach of duty of disclosure was found after the occurrence 
of accident, thus causing losses to the insured subject, declaring this insurance 
contract rescinded should be the last resort the policyholder wishes to do because 
such declaration would discharge the insurance company from further liability to pay 
the claim. Additionally, based on the MIA 1906 only, the injured marine assured can 
have this contract rescinded from the beginning. Alternatively, the injured assured 
has to bear this unfair insurance contract with some alterations. In providing the third 
additional or alternative damage remedy for the assured, under Chinese law the 
insurance company would not be able to take advantage of the insured’s vulnerability 
on this point.  
 
4.3.6.1.3. Legal consequences and remedies for the breach of duty of 
explanation 
As to the enforcement of the insurer’s duty of explanation in marine insurance, 
there is no clear answer in Chinese law. As stated earlier, principally this doctrine 
can be extended to the specialized areas. However, till now, there is no sufficient 
judicial support to confirm its application and this needs clarification by further legal 
interpretations.  
Despite this, analysing the consequences and remedies for the breach of this duty 
in general insurance law is still essential. According to article 17 of CIL 2009, if an 
insurer fails to explain the standard form clauses of the contract to the insured, no 
effects ensue. However, in accordance with article 54 of Chinese Contract Law, if the 
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injured insured can prove that the contract is concluded as a result of significant 
misconception, or obvious unfairness because the insurer did not explain the terms 
clearly enough, he can petition the court or arbitration institution to have this contract 
rescinded or altered. But, in the meantime, it has to be admitted that the burden of 
proof is substantially heavier for the alleged insured. On one hand, the assured has 
to prove that, at the conclusion of the contract, the insurer failed to explain the terms 
to him, and in cases where he wants to have damages recoverable he has to prove 
that the losses he suffered are caused by the insurer’s failure in explanation. On the 
other hand, if applied in marine insurance, an area in which the assured is assumed 
to have known the meanings of special rules and terminology, this regime seems 
unable to work appropriately since the marine insurance parties are assumed to 
understand the standard form contracts in practice. 
In summary, the remedies available in Chinese law for the injured marine insured, 
in cases where there is breach of duty of explanation (of standard form contracts), 
are alteration and rescission of the contract. Therefore, the alleged injured insured 
can request the courts or arbitration institutions to have it modified if he chooses to 
continue with the insurance contract. If there is irreconcilable conflict between the 
insurer and insured, the injured party can choose to request relevant institutions to 
have the contract rescinded, which in accordance with article 58 of the same law 
means that the contract would be confirmed to be null and void or revoked, and the 
paid premium is returnable. If it is proved that the assured has suffered loss because 
of the insurer’s breach of this duty, then he can claim damages.600 
                                               
600
 Article 58, Chinese Contract Law, stipulates that property acquired as a result of a contract shall be 
returned after the contract is confirmed to be null and void or has been revoked; where the property 
cannot be returned or the return is unnecessary, it shall be reimbursed at its estimated price. The 
party at fault shall compensate the other party for losses incurred as a result therefrom. If both parties 
are at fault, each party shall respectively be liable. 
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    By contrast, failure to explain exclusion clauses to the assured before the 
conclusion of the insurance contract would only render these clauses 
unenforceable.601 Thus, the insurer is required to provide sufficient notice or clear 
explanation to the assured in concluding the insurance contract, either written or 
orally; otherwise, the exemption clauses have no effects when the contractual parties 
have a dispute. The unenforceability would not vitiate the force of the whole contract, 
which means the assured can still recover damages caused by the insured accident, 
based on the other insurance contract terms.        
 
4.3.6.2. Insured’s breach of duty 
As specified by the CMC, in cases where the material information is non-disclosed 
intentionally, the insurer has the right to terminate the contract without refunding the 
premium. In cases where there is non-disclosed material information which was not 
due to an intentional act, the insurer has the right to terminate the contract or raise 
the premium. However, the factor that non-disclosed or misrepresented material 
circumstance must have an impact on the occurrence of such perils is excluded from 
the second case.602 The two types of the insured’s breaches of the duty of disclosure 
in Chinese law are intentional breach and unintentional breach, which correspond to 
two different legal consequences.603 Compared to the harsh English ‘all or nothing 
remedy’ applicable to both fraudulent and non-fraudulent concealment or 
misrepresentation in marine insurance,604 one might have the view that the manner 
adopted by the CMC is flexible and fairer for the marine insured. 
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 Paragraph 2, article 17, CIL 2009. 
602
 Paragraph 2, article 223, CMC. 
603
 These two types of misconducts are also corresponding to the categorisations finalized by the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. 
604
 Sections 17-20, MIA 1906. 
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4.3.6.2.1. Consequences and remedies for intentional non-disclosure605 
According to article 223(1) of CMC, if the insured breaches the duty of disclosure 
intentionally, the insurer is entitled to the right to rescind the contract without paying 
back the premium. Meanwhile, the insurer is discharged from the duty of paying 
indemnifications for loss caused by the insured perils before the termination of the 
insurance. Of course, the termination remedy is optional, so the insurer has the 
option either to continue the insurance or end it immediately.  
On the subject of remedies granted to the insurer in cases of the insured’s 
fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation, MIA 1906 is adopting the same 
manner as the CMC with only slight differences in the statutory language. According 
to the MIA 1906, an insurance contract is avoidable if the defaulting party breaches 
the duty of utmost good faith.606 In general contract law at English common law, the 
term of avoidance can be understood as putting both parties back to the positions 
where they were before they entered into the contract.607 Therefore, in this situation, 
the paid premium is returnable to the insured and the insurer does not need to pay 
the indemnifications for the loss caused by the accident. One has to be mindful here 
that this sanction is not sufficient for a fraudulent breach of duty, these sections 
(sections 17-20, MIA 1906) aforementioned only apply with an absence of fraud or 
                                               
605
 The exact meaning of ‘intentional misconduct’ is not available from CMC or relevant legislations, 
however, in the view of this thesis, the construction of ‘deliberate/reckless conduct’ in consumer 
insurance in English law could be referred to. According to section 5 of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, ‘[a] qualifying misrepresentation is deliberate or reckless if 
the consumer – (a) knew that it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether or not it was untrue 
or misleading, and (b) knew that the matter to which the misrepresentation related was relevant to the 
insurer, or did not care whether or not it was relevant to the insurer’. Similarly, section 5(3) of the 
same Act defines that ‘[a] qualifying misrepresentation is careless if it is not deliberate or reckless’, 
which could be lessons for the interpretation of ‘unintentional misconduct’ in Chinese law. 
606
 Sections 17, 28 and 20, MIA 1906. 
607
 However, extending the concepts of rescission and avoidance from general contract law to special 
insurance law is still a controversial issue because the avoidance in insurance area is doubted for its 
different practical meaning compared to the common law meaning. For instance, in insurance, if the 
injured party decided to rescind the contract after the occurrence of accidents, actually most of the 
damaged insured subjects cannot be restored.    
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illegality. Section 84 of the same Act further points out that the premium is not 
returnable providing there is fraud or illegality on the assured.608 Hence, it can be 
said that in both English and Chinese law, specifically for business marine insurance, 
in cases where the duty of disclosure is breached fraudulently by the assured, the 
insurer is empowered to avoid the contract without paying back the premium, and is 
discharged from paying indemnity for loss suffered by the insured.609 
Nevertheless, CMC does not apply to whether the insurer can rescue the 
insurance contract with extra requirements in cases of the assured’s fraudulent 
breach of this duty. Most Chinese scholars claim that, on the basis that article 223(2) 
of CMC entitles the insurer to demand a higher premium if some material information 
is non-disclosed unintentionally, there is no reason why a fraudulently cheated 
insurer cannot charge a higher premium.610 The increasing subsequent premium 
remedy is supported by article 54 of Chinese Contract Law, which stipulates that if a 
contract is concluded because of the other party’s fault, the injured party can request 
relevant institutions to have the contract altered or rescinded. Therefore, the 
retrospective rescission and alteration remedies are both available for the injured 
insurer in cases of the insured’s fraudulent non-disclosure in Chinese law.  
 
4.3.6.2.2. Consequences and remedies for unintentional non-disclosure 
Article 223(2) of CMC stipulates that the insurer has the right to terminate an 
insurance contract or require a higher premium if the assured conceals some 
material information unintentionally. As distinct from the retrospective rescission 
remedy awarded to the insurer in cases where there is a fraudulent breach of this 
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 Section 84, MIA 1906. 
609
 In this fraudulent situation, the termination of contract in Chinese law is equal to the retrospective 
rescission in English law, and unreturnable premium can be deemed as a sanction to punish the 
wrongdoer.   
610
 Li, ‘Comparative Study on the Duty of Disclosure between China and England’ in JCL, p. 21. 
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duty, the insurer still needs to cover the loss caused by the insured accident before 
the termination of this contract. However, the loss is not recoverable if the non-
disclosed or misrepresented information has an impact on the occurrence of such 
perils.  
It can firstly be seen that there are radical differences between the legal 
consequences of unintentional breach of the duty of disclosure in English and 
Chinese law. In English marine insurance law, the duty of utmost good faith is 
required to be performed strictly and faultlessly, and the avoidance remedy can be 
invoked by the injured party in cases of any degree of breach of this duty, from trivial 
to serious. For instance, if the material misrepresentation/non-disclosure before the 
conclusion of the contract would have caused the prudent insurer to increase the 
premium by 2%, then the rescission of the contract can be chosen by the insurer 
since there is a breach of duty of disclosure here. However, in this situation, the 
remedy awarded is very harsh. Thus, based on the MIA 1906, a marine insured’s 
fate is purely controlled by the insurer under the ceiling of the avoidance remedy.  
Section 2, Misrepresentation Act 1967 in English law further divides the 
unintentional act into the negligent and wholly innocent act.611 Although article 2 of 
the Misrepresentation Act 1967 suggests that the non-fraudulent act should be 
differentiated from the fraudulent act, and an alternative damages remedy can be 
awarded according to the judges’ discretion in lieu of a restrict rescission remedy, it 
is not clear if this approach adopted by general contract law can be extended to a 
special insurance contract. 612  Compared to the rigid uniformity of the rescission 
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Section 2, Misrepresentation Act 1967. However, as section 5 of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 provides, there are only two types of misrepresentations 
falling within the scope of qualifying misrepresentations, namely, deliberate/reckless and careless 
misrepresentations, which can be considered to be corresponding to the categorisation in CMC 
(intentional and unintentional misconducts).      
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 Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, pp. 742-3. 
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remedy in English marine insurance law, the termination remedy in Chinese law is 
considered to be fairer, reasonable and more flexible, particularly in cases of the 
assured’s wholly innocent breach.613 
Nevertheless, there are still some limits put on the awarding of the termination 
remedy in Chinese law. Therefore, if the non-disclosed or misrepresented 
information has an impact on the occurrence of such perils, the insurer can terminate 
this contract and in the meantime the loss caused by the perils previously is not 
recoverable. 614  Paragraph 5 of article 16 in CIL 2009 also stipulates that if an 
applicant fails to perform his obligation of making a full and accurate disclosure 
because of gross negligence, and this materially affects the occurrence of an insured 
event before the termination of the contract, the insurer shall bear no obligation for 
making any indemnity or payment of the insurance benefits but should return the 
premiums paid. Unfortunately, there is some lack of clarification about the exact 
requirements of ‘impact’ and ‘gross negligence’ in Chinese law. However, it is 
submitted by one leading academic in China that the ‘impact’ does not mean legal 
causation, but only certain attribution.615 
Combining the literal meaning of ‘impact’ and the leading Chinese academic’s 
‘attribution’ theory, the consideration should take account of the cases in which the 
non-disclosed information causes the occurrence of accident solely or partially as 
one reason. For instance, in The Tony Best,616 although the assured could prove that 
his non-disclosure was made unintentionally, the insurance company could be 
                                                                                                                                                  
    In the view of this author, since the remedies regime for the breach of utmost good faith is mirrored 
to the misrepresentation theory at common law, the application from general law to specialized law 
should not become an obstacle here. 
613
 In this context, the effect of terminating the contract is to bring the contract to an end only from the 
date of termination. See Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367, 393, per Lord Wilberforce, cited by Eggers, 
et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, para. 16.72.  
614
 Article 222, CMC. 
615
 Wang, The Law of Marine Insurance, p. 80. 
616
 Recommendations, Statutes and Explanations on the Amendments of Chinese Maritime Code of 
the PRC (Recommendations). 
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discharged from the responsibility to pay for the claims if the insurer could prove that 
the non-disclosed circumstance had impact on the occurrence of such perils, solely 
or partially. 
Another existing ambiguity in CMC lies in identifying whether the premium is 
returnable to the insured in cases of the assured’s non-fraudulent/unintentional non-
disclosure. In the view of this thesis, the answer could vary. If the 
negligently/carelessly non-disclosed information has a certain attribution on the 
occurrence of insured perils, the insurer is entitled to demand a higher premium, or 
termination of contract. In the termination situation, combined with article 16 of CIL 
2009, the paid premium shall be returned to the assured in the absence of fraud or 
illegality. Under the second circumstance where the insurer is guilty of a wholly 
innocent non-disclosure, the injured insurer is entitled to have the contract altered or 
terminated, but the insured is not discharged from paying compensation for the loss 
caused before the termination of contract. In the second case, the paid premium 
shall not be returnable fully but proportionally since the insurer would perform its 
liabilities anyway.      
 
4. 4. Conclusion 
Chapter 4 analysed the status and contents of the duty of good faith with specific 
reference to the pre-contractual duty of disclosure in Chinese law. After a 
comparative study regarding its duration, legal nature, scope, limits, and the legal 
consequences of the breach of duty in both Chinese law and English law, the 
following points have been concluded. Firstly, the duty of utmost good faith has never 
been formally recognized by the Chinese Maritime Code and other related legislation 
but accepted impliedly, which tends to encourage some Chinese academics to 
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introduce the whole of section 17 from the MIA 1906 to Chinese marine insurance 
area. In addition to the awkward situation of utmost good faith in Chinese law, it is 
found that the statutory contents of the duty of disclosure mainly consists of a pre-
contractual duty of disclosure, the duty of explanation, a post-contractual duty of 
disclosure, which is substantially different from that in English statutes. Thirdly, unlike 
the test established by English law,617 the standard in Chinese marine insurance 
adopts a three-fold test which includes prudent insurer, decisive influence, and actual 
inducement test. Fourthly, compared to the harsh English remedies available to the 
breach of this duty, the remedies in Chinese law seem to favour the unprofessional 
assureds by providing them with the termination, 618  alteration and/or damages 
options for remedies. 
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 The two-limb prudent insurer actual inducement test. 
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 Both retrospective termination like rescission and common termination. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE POST-CONTRACT GOOD FAITH AND FRAUDULENT CLAIMS IN ENGLISH 
MARINE INSURANCE LAW 
 
5.1. Overview 
It has been pointed out that the duty of utmost good faith is most controversial at 
the post-formation stage, especially its harsh effect of a post-contractual breach, 
namely, avoidance ab initio.619 In the view of this author, the remedy issue is just the 
tip of the iceberg, reflecting a series of concerns with respect to the post-contract 
events, which is divided into the general post-formation events and a special issue, 
namely, fraudulent claims. The first two sections of this chapter, therefore, focus on 
the post-contract stage to elaborate its legal basis and functions, characteristics and 
information needed to be post-contractually disclosed, the elusive tests for different 
types of general post-information duties and its practical application to specific issues, 
and finally, the legal consequences of non-compliance. 
With regard to fraudulent claims, the research begins with its first principles, 
including the origins, legal basis, meanings, and different types of fraudulent claims. 
Then the attention is diverted to the map of remedies for fraudulent claims. 
Subsequently, the issue of insurer’s late payment and good faith is addressed to 
strengthen the integrity of this topic. Apart from the above issues, the insurance 
contract law reform undergoing in the Law Commissions is considered as another 
section. Finally, in order to identify the exact degree of good faith for the post-
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 Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, chapter 18. 
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contract stage, the normal level of good faith or utmost good faith, the elusive tests 
are summarized and evaluated in the conclusive section.   
 
5.1.1. General ground of the post-contractual duty of good faith and concerned 
situations 
As stated earlier, both scholars and the judiciary used to be occupied with issues 
concerning the legal basis of the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith, which is 
actually linked to remedies available for a breach. On the one hand, this duty is 
suggested to be implied by contractual terms.620 However, this proposition is doubted 
because, based on section 17 of the MIA 1906, the breach of utmost good faith 
should not lead to a claim for contractual damages, but only the statutory avoidance 
remedy is available. Some authorities,621 on the other hand, state that this duty is 
founded on a separate rule of law, which is likely to be accepted as the 
overwhelming trend. Despite these arguments revolving around the origins of the 
post-contract duty of good faith, in the opinion of this author, there is no doubt that it 
is a continuing duty, which starts from the beginning of the contemplation of an 
                                               
620
 Black King Shipping Corporation v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437, p. 518, 
per Hirst J (at the claims stage); Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co of Chicago v Alliance 
Assurance Co Ltd (The Captain Panagos D.P.) [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 511 (Evans J held that any 
breach of the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith in relation to the making of claims also breaks 
an implied term of the contract); Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association 
(Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 514 (Hobhouse J treated the continuing duty of 
utmost good faith as arising from an implied term of the contract); Banque Financiere de la Cite SA 
(formerly Banque Keyser Ullmann SA) v Westgate Insurance Co (formerly Hodge General & 
Mercantile Co Ltd) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69, QB (Com. Ct.); Bonner v Cox [2005] Lloyd’s Rep. IR, 569, 
para. 255 (on appeal, the point appears to have been common ground ([2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 152, 
Para. 86) and hence the analysis in the judgment is contractual). 
621
 For judicial support, see Merchants & Manufacturers’ Insurance Company Limited v Hunt and 
Others [1941] 1 KB 295 (CA); Banque Financiere de la Cite SA (formerly Banque Keyser Ullmann SA) 
v Westgate Insurance Co (formerly Hodge General & Mercantile Co Ltd) [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513, 
CA, pp. 549-551; [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377, p. 388; Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks 
Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 238, p. 263; the Court of Appeal in 
The Good Luck [1990] 1 A.B. 818,p. 888; Orakpo v Barclays [1995] L.R.L.R. 443; [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
389, HL, per Lord Hobhouse; Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) (No.1)[2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 42, CA. 
    For academic support, see Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract; Gilman, et al., 
Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average; Andre Naidoo and David Oughton, ‘The Confused 
post-formation duty of good faith in insurance law: from refinement to fragmentation to elimination?’, 
(2005) JBL, pp. 346-371.   
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insurance contract (pre-contract duty), and continues during the currency of the 
contract (post-contract duty).622 
This doctrine’s mutuality is confirmed by section 17 of the MIA 1906, which 
imposes this duty on both parties, as a preamble section of the following sections 18-
20, which is further confirmed by the judiciary.623 Some authorities624 maintain that 
the reciprocity of this duty also applies to the post-formation stage. This opinion is 
embodied in insurance practice, requiring the insurer to handle claims in good faith 
and make a payment in a timely fashion, whilst also requiring the assured to perform 
the duty of post-contractual disclosure and good faith in the context of claims. 
The confirmation of the purpose of the duty of good faith can be dated back to 
Carter v Boehm, 625  in which its existence is specified to prevent fraud and to 
encourage good faith. Therefore, the purpose of preventing fraud requires the 
assured and its agent to disclose all material circumstances and refrain from 
misrepresentation during the negotiations leading up to and including the conclusion 
of the insurance contract.626 Susan Hodges suggests,627 in order to comprise utmost 
good faith’s position as a fountain-head where its other duties flow from, it must be 
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 For example, Black King Shipping Corporation v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
437, pp. 507-512, per Hirst J; Cory v Patton [1872]; [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 389, HL, paras. 6, 48, 51-57, 
110-111; Lishman v Northern Maritime Ins. Co. (1875) Lloyd’s Rep. 10 CP 179; Overseas 
Commodities Ltd. v Style [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 546, p. 559; Liberian Insurance Agency v Mosse [1977] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 560; Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services [1995] LRLR 443; New Hampshire 
Insurance Company v MGN Limited [1997], 48, per Potter, LJ, 61, per Staughton LJ; K/S Merc-
Scandia XXXXII v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563, 
CA, paras. 34, 39-40, per Longmore LJ. 
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 For example, Banque Financiere de la Cite SA (formerly Banque Keyser Ullmann SA) v Westgate 
Insurance Co (formerly Hodge General & Mercantile Co Ltd) [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 513, CA, p. 544, 
per Slade LJ. It is remarked by LJ Slade that ‘the obligation to disclose material facts is a mutual one 
imposing reciprocal duties on insurer and insured. In the case of marine insurance contract, section 17 
in effect so provides’. 
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 For example, Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, para 10.20. It is pointed out by the 
authors that the assured will seldom wish to set aside his insurance contract in case a breach of the 
insurer’s: Manifest Shipping Insurance Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2001] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 389, HL, para. 27, per Lord Hobhouse. 
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 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905, para. 1911. 
626
 Black King Shipping Corporation v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437, p. 512. 
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 Hodges, Law of Marine Insurance, p. 88. 
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performed before and after the conclusion of the contract. However, it does not mean 
that it is an endless duty, otherwise, it is an obvious imposition for contractual parties, 
especially for the assured. Some authorities prefer to state that the duty of good faith 
continues throughout the contractual relationship at a level appropriate to the 
moment.628 
The uniqueness of the post-contractual duty of good faith also lies in its distinction 
from the general doctrine underlying section 17 of the MIA 1906. In exceptional 
circumstances, utmost good faith is required to be performed post-contractually, for 
instance, the assured is required to disclose all material information relating to 
variations or renewals to an insurance policy to the insurer in order to make its 
amendments or renewals valid. Conversely, there is no general obligation on the 
assured to disclose facts material to the risk after the contract has been concluded 
as a result of the general doctrine of alteration of risks and section 21 of the MIA 
1906. Judging from the wider sense, it has to be admitted that the conclusion of an 
insurance contract does not exclude the duty of utmost good faith, but it does bring 
about a concern regarding the relationship between the duty and the contract.629 The 
duration of the duty of utmost good faith is still unclear in section 17 of the MIA 1906. 
However, it is described that as long as the contract of insurance remains in 
existence, the duty therefore continues, to the extent that it is required, until there is 
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 Clarke, Law of Insurance Contracts; in Thomas Schoenbaum, ‘The duty of utmost good faith in 
marine insurance law: a comparative analysis of American and English law’ (January, 1998) 29 JMLC, 
p. 31, Schoenbaum described it as a duty which will arise at ‘specific decision points’. Tuckey J, at first 
instance in Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 651, p. 667, was aptly to define it as a continuing duty which is ‘moulded to the moment’. Lord 
Hobhouse, in The Good Luck [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 514, p. 545, stated that ‘there can be situations 
which arise subsequently where the duty of utmost good faith makes it necessary that there should be 
further disclosure because the relevant facts are relevant to the later stages of the contract’. Also see 
Hodges, Cases and Materials on Marine Insurance Law, p. 226.  
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 Rhidian Thomas, ‘Held Covered Clauses in Marine Insurance’ in Rhidian Thomas, The Modern 
Law of Marine Insurance, Vol. 2, (London: LLP, 2002), p. 48. 
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no further use for the duty.630 In other words, the duty of utmost good faith ceases 
once the rationale for the duty is at an end. For example, the pre-contractual duty of 
disclosure and not to misrepresent ceases at the conclusion of the insurance 
contract, but simultaneously, the post-formation duty of disclosure before the 
variation of contract will be invoked if there are some adjustments of the contractual 
obligations. However, the contractual duties cease when the contract is avoided or 
rescinded, including the duty of utmost good faith.631 An alternative election for the 
parties of the marine insurance contract to terminate utmost good faith is the 
commencement of litigation procedures,632 which is elaborated below. 
 
5.1.2. Elusive standards and principles 
Some authorities633 state that as one part of the duty of utmost good faith ruled by 
section 17 of the MIA 1906, there is no reason to adopt a different system to post-
contractual events. In The Litsion Pride, 634  it was held by Justice Hirst that 
‘avoidance’ in section 17 was avoidance ab initio, and he saw no reason for putting a 
different meaning on the word in relation to post-contractual issues. The Court of 
Appeal, in The Good Luck, stated that there was ‘no reason why the source in law of 
the obligation, or the remedy for its breach, should be different after the contract is 
made, from what it is at the pre-contract stage’.635 In The Star Sea,636 Leggatt LJ in 
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 Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, para. 10.03. 
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 Ibid, para. 10.64. 
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 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 389, 
HL, per Lord Hobhouse of Woodbourough, Lord Clyde and Lord Scott; Agapitos v Agnew (The 
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 Black King Shipping Corporation v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437, p. 515, 
per Hirst J; Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [1997] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 360, CA, p. 370; Fraser Shipping Ltd v Colton and Others [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 586; K/S Merc-
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 [1990] 1 QB 818, para. 888. 
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the Court of Appeal, summarised that there should be no difference in principle as to 
the extent of disclosure required between entering into a policy and the renewal of it. 
In both cases, the scope of the duty of disclosure should be the same. According to 
Leggatt LJ’s statement, the ‘materiality’ and ‘actual inducement’ test should apply in 
the post-formation issues as well. In Fraser Shipping Ltd v Colton and Others,637 the 
judge was found to adopt the rules on ‘materiality’ in the case of pre-contractual non-
disclosure to what was effectively a breach of the duty of disclosure under section 
17.638  Therefore in this case, the judge aptly applied the same test of the pre-
contractual event to the post-contractual stage. Recently, in The Mercandian 
Continent,639 Lord Justice Longmore, in the Court of Appeal, considered the breach 
of the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith. He held that an insurer could only 
have the right to avoid for a post-contractual breach of the duty of utmost good faith, 
where the insurer would otherwise be justified in accepting the insured’s conduct as 
a repudiatory breach of the policy. It was stated that the rationale behind this 
conclusion was that it must have been intended that avoidance for post-contractual 
matters should be subject to at least the same requirements as avoidance for pre-
contractual matters. Hence, the concepts of materiality and inducement, adapted to 
the post-contractual context, should exist before an insurer can avoid the policy for a 
post-contractual breach of the duty.640 
On the contrary, some authorities pointed out that it was crucial to require the 
assured to make full disclosure and accurate representation with his greatest 
honesty in the negotiation of an insurance contract. Therefore, even a trivial fault 
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would cause the contract to be avoided by the injured party. However, after 
concluding the contract, it has been claimed that there was no justification to require 
the same high degree of openness post contractually as an insured is obliged to 
show pre-contractually.641 In this view, a flexible construction of the duty of utmost 
good faith is recommended to be adopted.642 In the same judgment, Lord Hobhouse 
criticized the remedy of avoidance for a post-contractual breach of the duty of utmost 
good faith as ‘anomalous and disproportionate’ and said that ‘the result is effectively 
penal’.643 
At the present time in English law, it has been suggested that in consideration of 
identifying any post-contractual events of utmost good faith, some factors should be 
borne in mind. The first factor is the harsh effect of the breach of the duty, namely 
avoidance of the contract according to section 17 of MIA 1906. Secondly, the insurer 
can still be protected against the bad faith of the assured by the contractual 
stipulations or other legal principles like the doctrine of alteration of risk.644 
It becomes more complex when the post-formation duty applies to specific issues, 
including the adjustments or renewals of contractual obligations, held covered 
clauses, and alteration of risk. Consequently, the search for elusive principles for the 
post-contractual duty issues becomes the main trend. In the view of this author, it is 
unrealistic to create only one unified test, or adopt the pre-contract system to control 
the post-contractual events, or even a unified system within the post-contract 
mechanism for individual issues. Some academics allege that the uncertainty 
concerning the juristic basis is a result of the attempt to fashion a multi-faceted, 
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singular post-formation duty that applies in many different factual circumstances.645 
David Foxton QC even criticized the attempt to treat all post-contractual duties of 
good faith in terms of the general duty enshrined in section 17 as hindering the 
development of marine insurance law and insurer’s reciprocal duties.646 This opinion 
is facilitated by an influential comment committed by Bennett: 
‘It is both preferable and more accurate to refer to a doctrine of utmost good 
faith that gives rise to a number of distinct features,…, differences in scope, 
standard of required behaviour and remedies for breach demand flexibility 
from the post-formation doctrine.’647 
 
Connected with the above authorities and the practical application of good faith or 
utmost good faith in specific issues, this chapter analyses the principles of the duty of 
post-contractual good faith (including both the normal good faith and utmost good 
faith), and the duty to abstain from fraud in respect of the parties’ dealings.648 In 
order to strengthen the research on the first principle, elusive requirements of good 
faith are compared at the end of this chapter. 
 
5.2. Post-contractual duty of good faith 
5.2.1. General ground 
The purpose of the post-contractual duty is to permit either party, who is about to 
make a decision for the continuance or performance of the contract, or in connection 
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with a claim, to consider his position with the benefit of all the information known to 
the other party and act accordingly.649 Without this crucial doctrine, no duty will be 
observed after the conclusion of a contract. Nevertheless, the status of post-
formation duty is still uncertain in the context of particular cases, for instance, the 
scope of information needed to be disclosed varies in different circumstances. The 
situation becomes severer in the context of fraudulent claims. This raises questions 
of whether the pre-contract system can be extended to post-contract events or 
fraudulent claims, and how the drawbacks of the pre-contract system can be 
overcome. Furthermore, the issue of whether the actual inducement and materiality 
test is suited for the post-formation stage is examined. Finally, it is questioned 
whether a retrospective or prospective remedy is recommended. 
 
5.2.2. Post-contractual duty of disclosure and specific issues 
After the observation of recent developments in creating a post-contractual duty of 
the utmost good faith system in a systematic manner, it is found that three judgments 
in the first two years of the new millennium have played a significant role in 
determining the scope of this duty, providing some guidelines for the future of this 
concept.650 However, the nature and scope of this duty are still left unresolved.   
Some authorities651 investigated the duration of the post-contractual disclosure 
duty and exemplified its extension to some specific issues. For instance, after having 
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examined that the duty of good faith continues throughout the contractual 
relationship at a level appropriate to the moment, Professor Malcolm Clarke 
extended the duration of this duty to the cover extension and renewal, and also when 
the insured claims insurance money.652 Consequently, Justice Hirst in The Litsion 
Pride added more circumstances which would appropriately trigger the ‘appropriate 
moment’ contemplated by Clarke, including reinsurance and cancellation clauses.653 
Obviously, difficulties in this area lie in its duration in individual cases and the 
extensive scope of information needed to be disclosed after the conclusion of an 
insurance contract. Therefore, attention will be directed to the developments 
regarding circumstances where the duty might attach. Orders for ship’s papers, held 
covered clauses and fraudulent claims jurisdiction were considered to be three pillars 
of general post-contractual duty of utmost good faith under section 17 of the MIA 
1906. 654  Although this statement is doubted for its potential difficulties, 655  its 
contribution to mapping the main components in a general post-contract system still 
cannot be disregarded. This difficult question has been partially answered by the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. According to this 
Act, it is suggested that in consumer insurance, this new legislation of pre-contract 
information also extends to contract variations.656 Also, according to the Explanatory 
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Note, it was pointed out that at the practical level, the renewal of insurance is 
considered as a new contract.657 
 
5.2.2.1. Alteration of risk and held covered clauses 
In practice, due to high risks attached to the insurance industry, it is in the interest 
of both insurers and assureds to restrict the scope of marine insurance contracts.658 
However, because of its unpredictability, both parties are aware that the policy may 
not apply to all the circumstances which may arise during a marine adventure, and 
the assured may want to provide so far as possible that his insurance cover is 
uninterrupted.659  For instance, during the currency of an insurance contract, the 
agreed ports are altered,660 or there may be a change of voyage,661 deviation,662 an 
absence of specifying several ports of discharge, 663  or a delay in a voyage. 664 
According to sections 43-48 of the MIA 1906, unless agreed by both parties, all the 
aforesaid cases of alteration of risk can discharge the insurer from the liability under 
the contract. As this doctrine suggests, the alteration of risk during the performance 
of an insurance contract does not need to be disclosed, unless the alteration is so 
great that it would change the nature of an insurance policy.665 For instance, material 
events listed in sections 43-48, and any other substantial changes could allow the 
insurer to reassess the risk and premium. On the contrary, if the event does not 
cause any material alteration of the risk, no further premium may be payable.666 
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Hence, this event is not great enough to change the nature of primary risk and it is 
therefore unnecessary to be disclosed. Apparently, this doctrine only applies in the 
absence of an express term, and it becomes common to contain an ‘alteration of risk’ 
clause. This subsequently obliges the assured to advise the insurers of 
circumstances which increase the risk of an insured loss occurring, failing which the 
assured will not be insured, or the insurer will be entitled to avoid.667 In Ansari v New 
India Assurance,668 it was clarified by the insurance policy that any material alteration 
to the insured subjects (Premises or Business in this case), or any material change in 
the facts stated in the Proposal Form, or other facts supplied to the insurer, would 
have the insurance policy ceded unless the insurer agrees to continue in writing. 
Judging from English case law and the MIA 1906, it can be concluded that the 
remedies available for the assured’s failure in the duty of alteration of risks 
notification are always prospective, but not retrospective. In other words, in cases 
where the assured did not disclose any significant change of risks insured against, 
the insurer could be discharged from the indemnification for losses caused by the 
concealed information, as sections 45, 46 and 48 of the MIA 1906 suggest.669 
    On the one hand, the general alteration of the risk doctrine in MIA 1906 empowers 
the insurer to confine his exposure to protect his interests from being prejudiced by 
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the assured’s act after concluding an insurance contract. Nevertheless, this doctrine 
imposes more options on the assured to have unpredictable circumstances insured 
by a wider-ranging cover with extra conditions, for example, payment of an additional 
premium with agreed terms. There are various possible solutions suggested to 
smooth the conflicts of two opposite standings (maintenance and flexibility), including 
an automatic renewal of its cover, negotiation of an effective variation of existing 
contract, and a contemplation of a fresh cover.670 A ‘held covered’ clause thus, is 
invoked as a practical solution to extend the scope of cover, with invocation 
preserving the negotiated cover from the threat of being lost.671 The primary function 
of the held covered provision, therefore, was considered to inject a note of flexibility 
into the concluded bargain and mitigate the hard insurance contract law regarding 
the general doctrine of alteration of risk.672 
A ‘held covered’ clause is defined to be a provision often found in marine (and 
other) insurance policies under which the coverage can be extended for an additional 
premium and/or on terms to be agreed, if notice is given to the underwriter. 673 
Unquestionably, this clause is still playing an influential role in the context of utmost 
good faith, since it has been suggested to spread the latter to the renewals and 
variations of contracts. 674  In contemporary practice, the legal validity of a held 
covered clause is partially embodied by section 31(2) of the MIA 1906,675 stating 
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additional premium as one situation where the extended cover applies as binding 
contracts.676 
Normally, this traditional clause is like an exclusion clause inserted in the policy 
specifying that the existing policy is ‘held covered in case of any breach of warranty 
or agreed terms, provided notice be given to the underwriters immediately after 
receipt of advices and any amended terms of cover and any additional premium 
required by them be agreed’. 677  The practical Institute Clauses provide typical 
traditional instances, for example, Institute Time Clauses Hulls (2009), Breach of 
Warranty (clause 3); International Hull Clauses (2003), Breach of Navigation 
Provision (clause 11); Institute Cargo Clauses (1982), 678 Change of Voyage (clause 
10). The recently revised Institute Cargo Clauses abandoned the traditional formula 
of a held covered clause, and instead, the same effect is achieved with a view to 
making the position more readily understandable to potential assureds. 679  For 
example, the revised Institute Cargo Clauses (2009), Change of Voyage (clause 10) 
and Termination of the Contract of Carriage (clause 9).680 Differing from the wording 
of clause 10 in the 1982 version, the revised clause 10 stipulates that: 
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‘10.1 Where, after attachment of this insurance, the destination is changed 
by the Assured, this must be notified promptly to Insurers for rates and 
terms to be agreed. Should a loss occur prior to such agreement being 
obtained cover may be provided but only if cover would have been available 
at a reasonable commercial market rate on reasonable market terms. 
10.2 Where the subject-matter insured commences the transit contemplated 
by this insurance (in accordance with Clause 8.1), but, without the 
knowledge of the Assured or their employees the ship sails for another 
destination, this insurance will nevertheless be deemed to have attached at 
commencement of such transit.’ 
 
Based on the revised clause 10.2 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (2009) regarding 
change of voyage, the risk is deemed to have attached, and no question of the 
assured being required to give notice or of an additional premium being required will 
arise. Meanwhile, clause 10.2 is not considered to be a held covered clause by some 
leading marine insurance academics.681 Nevertheless, in the view of this author, the 
held covered clause has never been abandoned, but replaced by the modified clause 
as a new automatic held covered clause formula, which is also preferred by some 
lawyers.682 Apparently, the automatic extended cover case simplifies the relationship 
between itself and utmost good faith. The following work below, therefore, is 
addressed in the context of traditional formula of held covered clauses with notice 
given in advance.  
Utmost good faith is suggested to be tightly connected to the held covered clauses. 
The judicial support so far offered to this question, confirms that utmost good faith is 
the condition for the assured to invoke the held covered clauses successfully. For 
instance, the judgment of Justice McNair in Overseas Commodities Ltd v Style683 
held that ‘to obtain the protection of the held covered clause, the assured must act 
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with the utmost good faith towards the underwriters…’. Similarly, it was observed by 
Justice Donaldson in Liberian Insurance Agency Inc. v Mosse684 that utmost good 
faith was indispensable for an assured who seeks to invoke a held covered clause. 
Analogous statements have been provided by Lord Hobhouse in the House of Lords 
in The Star Sea,685 and Lord Justice Longmore in The Mercandian Continent.686 To 
sum up, the assured should disclose all circumstances material to the fixing of 
premium in held covered clause cases. The assured is entitled to rely on the held 
covered clause only upon reasonable notice being provided to the insurer.687 
Some questions may arise with respect to the application of utmost good faith in 
the held covered clause cases. Foremost, does it fall within the scope of the pre-
contract system or post-contract system? This question used to cause lively debate 
among the judiciary and academics. If this clause arises in connection with the post-
contract application of the duty of utmost good faith, consequently, section 17 of the 
MIA 1906 turns to be its only resource. Therefore, the avoidance ab initio remedy in 
section 17 should logically spread to the held covered clause cases. In the view of 
this author, this post-contract statement appears to be accurate in terms of the timing 
requirement in the context of the post-formation system, since the held covered 
clause is invoked for a further protection to the assured after the conclusion of an 
insurance contract. Despite this, there is still a need to discuss relevant difficulties. 
Firstly, utmost good faith in section 17 of MIA 1906 is a mutual obligation imposed on 
both insurance parties. But, the held covered clause gives rise to a unilateral offer by 
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the insurer to provide extended cover on the terms of the clause.688 In practice, the 
assured has no obligation to adopt an extended cover, but as long as he invokes this 
clause in an utmost good faith context (the traditional formula of held covered clause) 
or with agreed terms (the automatic extended cover or modern formula of held 
covered clause), the insurer is obliged to indemnify the loss caused by additional 
risks out of the primary policy. Apparently, its unilateral nature in practice is not a 
match to the mutual nature of general utmost good faith specified by section 17, 
which is deemed as the principal provision generating a post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith. Secondly, if the held covered clause is considered to be attached 
to the primary insurance and governed by the doctrine of post-contractual utmost 
good faith, the avoidance remedy should be extended to the held covered clause 
cases and become the only eligible remedy according to section 17 of the MIA 1906. 
Given these conditions, whilst the assured in question acts with his extreme good 
faith for the main body of the original contract, but fraudulently or negligently in terms 
of the material information in relation to the risks held covered, the whole insurance 
contract could be denied. This is blatant unfairness for the assured, since at common 
law, punishment is not the purpose of contractual remedies. Consequently, its 
irrationality also fails to comply with the requirement for inducement. It is found that 
early authorities did not deliver any statement regarding the requirement for 
inducement to avoid the entire contract or variations at the moment of making the 
decisions.689 Although the later Pan Atlantic690 case created the actual inducement 
requirement for utmost good faith, it is still difficult to find the final judicial decision. 
However, in the view of this author, the materiality and inducement requirement 
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should be limited to the alterations attached to the held covered clause. In other 
words, the party who wants to challenge the altered terms or additional premium 
provisions must prove that non-disclosure or misrepresentation is material to the 
variations only.691 Fourthly, admitting the variation alluded to the held covered clause 
as one part of the original policy gives rise to incompatibility between this clause and 
the principle of utmost good faith, with respect to the test and scope of material 
information needed to be disclosed. As to the principle of utmost good faith in 
sections 18-20, MIA 1906, the material circumstances which influence a prudent 
insurer’s decision and have actually induced the conclusion of a marine insurance 
contract must be disclosed before concluding this contract. This general test of 
materiality is too wide for the held covered clause issue, which could be an extreme 
imposition for the assured by requiring him to make full disclosure of material 
information even after the conclusion of the said contract. Therefore, the information 
which is material in terms of the held covered clause needs to be disclosed by the 
assured before its application, but not that of importance for the whole contract. 
Keeping this in mind, most authorities suggest categorizing this clause into the 
scope of the pre-contract stage,692 or alternatively, under sections 18-20 concerning 
pre-contract utmost good faith in MIA 1906 (this blind application suggestion is 
criticized for its veracity below). One reason is that since the held covered clause is 
to be invoked for covering forward risks out of the primary policy, the risks held 
covered, thus, constitute a distinct contract theoretically.693 According to Thomas, the 
held covered clause gives rise to a unilateral offer by the insurer to provide an 
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extended cover on the terms of the clause, and with notice given, a reasonable 
premium and reasonable terms agreed, the assured is both accepting and giving 
consideration for the unilateral offer.694 The procedures summarized by Thomas just 
reflect on all elements for a separate valid contract, including, offer, acceptance, 
consideration and an intention to create legal relations.695 
Treating the amendment alluded to the held covered clause as a separate new 
contract is getting more support, from both the judiciary and academia. The judicial 
evidence lies in the judgment of Lord Justice Potter in Fraser Shipping Ltd v N.J. 
Colton & Others,696 in which section 18 of the MIA 1906 was referred to in order to 
assess whether the disclosed information is material. This is assumed to be an 
indirect confirmation of excluding a held covered clause event from the post-contract 
scope by importing it to the pre-contract system,697 since it is widely known that 
sections 18-20 of the MIA 1906 are applied to the contemplation of an insurance 
contract. Another authoritative judgment, delivered by Lord Hobhouse, in Iron Trades 
Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd v Companhia de Seguros Imperio,698 expressed a further 
need to tailor the duty to its context. In his judgment, it was articulated that:  
‘Where there is an addition to a contract, as where it is varied, there can be 
a further duty of disclosure but only to the extent that it is material to the 
variation being proposed. If the addition does not alter the contractual rights 
there will be no fact that it is material to disclose and the same will apply if a 
variation is favourable to the insurer. It will only be when the insurer is being 
asked to take on some additional risk and/or needing of reassess the 
premium or terms of cover that disclosure of further facts could be material 
                                               
694
Rhidian Thomas, ‘Cargo Insurance: Issues Arising from the Standard Cover Provided by the 
London Institute Cargo Clauses’, in Marc Huybrechts, et al., Marine Insurance at the turn of the 
Millennium, Vol. 1, (Intersentia, 1999), pp. 325, 332. 
695
 At common law, it is assumed that, principally, contracting parties of a commercial agreement have 
serious intentions to create a legal relationship. Additionally, additional premium just meets the 
‘additional consideration for an additional contract’ requirement at common law. For more details of 
the elements of a valid contract in contract law, see MacIntyre, Business Law.     
696
 [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 586, pp. 594-597, per Potter, LJ. 
697
 This view is expressed by Soyer, ‘Continuing duty of utmost good faith in insurance contracts: still 
alive?’, in LMCLQ, pp. 39-79, at p. 65. 
698
 (1992) 1 Re LR 213, cited by Bennett, ‘Mapping the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance 
contract law’, in LMCLQ, note. 220. 
180 
 
and, even then, the facts to be disclosed are only those which are material 
to what the insurer is being asked to do…Any other conclusion would lead 
to an absurdity; the duty of the utmost good faith does not include giving the 
insurer an opportunity, after he has accepted the risk and become bound, to 
escape from his commitment.’699 
 
As Lord Hobhouse’s judgment suggests, the duty of utmost good faith is confined 
to the risks accepted by the assured and ceases at the conclusion of the contract, 
otherwise, the insurer would be awarded with an opportunity to escape from his 
commitment. Indirectly, Lord Hobhouse’s judgment implies that the injection of 
additional risks or variations of contracts should be treated like a new contract, or at 
least trigger a new pre-contract duty of utmost good faith out of the original policy. As 
a matter of fact, this judgment can be considered to be of significance to link utmost 
good faith for the held covered clauses to contract variations and also renewals.700 
The second concern, which is linked to the first, is the scope of information which 
needs to be disclosed before invoking the held covered clause successfully. 
Regarding Lord Hobhouse’s judgment, under the circumstance of an additional risk 
to a contract, the further duty of disclosure was limited to material information to the 
variation.701 One condition precedent to invoke this test, as Lord Hobhouse observed, 
was whether the variation being proposed would lead the premium to be reassessed 
or additional terms of cover agreed, for example, when the insurer is asked to take 
account of some additional risks. 702  In an analogous position, treating contract 
variations resulting from a held covered clause as a separate new contract simplifies 
and minimises a series of issues raised, including those with regard to the variation 
of an insurance contract which is addressed below. Followed by The Mercandian 
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Continent,703 Longmore LJ stated that it had never been suggested that a breach of 
the duty in those situations may avoid the whole of the contract of insurance, 
although it is clear that avoidance is the only statutory remedy available. The 
separate new contract theory therefore, on the other hand, states that the information 
is not needed to be disclosed unless it is material to the risks held covered, or it is 
material to the variation and renewal of the insurance contract.704 It is suggested in 
Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, that cases in held covered clauses 
can be distinguished by those in which the insurer has a decision to make, and those 
in which the insurer does not.705 Following this suggestion, it is observed by its 
present editors that in the former case, disclosure should be made of those matters 
which are material to the decision the insurer has to make. Furthermore, since this 
duty of disclosure in held covered clause cases is also a voluntary duty suggested to 
be attached to section 17 of MIA 1906, it is analogous to require the assured to 
reveal all material information positively on the basis of a prudent insurer’s mind but 
not on the assured’s assumption. For example, in Moore Large & Co Ltd v HERMES 
Credit & Guarantee Plc, 706  it was observed that where specific information was 
requested under the terms of a policy endorsement and the information provided 
may serve purposes other than those related to the assessment of risks, the assured 
should not be led to the inference that no further information should be disclosed.707 
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5.2.2.2. Variations to insurance contracts 
In the context of contract variations, the materiality and actual inducement test 
apply, but not with the same standard created in the principal duty of utmost good 
faith underlying section 17 of the MIA 1906. Sawtell v Loudon708 can be cited as one 
of the earliest cases regarding the variation of contract. In this case, a broker was 
instructed to effect a policy on goods, but by mistake he effected it on a ship. This 
policy was afterwards rectified by the underwriter subscribing a memorandum in the 
margin and his initials. The broker failed to communicate some information he 
acquired about the insured ship, the Sofia, in the interim. Therefore it was argued by 
the underwriters that this non-disclosure vitiated the whole policy. One point held by 
Heath J is that the information disclosed was a material fact and ought to have been 
disclosed.709 In spite of this, it is observed that the facts of this case offered no 
guidance on the general effect of lack of good faith in a variation to an insurance 
contract since the original policy became spoiled as a result of an error in 
communication.710 
As a result, before the parties proceed to make any changes to the original policy, 
the circumstances which are material to the variations must be disclosed.711 Baron 
Blackwell set one fictitious example in his judgment of Lishman v Northern Maritime 
Insurance Co, demonstrating why the position of materiality (and inducement) would 
be different: 
‘If the parties, after making the original agreement, were dissatisfied with 
the terms of it, and altered it in drawing up the final terms of the insurance, 
so as substantially to alter the nature of the bargain as affecting both 
sides,…, it might well be that the obligation to communicate material facts 
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would continue until the time of the execution of the policy, at any rate with 
respect to all matters material to the alteration of the terms.’712 
 
This view was cited by Lord Hobhouse afterwards in The Star Sea,713 reaffirming 
that the duty of disclosure would apply to a variation, but only facts material to the 
additional risk falling within the variation need to be disclosed.714 As a matter of fact, 
Lord Hobhouse expressed a clear view in The Star Sea, clarifying that where the 
contract is being varied, facts must be disclosed which are material to the additional 
risk being accepted by the variation, and meanwhile, after the conclusion of the 
original policy, there is no need to disclose facts occurring or discovered material to 
the acceptance and rating of that risk afterwards.715 Although Blackwell J did not 
consider whether avoidance would be limited to the variation or extended to the 
original contract in Lishman v Northen Maritime Insurance Co, one might have the 
view that apparently, this limitation should apply to the avoidance remedy. 
Discussion is continued in some recent cases in marine insurance.716 Especially in 
Justice Hirst’s judgment in The Litsion Pride, it is agreed that ‘a circumstance is 
material if it would influence the judgment of a prudent underwriter in making the 
relevant decision on the topic to which the misrepresentation or non-disclosure 
relates’. It was held that the information was material because it would possibly 
change the underwriter’s decision as to the rate of additional premium, the facultative 
reinsurance, and even the execution of the cancellation clause.717 
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The judicial evidence does not only confirm the materiality test in the context of 
contract amendments, but also follows the test adopted in the pre-contract system, 
namely, circumstances are material which would influence the judgment of a prudent 
insurer in fixing the additional premium, or determining whether he will accept that 
variation.718 
As another element at the core of utmost good faith, the mutuality nature cannot 
be ignored. In the principal duty of utmost good faith in section 17 of the MIA 1906, 
either party must observe this duty, although the avoidance remedy of the contract is 
much likely to be one-sided in practice. By analogy, its unitary inclination in the post-
contract situation was confirmed by the judiciary in The Star Sea, stating that ‘an 
inevitable consequence in the post-contract situation is that the remedy of avoidance 
of the contract is, in practical terms, wholly one-sided’. 719  However, its unitary 
inclination of avoidance remedy cannot deny the mutuality nature of utmost good 
faith itself. It is not difficult to imagine that both the insurance company and assured 
have the right to propose variations to the insurance policy and before the variations 
being agreed the proposer needs to disclose every material circumstance relating to 
the variations. 
 
5.2.2.3. Renewals to insurance contracts 
In most non-life insurance,720 the duration is specified by an insurance policy, 
which is normally for one year. A renewable insurance contract is providing a window 
for both insurance parties to have the existing policy renewed without complicated 
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procedures undergone during the negotiation of the original insurance policy, but 
probably with a higher premium or extra terms. In practice, a ‘days of grace’ provision 
would be contained in a renewable insurance, granting the assured a short additional 
time for payment and the renewal would lapse if the assured fails to pay the renewal 
premium.721 On the other hand, the right to renew an insurance contract is not an 
automatic right, but qualified upon the acceptance of such an extension or renewal 
by the insurers.722 With a valid offer, an acceptance, additional considerations from 
both parties and the serious intentions to continue a legal relation, it is logical and 
legally acceptable to treat the renewed insurance like a separate contract. 723 
Meanwhile, it is also reasonable to suggest sections 17-20 of the MIA 1906 
governing the utmost good faith issues with respect to the renewal of insurance as 
being applicable. 
Materiality is judged by analogy with the pre-contractual position, which means 
that every material circumstance must be disclosed or represented during the 
negotiation of renewing insurance. Similarly, the circumstance is not material unless 
it would influence the prudent insurer to accept the extension of the original policy, 
and the insurer would not have accepted the extension with the information 
discussed. In the non-disclosure context, the party who intends to challenge the 
renewed contract is obliged to prove that the non-disclosed or misrepresented 
information is material, or continues to be material for the renewals, otherwise, the 
materiality requirement specified for the renewed part is not satisfied and the 
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information is, in discussion, immaterial.724 In the view of this author, the materiality 
test here is also prospective compared to the entire contract. Additionally, the 
information is material for the renewals only if it is crucial at the time of the renewal of 
the insurance contract but irrelevant to the nature in the previous policy.    
 
5.2.2.4. Orders for ship’s papers and litigation procedures 
The order for ship’s papers was deemed as an exceptional pre-defence discovery 
procedure, unique to actions on marine insurance policies.725 Therefore, pursuant to 
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 31.12 and rule 58.14, the insurer applies for a 
discovery order of ship’s papers, the court may make an order for specific disclosure, 
or specific inspection, and subsequently one party must disclose documents 
specified in the order and/or any documents located as a result of that research. 
Alternatively, the assured must provide a convincing explanation on why disclosure is 
unsuccessful or denied to be submitted. The reason to create this exceptional 
discovery procedure for marine insurers is that the underwriters have no means of 
knowing how a loss was caused if it occurs when the ship is entirely under the 
control of the assured.726 Consequently, the information imbalance will be redressed 
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and the quality of claims and allegations will be improved.727 The timing of disclosure 
of ship’s papers, therefore, is after the commencement of litigation procedures.728 
The heart of this issue is the relationship between the post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith in section 17 of the MIA 1906 and disclosure of ship’s papers. It is 
understandable why some early authorities729 treated the origin of the power of the 
court to require disclosure of ship’s papers as one duty lying in utmost good faith, 
since then, according to this order and the rules in Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the 
assured must disclose the information of any document specified by this order, or is 
relevant to this search. It cannot be neglected that even the draftsman of this Act, Sir 
Mackenzie Chalmers, noted that the order for disclosure of ship’s papers was a 
species of utmost good faith, instancing the former as an example of the operation of 
post-contract good faith,730 and this statement has existed for a considerable amount 
of time. However, some current authorities favour the opposite opinion,731 claiming 
that this order is independent of the doctrine of utmost good faith. To deal with this 
question, investigations need to be firstly addressed to the following issues. 
The first concern is the scope of papers that must be disclosed pursuant to the 
order. Literally, based on rule 31.12 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, all the 
documents specified by the order and/or related to the search must be produced. 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the ‘ship’s papers’ is defined to be ‘the papers 
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that a vessel is required to provide as the primary evidence of the ship’s national 
character, ownership, nature and destination of cargo, and compliance with 
navigation laws’. 732  In practice, the ship’s papers include certificates of health, 
charter-party, muster-rolls, licenses, bills of lading, insurance documents, and any 
other documents to prove the vessel’s status. Besides, the scope of this duty is 
considerably wide because the insurer can apply for every document he thinks is 
linked to the claims to be produced. As a consequence of admitting the disclosure of 
ship’s papers as a species of utmost good faith under section 17 of the MIA 1906, 
the pre-stage system should also apply to the post-formation system and extensively 
to the disclosure of ship’s papers for the insurer. But, the extensive scope of ship’s 
papers which the insurer can apply to be disclosed would require a radically different 
test compared with the prudent insurer, materiality and actual inducement test, in the 
pre-contract phase. This is because, under present circumstances the particular and 
individual insurer’s requirements should be taken into consideration, but not those of 
a hypothetical prudent insurer’s. 
The second concern is whether the utmost good faith duty plays any role in the 
litigation stage.733 It has also been suggested that the duty of utmost good faith exists 
in the conduct of litigation. 734  Sir MacKenzie Chalmers suggested in his 1907 
commentary on section 17 that ‘even in litigation both sides must play with their 
cards on the table; hence the full discovery allowed as to ship’s papers and other 
material documents’.735 In The Mercandian Continent, Longmore LJ expressed his 
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statement citing Cox v Bankside Agency Ltd.736 He appeared to support the view that 
there was a duty of good faith in the conduct of litigation, but noted that the 
avoidance ab initio remedy attached to its non-compliance was inappropriate.737 The 
duty of utmost good faith, therefore, based on these authorities, appeared to survive 
the commencement of proceedings. In contrast, some authorities held that the duty 
of utmost good faith came to an end when the litigation started.738 In The Star Sea, 
Tuckey J suggested that the duty came to an end once legal proceedings had 
commenced. 739  Consistent with this opinion, Lord Hobhouse reflected that once 
proceedings had commenced, important changes came about in the parties’ 
relationships.740 Clearly, it is not appropriate to require the assured to act to the same 
standard of good faith to be observed in the pre-contract system, since the external 
environment and internal elements have been changed once the litigation procedure 
commences. In the opinion of this author, the assured indeed must produce the 
specified ship’s papers by the order in good faith, based on the obligation attached to 
the procedural order, but not an implied contractual obligation. Actually, one might 
have the view that this concern is irrelevant to the status of disclosing ship’s papers 
in the conduct of litigation, since rule 58.14 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
empowers the Courts to issue the order to require the assured to disclose specified 
ship’s papers ‘at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms, if any, as to 
staying the proceedings or otherwise, as the court thinks fit’. This concern can then 
be addressed, as this is a procedural duty in association with the order issued but not 
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one aspect of the complicated utmost good faith doctrine. In practice, one statutory 
example of drawing a line between the general duty of good faith and litigation 
procedure is the International Hull Clauses 2003, clause 45.741 
The third concern regarding this statement is the incompatibility between English 
case law and section 17 of the MIA 1906 with respect to the scope of the order for 
ship’s papers and the remedies for a breach.742 The negative influences of dividing 
this aspect into the duty of utmost good faith in section 17 include, first of all, the 
incompatibility between the application of an order for ship’s papers and section 17. 
From the history of this order,743 it is found that it was rooted in equity and unique in 
marine insurance actions. The judiciary reaffirmed their views that they did not want 
to extend this order to actions other than marine insurance actions.744 However, 
section 17 of the MIA 1906 applies to both marine and non-marine insurance, and 
categorizing the pre-defence discovery of ship’s papers into section 17 would require 
the former duty to be extended to both marine and non-marine insurance. This 
ultimately conflicts with the fundamentals of establishing the order for ship’s 
papers745 and subsequent case law creating limitations on its application. Secondly, 
an incompatibility is also created between case law and its avoidance remedy 
attached to section 17. According to Bennett, there is no record either of early 
discoveries having been awarded against an insurer or of an insurer being held 
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entitled to avoid a policy for non-compliance with an order for ship’s papers.746 On 
the basis of judicial attitudes, it can be concluded that it has never been suggested 
that the non-compliance with disclosure of ship’s papers would entitle underwriters to 
avoid the policy,747 since ‘whatever it was, it was not the obligation referred to in 
s.17’.748 Stay of proceedings, therefore, is the only remedy available for its non-
compliance. 
It can be concluded that the duty of utmost good faith has no relationship with the 
assured’s duty to discover ship’s papers. It is unrealistic to have the assured’s duty to 
discover ship’s papers covered by the duty of utmost good faith in section 17, since 
in doing this, more difficulties and potential incompatibilities would be caused. One 
might have the view that since the timing of delivering this order is after the 
conclusion of the referred insurance contract and at the commencement of litigation 
procedures, then requiring the assured to continue the duty of utmost good faith is, 
apparently, against the general principle that this duty ends when litigation starts. 
Furthermore, the obligation imposed on the assured is a procedural response 
derived from the order issued by the court, but not attached to the marine insurance 
policy itself. This is upheld by the authoritative judgments delivered by Leggatt LJ749 
and Lord Hobhouse750 in The Star Sea, stating that such orders constituted no more 
than examples of the Court’s procedure for handling cases of this kind, and the 
breach of which attracted procedural remedies rather than the remedy of avoidance. 
Additionally, it is suggested by some authorities that the order for ship’s papers is 
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better viewed as a purely procedural response to the lack of appropriate common law 
discovery procedures. 751  Apart from its exclusive character in marine insurance 
policies, its increasing discretionary nature752 appears to conflict with the mandatory 
requirement to observe utmost good faith under an insurance contract in section 17. 
Finally, the above factors (including its unilateral character and limitations during the 
enforcement, incompatibilities with section 17 and case law, a radical different 
remedy available for a breach compared to the principal utmost good faith system) 
demonstrate that the assured’s duty to disclose vessel’s papers is of little weight in 
utmost good faith.    
 
5.2.2.5. Other situations 
5.2.2.5.1. Cancellation clauses 
A cancellation clause is defined to be a contractual provision allowing one or both 
parties to avoid their obligations under certain conditions.753  Under a continuous 
insurance cover, with a notice given by the assured in advance, the insurer has a 
right to make a decision to terminate or continue the current policy. If the insurer 
decides to terminate the policy upon the information revealed afterwards, the insurer 
or reinsurer would give notice of cancellation, and arrange consequential discussions 
on terms or contract renewals during the notice period. On the contrary, if the insurer 
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accepts the information revealed by the assured and decides to continue the existing 
policy, the cancellation clause becomes one part of the original policy.754 
As to the duration of a general post-contractual duty of utmost good faith, on the 
one hand, it is a common practice for the assured to be released from a continuous 
duty of material circumstances disclosure to the risks insured against after 
concluding the insurance contract. Otherwise, there would be inexhaustible excuses 
available for the insurer to avoid himself from taking market risks, for example, 
terminating the insurance policy because of the increasing risks insured against. On 
the other hand, the right to cancel gives the insurer an opportunity to repudiate his 
liability in respect of an accepted risk,755 especially in a long-term and continuous 
insurance policy. In order to resolve conflicts between these two views, and avoid the 
insurer’s abuse of utmost good faith, the judiciary suggested treating the right to 
cancel a cover not as an absolute right but as an option.756 It was held by both the 
Court of Appeal and House of Lords in Commercial Union Assurance Co v Niger Co 
Ltd that there was no continuing duty of disclosure to enable the insurers to 
determine whether or not to terminate the insurance.757 Lord Sumner expressed his 
concern in applying the duty of disclosure too extensively, considering that the 
extensive application ‘would turn what is an indispensable shield for the underwriter 
into an engine of oppression against the insured’.758  In order to redress further 
potential disputes, it was suggested by Bankes LJ that in the case of a long-term 
contract, it would be wise to contain a provision requiring notice to be given to them if 
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the nature of the risk alters appreciably. 759  In the subsequent judgment, it was 
observed that there should be no fresh voluntary duty of disclosure imposed on the 
assured during the notice period given, but a duty not to materially misrepresent facts 
in discussions with insurers.760 This observation also accords with the initial judicial 
intention which is reluctant to extend the duty of disclosure endlessly.761 
 
5.2.2.5.2. Claims notification clause – a precedent condition or an innominate 
term? 
In practice, most insurance contracts contain a provision requiring the assured to 
notify either claims or circumstances which would give rise to a potential loss to the 
insurer in a specified manner. This is usually in writing within a time limit given, 
(which is normally contractually clarified, or within a reasonable time which reads like 
‘as soon as reasonably practicable’ or ‘immediately in the event of losses occurred’). 
In an absence of an express provision, the practice is that the insurers need to pay 
immediately in the event of a loss according to the insurance policy dependent upon 
notification. However, if the contracting parties involved have disagreements 
regarding claims afterwards, business efficiency would be referred to by the courts to 
judge if there is a duty of notification implied in this case.762 
One of the earliest case examples enshrining the post-formation duty, The Litsion 
Pride,763 intended to extend good faith to the delivery of notification. In subsequent 
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cases, The Mercandian Continent764 and Alfred McAlpine Plc v BAI Insurance (Run 
Off) Ltd,765 some remarkable statements in connection with utmost good faith and a 
claims notification clause were provided. The Mercandian Continent case is 
construed as a landmark in respect to the claims notification clause because it 
provided a crucial judgment in categorizing terms and the effect of the breach of a 
claims notification clause. According to the leading judgment delivered by Longmore 
LJ, the first three categories of terms in English law766 coexist with the conditions 
precedent to the insurer’s liability for a particular claim constituting a contract. As 
Longmore LJ held, four types of contractual terms were observed: (1) condition, a 
term any breach of which entitles the innocent party to terminate the contract and 
discharge himself from all further liabilities from the breach; (2) warranty, a term any 
breach of which only entitles the innocent party to damages; (3) innominate terms, in 
respect of which the consequence of the breach depends on the nature and gravity 
of the breach; 767  (4) condition precedent, a term the observance of which is a 
condition precedent before the other party to the contract comes under any liability 
whatsoever.768 It was accepted to apply a duty of good faith in connection with both 
the notification of claims and litigation procedures, but on the basis of some lesser 
remedy other than the statutory avoidance ab initio.769 
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Recently, confusion in the terminology used for insurance contracts and ordinary 
contracts was discussed in academia, by summarizing different types of contractual 
terms in insurance law and their equivalents in general contract law.770 
The BAI case is another noticeable decision here because it introduced some 
freshness in categorizing terms and the effect of the breach of a claims notification 
clause.771 During the leading judgment delivered by Waller LJ, the traditional attitude 
treating the claims notification clause as a simple absolute condition precedent to 
recovery, a term any breach of which entitles the insurer to reject the claim, was 
suggested to be shifted to the innominate term theory,772 or a new-type innominate 
term,773 which is limited to particular claims rather than the whole contract as with a 
general innominate term. According to his judgment, the consequences of a breach 
of the notification duty may be sufficiently serious to entitle the insurer (the BAI 
Insurance Company in this case) to reject the claim, albeit the breach is not so 
serious as to amount to a repudiation of the whole contract. 774  The resulting 
development is that the assured or his agent’s failure to notify the insurer of losses or 
circumstances would not simply lead a claim to be rejected, but would lead to a 
variable result upon assessed seriousness of the breach for relevant claim. Hong 
Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd775 was referred to illustrate 
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different effects of breaking the notification duty, upon whether the breach 
substantially deprives the insurer of his interests.776 
In the view of this author, the new-type innominate term analysis is indeed an 
injection of flexibility into the condition precedent theory for recovery. However, its 
vital weakness lies in the primary surrounding of this theory, as it must firstly be an 
implied term. As to this point, admittedly, difficulties in the precise quantification of 
loss, lead to a failure in attempting to persuade courts to accept a notification duty as 
an implied term without express provisions.777 Besides, some other concerns are 
proposed with the arising new-type innominate term statement. Considering the 
varied consequences of non-compliance with the duty of notification, for example, 
where the effect of the non-compliance is serious enough to entitle the insurer to 
reject the particular claim, this is the same result which would be achieved anyway 
where a notification clause is construed as a condition precedent. However, the 
result of a breach would distinguish a precedent condition from a notification duty 
when it is not sufficiently serious to entitle the insurer to reject the claim, by treating a 
notification clause equally to a new-type innominate term. Furthermore, the new 
threshold between sufficient and insufficient seriousness for a particular claim is hard 
to be unified since the degree of gravity is assessed upon individual claims and more 
uncertainties would be caused. 
As to the first concern, if the effect of a breach is serious enough for the insurer’s 
decision on this particular claim, breach of a condition precedent discharges the 
insurer of liability to pay the particular claim whether or not any prejudice has been 
suffered.778 Nevertheless, this does not discharge the insurer from further liability to 
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pay any subsequent claim notified in accordance with the condition precedent. 
Breach of a new-type innominate term, the effect of which is serious enough to 
substantially influence the insurer’s decision, discharges the insurer of any further 
liability associated with particular claims in question. However, there is still the same 
effect resulting for the particular claim under both circumstances. If the non-
compliance does not influence the insurer’s decision substantially, the breach of a 
precedent condition would not trigger a rejection of particular claims, but a lesser 
remedy.779 Conversely, the breach of a new-type innominate term in this case would 
only entitle the injured insurer to contractual damages instead of a partial termination 
of contract. Nevertheless, the second assumption is founded on the ground that the 
assured does not have a strict liability during the performance of a notification 
clause. 780  This echoes another concern regarding the difficulties in building a 
practical yardstick between sufficient and insufficient seriousness of a breach for a 
particular claim, since the degree of gravity varies in individual cases. It is suggested 
by this author that there is no unified resolution to this concern but it is believed that 
the insurance industry favours to leave this concern to be clarified by practice. 
Judging from the accomplishment achieved so far, dishonesty must be established 
for claiming a breach of good faith of notification duty.  
In practice, the information notified to the insurer will take into consideration the 
compensation assessment and evidence collection, the premium revaluation for a 
renewal contract, and the handling of some other contracts linked to the original 
insurance policy, for example, a reinsurance contract or a carriage of goods by sea 
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contract with a time limit for suit given.781 Although the non-compliance with the 
requirements in fulfilling the notification clause does not play a crucial role in every 
aspect of the whole contract, good faith is necessary for the particular claim, 
especially sometimes where the assured’s non-notification of claims causes 
consequential losses to the insurer. For instance, one 6 month’s delay would cause 
the insurer’s failure in recovering a reinsurance claim from the reinsurer. In this 
hypothetical circumstance, rejecting the particular claim is adequate for the assured’s 
decision, since the so-called injured insurer does not suffer any loss by discharging 
himself from the liability for this particular claim, and actually he is not allowed to 
benefit from the reinsurer on the basis of the doctrine of indemnity. In the meantime, 
good faith is not deemed to be broken where only the assured’s negligence is proved 
in supplying details of information,782 but contractual damages should be awarded. 
 
5.2.2.5.3. Rights of inspection, follow the settlements and incorporation 
clauses in general claims context other than fraudulent claims 
5.2.2.5.3.1. Rights of inspection 
The contracting parties’ rights to information also include the disclosure of 
documents in an insurance contracting relationship. Discovering the ship’s papers 
upon the insurer’s order is recognizable as a procedural duty and the duty of 
claims/loss notification associated with the notification clause treated like a condition 
precedent for a particular claim,783 whilst, these two duties are obliged (mainly to the 
assured though) to support the substantive rights to information under an insurance 
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contract.784 
Generally, in a reinsurance contract, it is common for a reinsurer to inspect the 
records of the reassured. Practically, the right to inspection of records is operated in 
an express clause form since the insurer is strongly recommended to do so to avoid 
any further contractual disputes or tensions created between the insurance parties. 
However, it was submitted to be primarily implied in a reinsurance contract in an 
absence of an explicit duty. In Phoenix General Insurance Co. of Greece S.A. v 
Halvanon Insurance Co. Ltd.,785 Lord Hobhouse stated that certain terms relevant to 
the unique reinsurance relationship have to be implied primarily to make sure the 
business proceeds in a proper and business-like fashion. Meanwhile, there is also a 
different voice alleging that since there is no such right to investigate expressly set 
out in the insurance contract, the reinsurer has no right to get access to his 
reassured’s books.786 
Apart from confirming the essential position of an inspection clause, either implied 
or express, another contribution of the Phoenix case is that Lord Hobhouse’s 
judgment set out several principal points for good faith in this regard. Firstly, his 
judgment admitted the relationship between good faith and the reinsurer’s right to 
inspect records. Clearly, Lord Hobhouse believed that the right to inspect was 
grounded in, and imported by, the duty of good faith by delivering a judgment on 
discussing the duration of certain duties. 787  Furthermore, the reinsurer’s right to 
inspection of records is not ceded at the conclusion of a reinsurance policy, but was 
continuing.788 It is a practical statement since it is exactly what is undergoing in the 
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insurance market. The right to inspect is operated throughout the entire contract, 
from the contemplation and performance stage to the claiming stage. 
It is supposed that the right to investigate information relevant to the insurance 
contract is not unilateral but also entitled to the assured, especially at the 
contemplation stage before the assured has made a valid offer. This is reasonable if 
the assured commenced investigation on the insurance company’s information, 
including its satisfaction of claims records, service and premium scales offered. 
However, a marine assured has no interests on this point, but is more interested in 
the insurance company’s certifications, and whether his potential insurer is being 
registered in any world or regional insurer association list. The assured’s right to 
inspect becomes extremely vital when the insured object is so valuable that the 
shipowner is worried that his insurer could not afford any losses and probably 
announce a bankruptcy to avoid his liabilities. In this typical case, the shipowner’s 
insurance policy is reinsured. 
The right to inspection of the assured’s documents is suggested to be operated in 
an efficient and professional manner,789 usually by an inspector or the insurance 
company’s own in-house team. However, criticisms relate to the insurers’ overuse of 
this right to confidential documents during the inspection, 790  and the insurance 
companies’ underhand tactics to avoid liabilities during the investigation stage. 
Because the assured’s relevant records and documents are mainly inspected by 
the experienced inspection team from the insurance company, as long as the 
assured is willing to open his files to the insurer there is practically no dispute in 
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respect to utmost good faith. 791  However, difficulties lie in the objective test to 
evaluate the mental element to establish a breach,792 for instance, the assured is 
required to make relevant information reasonably available.793 Additionally, because 
of the assured’s trivial role in inspection, failing to allow the insurer to approach 
relevant information only entitles an order issued by a Court to have the inspection 
enforced, but not any avoidance remedy attached to principal non-compliance with 
utmost good faith.794 
 
5.2.2.5.3.2. Follow the settlements clauses 
Many reinsurance policies would contain a ‘follow the settlements’ clause, 
intending to ensure that the reinsurer settles claims covered by the primary insurance 
efficiently and commercially.795 This applies in relation to the acceptance of liability 
and the amount of the claim.796 This clause gives rise to the reassured’s good faith 
during the claims handling under the primary insurance policy and its influence on 
the consequential reinsurance policies (sometimes it is beyond one layer of 
reinsurance).  
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In Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd.,797 ICA effected an 
insurance contract with the warehouses and their contents in Monrovia and Liberia, 
against fire. Scor had the primary insurance policy reinsured as a leading reinsurer in 
the London market. Under the reinsurance policy, the reinsurer was required to 
‘follow the settlements’ of the reinsured. Later on, the warehouse caught fire and 
unfortunately, the insured warehouse and its contents burned to the ground. As the 
insurer of the primary insurance cover, ICA sent two loss adjusters to the scene for 
investigation, and reported that there were no suspicious circumstances. ICA, 
therefore, claimed on his reinsurance. However, the reinsurer, Scor, received several 
anonymous letters alleging that the Africa Trading Company (ATC), the operator of 
the warehouse, had deliberately set fire to the warehouse, and the relevant 
representatives of ICA had been bribed to defraud members of the Lebanese and 
Indian business community. 798  Unfortunately, Scor’s intervention in investigation 
caused ICA to quit all co-operation, and Scor eventually denied to indemnify the 
reassured against its share of loss recovered by the primary policy. 
The ICA v Scor case appeared to be a case regarding the co-operation clauses in 
reinsurance. However, the test of the reassured’s good faith in settling claims was 
created at the heart of this judgment. After this case, the effect of a clause binding 
reinsurers to follow settlements of the insurers was also clarified. According to Robert 
Goff LJ’s judgment, the first requirement to the ‘follow the settlements’ clause is that 
the claims settled must have fallen within the scope of risks covered by the 
reinsurance policy as a matter of law.799 The other judges also added that the settled 
claim must have been recognized as falling within the scope of the original 
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insurance.800 Meanwhile, the insurer was further required to settle the claim honestly, 
and to have taken all proper and businesslike steps. 801  Difficulties lying in the 
requirements of settling claims with good faith were raised and finally resolved in 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc.802 In this case, the 
reinsurer was required to ‘follow without question the settlements of the Reassured…’ 
and the words ‘out of question’ became arguable. However, it was eventually 
confirmed by the judiciary that the absence of bad faith was not adequate to qualify 
the requirements underlying the words ‘out of question’, whilst the insurer was 
required to adopt a commercial and efficient manner in settling claims, distinguishing 
the ‘follow the settlement’ clauses from a general utmost good faith context.803 The 
Court of Appeal latterly recommended the reinsurance parties to contain an express 
‘follow the settlements’ clause, with a clear criteria that ‘in settling the claims the 
insurer had acted honestly and had taken all proper and business like steps in 
making the settlement’ attached’.804 
 
5.2.2.5.3.3. Incorporation Clauses 
An ‘incorporation clause’ functions efficiently in reinsurance providing that the 
assured will assist the insurer in the defence of claims.805 Operating with the claims 
clauses, the incorporation clause constitutes a claims-related-clauses blueprint. At 
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the claiming stage, both the insurer and assured are required to act in good faith. 
However, good faith alluded to the claims co-operation clause is not suggested to be 
an expression of post utmost good faith, since it arises on a purely contractual 
basis.806 
 
5.2.3. Remedies for post-formation good faith breaches – is avoidance the 
universal remedy or are there alternative remedies? 
5.2.3.1. Avoidance remedy for post-contract utmost good faith breach in held 
covered clauses, variations and renewals to insurance contracts context 
The third concern in the held covered clause context at this stage raises the 
question: is avoidance the universal remedy, or are there alternatives?807 In the view 
of this author, covering the held covered clause cases under the group of new 
contract is considered to allow a rationalization in terms of remedies available.808 The 
harshness and unreasonableness of the avoidance remedy rescinding the whole 
insurance policy ab initio in cases of an utmost good faith breach has been 
discussed in chapter 3. By analogy, the avoidance remedy becomes a penalty to the 
party who makes a mistake confined to the risks covered by the held covered 
clauses, variation and even the renewal of a contract. As stated earlier, the post-
contractual utmost good faith theory in the context of held covered clauses would 
turn section 17 of the MIA 1906 to be the exclusive origin of this issue. Therefore, 
avoidance, as the only available remedy, would become the unified solution for 
principal utmost good faith issues and specific decision points, which is apparently 
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disproportionate. This statement is favoured by Leggatt LJ in his judgment in the 
Court of Appeal, The Star Sea, 809  which held that under the circumstances of 
amendments, although it was still uncertain whether the remedy is avoidance of the 
whole contract, or merely of the amendment, taking ‘inducement of the actual 
underwriter’ into account was sufficient to conclude that a prospective avoidance of 
amendment should be the only remedy permitted.  
With the opinion that the insurer recreates a new and distinct insurance policy in 
the held covered clause cases, some opinions810 confirmed the governing position of 
sections 18-20 of the MIA 1906, by excluding the feasibility of section 17 into this 
issue. In the view of this author, this opinion is incorrect because of some latent 
weaknesses.811 First of all, according to the statutory language of the MIA 1906, it 
cannot be denied that sections18-20 apply to pre-contract utmost good faith, not 
special issues or post-contract events. Additionally, according to Bennett’s influential 
writing, the held covered clause issue does not fall within section 18 of the MIA 1906 
since the latter cannot continue once the contract has been concluded. Therefore, 
after concluding a new contract based on the amendments attached to held covered 
clauses, or variations of contract or renewals, denying the application of section 17 
actually would cause a gap at this moment. Bennett, thus, suggested another 
possible solution to avoid any potential complexity and unpredictability regarding 
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special decision points and even post-contract utmost good faith, namely, a solution 
moulding itself to its context in terms of scope and remedy.812 
There used to be some uncertainties on the effect of the breach of utmost good 
faith in the variation context. Some early authorities had some hesitations in applying 
avoidance to the original insurance policy. 813  However, others suggested that a 
material non-disclosure and misrepresentation attached to the contract variation 
would lead to the entire policy being vitiated.814 In Blackburn J’s judgment in Lishman 
v Northen Maritime Insurance Co.,815 it was held that: 
‘[S]uppose the policy were actually executed, and the parties agreed to add 
a memorandum afterwards, altering the terms: if the alteration were such as 
to make the contract more burdensome to the underwriters, and a fact 
known at that time to the assured were concealed which was material to the 
alteration, I should say the policy would be vitiated.’ 
 
Recently, some judicial evidence proves that the right of avoidance only applies to 
the variation and not to the original insurance contract. For instance, in Lord 
Hobhouse’s judgment of Iron Trades Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd v Companhia de 
Seguros Imperio, it was held that:  
‘Where there is an addition to a contract, as where it is varied, there can be 
a further duty of disclosure but only to the extent that is material to the 
variation being proposed. If the addition does not alter the contractual rights 
there will be no fact that it is material to disclose and the same will apply if a 
variation is favourable to the insurer.’816 
 
Subsequently, in Leggatt LJ’s judgment of The Star Sea, he stated that: 
‘[I]n relation to amendment a duty of disclosure of facts material to the 
amendment will exist but the law is not, we think, clear as to whether the 
remedy is avoidance of the whole contract or merely of the amendment. 
Since inducement of the actual underwriter is necessary, there seems much 
                                               
812
 Ibid, at p. 222. 
813
 For example, Sir Michael Mustill and Jonathan Gilman in Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and 
Average, 16
th
 ed., 1981, vol. 2, para. 621; Fraser Shipping Limited v N.J. Colton [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
586, this question is left open by Potter LJ. 
814
 Lishman v Northen Maritime Insurance Co. (1875) Lloyd’s Rep. 10 CP 179, p. 182, per Blackburn J. 
815
 (1875) Lloyd’s Rep. 10 CP 179, p 182, per Blackburn LJ. 
816
 (1992) 1 Re LR 213; p. 224, per Lord Hobhouse 
208 
 
to be said for the point of view that avoidance of the amendment is all that 
should be permitted…’817 
 
Similarly in The Mercandian Continent,818 Longmore LJ expressed the scope of 
the right of avoidance stating, ‘it only applies to the variation not to the original risk’, 
and so it is, if the variation is induced by fraudulent misrepresentation. Based on 
Longmore LJ’s judgment, Mr Siberry QC in O’Kane v Jones819 confirmed that ‘non-
disclosure [at that point] would give rise to a right to avoid only the variation, not the 
contract itself’. Longmore LJ’s prospective remedy view is also cited in Groupama 
Insurance Co Ltd v Overseas Partners Re Ltd,820 in which it was held that in cases of 
any additional subscription, induced by false statements under a reinsurance policy, 
the avoidance of additional subscription is the only remedy permitted.   
After observing Lord Hobhouse’s judgment in The Star Sea821 and Longmore LJ’s 
judgment in The Mercandian Continent,822 it can be said that, indirectly, the judiciary 
also favoured extending the pre-contract system to non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation issues arising in respect to any renewed insurance.823 In a later 
part of his judgment, Longmore LJ reaffirmed that the avoidance should be limited to 
the variation, renewal or the application of the ‘held covered’ provision, 
prospectively.824 
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5.2.3.2. Remedies available in other post-contract formation situations 
5.2.3.2.1. Cancellation clause and claims notification clause 
In terms of the non-compliance with cancellations clauses, it is supported by both 
leading academics and judicial interpretation that there is no continuing post-contract 
good faith imposed.825 Therefore, if an expressed ‘cancellation clause’ is agreed by 
insurance parties, any non-compliance with this clause constitutes a contractual 
breach which causes contractual damages. With the absence of such provisions in 
insurance, any non-compliance would be considered by the judiciary, referring to 
business efficiency and commercial practice. 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the negligent non-notification of claims does not 
constitute a breach of good faith in the notification clause context, and dishonesty 
should be established. Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the effect of a fraudulent 
notification in insurance is still left open by the judiciary,826 for example, it is unclear 
whether the effect of a fraudulent notification would constitute a breach of the 
continuing post-formation duty of utmost good faith for the whole contract. In order to 
resolve this problem, there is a need to clarify the position of a notification clause for 
the whole insurance policy. 
In the view of this author, a duty of notification is a continuing duty derived from 
utmost good faith for the whole contract, but should be distinguished from the latter. 
It can be said that sometimes non-compliance with this duty is not grave enough to 
influence the whole contract. It becomes a commercial sense, especially in insurance 
with professional advice provided. Even the non-experienced assured should have 
acknowledged that at least he has to notify the insurer of the occurrence of an 
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accident, otherwise, no claims would be recovered. Uncertainties lie in the 
reasonable time limits given in the absence of an express term requiring claims/loss 
notification. The reality is that there are only rare cases in practice relating to this 
issue. It becomes one reason why the attempts to persuade the courts to imply a 
term that the insurer will act with reasonable speed and efficiency in the negotiation, 
assessment and payment of claims, are likely to fail.827 
One might have the view that since the assured’s notification duty is suggested to 
be derived from utmost good faith, a breach of this duty should entitle the injured 
insurer to avoid the entire contract ab initio; the author disagrees with this point. 
Furthermore, it is clearly stated by the present editors of Arnould’s that there is no 
room for a middle concept of avoidance from the date the insurer avoids, which adds 
complexities to the point whether this duty (of utmost good faith) can attach in 
connection with a claims notification clause (not a fraudulent act), given that the 
authorities which support the extent of the duty in those situations are premised on 
the remedy of avoidance ab initio not being available.828 
This promotes questions about the position of a fraudulent notification. Does it fall 
within the scope of fraudulent claims, or should it be simply treated as a breach of a 
normal contractual term, such as, a condition precedent? If it is identified as a 
fraudulent claim issue in utmost good faith, what remedies are available here? If the 
avoidance remedy is awarded in a fraudulent notification context, is not it an overly 
harsh penalty to the assured compared with the prospective forfeiture of claim 
remedy? And logically, attention is directed to the harshness of the rescission 
remedy in post-formation utmost good faith. On the other hand, if it is deemed as a 
breach of a traditional condition precedent, is not it encouraging the incentive of 
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making dishonest notification of claims since no retrospective sanction would be 
triggered? In the same hypothetical circumstance, would the claimant’s dishonest 
conduct influence the subsequent claims? All these aforesaid concerns need to be 
clarified by further judgments.  
Simultaneously, the application of the new-type innominate term theory needs to 
be treated with caution, since in Friends Provident Life & Pensions Ltd. v Sirius 
International Insurance Corp, 829  the Court of Appeal rejected Justice Waller’s 
analysis in BAI, and insisted that previous decisions on this point were obiter only.830 
Apparently, there is still uncertainty as to the real legal position of a notification 
clause, since the new-type innominate term analysis has no application after the BAI 
decision. As its uniqueness suggests, the claims notifications clause falls outside of 
the scope of general post-formation utmost good faith.       
With the statements given, this author agrees with the opinion in favour of 
recommending to both parties to set out expressly the notification clause and the 
effect of breach, but, where they do not do so, it is for the court to infer their intention 
by construing the contract. 831  In other words, whether the notification clause in 
question is a precedent condition depends on the business efficacy and the 
judiciary’s discretion in individual cases. If it is confirmed to be a precedent condition, 
fraudulent breach would entitle the injured insurer to reject the particular claim. It will 
not influence subsequent claims notified in accordance with this notification clause, 
whilst negligent notification does not constitute a real breach of this duty. If it is 
confirmed to be an ordinary term, but not a precedent condition, the breach of a 
notification clause would entitle the insurer contractual damages only if the insurer 
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can prove that his loss is caused by this breach, or he could reject the claim if this 
breach seriously prejudiced him. 
 
5.2.3.2.2. Rights to inspection, follow the settlements and incorporation 
clauses 
Because of the assured’s trivial role in inspection, failing to allow the insurer to 
approach relevant information only entitles an order issued by a Court to have the 
inspection enforced, but not the avoidance ab initio remedy attached to the non-
compliance with the principal utmost good faith duty.  
The consequence of the insurer’s dishonesty in handling claims would constitute a 
fraudulent claim under the consequential reinsurance contract which the insurer 
claims on, and obviously this would cause the reinsurance attached to be avoided. 
Uncertainties lie in whether the avoidance remedy is available for the insurer who 
settles claims negligently but not dishonestly, for example, lacking of prudence as a 
professional insurer to dispose the primary claims or the manner adopted is not as 
efficient or commercial as a business-like manner. The majority of cases dealing with 
this concern have been resolved by practical trading custom, since business 
efficiency would be hindered if every claim settled by the primary insurer has to be 
confirmed and qualified by judicial interventions and arbitrations.832 It would be wise 
for the insurance parties to clarify that the insurers should settle the claims 
reasonably. Moreover, the burden of proof would go to the reinsurer if he intends to 
challenge either the insurer’s honesty or professionalism in settling primary claims.833 
However, in practice, it is really difficult for the reinsurer to prove the original insurer’s 
unprofessionalism although the primary insurer is commonly required to co-operate 
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with his reinsurer. Apart from the practice abovementioned, in the view of this author, 
there are some possible solutions. First of all, in the absence of fraud and dishonesty, 
the reinsurer has the option to dispose the claims on reinsurance gently, and send 
this case back to the original insurer for re-investigation. Secondly, the reinsurer 
could negotiate with the primary insurer on the amount of indemnity and try to 
achieve comprise in compensation. Thirdly, if there is no comprise achieved, the 
courts or arbitration institutions would become the last resort for the reinsurer, and 
the attention would be directed to the general burden of proof principle in the ‘follow 
the settlements’ clause context.  
As observed earlier in this chapter, continuing utmost good faith is not suggested 
to be imposed on the reinsurance parties in the incorporation clause context. On this 
ground there are two relevant situations: (1) the reassured’s cooperation is argued 
for being a condition precedent or simple condition; 834  and (2) the unified 
construction of a co-operation clause.835 For the first consideration, this author is in 
favour of treating the co-operation clause as a simple condition. Possible reasons for 
the primary insurer to refuse cooperation with his reinsurer during claims 
investigation could be that there is nothing more than the reinsurer concealing his 
fraudulent claims or negligence, or protecting his confidential information. In the view 
of this author, a confidential agreement between both parties in association with the 
insurer’s duty to inspection can be invoked for the assured’s information protection. 
Moreover, it is suggested that the assured should distinguish confidential from 
unconfidential information in order to avoid potential tensions caused between 
insurance parties. If the insurer intends to challenge the assured’s honesty and claim 
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compensation on this insurance, the insurer is obliged to prove that the assured in 
question has made a fraudulent claim. However, it is still positive that the assured’s 
non-compliance would be influential for the insurer to conduct a loss investigation, 
and being a condition precedent, any breach would only cause particular claims to be 
rejected. Therefore, a condition theory is favoured by this author, which means any 
breach of a co-operation clause would lead to the insurance contract being 
repudiated, and the injured insurer to be entitled to damages if any loss can be 
proved.  
 
5.3. Fraudulent claims – utmost good faith or good faith? 
Currently, fraud is recognized as a severe and expensive global problem in the 
insurance industry. An insurer is even described to be particularly vulnerable to 
fraud.836 According to the figures released by the ABI, insurers detected over 2,500 
fraudulent claims worth £18 million every week in 2010, which increased the cost to 
protect honest customers against fraud up to £2 billion a year. However, the extra 
expense is paid for by honest policyholders through higher premiums.837 In addition 
to the confirmation of its central role in the assured’s presentation of claims from 
practice, the duty to advance claims honestly is clarified to be the only component of 
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the assured’s duty in his presentation of a claim by judicial statements,838 which 
gives people sufficient reason to reconsider fraud issues. Therefore, as the voice of 
the UK’s insurance, the ABI launched the Insurance Fraud Register that will contain 
details of all known insurance fraudsters,839 on the basis of one of its fundamental 
reports.840 
Uncertainties lie in the issue concerning whether the insurer’s remedy is to decline 
the fraudulent claim, or whether there is a further entitlement to rescind the entire 
policy for a breach of utmost good faith. Principally, according to section 17 of the 
MIA 1906, any breach of utmost good faith would cause the whole insurance contract 
to be avoided. The avoidance remedy including recouping any claims previously paid, 
therefore, appears to be the exclusive statutory remedy available. However, it has 
been proved that Courts are reluctant to entitle the insurer with the forfeiture of the 
whole contract, but only of the fraudulent claim.841 On the one hand, the divergence 
between common law and section 17 of the MIA 1906 is considered to cause 
unnecessary complexities and confusions to post-contractual duties. On the other 
hand, the disjuncture lends support to most practitioners to express their anxiety for a 
statutory reform. According to the responses received by the Law Commission 
regarding its Issues Paper 7, 23 of 25 responses considered that it would be helpful 
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to introduce legislation to clarify the insurer’s remedies available in connection with 
the assured’s fraud.842 
 
5.3.1. Origins and legal basis of the assured’s duty to promote claims with 
honesty 
The Fraud Act 2006 provides a comprehensive criminal sanction mechanism for 
fraud.843 At English common law, civil fraud was judicially confirmed ‘to be proved 
when it is shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) 
without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false’.844 
However, in the insurance context, the legal definition of fraud was considered by 
Pollock C.B. in Goulstone v Royal Insurance Company.845 In this case, it was held 
that ‘the claim was fraudulent’ if ‘it was wilfully false in any substantial respect’ and 
the assured ‘forfeited all benefit under the policy’.846  Meanwhile, this decision is 
generally cited as the genesis of the common law rule that the fraudulent claims 
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cannot be recovered at all.847 Nevertheless, most judges did not define the legal 
basis of fraud or its relationship with the duty of good faith. 
Currently, most insurance contracts contain a ‘fraud clause’ to clarify the insurer’s 
remedies for fraud, 848  which is considered to be a ‘contractual solution to the 
uncertainty of the fraudulent claims rule’.849 One outstanding example is clause 45.3 
of the International Hull Causes (01/11/03), which stipulates that: 
‘45.3 It shall be a condition precedent to the liability of the Underwriters that 
the Assured shall not at any stage prior to the commencement of legal 
proceedings knowingly or recklessly; 
45.3.1 mislead or attempt to mislead the Underwriters in the proper 
consideration of a claim or the settlement thereof by relying on any 
evidence which is false; 
45.3.2 conceal any circumstance or matter from the Underwriters material 
to the proper consideration of a claim or a defence to such a claim.’ 
 
The ‘fraud clause’ is also strongly recommended to commercial contractual parties 
to protect themselves from damage caused by the fraudulent misconduct, but only 
becomes effective when it is expressed in unambiguous terms and communicated to 
the other party.850 Practice has been revealed to be in connection with fire policies,851 
and commonly found in property policies (such as vehicle and household insurance), 
and less frequently, liability policies.852 The fraudulent claims clause is also always 
found on the very first page of the familiar Lloyd’s J Form, noting that ‘if the assured 
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shall make any claim knowing the same to be false and fraudulent, as regards 
amount or otherwise, the policy shall become void and all claims hereunder shall be 
forfeited’.853 On the contrary, the situations become uncertain in the absence of an 
expressed ‘fraud clause’. Interestingly, one early case Britton v Royal Insurance 
Company (1866) held that fraudulent claims failed even in the absence of an express 
fraud clause,854 which was further affirmed by Longmore LJ in the Court of Appeal in 
The Mercandian Continent.855 Others suggested that the ‘fraud clause’ should be 
considered as an implied term.856 Therefore, the legal basis of the assured’s duty not 
to make fraudulent claims and its relationship with section 17 of MIA 1906 are still left 
open. 857  However, as stated earlier, the answer to this issue is relevant to the 
insurer’s remedies for fraudulent claims. If the fraudulent claim issue is proved to be 
founded on the basis of the duty of utmost good faith and section 17 of the MIA 1906, 
there would be no doubt that the avoidance ab initio remedy must be the exclusive 
remedy awarded to the injured insurer. However, if it is proved to be founded on the 
basis of a separate rule of law, then the insurer’s remedies could be more flexible. 
Some members of the judiciary and commentators favoured the first opinion, 
stating that the assured’s duty not to make fraudulent claims is one aspect of the 
post-contractual duties of utmost good faith. The former, therefore, should fall within 
the scope of utmost good faith and section 17.858 For instance, in The Litsion Pride, 
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Justice Hirst held that although the post-contract breach was open to the 
underwriters to simply defend claims without avoiding the policy, the duty not to 
make fraudulent claims was implied in the insurance contract and logically, section 
17 of MIA 1906 could also be extended to the post-contractual stage.859 In his later 
judgment, it was held that the duty of utmost good faith was applied with a ‘full rigour’ 
in relation to the giving of information of the voyage in question and the presentation 
of the claim.860 In Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services Co Ltd,861 it was held by the 
majority that deliberately exaggerated claims were substantially fraudulent and the 
insurers were entitled to demand the forfeiture of the whole policy. 
On the contrary, some others favoured the second opinion, claiming that the duty 
not to promote honest claims does not fall within the scope of utmost good faith,862 
but is based on a separate rule of law.863 In the view of this author, the logic is simple. 
Firstly, categorizing the duty not to make fraudulent claims as beyond the origin of 
utmost good faith would avoid the implications to the insurer’s remedies, which are 
addressed by the straightjacket from section 17 of MIA 1906. Getting rid of the 
limitations of the avoidance remedy, more remedies could be introduced successfully, 
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for example, forfeiting the particular fraudulent claims, but not the genuine claims, 
which may have been paid previously. 
Secondly, it was suggested that not treating the assured’s duty to promote honest 
claims as one aspect of utmost good faith, could make it easier to release the whole 
doctrine from being criticized for its extremely punitive remedy at the post-contract 
stage. Without the limitations created by the statutory avoidance remedy from section 
17 of the MIA 1906, some alternatives could be introduced and adopted in the case 
where the assured makes dishonest claims. For instance, one could mention the 
proportionality remedy adopted by Australian insurance law,864 Misrepresentation Act 
1967,865 and the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012.866 
Meanwhile, judicial support is found for supporting the injection of flexibility to the 
insurer’s remedies for fraudulent claims.  
In Direct Line Insurance v Khan,867 it was held that the fraudulent claims for rent 
tainted the whole of the defendant’s claims, and all benefits under that policy were 
forfeited. In this case, the joint policy-holders, husband and wife, took out a policy on 
their home, against risks including fire. The insured house was burned afterwards 
and the husband made fraudulent claims for rent without the knowledge of his wife 
(the alternative accommodation was revealed to be owned by the husband). The 
other claims included sums for reinstatement of building and replacement of contents, 
which were covered by the insurance company. In the end, it was held by the Court 
of Appeal that although it was disproportionate to punish Mrs Khan as an innocent 
joint policy-holder because of her husband’s fraud, all benefits should be forfeited 
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since this couple owned the same interest and the husband was acting partly on 
behalf of both himself and his wife as an agent. Undoubtedly, the whole policy was 
avoided.  
This issue has since been extended to whether earlier claims made before a fraud 
and subsequent claims made after a fraud are tainted. Not until recently have judges 
made a statement on this point. In Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb,868 it was 
held by the Court of Appeal that separate claims which were made without fraud 
were not tainted by another individual fraudulent claim, which just strengthened the 
judicial opinion regarding the insurer’s remedies for fraudulent claims. The avoidance 
ab initio remedy is not available, as a fraud would not lead to a forfeiture of all claims, 
but only to contaminated claims under the insurance policy.869 
Attached to the separate rule of law theory, an implied contract theory is raised by 
some commentators.870 The discussions undertaken relate to whether the assured’s 
duty to make truthful claims is based on a separate rule of law derived from an 
implied term in the contract? 871  The implied contract theory is quite appealing 
because more contractual remedies would be dragged into the cases of fraudulent 
claims, since this misconduct is simply treated as a breach of contract. This 
proposition appears to avoid the restricted and debatable avoidance ab initio remedy 
for fraudulent claims in utmost good faith framed by section 17 of MIA 1906. In reality, 
this statement is still lacking of a strong basis,872 so the attempts to rely on ‘business 
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efficacy’ or ‘necessary implication’ would be factually contentious.873 That is also why 
a contractual implied term for fraudulent claims is commented to be ‘unnecessary 
and superfluous’.874 However, in the view of this author, putting the pitfalls aside, the 
implied term statement turns the restricted and bald rescission remedy to be elastic, 
by introducing more contractual remedies. 
 
5.3.2. Meanings and degrees of fraud 
5.3.2.1. Meanings of fraudulent claim - must materiality be satisfied? 
In addition to the fraud defined in Derry v Peek,875 Viscount Sumner delivered his 
judgment on the construction of false claims in another influential case, Lek v 
Mathews,876 defining that: 
‘[A] claim is false not only if it is deliberately invented but also if it is made 
recklessly, not caring whether it is true or false but only seeking to succeed 
in the claim.’ 
 
A combined test of dishonesty was further provided by Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley 
and Others.877 In this case, Lord Hutton termed a ‘combined test’ of ‘dishonesty’, 
providing that ‘it must be established that the defendant’s conduct was dishonest by 
                                               
873
The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, cited by Thomas, see Ibid, at p. 510. For common law, see 
Banque Financiere de la Cite SA (formerly Banque Keyser Ullmann SA) v Westgate Insurance Co 
(formerly Hodge General & Mercantile Co Ltd) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377, HL. In this case, the 
possibility of applying contractual remedies for damages was fully rejected.  
874
 Thomas, ‘Fraudulent insurance claims: definition, consequences and limitations’, in LMCLQ, pp. 
485-516, at p. 510. According to Thomas, the development of the common law rule of forfeiture turns 
the contractual implied term proposition to be unnecessary and superfluous. According to Aikens, ‘The 
post-contract duty of good faith in insurance contracts: is there a problem that needs a solution?’, in 
JBL, pp. 379-393, the principle that an insured and an insurer must act in good faith is of universal 
application in common law, not depending on an implied terms of a contract. In Foxton, ‘Fraudulent 
claims: the law in eight principles’, the separate rule generated from general law theory is listed as the 
first principle in law for fraudulent claims.  
875
 (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas 337, p. 337. As a matter of fact, the basis of the ‘fraud’ concept was 
grounded in some earlier cases. Such as Goulstone v Royal Insurance Company (1858) 1 F & F 276, 
p. 279, which was analysed earlier, and Chapman v Pole (1870) 22 LT 306, p. 307, per Cockburn CJ. 
But Viscount Sumner’s statement later is deemed as a relatively comprehensive definition providing a 
judicial ambit of fraud.   
876
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the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people and that he himself realised 
that by those standards his conduct was dishonest’, which is defined to be a 
comprehensive definition embracing an objective test and a subjective test.878 
The scope and meaning of fraudulent claims abovementioned are widely 
recognized in both judicial and leading academic writings. 879  Despite this, the 
meaning and scope of fraudulent claims in insurance is well developed by The 
Litsion Pride,880 in which the traditional situations of fraud were extended.881 In this 
case, by comparing with Style882 and Liberian,883 the duty in the claims sphere was 
extended from the traditional confines to fraud in the circumstances of the casualty, 
or the quantification of the loss to culpable misrepresentation,884 or non-disclosure.885 
However, Justice Hirst’s ‘culpability’ theory in The Litsion Pride was rejected by the 
House of Lords thereafter.886 
Apart from the extension of the ambit of fraudulent claims, in Justice Hirst’s 
judgment, a materiality test was adapted from section 18(2) of the MIA 1906.887 His 
judgment can be described to be ‘curious’ because of the incompatibility with another 
judgment delivered in the same case, noting that materiality does not need to be 
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approved in fraud cases.888 Similarly, some authorities identify three elements to a 
fraudulent claim in insurance: substantiality, wilfulness and materiality,889 which in the 
view of this author, co-operate as a comprehensive compact. In a later case, The 
Mercandian Continent,890 Longmore LJ further developed the test of ‘materiality’ in 
fraud by indicating the situations where the remedy of avoidance was appropriate in 
a post-contractual context. In the judgment of Longmore LJ, two considerations were 
put forward. Firstly, the avoidance remedy is appropriate in the post-formation stage 
in situations analogous to situations where the insurer has a right to terminate for 
breach. Secondly, in order to meet the requirements to this purpose, the fraud must 
be (A) material in the sense that the fraud would have an effect on underwriters’ 
ultimate liability; and (B) the gravity of the fraud or its consequences must be such as 
would enable the underwriters, if they wished to do so, to terminate for breach of 
contract.891 
Distinguished from Justice Hirst’s controversial efforts to transplant the ‘materiality’ 
test in section 18 in MIA 1906 during The Litsion Pride, an authoritative and certain 
explanation of ‘materiality’ in fraudulent claims was framed. This provided that a 
material fraud must be influential to the insurer’s handling of claims, such as the 
obtainment of a settlement or a better settlement, or winning at trial.892 A fraud is thus 
judged to be material if truth would make some difference to the insurer’s final 
decision of claims handling. The Aegeon893 is a watermark of the cases of fraudulent 
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devices, but it is also cited by the Law Commission’s Issues Paper 7 as a case 
example of material fraud. For this reason, some authorities argued that ‘materiality’ 
was not needed in fraud, but is demanded in the cases of fraudulent devices only.894 
 
5.3.2.2. Substantiality, degree of fraud and concerns 
Unquestionably, any fraud in making claims goes to the root of the contract and 
entitles the insurers to be discharged from his liabilities. 895  Nevertheless, 
considerations are left by most judges regarding the nature of the insurer’s remedies 
available, whether retrospective or prospective. This issue could also be described 
as the second pillar of the rationale underlying the insurer’s remedies for fraudulent 
claims. 896  Meanwhile, another relevant concept, the substantiality of fraud, was 
introduced in Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services.897 
In this case, Mr Orakpo’s benefits under the insurance policy were totally forfeited 
on the grounds of misrepresentation in the proposal form by reason of the condition 
of the property at inception and on renewals, and a gross exaggeration of the claims 
on loss of rent. The ‘substantiality’ concept in fraud was firstly mentioned by 
Hoffmann LJ in his judgment regarding the ground on which the insurer’s claim 
failed.898 Firstly, Hoffmann LJ confirmed that there was no reason to discontinue the 
duty of good faith on the part of the assured when the contract has been made, 
which was followed by his further observations in this case. On the contrary, 
Hoffmann LJ did not make any further explanation on how ‘substantiality’ was 
defined in fraud, but described the facts found by the previous judge by citing that 
                                               
894
 Ibid, paras. 37-38, per Mance LJ. 
895
 Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services [1995] 1 LLR 443, per Hoffmann LJ, Sir Roger Parker, and 
Staughton LJ. 
896
 The first principle in this part is the discussion of the judicial basis of the assured’s duty not to make 
fraudulent claims. The insurer’s remedies issue is addressed in 5.3.4. of this chapter. 
897
 [1995] 1 LLR 443. 
898
 Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services [1995] 1 LLR 443, p. 451.     
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‘the plaintiff [Mr Orakpo] had knowingly put forward a claim which he knew to be 
largely false and had pursued in this claim at the trial’. 899  Finally, in Sir Roger 
Parker’s judgment, it was also upheld that the claim pursued by Mr Orakpo was 
‘fraudulent to a substantial extent’ and consequently, the assured’s benefit under this 
policy should be forfeited. The criteria of being a substantial fraudulent claim is 
uncertain according to the main judgments delivered in this case, yet, some clues are 
still available. The total sums of claim was £265,000 and it was discovered by the 
judge that the loss for rent was grossly exaggerated since it was pursued that ‘all 13 
bedrooms would have been fully occupied for the ensuing two years and nine 
months after the first casualty, notwithstanding that there were only three occupants 
when that casualty occurred’.900 Also based on this ground, three judges seated in 
the Court of Appeal delivered the judgments, dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal and 
upheld the First Instance Court’s judgment to forfeit not only the part for rent loss but 
the whole claim under this policy. Therefore, in the case where the claim is made in 
part genuine and in part fraudulent, whether or not the whole claim can be treated as 
fraudulent depends on whether or not the fraud is substantial901 in the promotion of a 
claim. 
The concept of ‘substantiality’ in fraudulent claims was further addressed in later 
cases after Orakpo.902 HHJ Peter Coulson QC stated in Tonkin v UK Insurance Ltd903 
that, ‘it would be absurd if an entirely insubstantial element of a large claim, which is 
found to be fraudulent, could taint the entirety of that claim’. As stated earlier, in 
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theory, any breach of utmost good faith according to section 17 of the MIA 1906 
would cause the whole insurance contract to be rescinded. At the same time, after 
the investigations of the relationship between the duty to promote honest claims and 
utmost good faith in previous paragraphs of this chapter, it is observed that this duty 
is suggested to be excluded from the scope of the duty of utmost good faith, but is 
based on a separate rule of law. On the one hand, this point injects elasticity into the 
strict avoidance ab initio remedy system underlying section 17 of the MIA 1906, 
which is evaluated below. More significantly, it gives enough reasons for further 
debates on whether or not the fraudulent part is sufficiently substantial to cause the 
whole related claim to be forfeited.904 
Obviously, difficulties lie in how to define the range within which fraudulent claims 
are substantial to contaminate related claims as a whole. Despite this, some 
authorities still demonstrate a rough degree of latitude allowed by the courts in 
relation to the allegations of fraud in insurance cases.905 A claim for £18,000 was 
denied in Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd906 because it included a 
claim for an item worth over £2,000 (representing around 11% of the total claim) 
which had not been lost but was invented by the assured.907 On the contrary, in 
Tonkin v UK Insurance Ltd,908  the claim was not entirely disallowed because of 
another £2,000 fraudulent claim component, representing no more than 0.3% of the 
total claim. 909  In accordance with the judicial support, HHJ Peter Coulson QC, 
summarized a rough range of latitude within which the claim could be announced to 
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be insubstantial fraud; the latitude did not extend to 12% in Galloway910 or 11% in 
Direct Line.911 
However, in contrast to Coulson’s conclusion in Tonkin, it was observed by some 
academics that a substantial fraud could not be concluded merely upon the greater 
amount put forward (for example, £2,000 was considered to be substantial in the 
Galloway, but insignificant in the Tonkin) or the proportions of the genuine and the 
fraudulent parts of the claim (although this may be a relevant consideration to take 
into account).912 It is suggested by Eggers that one must consider the fraudulent part 
of the claim on its own and ask whether or not the claim is itself fraudulent, in the 
sense of being more than merely trivial.913 The same logic will apply to a claim which 
is wholly fraudulent, especially the small fraudulent claims.   
Several concerns are addressed to the substantiality test as follows. First of all, 
assuming the assured’s duty not to promote fraudulent claims to be outside of the 
post-formation doctrine of utmost good faith or section 17 of the MIA 1906 injects 
flexibility into the overly harsh avoidance ab initio remedy for fraudulent claims, 
particularly in the cases where the claims are partly genuine and partly fraudulent. 
Also based on this ground, the avoidance ab initio remedy is not going to be the 
exclusive remedy, but negotiable for some other issues relating to fraudulent claims, 
especially in cases where there are trivial frauds. Nevertheless, the adoption of a 
substantiality test in fraudulent claims will face the uncertainty of a qualified criterion. 
Although as precedents demonstrate so far, the degree of latitude of insubstantial 
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fraud is no more than 12% of the total claim in Galloway,914 whether it is substantial 
or not is, in each case, a question of fact. In conclusion, whether a fraud is 
substantial or not cannot be concluded merely upon the amount of exaggeration put 
forward, or its proportion of the whole claim, but combined with the facts in individual 
cases, commercial good sense and sound practice. Hence, it is also suggested by 
some commentators and judiciary that there is no reason to wipe out the whole of the 
claimants’ claim just because of a trivial fraud. The main reason of this opinion, in the 
view of this author, is that commercial law mainly aims to honour an agreement and 
encourage the business transactions rather than deny it to the inception.  
A consequential concern following the adoption of a substantially fraudulent claim 
theory is that the introduction of partial avoidance of a tainted claim would remove 
the assured’s incentive to honesty since the fraudster would not be penalized nor 
deprived of his genuine benefits under the insurance policy once fraud is discovered. 
As Willes J commented, ‘it would be most dangerous to permit parties to practise 
such frauds and… notwithstanding their falsehood and fraud, to recover the real 
value of the goods consumed’.915 
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5.3.3. Types of fraudulent claims 
5.3.3.1. General fraudulent claims 
According to authorities, the assureds’ claims are declined because the assured 
fraudulently invented a loss which had not taken place, recklessly let it happen, 
deliberately caused the loss, or concealed relevant information.916 
In Britton v Royal Insurance Company,917 a fire insurance case, the assured who 
was suspected of arson took advantage of the fire to make a fraudulent claim. 
Because of this reason, the assured’s benefits were forfeited. In a later case, 
Broughton Park Textiles (Salford) Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co. Ltd.,918 
underwriters alleged that the fire was deliberately caused by the assured. Similarly, 
in James v CGU Insurance Plc,919 the assured’s claim was declined because it was 
alleged by the insurer that he ignited the fire himself, or failed to take steps to 
extinguish it before it caused damage. Connected with some other examples of the 
assured’s wilful misconduct and claims based on this, one type of fraud is 
summarized to be the assured’s ‘pure fraud’ by some leading scholars.920 
Sometimes, in order to conceal the fact that would entitle the insurer with a 
genuine defence to the claim, the assured misrepresents or non-discloses certain 
aspects of claims. In Direct Line Insurance Plc v Khan,921  one of the assureds 
cloaked the fact that he did not pay any rent for the alternative accommodation when 
the assured house was burned.922 When his fraud was discovered, not only his, but 
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also his wife’s benefits were forfeited under that policy. Another case example is 
Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services,923 in which the assured misrepresented the 
rent claim.924 In the end, the judges upheld the insurer’s defence that there was a 
substantial fraud committed by the assured and as a consequence, his benefit 
should be totally forfeited. In the outstanding case Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) 
(No.1), it was held by the Court of Appeal that ‘if there was a known defence to a 
claim which the assured deliberately suppressed, his conduct would fall within the 
fraudulent claim rule’.925 
 
5.3.3.2. Exaggeration of a genuine claim 
Based on ABI’s report, bogus or exaggerated claims play a large proportion in 
insurance, especially in home insurance.926 As a matter of fact, it is not difficult to 
reveal that some overlaps exist between instances of general fraudulent claims and 
fraudulent exaggerations. For example, fabricating loss which has not been suffered 
is described as an extremely fraudulent exaggeration (from null to a greater 
amount).927 A claim is definitely fraudulently exaggerated when the assured forges 
documents to support his claim which is more than his due under the insurance 
policy.928 At the same time, people cannot neglect claims which are insignificantly 
exaggerated for a start of negotiation, or by haggling over the final amount of 
indemnity. Thus, regardless of the nature and degree of fraud (substantial or 
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insubstantial), exaggeration of claims can be discussed through the angles of an 
exaggeration for negotiation and a fraudulent exaggeration individually.              
 
5.3.3.2.1. Exaggeration for ‘horse-trading’ 
Not all exaggeration amounts to fraud. Sometime, a genuine claim is exaggerated 
by the assured for the purpose of negotiation, ‘knowing that they will be cut down by 
an adjuster’,929 which was confirmed by Staughton LJ as a common issue in practice 
in Orakpo. 930  Based on Hoffmann LJ’s judgment, with the absence of 
misrepresentation or concealment, ‘the loss adjuster is in as good a position to form 
a view of the validity or value of the claim as the insurer, it will be a legitimate reason 
that the assured was merely putting forward a starting figure for negotiation’.931 In a 
later case, Nsubuga v Commercial Union Assurance,932 Thomas J utilized the term of 
‘horse trading’ to expound the situations in which the assured put forward a greater 
amount of claim than they believed that they will recover, expecting to engage in 
some form of negotiations. The statement of ‘horse-trading’ and his explanation was 
further deemed as the ‘most explicit discussion of this point’.933 
In the view of this author, the statements foresaid could be considered as a desire 
which is supported by both authorities and principles, on the basis of a general 
commercial sense and practice in good faith. Meanwhile, the judiciary still cannot 
overlook the desire of setting a certain standard to have the genuine claims inflated 
for the purpose of negotiation distinguished from an exaggeration committed for the 
purpose of deceiving the insurer. Judging from the judicial opinion in Orakpo, at least 
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the exaggerated £77,233 claim cannot be condoned compared to the total sums of 
£265,321. Additionally, the logic of substantiality in a fraudulent claim can apply in 
exaggeration as well, since it was observed that there is overlap between these two 
issues. The nature of exaggeration, therefore, cannot be readily concluded merely 
upon its greater amount or proportions compared to the total sums of claims, but 
whether the exaggeration itself is for the purpose of negotiation within a reasonable 
range, or not.  
 
5.3.3.2.2. Exaggeration and fraudulent claims 
Also in Orakpo, according to the leading judgment delivered by Staughton LJ, in 
the cases where the falsity of what is stated is readily apparent, the gross 
exaggeration was considered to go beyond what can be condoned or overlooked.934 
This opinion echoes the general requirement of there being a substantially fraudulent 
claim as stated in earlier paragraphs. Logically, one might say that a substantial 
exaggeration would amount to a fraudulent one, whereas, an insignificant 
exaggeration which can be condoned or overlooked would not amount to a wilful one, 
but a reasonable exaggeration for negotiation instead. 
In Baghbadrani v Commercial Union Assurance Co. Plc, 935  Justice Gibbs 
described the fictitious VAT amounting to over £3,000 as material, ‘either in itself or 
in comparison with the total material damage claim’. On the contrary, in a recent 
case Danepoint Ltd v Underwriting Insurance Ltd, 936  HHJ Peter Coulson QC 
expressed his statement on the error in the calculation of interim payments in the 
construction industry, concluding that ‘there is always a relatively wide margin for 
error’ here which is ‘capable of adjustment’. Thus, the judge empathized that it would 
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be wrong to find that claims for interim payments were made fraudulently ‘without 
compelling evidence’, since the valuations are mostly dependent on someone’s 
opinion. It is discovered that the Courts have distinguished the mere exaggeration of 
the overall loss and invention of items to improve the claim. It is observed by the Law 
Commission in the Issues Paper 7 that the former is treated more ‘leniently’ than the 
latter, since there is an obvious intention to deceive in invention, but not in an 
exaggeration.937 Nevertheless, in practice, the precise boundary between the honest 
exaggeration for horse-trading and dishonest claim exaggeration is still difficult to 
draw.       
 
5.3.3.3. Fraudulent devices 
To amount to a fraudulent claim, it does not need to be fraudulent from its 
incipiency, and an initially honest claim amounts to a fraudulent claim if it is 
maintained dishonestly thereafter.938 At the present, the MIA 1906 is silent on this 
point, but judicial support is discovered in case law. 939  The Aegeon 940  is an 
outstanding case example in fraudulent claims. It not only expressed a judicial 
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documentations in order to advance their claim with the intention that the insurance company would 
be deceived to pay the claim. 
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position on the insurer’s remedies for fraudulent claims and duties under section 17 
of MIA 1906 after the commencement of litigation, but also pointed out a new pattern 
in which fraudulent manners were used to promote claims. In this case, a passenger 
ferry Aegeon was insured against hull and machinery port risks whilst undergoing 
maintenance work. The assured warranted that their salvage association certificate 
would be updated and they would comply with all recommendations prior to the 
commencement of hot works. A fire subsequently occurred on the Aegeon and 
caused damages while hot works were being carried out. The insurer declined to 
indemnify the assured on the basis of a breach of warranty relating to the failure to 
satisfy the requirement to update the salvage association certificate. After the 
commencement of litigation, it was discovered that the assured disclosed two sworn 
statements attesting that hot works of a substantial nature had been performed on an 
earlier date, but not the one maintained by the assured. The insurer therefore, 
asserted to avoid this policy for fraud. In Lord Justice Mance’s judgment, the use of 
fraudulent devices was held to be ‘a sub-species of making fraudulent claims’, which 
led to ‘the claim itself in relation to which the fraudulent device or means is used’ 
being forfeited’.941 In his later judgment, Mance LJ also distinguished the cases of a 
fraudulent device being used from those claims committed fraudulently. A fraudulent 
device is used mostly to improve his claim or ‘embellish the facts surrounding the 
claim by some lie’ and significant lies of course would cause the nature of the claim 
to be advanced.942 
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The Aegeon was deemed to provide a ‘tentative view of an acceptable solution’ in 
this area.943  There are more instances.944  In Lek v Mathews,945  Mr Lek claimed 
compensation for his assured stamp collection by submitting a schedule of the lost 
stamps. However, it was discovered that some of the listed stamps had never been 
issued and some others were extremely rare which Mr Lek could not prove that he 
had possession. Finally according to the judgment of the House of Lords, it was 
clarified that if the assured claimed for the loss of things which he knew he had not 
got, there is a contradiction in terms to say that he may have honestly believed in his 
claim.946  In Wisenthal v World Auxilliary Insurance Corp Ltd,947  it was noted by 
Roche LJ that ‘fraud…was not mere lying’ and ‘it was seeking to obtain an advantage, 
generally monetary, or to put someone else at a disadvantage by lies and deceit’.948 
One more recent example of using fraudulent manners to improve the claim is 
Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd. 949  In Galloway, the assured 
fraudulently claimed £2,000 for a computer which did not exist by submitting a claims 
form which contained a declaration that ‘the particulars given on this form are true 
and complete’, presenting about 10% of the whole claim. The Court of Appeal judged 
that the entire claim was contaminated by fraud and Galloway was deprived of the 
whole claim. Although, according to this judgment, Galloway’s concealment of the 
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 According to Nick Burgess, ‘Post-contractual duty of good faith and the fraudulent claims rule’, 
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conviction for obtaining property by deception when filling in the proposal form 
constituted a breach of utmost good faith at the pre-contract stage which would 
cause the whole policy to be avoided, whether or not the entire claim was tainted by 
fraud at the claiming stage was focused on by judges seated in this case.950 It was 
judged by the court that the fraudulent component was substantial enough to decline 
the assured’s claim as a whole. 
It is found that overlaps also exist between the cases of using fraudulent devices 
to improve a claim, and the cases of which are generally fraudulent, since a fraudster 
adopts any possible manner, such as presenting false evidence, or forging 
statements to falsify or advance his claim. However, the use of fraudulent manners 
does not definitely equate to fraud (or even substantial fraud) at the claiming stage in 
insurance.951 Therefore, a further requirement to fraudulent device cases is needed. 
In The Aegeon,952 Lord Justice Mance refused the requirement of inducement here, 
stating that it is irrelevant in the context of a fraudulent claim for non-existent or 
exaggerated loss.953 It is observed that there is no logic in requiring the fraudulent 
manners to be relevant to the fraudulent claim, as the purpose of this doctrine at 
common law is to prevent the assured from making such claims and not merely the 
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prevention of the insurer suffering damage thereby.954 In Mance LJ’s later judgment, 
it was suggested that: 
‘[T]he Courts should only apply the fraudulent claim rule to the use of 
fraudulent devices or means which would, if believed, have tended, 
objectively but prior to any final determination at trial of the parties' rights, to 
yield a not insignificant improvement in the insured’s prospects - whether 
they be prospects of obtaining a settlement, or a better settlement, or of 
winning at trial.955 
 
In Stemson v AMP General Insurance (NZ) Ltd,956 Mr Stemson’s insured building 
was partially destroyed by fire and a claim was made on the policy. The false 
statement issued by Mr Stemson to AMP’s adjuster at the investigating stage, which 
led to AMP declining an indemnity, was held to amount to the use of fraudulent 
devices to promote the claim.957 In the concurring judgment by Lord Justice Mance, it 
was commented that, in this case, the materiality of the fraudulent manners to the 
insurer’s settlement was not challenged and was obvious.958 Clearly, different from 
the status of fraud in fraudulent claims, the ‘materiality’ but not the inducement factor 
is necessary in order to establish the use of fraudulent devices at the claiming stage.  
 
5.3.4. Framing the appropriate remedies for fraudulent claims 
The temporal extent of the duty of utmost good faith in section 17 of MIA 1906 
raises the question whether the avoidance ab initio remedy applies beyond the 
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conclusion of the contract.959  Because the uncertainty lies in its post-contractual 
application, the remedies available for a post-contract breach of good faith becomes 
a long-lasting unresolved issue. This is always connected with another periodic hot 
point, namely, the harshness of the avoidance ab initio remedy for a breach of good 
faith in the post-contract event. 960  In order to map the system of the insurer’s 
remedies available for fraudulent claims, it is necessary to look at the current law, 
including the statutory rules, English case law, and contractual damage. 
 
5.3.4.1. Statutory Rule 
Currently, the MIA 1906 is the unquestionably statutory resource for not only 
marine insurance, but also non-marine insurance. Nevertheless, because the 
ambiguity lies in the scope of its application and the severe avoidance sanction 
awarded, section 17 of MIA 1906 becomes an overarching barrier which is always 
hiding in the shadow of a controversial issue regarding the remedies available for 
post-contract events. 961 The following paragraphs are aimed at analysing its 
drawbacks in the post-contractual events, especially for fraudulent claims.  
Firstly, extending section 17 of the MIA 1906 to fraudulent claims is inconsistent 
with the recent trend which alleges that the judicial basis of the duty of good faith at 
the claiming stage is a separate rule of law.962 
Secondly, applying the traditional avoidance ab initio remedy to fraudulent claim 
events is revealed to be a penal remedy since a trivial fraud would cause all benefits 
of the insurance policy to be forfeited according to section 17, including both genuine 
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and fraudulent claims. Although common law is famous for its elasticity in being 
updated by cases and the English courts maintain this point by creating a halfway 
avoidance remedy,963  the partial avoidance was fully rejected by current leading 
academics. 964  On the one hand, the proportionate remedy is deemed to be 
encouraging fraud. The logic dictates that the fraudster would be encouraged to have 
a thirst of speculative interests since the genuine claim would not be deprived of, if a 
fraud is discovered. On the other hand, this refusal just terminates the possibility of 
introducing a proportionate remedy to fraudulent claims, which also places this issue 
back to a vicious circle, namely, the disproportionality of avoidance ab initio remedy 
for fraudulent claims.  
Thirdly, in order to maintain the traditional elasticity of the common law, it is ideal 
to confine the application of section 17 of MIA 1906 to the pre-contract stage. This 
opinion, as observed previously, is evidenced by the judicial reluctance to extend 
section 17’s application scope. Literally, even based on the ordinary meaning of 
section 17, it is apparent that the insurance contract is concluded ‘on’ utmost good 
faith, which does not clarify whether this duty continues after concluding the contract 
or not.  
Fourthly, to sum up the above legislative defects, much light has also been shed 
on the incompetence in the current statutes, in disposing of the general post-contract 
events, which is also unravelled by the Law Commission’s official publications.965 
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 Although this proposal was clearly rejected by the current editors of the leading academic writing, 
Arnould (Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, p. 750), people still cannot 
disregard the importance of adapting a partial remedy, namely, proportionality remedy, which is 
currently adopted by Australian law. This approach is also presented by the Law Commission for the 
coming statutory reforming consultation, citing practical custom from the insurance market. See the 
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance Contract 
Law: Post Contract Duties and other Issues (CP 2), pp. 75-76.  
964
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One credible response from practice concerning the application of avoidance to the 
post-contractual event, especially for fraudulent claims, notes that this would bring 
the industry into ‘disrepute’, since ‘this does not do the industry any credit’.966 
In other words, the current statutory avoidance remedy is not good law but 
outdated for fraudulent claims. This is also the main reason why the Law 
Commissioners conducted a review, presenting a proposal to adopt a prospective 
remedy rather than the avoidance remedy at English common law.967 
 
5.3.4.2. Common law rule 
Apart from the statutory rule underlying section 17 of the MIA 1906, the avoidance 
ab initio remedy is also supported by the judiciary, especially those in The Star 
Sea.968 The leading judgment by Lord Hobhouse stated that avoidance was the sole 
remedy and there was no remedy in damages for any want of good faith.969 However, 
in the meanwhile, a common law remedy is also embodied by cases regarding 
fraudulent claims, namely, forfeiture.970 
In the view of this author, the forfeiture remedies often coexist with the avoidance 
remedy, as if the insurer is entitled to the avoidance ab initio remedy, because of the 
assured’s fraudulent claims, then all of the assured’s benefits under that policy would 
be forfeited. If the insurer is awarded with the avoidance of the tainted claim(s) only, 
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then the assured’s benefits underlying the tainted claim(s) would be forfeited. 
Subsequently, the forfeiture remedy partially originates from insurance contracts 
when the fraud clauses are contained.971 Briefly, as English case law suggests, there 
are two possible approaches for insurers which are, claiming for retrospective 
forfeiture or prospective forfeiture, but the final decision is always debatable. 
Interestingly, the retrospective forfeiture remedy for the insurer appears to coexist 
with the avoidance remedy under section 17 of the MIA 1906. The history of the 
forfeiture rule can be dated back to Goulstone v The Royal Insurance Company972 
and Britton v The Royal Insurance Company.973 However, the scope of forfeited 
benefit is still arguable and left open. Judging from recent juristic opinions, the 
judiciary is reluctant to award the avoidance ab initio remedy to the injured party or a 
retrospective forfeiture of all benefits under the insurance policy, but rather adopts a 
prospective approach. In Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb,974 it was clarified by 
the judiciary that ‘there is no basis or reason for giving the common law rule relating 
to fraudulent claims a retrospective effect on prior, separate claims which have 
already been settled under the same policy before any fraud occurs’. However, there 
is a crucial condition precedent for the above discussion, namely, the benefits are 
required to be attached to multiple claims. Unfortunately, under the current law the 
forfeiture of subsequent claims is still ambiguous, and thus needs further 
clarifications. In terms of the benefit derived from one particular claim, according to a 
recent judgment of Aviva Insurance Ltd v Brown, 975  it was revealed that a 
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 In cases where a forfeiture of fraudulent claims is clarified by the insurance contract. 
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 (1858) 1 F & F 276, p. 279. In this case it was held that ‘the claim was fraudulent’ if ‘it was wilfully 
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retrospective forfeiture remedy was allowed to the injured party of an insurance 
contract. Under the current state of insurance rules in England and Wales, the 
prospective forfeiture remedy was considered by two notable cases, Orakpo v 
Barclays Insurance Services 976  and Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) 
Ltd.977 
According to the practice in the UK, the FOS follows ICOBS, entitling a partial 
forfeiture remedy to the defaulting party.978 The approach adopted by the FOS can 
be considered to show mercies to the dishonest assured in cases of minor frauds. 
However, some concerns are caused for the reconsideration of a prospective 
approach.  
First of all, at its superficial value, a prospective forfeiture remedy would discharge 
the involved parties from their future liabilities, especially those that belong to the 
insurance company. In practice, the assured may suffer the pure genuine loss and 
the fraudulent loss. As stated earlier, the fraudulent loss is affected by fraud and the 
insurance company is discharged from all liabilities in relation to the contaminated 
claim. Then, what would happen to the legitimate claim which is made subsequently 
to the disclosure of fraud, and would the following separate claim be declined by the 
insurance company? In the view of this author, the logic is simple here, in cases 
where there is a group of separate claims, trivial fraud should not be deemed as a 
serious breach of good faith and uncontaminated claims should not be affected. This 
opinion is also favoured by other legal systems, and one outstanding example is in 
Australian law. According to section 56 of the Australian Insurance Contracts Act 
1984, the statutory remedy is limited to the contaminated claims in cases of minor 
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frauds.979 Additionally, it is undoubtedly logical that in cases where there is one 
particular claim, all subsequent benefits attached to this claim should be forfeited 
since they are definitely tainted here. In cases of significant fraud, in the view of this 
author, the method based on Australian law is recommended. As section 56(1), 
Australian Insurance Contracts Act 1984, states, a retrospective remedy would be 
applied for fraudulent claims but not a retrospective avoidance remedy. In the 
meanwhile, one might have the view that the general contract law principle should 
also be taken into account. As a matter of fact, the approach of adopting a 
retrospective remedy, or a so-called ‘proportionality remedy’,980 for fraudulent claims 
is not a perfect solution but gives rise to another wave of subsequent concerns, 
among which the most noticeable topic is its negative impact on the assured. In 
terms of the dangerousness of the proportionality remedy to the assured’s incentive 
to be honest, this has been addressed above.981 In the meantime, another concern 
under this topic is the lack of sufficient support from both the judiciary and academics. 
On the one hand, the precedent condition attached to the momentous proportionality 
remedy legislation in Australian law is that the fraud must be insignificant or minimal, 
which reveals its limitations. The most grievous one is its elusive standards in 
practice. For a grant of partial relief, the alleged party has to prove that the degree of 
fraud in an individual case is substantial to the whole claim, but the exact latitude of 
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an insignificant fraud is questionable.982 Additionally, its application is dependent on 
broad judicial discretions, which is hard to be absolutely standardized. Despite the 
uncertainties addressed, the approach in English law is supported by some leading 
academics.983 
 
5.3.4.3. Contractual damage remedies 
In addition to the statutory and common law rules, there is always another voice 
proposing extra remedies for a breach of the post-contractual duty of good faith, 
namely, contractual damages. Apparently, this opinion follows the argument that the 
assured’s duty not to commit fraudulent claims is an implied term, entitling the insurer 
to a right to claim compensations for contractual damages. 
The origin of contractual remedies is the adoption of a ‘fraud clause’, which is 
strongly recommended for commercial contracts. 984  Since a ‘fraud clause’ is 
incorporated into the insurance contract, then the remedies stipulated by this clause 
are considered as contractual remedies. Of course, the detailed consequence 
attached to each individual expressed ‘fraud clause’ is totally based on the freedom 
of contract, including forfeiture of all claims 985  or an ‘automatic termination’ of 
insurance.986 The adoption of ‘fraud clauses’ appears to be a ‘contractual solution to 
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the uncertainty of the fraudulent claims rule’987 by extending the insurers’ remedies. 
But it is still helpless for cases with an absence of an express term. Additionally, it is 
commented that awarding contractual remedies by ‘fraud clauses’ could impose 
restrictions on the development of case law in insurance. 988  Therefore, some 
commentators intend to establish the second pillar of proposing contractual damages 
as the remedies for fraudulent claims, which is founded on the basis of an implied 
term. Of course, the limitations to the implied terms theory has been stated in earlier 
paragraphs.989 However, the implied term theory is worthwhile to be discussed here 
for adapting possible solutions to appropriate remedies for fraudulent claims. 
Under general contract law, the three typical types of contractual terms are the 
condition, the warranty, and the innominate term.990 Accordingly, there are varied 
contractual remedies available for breaches of contracts. In cases of a breach of a 
conditional term, the injured party is awarded the right to terminate the contract and 
claim compensation for contractual damages. In cases of a breach of a warranty 
term, the injured party is awarded with contractual damages only.991 In cases of a 
breach of an innominate term, where it may be difficult to tell whether it goes to the 
root of contracts or not, the injured party would be awarded with the contractual 
remedies upon the effect of breach. 992  It seems to complicate the remedies 
mechanism for the contractual breaches by providing more options for fraudulent 
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claims compared with the restrictive and exclusive avoidance ab initio remedy 
underlying section 17 of the MIA 1906. However, judging from judicial opinion, the 
introduction of contractual damages to insurance contracts for fraudulent claims is 
rejected by the Court of Appeal in La Banque Financiere de la Cite v Westgate.993 In 
this case, it was clarified that contractual damages were not recoverable in cases 
where a pre-contract breach of good faith and avoidance is the only remedy 
available. 994 Therefore, it can be concluded that contractual damages are not 
recoverable in all good faith events in insurance law on the basis of a breach of an 
implied term. 
Despite the judicial refusal and academic support,995 limitations and consequential 
concerns are revealed regarding this judgment provided that the assured’s duty to 
make correct claims is implied by contractual terms. First of all, there is an apparent 
impossibility for the injured party to sue an assured for damages following a 
fraudulent claim, but the consequential cost of a claims investigation after fraud is 
discovered must be questioned. Furthermore, would the defaulting party be 
responsible for indemnifying contractual damages in that case?996 Interestingly, the 
judicial answer is negative, which is reflected in London Assurance v Clare.997 In this 
case, it was held by the High Court that expenses incurred in the investigation of 
claims were not recoverable as damages for breach of an implied contractual term 
requesting the assured not to commit a fraudulent claim. Another issue relating to 
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995
 For academic support, see Rhidian Thomas, ‘Review of Contemporary Legal Developments’, 
(2001)2/3 JIML, pp. 71-76. 
996
 The Law Commission, Issues Paper 7, The Insured’s Post-contract Duty of Good Faith, p. 41. 
997
 (1937) 57 Ll. L. Rep. 254. 
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contractual damages in fraudulent claims is whether the injured party is entitled to 
claim damages for deceit.998 
 
5.4. Insurer’s late payment and good faith 
At the claiming stage under an insurance policy, besides the assured’s duty not to 
promote fraudulent claims, the insurer is requested to handle the claims honestly, 
and indemnify a valid insurance claim as soon as possible.  
If the insurer rejected a valid claim or delayed payment, the assured is not 
awarded any damages for the losses caused by the insurer’s late payment. With 
‘distinguished reluctance’, the current English Courts prefer not to approve the 
assured’s claim for damages caused by the insurer’s unreasonable delay in 
payment,999 which is considered to affect the fairness and competitiveness of English 
law.1000 
There are two types of debatable liabilities established in concurrent English law 
and some regulations in the UK. The liability is incurred on the basis of the insurer’s 
breach of his primary obligation to pay compensation and the insurer’s duty of good 
faith. Unfortunately, both theories are not neat enough to be invoked. In the first 
place, the Courts created a series of precedents to build up the ‘hold harmless’ 
principle, meaning that the insurer’s primary obligation is not to hold the assured 
harmless, but prevent the assured from being injured by risks insured. 1001  The 
                                               
998
 Including the Law Commissioners, leading academics such as Eggers, et al., Good Faith and 
Insurance Contract, para. 11.116.   
999
 For case examples, see The President of India v Lips Maritime Corporation (The Lips) [1988] AC 
395; Ventouris v Mountain (The Italia Express) (No 3) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 281; Sprung v Royal 
Insurance (UK) Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 111. 
1000
 For details, see the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation 
Paper, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and other Issues (CP 2), part 4. 
1001
 For example, Ventouris v Mountain (The Italia Express) (No 3) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 281; The 
President of India v Lips Maritime Corporation (The Lips) [1988] AC 395; Sprung v Royal Insurance 
(UK) Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 111. 
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second step taken by the Courts was denying the ‘implied obligation’ theory through 
judicial interpretations directly. Some commentators have a different opinion, 
claiming that some other jurisdictions can be considered as a resource of the ‘implied 
term’ theory in the UK. In England and Wales, the FOS1002 and the original FSA1003 
rules, both award the innocent assured with damages for an insurer’s unreasonable 
delay in payment or wrongful rejection of a valid claim.1004 However, these rules do 
not apply to either business insurance or businesses of a medium or large size, but 
are confined to ‘consumers’ or a ‘private person’.1005 The implications of the above 
solutions decide that they are definitely inadequate to be treated as a statutory 
source of the implied obligation theory. In the view of this author, there is another 
                                                                                                                                                  
    The nature of the insurer’s liabilities was earlier raised in Ventouris v Mountain (The Italia Express) 
(No 3) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 281, p. 292. According to Hirst J’s judgment in the Commercial Court, it 
was said that the insurer was ‘in breach of contract for having failed to hold the indemnified person 
harmless against the relevant loss or expense’ once ‘the loss is suffered or the expense incurred’. In 
the judgment delivered by Hirst J, Lord Goff’s ruling in Firma C-Trade S.A. v Newcastle P. & I. 
Association (The Fanti and Padre Island), (H.L.) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 was cited to support his 
statement. However, the ‘hold harmless’ analysis is targeted as one main defect of the current English 
case law for the insurer’s non-payment cases under the reforms committed by the Law Commission, 
which is addressed below (see § 5.5 below). 
1002
 Rule 8.1.1R, ICOBS. 
1003
 Section 150(1) of FiSMA 2000. 
1004
 Currently, this topic is regulated by section 138D, Chapter 2, Part 9A, Part 2 of the Financial 
Services Act 2012,  
1005
 According to the FOS case examples analysed by the Law Commission in its Consultation Paper 
2, it is revealed that a small amount of damage is mostly awarded for distress and inconvenience to 
consumers and small/medium sized businesses. See the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and other 
Issues (CP 2), p. 39.  
    According to rule 3 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 
2001, ‘private person’ means an ‘individual’ or a ‘legal person’. Rule 3(1) stipulates that:  
‘Private persons. 
3. – (1) In these Regulations, ‘private person’ means — 
 (a) any individual, unless he suffers the loss in question in the course of carrying on — 
    (i) any regulated activity; or 
    (ii) any activity which would be a regulated activity apart from any exclusion made by 
article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order (overseas persons); and 
 (b) any person who is not an individual, unless he suffers the loss in question in the course 
of carrying on business of any kind; 
but does not include a government, a local authority (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) 
or an international organisation. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), an individual who suffers loss in the course of 
effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance (within the meaning of article 10 of the 
Regulated Activities Order) written at Lloyd’s is not to be taken to suffer loss in the course 
of carrying on a regulated activity.’ 
    Section 138D(6) of the Financial Services Act 2012 provides that ‘’(p)rivate person’ has such 
meaning as may be prescribed’,    
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possible reason for this objection. Admitting the ‘implied term’ theory for the insurer’s 
primary obligation to indemnify the assured’s losses, is equivalent to admitting that 
contractual damages are available for the insurer’s breach of this obligation, which is 
inconsistent with all precedents in English case law. In order to redress confusion on 
this issue, the Courts chose to express their view directly in Sprung.1006 In Sprung, 
the insurer’s failure to commit payment under a policy was judged to be a failure to 
pay damages, and an assured had no cause of action for damages for non-payment 
of damages. A claimant, therefore, was compensated by the entitlement to interest 
on the damages only.1007 
In these cases, the second type of liability applicable to the insurer is based on a 
breach of good faith. At the claiming stage, the insurer is always demanded to handle 
the assured’s claims honestly in a timely fashion, which is due to the mutuality nature 
of good faith.1008 The establishment of ‘good faith’ explores a concern about the 
assured’s remedies for the insurer’s late payment or wrongful rejection of valid claims. 
One might have the view that since the insurer’s obligations are founded on good 
faith, and section 17 of the MIA 1906 has provided avoidance as the only remedy in 
cases of a breach of utmost good faith, no damages should be awarded to the 
assured. This statement is not illogical, but it is indeed inconsistent with the damages 
doctrine applied to general contracts. According to current English contract law, the 
injured party is entitled to contractual damages for any loss caused by the defaulting 
party’s breach, as long as the claims satisfy the requirements of the ‘damage’ 
                                               
1006
 Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 111. 
1007
 This was applied to Ventouris v Mountain (The Italia Express) (No 3) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 281. 
1008
 Since the assured is required to act in good faith during the whole insurance contract, including its 
performance and claiming stage, it would be unfair if no similar requirements were demanded from the 
insurer’s side. In insurance practice, currently, the large insurance companies are considered to be 
insurers with overwhelming skills, experience and power compared with the assureds, which becomes 
more obvious in terms of consumer insurance. Therefore, in order to protect the assured individual 
consumer’s interests, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 requires the conclusion of a contract to be 
fair. 
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principle created by the fundamental case of Hadley v Baxendale.1009 Later, it was 
interpreted by the Courts that this ‘damage’ principle was limited to general contract 
cases, rather than insurance cases.1010 There are many reasons why an insurance 
contract is treated so differently, but it is believed that the central one is that it is a 
contract based on speculation. 
In the light of the above approach adopted by the English Courts, no damages 
would be awarded to the assured for the insurer’s late payment or rejection of a valid 
claim. However, in terms of consumer insurance, the statutory duties are available 
from the FOS and FAS rules, which were also supported by the recently released 
publication of the Law Commissions.1011 
 
5.5. Reforms undergoing in the English and Scottish Law Commissions 
Various pressures from both practice and academia have forced the English and 
Scottish Law Commissions to consider a statutory reform. 1012  The reforming 
                                               
1009
 (1854) 156 ER 145.The ‘remoteness’ doctrine was established in this case for contractual 
damages in contract law. According to this doctrine, not every loss caused by the defaulting party’s 
breach is recoverable, unless it falls within either one of the following two rules: (A) damages arise 
naturally from a breach of contract, or (B) damages are within the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of contracting. For details, see MacIntyre, Business Law, pp. 192-193. 
1010
 Ventouris v Mountain (The Italia Express) (No 3) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 281; The President of India 
v Lips Maritime Corporation (The Lips) [1988] AC 395; Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd [1999] 1 
LLR IR 111. 
1011
 See the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Summary of Responses to Second 
consultation Paper: Post contract Duties and other Issues, Chapter 1 Damages for Late Payment, 
available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/insurance-contract-law.htm, accessed in 
January 2013. See paragraphs below for detail.  
1012
 For the Law Commission’s reports, see the Law Commission, Issues Paper 7, The Insured’s Post-
contract Duty of Good Faith; the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint 
Consultation Paper, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and other Issues (CP 2). And also 
the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Summary of Responses to Second 
consultation Paper: Post contract Duties and other Issues, Chapter 1 Damages for Late Payment; 
Summary of Responses to Second Consultation Paper: Post contract Duties and Other Issues, 
Chapter 2 Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent Claims, available at 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/insurance-contract-law.htm, accessed in January 2013. 
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accomplishments are discussed in the pre-contractual sections,1013 and the following 
paragraphs research the situation in post-contractual events.  
There are 4 main Law Commission’s publications concerning the assured’s post 
contract duties, the Issues Paper 7 and Joint Consultation Paper 2 (CP 2), and the 
Summary of Responses to Second Consultation Paper regarding insurer’s remedies 
for fraudulent claims. The Issues Paper 7 analysed the current status of insurance 
law for fraudulent claims, presented proposals for reform, and finally listed out keying 
questions for consultations. In December 2011, CP 2 was finally released by the Law 
Commissions, finalizing a proposal for reforming insurance law on the basis of 
responses to the topics contained in the Issues Paper 7. The Law Commissions 
recently published the Summary of Responses to the CP 2 regarding the insurer’s 
late payment and remedies for fraudulent claims in December 2012, reflecting strong 
support from the conlustees who replied for the above proposals. 
According to CP 2, in terms of the insurer’s non-payment in business insurance, 
the Law Commissions proposed to adapt the current Scottish Law provisions and 
some other regulations(e.g.: FOS and FAS rules) in England and Wales, in order to 
award damages for the losses caused by the insurer’s breach of his reasonable 
indemnification liabilities. Therefore, the Law Commissions proposed to overthrow 
the traditional ‘hold harmless’ principle, but to build up a contractual obligation which 
requires the insurer to pay valid claims within a reasonable time.1014 On the basis of 
the responses regarding whether the ‘insurers should be able to add to the statutory 
remedies for fraudulent claims through express contractual terms’, 86% of 
                                               
1013
 See chapter 3 above for details. 
1014
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance 
Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and other Issues (CP 2), part 5, p. 51. In order to ensure that the 
insurer has enough time to carry out a full investigations, the Law Commission proposed to introduce 
the concept of ‘reasonable time’ to the statutory reform, and explained that the ‘reasonable time’ 
should vary according to each individual case with market practice, different locations, sizes of 
insurance and complexities considered.  
253 
 
consultees provided strong support.1015 Subsequently, CP 2 proposed that damages 
should be available for the insurer’s late payment,1016 which was also agreed by most 
consultees (87% of consultees).1017 In the meanwhile, further limits were imposed, 
which directed that the insurer’s indemnification obligation is excludable by an 
express term, but not the duty of ‘good faith’.1018 
According to the proposal presented by the Law Commissions, four main elements 
need a statutory reform or restatement for the assured’s post-contract breaches of 
good faith. 1019  Firstly, in order to preserve the current law, a policyholder who 
commits a fraud in relation to a claim forfeits the whole claim to which the fraud 
relates, and any interim payments made in respect of the claim must be paid back. 
Therefore, as this factor suggests, in cases where one claim is involved, forfeiture is 
preferred rather than avoidance, in order to refrain from being castigated for its 
unprincipled nature. Secondly, in terms of the subsequent claims which arise after 
the discovery of fraud, the Law Commissions presented a proposal, in the sense that 
the coming statutory reform can clarify the prospective nature of forfeiture. This 
element indicates that the Law Commissions intend to treat the assured’s duty of 
good faith at post-contractual stages as an implied condition of an insurance contract 
and the consequence of its non-compliance is the termination of the contract.  
                                               
1015
 See the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Summary of Responses to Second 
Consultation Paper: Post contract Duties and Other Issues, Chapter 2 Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims, part 4. 
1016
 Ibid, p. 50. According to the proposal, in order to limit the amounts of damages for the insurer’s 
late payment, the Hadley case under general contract law was recommended to be adopted in the 
coming statutory reform combining with the foreseeability test established.      
1017
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Summary of Responses to Second 
consultation Paper: Post contract Duties and other Issues, Chapter 1 Damages for Late Payment, part 
2. 
1018
 Ibid, pp. 51-52. According to the proposal, the insurer’s indemnification obligation or paying 
damages for losses caused by delay is allowed to be excluded with an express term, but only on the 
basis of acting in ‘good faith’. Therefore, the excludability nature is proposed to be imposed to the 
insurer’s indemnification duty itself but not extended to the duty of good faith.  
1019
 Ibid, part 8. 
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Pursuant to the second element, thirdly, the Law Commissions proposed a further 
point to reaffirm the prospective nature of the forfeiture remedy for this issue, rather 
than the draconian avoidance ab initio remedy.1020 Under the current case law, this 
point is supported by the judiciary, but is inconsistent with section 17 of the MIA 1906. 
The Law Commissioners, therefore, expected that the statutory reform can have this 
clarified. Also being relevant to the second element, more options of contractual 
damages are proposed to be awarded for fraudulent claims by the Law Commissions. 
According to the fourth element, proposing that ‘the insurer should also have a right 
to claim the costs reasonably and actually incurred in investigating the claim’,1021 one 
gate is open for contractual damages in such cases. However, further limitations are 
imposed on its application by the Law Commissioners, requesting that the costs of 
claims investigation would not be available where the ‘savings made from the 
forfeited claim already offset the costs of investigation’.1022 Apart from the reasonable 
claim investigation costs, the Consultation Paper 2 also approved that there was a 
possibility that the insurer would be able to claim damages for deceit. 
All the above elements were proposed for further consultations. Based on the 
summary of responses from commentators in academia, judiciary and practitioners, 
the above proposals were supported by most of the consultees replied.1023 The Law 
Commissions aim to present a full draft Bill of Business insurance contract law for 
post contractual duties in 2013. Until now, the proposed proportionality remedy for 
                                               
1020
 Ibid. 
1021
 Ibid. 
1022
 Ibid, p. 87. In this Consultation Paper 2, there are three hypothetical examples exemplified to 
illustrate how it operates. 
1023
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Summary of Responses to Second 
Consultation Paper: Post contract Duties and Other Issues, Chapter 2 Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims, parts 1-3.  
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fraudulent claims is ideal to redress the uncertainties and confusions caused by the 
current law, by avoiding traditional concerns in this regard.1024 
 
5.6. Conclusion – Reconsidered levels of requirements: good faith or utmost 
good faith in post-contractual events? 
The levels of requirements are confusing. What is the exact degree of ‘good faith’ 
required from insurance parties for the post-contractual stage? Is it an average level 
of ‘good faith’, or an extremely high degree of ‘good faith’ as required at the pre-
contract stage?  
As stated above in this chapter, contractual parties’ duties at the post-contractual 
stage are definitely inconsistent with those at the pre-contractual stage.1025 Because 
of its restriction, and the rigidness of the observation of pre-contract utmost good 
faith, whether there is a breach is judged on the basis of the actual inducement 
reality, but not the degree of fault or negligence. Therefore, in pre-contract utmost 
good faith circumstances, both vital and trivial mistakes could be disastrous to the 
continuity of the insurance policy, as long as the two-limb requirements are 
satisfied.1026 
As is suggested in this chapter, good faith continues as a requirement after 
making an insurance contract. In the meanwhile, under certain circumstances, 
‘utmost good faith’ is required. The first reason to distinguish the post-contractual 
duties from the pre-contractual ones, is that the extent of the post-contractual duty of 
                                               
1024
 The avoidance ab initio in English common law is not the harshest remedy compared with the 
statutory provision in Norwegian marine insurance law. According to paragraph 3 of § 5-1 under the 
Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan 1996, 2010 version, ‘if the assured has acted fraudulently, the 
insurer is free from liability; the insurer may also cancel any insurance contract he has with the 
assured by giving fourteen days’ notice’.  
1025
 In terms of the difference between utmost good faith and its contents in business and consumer 
insurance, see chapter 3 above for details. 
1026
 Materiality and actual inducement test. 
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good faith varies according to the stage where it arises. Compared with the relatively 
simple pre-contractual circumstances (the duty of disclosure and not to misrepresent 
information), the situation under post-contractual circumstances is much more 
complex. As this part addresses, the post-contract duties in insurance contracts 
embrace different issues. It was found that after the conclusion of an insurance 
contract, only in cases of renewals of the policy, variations to extend the policies, 
alterations of risks and ‘held covered’ clauses, the contractual parties are requested 
to exercise the duty of utmost good faith, but nowhere else.1027 Apart from these four 
situations, no other cases were mentioned or sent to the Courts. Since the degree of 
‘good faith’ was described to vary depending on the stage of the parties’ 
relationships,1028 there are elusive principles, but not a universal requirement of good 
faith needed for the post-contract stage. 
Another reason to treat the post-contract duties differently is its distinctive basis. 
As discussed before, the majority of leading academics intend to separate them from 
section 17 of the MIA 1906 which is considered as the fountain of utmost good faith, 
preferring to categorise the post-contractual duty of good faith based on a separate 
rule of law.1029  This statement just opens the gate for the Law Commissions to 
introduce more alternative options for the defaulting party’s breaches of good faith, 
                                               
1027
 K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 357, QB, p. 570. According to Aikens’ judgment, the Courts have clearly held that there are four 
situations in which the duty of utmost good faith must be exercised by the assured attached after the 
conclusion of the contract.   
    Apparently, the insurer’s and assured’s statuses are exchanged after making an insurance policy 
and it is unfair to request both parties especially the assured’s side to continue a contract with the 
requirements to utmost good faith required pre-contractually. See Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-
Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 389, HL, paras.6 and 7, per Lord Clyde; 
the Court of Appeal in The Good Luck [1990] 1 Q.B. 818, para. 888.   
1028
 Aikens, ‘The post-contract duty of good faith in insurance contracts: is there a problem that needs 
a solution?’, in JBL, pp. 379-393. In this article, good faith was described as the Cheshire Cat: it never 
disappears entirely, but at certain times you can only see its smile. This opinion receives huge support 
from both academia and practice in favour of requiring a different level of requirements to the post-
contract duties. See § 5.1.2. 
1029
 See § 5.1.2. 
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especially the prospective and proportionality remedy for fraudulent claims.1030 
 
                                               
1030
 The prospective and proportionality remedy is available for fraudulent claims in cases where there 
is a group of different claims. In cases where one particular claim tainted by fraud, the coming law 
reform would persevere with the current law, under which the defaulting policyholder should forfeit the 
whole claim. See the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, 
Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and other Issues (CP 2).  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE POST-CONTRACT DUTIES AND GOOD FAITH IN CHINESE INSURANCE 
LAW 
 
6.1. Introduction 
As stated in chapter 4 concerning pre-contractual utmost good faith in Chinese law, 
utmost good faith has never been legally recognized but only practically admitted. 
Therefore, utmost good faith itself needs further legal clarification to confirm its 
position in the Chinese legal system. The legislators’ reforming intention is finally 
embodied by the Amendments of the Chinese Maritime Code of the PRC in 2003 by 
introducing the doctrine of utmost good faith in English law to Chinese law.1031 In the 
meanwhile, compared with this highly developed doctrine in English case law, the 
present leading codes in China are lacking of detailed provisions.  
Currently in Chinese law, the concept of post contractual good faith can be traced 
to article 5 of CIL 2009, article 6 of Contract law and article 4 of the General 
Principles of Civil law,1032 which provide a blurry picture of good faith instead of 
pointing out in a straightforward manner whether this doctrine applies to post-
contract information or not. This circumstance of Chinese law is similar to that of 
English common law, which is lacking a clear and detailed statutory clarification. 
However, as distinct from Chinese codes, the legislative defects in English law were 
further redressed through subsequent cases by the imposition of application 
                                               
1031
 Clause 313, Amendments of Chinese Maritime Code of the PRC, stipulates that ‘if either party 
does not observe the duty of utmost good faith, the contract may be avoided by the other party’, which 
is exactly the same as section 17, MIA 1906. 
1032
 See chapter 4 above. 
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implications.1033 Circumstances under Chinese law, therefore, become unpredictable 
since there are only inadequate existing statutes without a binding precedent 
doctrine which can have legislative defects adjusted afterwards. This chapter, firstly, 
introduces the insurance parties’ post-contract duties of good faith, corresponding to 
the contents contained in chapter 5 regarding post-contract good faith at English 
common law. Secondly, a comparative study of the current leading codes and 
practical manners in China for each individual specific issue under the topic of post-
contract good faith is analysed. 1034  In order to provide a comprehensive study, 
notable case examples in both English law and Chinese law will be addressed.  
 
6.2. Post-contract duty of good faith and special issues 
6.2.1. Is good faith mutual and continuing in Chinese law? 
First of all, it is of tremendous importance to confirm the continuing and mutual 
nature of post-contract good faith in Chinese law. As distinct from the English 
position, under the MIA 1906, there is no overarching article regulating the duty of 
good faith and its application at the post-contract stage. Despite this pitfall, other 
general codes and commercial rules would be invoked to deal with relevant disputes 
as well. 
Article 5 of CIL 2009 stipulates that the principle of ‘good faith’ must be observed 
by the parties to an insurance contract. Article 6 of Contract Law expressly provides 
that the parties shall observe the principle of honesty and good faith in exercising 
their rights and in performing their obligations. Article 4 of the General Principles of 
                                               
1033
 See chapters above regarding English law. 
1034
 As stated in chapter 4, leading codes in Chinese law governing marine insurance include the 
Chinese Maritime Code of the PRC (CMC), Chinese Insurance Law of the PRC 2009 (CIL 2009), 
Contract Law of the PRC (Chinese Contract Law) and the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC 
1986 (General Principles of Civil Law). All these codes are listed in a descending order of their 
hierarchy.   
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Civil Law also notes that in civil activities, the principles of voluntariness, fairness, 
making compensation for equal value, honesty and credibility shall be observed. As 
the above statutes suggest, not just at the contemplation, but during the currency of 
a contract, both contractual parties are required to observe good faith.  
According to subsequent provisions, after the making of an insurance contact, 
variations of contract are allowed based on both parties’ agreement. The assured is 
required to notify the alteration of risks, 1035  and must perform the duty of loss 
notification and mitigation upon the occurrence of risks insured against. 1036 
Additionally, the assured is required to cooperate with the insurance company for 
claims investigations.1037 At the claiming stage, both the assured and insurer are 
obliged to act in good faith. From the insurer’s side, in order to maintain a smooth 
operation of the insurance contract, the insurer is obliged to handle claims with good 
faith1038 and make payment within a reasonable time.1039 Subsequently, the assured 
shall not have the loss recovered in cases where there is a fraud element 
involved.1040 
As all the above codes reflect, the duty of good faith is not confined to the pre-
contract stage but is extended to the post-contract stage in Chinese law.      
 
                                               
1035
 Article 52, CIL 2009. 
1036
 Article 236, CMC; arts 21 and 57, CIL 2009. 
1037
 Article 22, CIL 2009. 
1038
 Article 25, CIL 2009.  
1039
 Articles 237-240, 243-244, CMC; article 23, CIL 2009.  
1040
 Article 242 of CMC; article 27, CIL 2009. 
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6.2.2. Good faith and special issues in Chinese law 
6.2.2.1. Amendments and renewals of contract 
Based on article 20 of CIL 2009, the insurer and assured may amend the contents 
of the insurance contract subject to agreement. Under the same article, amendments 
after the making of an insurance policy are required to be embodied in a written form, 
for instance, an endorsement slip or some other type of written agreement. The 
requirement of a written format is imposed by law to avoid any potential disputes by 
providing paperwork proof, so as to maintain the insurance contract to be performed 
and completed successfully.  
It is found that as with MIA 1906, statutes in Chinese law are silent on the 
assured’s duty of good faith for the variations and renewals of insurance contract. 
However, business efficiency in China prefers to treat the amendment of contract as 
a partial renewal of contract. Therefore, such cases are logically governed by the 
rules applied at the contemplation of a new contract. Connected with the contents 
underlying chapter 4, regarding the assured’s pre-contract duty of disclosure, it can 
be concluded that when it applies to the amendments and renewals to insurance 
contract, articles 222 and 223 of the CMC require the assured to voluntarily and 
truthfully inform the insurer of the material circumstances which the insured has 
knowledge of, or ought to have knowledge of, in his ordinary business practice, 
which may have a bearing on the insurer in deciding whether he agrees to accept the 
variations or renewals.1041 In other words, the assured is obliged to disclose material 
circumstances to the amendments and renewals of insurance contracts, which is 
also a popular statement accepted by most academics in China.1042 
                                               
1041
 See § 4.3 above. 
1042
 For example, Mingyuan Zhang, ‘A study on liability defence of the insurer in a marine insurance 
contract’, (1998) 20 CCLR, p. 642. 
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Compared with the assured’s duty of utmost good faith for variations and renewals 
of insurance contracts in English law, the approach adopted by Chinese law is of a 
dual character. On the one hand, it is an explicit statutory obligation imposed on the 
insurance parties that alterations and renewals are only allowed based on written 
agreements. Subsequently, CIL 2009 lists out several detailed examples of written 
agreement on alterations and renewals, including an endorsement, or a separate 
endorsement slip attached to the original insurance policy, or an individual written 
agreement signed between the insurer and assured. Article 20 of CIL 2009, to a 
large extent, redresses the wrongs committed by the assured for amending and 
renewing an insurance contract by providing a guideline including the formality 
requirement to the variation agreement.  
Nevertheless, the assured’s duty of good faith for the variations and renewals of 
insurance contract is not legally clarified. The only feasible solution is treating the 
variation of insurance contract as a partial renewal of contract, and both parties are 
obliged to disclose all material circumstances of amendments or renewals with 
utmost good faith.                    
 
6.2.2.2. Alteration of risks during currency of contract 
In English law, once the insurance contract is made, unless the policy provides 
otherwise, the assured is not obliged to disclose any alterations of risks against 
under the insurance policy, unless the increasing risks change the nature of the 
insurance.1043 
                                               
1043
 According to English law, the alteration of risk during the performance of an insurance contract is 
unnecessary to be disclosed, unless the alteration is so great to change the nature of insurance policy. 
Sections 43-48 of the MIA 1906 exemplify some exceptions under the doctrine of alteration of risks 
which need to be disclosed. Principally, such a duty of good faith is embodied by ‘warranties’ at 
common law. See § 5.2.2 above.  
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In Chinese law, the insurer’s right to acknowledgement of changes of risks is 
reaffirmed by CIL 2009. According to article 52, CIL 2009, after the conclusion of an 
insurance contract, the assured is obliged to notify the insurer of the increasing risks 
according to the insurance provisions, and the insurer is entitled to increase the 
premium or terminate the insurance contract. In cases where the assured fails to 
perform the above duty of disclosure, the insurer is not responsible for any losses 
caused by concealing of increasing risks. There are several concerns relating to this 
article. Firstly, the assured’s duty to notify the increasing risks to the insurer is a 
contractual obligation which is totally based on an express term. Therefore, as 
distinct from the other aspects of good faith in Chinese law, the duty of notifying 
increasing risks is not mandatory but founded on the express provisions. Also 
because of this reason, it is strongly recommended that an express ‘increasing risks 
notification’ clause should be contained in insurance policies, in order to mitigate the 
losses which would be caused by any potential changes of risks.  
Secondly, not every degree of risk change is required to be disclosed according to 
the provisions, but significant increase only. A detailed definition of ‘significant 
increase’ is still uncertain in Chinese law, which needs further legal clarifications. 
However, in the view of this author, it would be beneficial to extend the standard 
adopted in English case law to Chinese practice.1044 One reason to introduce English 
procedure here is, that since good faith is a universal umbrella to guarantee business 
transactions, its ultimate goal is to maintain a balance between the insurer and 
assured through the negotiation and currency of insurance policy. Thus, on the one 
hand, the doctrine of good faith demands definite fairness and equality between the 
insurer and assured, which logically means that neither party should be overloaded. 
                                               
1044
 See § 5.2.2 above. 
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Therefore, it is unreasonable to require the assured to fulfil the everlasting duty of 
good faith even where insignificant information appears after the conclusion of the 
insurance contract. In the view of this author, since the insurer concludes an 
insurance contract with the assured, and charges an insurance premium, the insurer 
shall take the risks and be responsible for losses caused by the occurrence of perils 
insured against. However, at the same time, another balance between the risks 
insured against and the agreed premium at the beginning is not invariable, but can 
be easily broken by external elements, including alterations of risks. In order to keep 
the scales weighing the interests of both sides to be in equilibrium, alterations of risks, 
especially significant increasing risks, need to be notified. As this paragraph 
suggests, on the premise that there are provisions of an increased risks notification 
duty, the assured should notify increasing risks which would change the nature of 
insurance to the insurer in a timely fashion. Judging from the information provided by 
this article and business efficiency, the significant increase of risks should be 
substantial enough to change the nature of insurance, for example, increase the 
original premium or original risks insured under the insurance policy. Besides, if the 
concealed increase of risks would cause the insurer not to accept the insurance at 
the beginning, the insurer could have the insurance contract terminated. Apart from 
its ‘materiality’, the inducement factor also came into the sight of the leading experts 
from Comité Maritime International (CMI), 1045  although in the end it was totally 
rejected. In the view of this author, the reasoning for this objection is clear, since the 
                                               
1045
 According to the CMI’s 2004 Yearbook, the International Working Group on Marine Insurance 
(IWG) was set up to represent underwriters, academics and practitioners from both common law and 
civilian roots. The IWG resolved to concentrate initially on four issues which were identified as the 
ones most in need of attentions, including the duty of good faith, the duty of disclosure, alteration of 
risk, and warranties. See CMI, Yearbook 2004, Vancouver II, pp. 249-259. 
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failures of disclosing alterations of risks with good faith would happen after the 
conclusion of a contract.1046 
Furthermore, in the view of this author, another essential contained in this article is 
that the assured shall perform his provisional duty of risks increase notification in a 
timely fashion. However, ‘timing’ here should be understood as ‘as soon as possible’, 
depending on individual cases. For instance, article 8(1) of the Hull Insurance of the 
People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC) 2009 clearly stipulates that 
‘immediately upon receipt of advice of any accident or loss to the insured vessel, it is 
the duty of the insured to give notice to the insurer within 48 hours, and if the vessel 
is abroad, to the insurer’s nearest agent immediately, and to take all reasonable 
measures for the purpose of minimizing a loss which would be recoverable under this 
insurance’. Thus, judging from the above codes and practical insurance clauses, it 
can be observed that the assured’s duty of notifying the alteration of risks to the 
insurer is not a one-off requirement, but a continuing one including its further 
development.   
Fourthly, in cases where an ‘increasing risks notification’ clause is contained and 
the assured performs this obligation correspondingly, the insurer may be entitled to 
extra premium or a termination of contract. The first option for the insurer is easy to 
understand, since the insurance premium should be correspondent to the level of 
perils insured against. More difficulties lie in the termination of insurance contract. In 
order to clarify the termination issue, directions are firstly diverted to its feasibilities in 
practice. The termination remedy is available to the insurer according to paragraph 1, 
article 52 of the CIL 2009. According to this article, in cases where the insurer 
decides to terminate the insurance contract, the premium paid shall be returned to 
                                               
1046
 CMI, International Working Group on Marine Insurance, (Singapore, February, 2001) Discussion 
Paper, available at http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/cmi/marag.pdf, accessed in January 2013, p. 9. 
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the assured with the part of premium from the date when the insurance contract 
begins, to the date when it is terminated, being deducted. Additionally, the 
termination of contract is awarded together with a forfeiture of prospective claims 
caused by concealed significant increased risks.1047 
 
6.2.2.3. Held covered clause 
In English law, the assured is also obliged to practice utmost good faith in relation 
to the applicability of the held covered clause.1048 
In Chinese law, the held covered clause is not referred to in any insurance 
legislation, however, requirements are imposed in practice. The Ocean Marine Cargo 
Clauses 2009 and Hull Clauses of the PICC 2009 provide two practical examples. 
Clause 4(3) of the Ocean Marine Cargo Clauses 2009 stipulates that:  
‘[I]n case of a change of voyage or any omission or error in the description 
of the interest, the name of the vessel or voyage, this insurance shall 
remain in force only upon prompt notice to this company when the assured 
becomes aware of the same and payment of an additional premium if 
required[.]’  
 
Similarly, clause 6(3) of the Hull Clauses 1/1/1986 provides another example of 
the held covered clause. According to this clause: 
‘[I]n case the assured is notified with a noncompliance with the insurance 
provisions concerning the assured cargo, voyage, navigation area, towing, 
salvage or the sailing date, this insurance shall remain in force only upon 
prompt notice being given to the insurer and an agreed amended insurance 
with a higher premium when required; otherwise, the cover would be 
terminated automatically.’    
 
                                               
1047
 Paragraph 2, article 52, CIL 2009 stipulates that if the assured fails to perform the obligation 
provided, the insurer shall bear no obligation for indemnifying the insured in respect of an event which 
occurs due to the increased risk to the subject matter of the insurance. 
1048
 For case examples of English law, see: Overseas Commodities Ltd v Style [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
546; Liberian Insurance Agency Inc. v Mosse [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 560; and K/S Merc-Scandia 
XXXXII v Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 357, QB; [2001] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 563, CA.Also see § 5.2.2.1 above. 
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Judging from the trading custom and clause examples widely adopted in China’s 
insurance market, it can primarily be concluded that, only with the absence of a 
timely notice given to the insurer and agreed amended terms of cover with an 
additional premium when required, the automatic termination would be invoked. In 
English law, the held covered clause is not referred to in statutory legislation either. 
Also, because of the characteristics of a common law system and uncertainties of the 
judicial basis of the held covered clause, the remedies available for the assured’s 
breach of utmost good faith in such cases are controversial. 1049  The recent 
affirmative tendency is treating the alteration alluded to the held covered clause as a 
brand new contract. The breach of utmost good faith at the present, therefore, would 
cause the alluded amendments to be rescinded prospectively, but not the previous 
contract or payment. This is a result achieved after a long debate based on relevant 
cases. As distinct from the historic development of utmost good faith for the held 
covered clause in English law, the provisions of the PICC clauses simplify this issue 
by awarding an automatic termination of this cover for the assured’s failure to 
perform good faith.  
 
6.2.2.4. Duty of loss notification 
At English common law, the assured is obliged to notify to the insurer, either 
claims or circumstances which would give rise to a potential loss according to the 
insurance provisions. In case of an absence of an express loss notification clause, 
business efficacy is referred to by the Courts once the insurance parties have such 
disputes.1050 
                                               
1049
 See § 5.2.2 above. 
1050
 See § 5.2.2.5.2 above for English law. 
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In Chinese law, there is an implied obligation imposed on the assured to notify the 
insurer immediately and to avoid or minimize the loss once the peril insured against 
occurs; otherwise, the insurer shall not be responsible for the extended loss caused 
by the assured’s breach of this obligation.1051 Subsequently, article 21 of the CIL 
2009 introduces circumstances of breach of good faith. According to this article, in 
cases where the assured deliberately or recklessly fails to perform the loss 
notification obligation, and causes uncertainty to the assessment of the nature of, the 
cause for and the extent of the loss, the insurer shall not be liable for indemnities or 
insurance benefits for the undetermined portion. However, the above rule does not 
apply when the insurer has been, or should have been, notified with the occurrence 
of insured accident timely through some other manner. 
As the above contents in Chinese law suggest, firstly, there is a duty of good faith 
after the making of insurance, requiring the assured to notify the insurer with the 
occurrence of insured accidents immediately; otherwise, the insurer is not 
responsible for the indemnity to the beneficiary or assured. Secondly, especially on 
the basis of the CIL 2009, the assured’s breach of this duty is mainly reflected by the 
assured’s deliberateness or recklessness. The assured, thus, cannot have the loss 
covered by the insurance company if the loss is caused by the assured’s 
deliberateness or recklessness in his breach of loss notification duty.  
Furthermore, from the assured’s side, the assured is obliged to fulfil this obligation 
of loss notification. However, on the other hand, the reality that the insurer has the 
acknowledgement of the occurrence of the insured accident can break the chain of 
causation and the insurer shall bear the indemnifying duty. Therefore, as long as the 
insurer is informed by the assured directly or by a third party of the occurrence of the 
                                               
1051
 Article 236, CMC.  
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insured accident, or the insurer should have known this accident through any other 
manners, such as newspapers, the assured’s duty of loss notification is discharged, 
and the insurer should bear and complete the compensation for the loss caused.  
The last concern raised concerning the assured’s duty of good faith in notifying 
loss is the consequence of the assured’s failure of performing this obligation. 
Apparently, this point is tightly linked with the remedies available for the assured’s 
good faith breach, and it is discussed below.             
 
6.2.2.5. Other issues – duty of documents submission and mitigation 
Apart from the main pillars of the assured’s post-contractual good faith in Chinese 
law, some other circumstances are worth being discussed. 
Firstly, the assured is imposed with a duty of documents submission after the 
occurrence of a peril insured against as required. On the basis of article 251 of CMC, 
after the incurrence of a peril insured against, and before the payment of indemnity, 
the insurer may demand that the insured submit evidence and material related to the 
ascertainment of the nature of the peril and the extent of the loss as requested. 
However, this duty is not mandatory but proposed by the insurer, and according to 
Chinese law, there is no principal provision regarding the effect of a breach. In the 
view of this author, this article resolves most potential difficulties underlying 
insurance regarding the assured’s duty of documents submission, especially 
connected with the cooperation under claims investigations. Foremost, this article 
turns the assured’s duty to be implied by law in the absence of an express clause of 
insurance contracts. Against the backdrop of article 251, CMC, any rejection of 
fulfilling the duty of presenting relevant documentations and evidence as requested 
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by the insurer would constitute a breach of law. And logically, this duty becomes one 
necessary aspect of the assured’s post-contractual good faith in Chinese law. 
The second aspect, which can be linked with the assured’s post-contract good 
faith, is the duty of mitigation after the occurrence of risks insured against. This duty 
is provided by article 236 of CMC and article 57, CIL 2009, stating that upon the 
occurrence of the peril insured against, the assured shall notify the insurer 
immediately and shall take necessary and reasonable measures to avoid or mitigate 
the loss. Under this article, further requirements are provided, by requiring the 
assured to act according to the insurer’s special instructions as long as they are 
served.1052 
Therefore, in summary, the assured’s duty of mitigation after the occurrence of the 
insured event is implied as another aspect of good faith in Chinese law.1053 In order 
to maintain the assured’s loyalty and encourage its performance, the current Chinese 
law intends to allocate necessary and reasonable expenses caused by the assured’s 
performance of mitigation duty and some other duties to the insurer, which can be 
described as a fair and viable solution.      
 
6.3. Fraudulent claims 
Similarly to section 55 of the MIA 1906, the draftsman of Chinese insurance law 
provides a separate article specifically for fraud.  
CMC makes it clear that fraud is an unforgivable element for insurance. According 
to article 242, CMC, the insurer shall not bear the indemnification for the loss if the 
loss is caused by the assured’s intention. This is a straightforward and concise 
                                               
1052
 Paragraph 1, article 236, CMC. 
1053
 At English common law, this aspect is governed by section 78 of the MIA 1906, under the heading 
of suing and labouring clause. 
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provision which has clarified the legislators’ zero tolerance of fraud in marine 
insurance. As a matter of fact, further details are extended by article 27, CIL 2009 for 
general insurance except for life insurance. As the CIL 2009 provides, the assured or 
beneficiary’s fabrication of loss, intentional act, use of fraudulent devices to advance 
claims and exaggerations of genuine loss are four main aspects of fraud at the 
claiming stage. 
Until now, it is revealed that the discussed codes, CMC and CIL 2009, are silent 
on the definition of intention. However, some academics realized that a particular 
guidance was found within the Criminal Law of the PRC.1054 In accordance with 
article 14 of Criminal Law of the PRC, ‘an intentional crime refers to an act committed 
by a person who clearly knows that his act will entail harmful consequences to 
society but who wishes or allows such consequences to occur, thus constituting a 
crime’. However, some scholars intended to interpret ‘intention’ as ‘a typically 
culpable state of mind’ and deem ‘intentional breach of good faith’ in Chinese 
insurance law as a claim committed by ‘a proposer [if he] actually knows that what he 
disclosed is untrue or if he does not care whether or not it is true’. 1055  After a 
comparison between the definition of ‘intention’ in Chinese criminal law and English 
case law,1056 Chinese academics prefer to extend such guidance to insurance law 
and this needs confirmation by legal clarification.  
                                               
1054
 Zhenqi Wei, Civil Law (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2000) (Chinese version), p. 692; Liming 
Wang and Lixin Yang, Tort Law (Beijing: Law Press, 1996) (Chinese version), p. 71, cited by Hwee 
Ying Yeo, Yu Zheng and Jianlin Chen, ‘Of remedies and non-disclosure in the insurance law of the 
People’s Republic of China’, (2011) 6 JBL, pp. 556-577. 
1055
 Yeo, Zheng and Chen, ‘Of remedies and non-disclosure in the insurance law of the People’s 
Republic of China’, in JBL, pp. 556-577, notes 59 and 60. 
1056
 In English case law, the draftsman prefers using ‘recklessness or deliberateness’ instead of using 
‘intention’. The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 provides a 
comprehensive definition of a deliberate or reckless act. According to section 5(2), Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012: 
‘A qualifying misrepresentation is deliberate or reckless if the consumer — 
(a) knew that it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether or not it was untrue or 
misleading, and 
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As paragraph 1, article 27, CIL 2009 states, at the claiming stage, fraud in claims 
is created in cases where the assured makes a false claim or fabricates a claim 
which has not occurred.1057 Paragraph 2 provides that fraudulent claims could be 
committed in cases where losses are caused by the applicant or beneficiary’s 
deliberateness.1058  Paragraph 3 provides that if the assured or beneficiary uses 
fraudulent manners to advance claims, fraud is established at the claiming stage. 
Here, the circumstances under which a fraudulent device is used include the use of 
forged and altered documentations or relevant evidence.1059 Furthermore, also in 
paragraph 3, it is provided that exaggerating the genuine claim and falsifying the 
cause of the occurrence of the insured event is also treated as a fraudulent claim.1060 
Apparently, these aspects are the same as those defined by English case law.1061 In 
a civil law country, codes could simplify problems by certain language, but also could 
complicate problems because of the lack of flexibility. Therefore, according to the 
current Chinese legislation in insurance, practical examples are codified under article 
27, CIL 2009. In the meantime, article 27 differentiates legal effects for fraudulent 
claims, which is addressed below.                          
 
6.4. Insurer’s duty of claim handling and payment 
In English law, the insurer’s duty of reasonable claim handling and timely payment 
for compensation is derived from practice. In Chinese law, provisions prefer simplicity 
                                                                                                                                                  
(b) knew that the matter to which the misrepresentation related was relevant to the insurer, 
or did not care whether or not it was relevant to the insurer.’   
1057
 Paragraph 1, article 27, CIL 2009. 
1058
 Paragraph 2, article 27, CIL 2009. 
1059
 Paragraph 3, article 27, CIL 2009. 
1060
 Ibid. 
1061
 See § 5.3 above.  
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and have this point clarified straightforward in legislations as one aspect of the 
insurer’s post-contract good faith.  
In chapter 12, CMC, section 4 is created to regulate the liability of the insurer. 
Among these provisions, selected articles are worthwhile to be addressed. Generally, 
article 237 of CMC provides that after the loss caused by the occurrence of the event 
insured against, the insurer is obliged to promptly indemnify the assured. In the 
meanwhile, exceptional circumstances are exemplified by article 242, exempting the 
loss caused by the assured’s deliberateness from the general scope of the insurer’s 
obligation of prompt indemnification. According to article 243, unless otherwise 
provided in the insurance contract, the insurer is not liable for the indemnification for 
the loss or damage caused to the cargo by such circumstances as, a delay in the 
voyage or delivery of cargo, market fluctuation, natural loss, inherent defects or 
nature of the cargo, or improper packing. In terms of the hull insurance and freight 
insurance, the insurer is discharged from the duty of indemnification for the loss and 
damage caused to the vessel by the following causes, such as, unseaworthiness of 
the ship at the commencement of the voyage, (except where under a time policy the 
assured has no knowledge thereof) and where the loss is caused by natural wear or 
corrosion of the ship.1062  Therefore, but for the above exceptions, the insurer is 
generally obliged to handle valid claims and make prompt indemnification in good 
faith.  
Articles in CIL 2009 provide detailed contents of the insurer’s duty of reasonable 
claims handling and timely payment of compensation. Firstly, paragraph 1, article 23 
of CIL 2009 provides that after the receipt of a claim for indemnity, or for payment of 
the insurance benefits from the assured or the beneficiary, the insurer shall ascertain 
                                               
1062
 In article 218, CMC, it is specified that the Chinese Maritime Codes apply to both hull and cargo 
insurance. 
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and determine whether to make the indemnity or effect the payment of the insurance 
benefits in a timely manner; unless otherwise provided in the insurance contract, a 
decision shall be reached within 30 days in respect of complicated cases. This 
paragraph further requires that the final decision of whether to make the indemnity or 
effect the payment of the insurance shall be notified to the assured or beneficiary. 
With respect to the valid claims, the insurer shall fulfil his obligations for such 
indemnity or payment within 10 days after an agreement is reached with the assured 
or the beneficiary on the amount of indemnity or payment. Additionally, according to 
this paragraph, the insurer is required to fulfil his obligation within the time limits 
given by the insurance contract. Paragraph 2, article 23 of CIL 2009, provides that in 
cases where the insurer fails to fulfil the obligations specified in the preceding 
paragraph in time, the insurer shall compensate the assured or the beneficiary for 
any damage incurred as a remedy in addition to the payment of compensation, which 
is considered as the remedy available for the insurer’s breach of good faith in such 
cases. Furthermore, based on paragraph 3 of this article, the insurer’s obligation for 
indemnity or payment of the insurance benefits is defined as a legal obligation, and it 
is illegal for any entity or individual to interfere with the insurer’s such obligation, or 
hinder the assured’s right to receive the payment.  
Secondly, article 24 stipulates that in cases where invalid claims are made by the 
assured or beneficiary, the insurer shall issue the notice of rejection with main 
reasons within three days after the decision reached. Article 25 in the same law 
further notes that in cases where the amount of indemnity or payment of the 
insurance benefits cannot be determined within 60 days of the receipt of the claim, 
and relevant evidence and information thereof, then the insurer shall effect payment 
of the minimum amount which can be determined by the evidence and information 
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obtained. Thus, the insurer shall pay the balance after the final amount of indemnity 
or payment of the insurance benefits is determined. 
Finally, the time limits given for the assured’s right to claim compensation or 
payment for insurance benefits is two years.1063 Therefore, except for life insurance, 
the assured is entitled within two years to present valid claims from the date when 
the assured or beneficiary is aware of the occurrence of the insured event.1064 
 
6.5. Remedies available for post-contract breach of good faith 
6.5.1. Amendments and renewals of insurance contracts 
Except for the general requirement of good faith underlying articles 222 and 223, 
CMC is silent on the assured’s good faith for variations and renewals of insurance. 
However, the general legislation in insurance has this point regulated.  
As article 20, CIL 2009 stipulates, an insurance contract could be amended upon 
the agreement between the assured and insurer. Compared with English law, the 
draftsman of Chinese insurance law defines a more detailed formality requirement of 
amendments and renewals of insurance contracts. Article 20 of CIL 2009, further 
provides that where an insurance contract is amended, the insurer shall endorse or 
attach an endorsement to the original policy or other insurance documents, or the 
amendments shall be based on a written agreement between the insurance parties. 
In addition to CIL 2009, Chinese Contract Law and the General Principles of Civil 
Law also detail the formality requirements to the variation agreement between 
contractual parties and the effect of a bilateral amendment or an ambiguous 
                                               
1063
 Article 26, CIL 2009. 
1064
 Also according to this article, the assured or beneficiary of life insurance is awarded with a period 
of five years for presenting valid claims. 
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amendment clause.1065 It is found that on the basis of articles in CIL 2009, Contract 
law and General Principles of Civil law, any amendment of insurance contracts must 
be agreed in writing, otherwise it would be rejected and presumed as not having 
been altered. In cases where the amendment agreement is ambiguous, the 
insurance contract shall be presumed as not having been amended. 
Nevertheless, the current Chinese law does not deal with the area regarding the 
assured’s remedies for breach of good faith for contract variations and renewals. 
However, judging from the experience from English law, the leading trend is dividing 
contract variations and renewals underlying pre-contract events.1066 In the view of 
this author, this manner can be introduced to the current Chinese law, to resolve the 
legislative defects and logically, articles concerning general pre-contract events could 
be applied. In the meanwhile, any breach of good faith under contract variations and 
renewals would cause the amendments and new contracts to be avoided, 
prospectively. As stated in chapter 4 concerning the pre-contract duty of good faith in 
Chinese law, there are two types of pre-contract breaches of good faith (the 
intentional and unintentional misconduct) and, therefore, two correspondent 
remedies are available.1067 Linked with the above concerns, two types of remedies 
can be confirmed. In cases where the assured intentionally non-discloses material 
information at the contemplation of negotiation about insurance contract variations 
                                               
1065
 Article 77, Chinese Contract law.Articles 56-59 of the General Principles of Civil Law. CMC and 
CIL 2009 are silent on the legal effects of amendments to an insurance contract which are not 
evidenced in a writing form, but orally or by some other types of forms. However, this concern is 
addressed by the Contract law and General Principles of Civil law indirectly. According to the Chinese 
Contract law, in cases where the laws or administrative regulations provide, approval and registration 
procedures to such modification shall be gone through in accordance with such provisions. 
Additionally, any ambiguous and uncertainties caused by a modification of contract shall be presumed 
as not having effect. Article 56 of the General Principles of Civil Law also provides that civil acts 
(including contract) may be committed in a written form, oral form or other forms; in cases where law 
provides special requirements, civil activities shall be committed according to the provisions. In terms 
of the bilateral amendments and ambiguous amendment clauses, articles 57-59 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law address details.    
1066
 For example, see chapter 3 above for details regarding the application of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. 
1067
 Article 223, CMC. 
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and renewals, the insurer has the right to terminate the amended part or renewals 
without refunding the premium. In cases where the material information is non-
fraudulently concealed, the insurer is entitled with the right to terminate the contract 
or raise the premium for amended part or renewals, unless the non-disclosed 
information at the contemplation of amending and renewing insurance is material.  
After a comparison, it is found that based on the statutory remedies available for 
the assured’s pre-contract breach of good faith, the remedies for the assured’s 
breach of good faith for variations and renewals of an insurance contract are 
relatively prospective with regard to the whole insurance, but not as harsh as being 
retrospective.  
 
6.5.2. Alteration of risks during the currency of insurance 
Different from the general doctrine of alteration of risks at English case law, the 
assured’s obligation to notify the insurer with significant changes of risks is treated as 
one aspect of the assured’s good faith during the currency of insurance.1068 
As suggested by article 52, CIL 2009, any significant increased alterations of risks 
should be disclosed to the insurer on the basis of an express clause in the contract. 
Upon the receipt of the assured’s notice, the insurer is entitled to raise the premium 
or terminate the insurance contract. Paragraph 2 of this article further provides that in 
cases where the assured fails to perform the preceding duty, the assured shall not 
bear the losses caused by the concealed information. Therefore, it can be found that 
under the current Chinese law, the remedies available for the assured’s breach of 
such obligation is prospective again, which means that the insurer would be 
                                               
1068
 See § 5.2.2 above. 
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discharged from the indemnification for losses caused by the non-disclosed alteration 
of risk, but not with the avoidance ab initio.  
 
6.5.3. Held covered clause 
An automatic termination of insurance contract is provided by practical clauses for 
the assured’s good faith breach in relation to the held covered clause. 
As stated earlier, clause 4 of the Ocean Marine Cargo Clauses 2009 and clause 6 
of the Hull Clauses of the PICC 2009 provide the basics. In clause 4 of the Ocean 
Marine Cargo Clauses 2009, in cases where there is a change of voyage, or any 
omission or error in the description of the interest, the insurance shall be continued 
upon a prompt notice and extra premium as required. As a result, a good faith breach 
after the making of an insurance contract would cause the contract to be terminated. 
On the basis of clause 6(3) of the Hull Clauses of the PICC 2009, in case of a timely 
notice of a noncompliance with the insurance provisions concerning the assured 
cargo, voyage, navigation area, towing, salvage or the sailing date, the insurance is 
continued on the basis of an amendment agreement with extra requirements where 
relevant. Subsequently, without a prompt notice provided, the cover would be 
terminated automatically.     
Judging from the abovementioned insurance clauses provided by one of the 
biggest insurance companies in China, the PICC, it can be concluded that there is 
fine distinction between the remedies available for the assured’s good faith breach 
under a held covered clause in Chinese law and English case law, which is 
addressed in the conclusive chapter.1069 
 
                                               
1069
 See § (2).A.i of the general conclusion of this thesis. 
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6.5.4. Duty of loss notification 
Article 236 of CMC and article 21 of CIL 2009 provide that, after the occurrence of 
insured risks, the assured is imposed with a duty of loss notification. Under this 
obligation, the assured is required to give a timely notice to the insurer with good 
faith. In fact, on the basis of CMC, the two components of this loss notification duty 
are, the duty of prompt notification of loss and the duty of mitigation.  
Firstly, if the assured fails to fulfil the duty of loss notification because of his 
deliberateness/intention and gross negligence, and such failure also creates 
uncertainties to risk assessments, the insurer would be discharged from the 
indemnification for the consequential loss caused. 1070  Obviously, the remedy 
available for the assured’s deliberateness and gross negligence is a prospective 
forfeiture of claim further caused, but not the whole contract. Similarly, ‘gross 
negligence’ is not defined in either CMC, CIL 2009, or a general civil law branch 
(Contract Law or the General Principles of Civil Law). An explanation of ‘negligence’ 
in Chinese law can be found from the Criminal Law of the PRC, which stipulates that 
a negligent act is ‘committed by a person who should have foreseen that this act 
would possibly entail harmful consequences to society but who fails to do so through 
his negligence or, having foreseen the consequences, readily believes that they can 
be avoided, so that the consequences do occur’.1071 Compared with the definition of 
‘negligence’ at English common law,1072 the extension of criminal negligence to civil 
law is likely to be confirmed in Chinese law by further clarifications.    
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 Article 21, CIL 2009. 
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 Article 15, Criminal Law of the PRC. 
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 For example, section 5, Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. 
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Secondly, the assured is imposed with the duty of mitigation.1073 Also in article 236, 
CMC, after the occurrence of perils insured against, apart from the duty of notification, 
the assured is required to adopt reasonable manners to avoid or mitigate loss. Once 
the insurer provides special notification regarding reasonable approaches, the 
assured is required to act according to the insurer’s instructions. Paragraph 2 of 
article 236 subsequently specifies that in cases where the assured fails to perform 
the above duties, the insurer is entitled with a prospective right to reject 
consequential losses caused. To be more specific, if the assured does not adopt 
necessary approaches to mitigate/avoid further loss, or does not adopt appropriate 
manners according to the insurer’s instructions, the insurer is not liable for any 
consequential loss caused.            
 
6.5.5. Other issues 
6.5.5.1. Assured’s duty of documents submission 
The marine assured’s duty of documents submission after the occurrence of perils 
assured against and before the insurer’s commitment of payment for indemnification, 
requires the assured to provide documentations and materials relating to the 
                                               
1073
 The assured and his agents’ duty of averting or minimizing a loss is also available from section 78 
of the MIA 1906 in English law, although it is not covered by the principal doctrine of utmost good faith. 
According to section 78 in terms of the suing and labouring clause: 
‘(1) Where the policy contains a suing and labouring clause, the engagement thereby 
entered into is deemed to be supplementary to the contract of insurance, and the assured 
may recover from the insurer any expenses properly incurred pursuant to the clause, 
notwithstanding that the insurer may have paid for a total loss, or that the subject-matter 
may have been warranted free from particular average, either wholly or under a certain 
percentage. 
(2) General average losses and contributions and salvage charges, as defined by this Act, 
are not recoverable under the suing and labouring clause. 
(3) Expenses incurred for the purpose of averting or diminishing any loss not covered by 
the policy are not recoverable under the suing and labouring clause. 
(4) It is the duty of the assured and his agents, in all cases, to take such measures as may 
be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising a loss.’  
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assessment of the nature of perils and the extent of loss where requested.1074 Article 
22, CIL 2009, provides a similar requirement, noting that after the occurrence of 
insured risks, the applicant, assured, or beneficiary shall bear the duty of co-
operation and submit relevant documentations and materials regarding the 
assessment of loss.  
After a close observation, it is found that both CMC and CIL 2009 are silent on the 
legal consequence of the assured’s failure of performing the duty of documents 
submission and presenting important materials regarding risk and loss assessments. 
However, judging from selected articles in CIL 2009, some clues can be found. 
Firstly, based on the provisions of the insurance contract, in cases where materials 
and information provided are inadequate, the insurer shall notify the assured or the 
beneficiary with a request to provide the insurer with additional evidence or 
information.1075 
According to Chinese insurance law, articles 23-25, after the receipt of relevant 
evidence and information, the insurer is obliged to complete the claim investigation 
and commit payment for compensation within 60 days. In cases where the 
indemnification and insured benefits are hard to be determined, the insurance 
company shall effect the minimum payment which can be confirmed on the basis of 
relevant information obtained, and pay the balance when it can be confirmed. Apart 
from the articles requiring the assured to provide relevant information, article 27 in 
the same law also awards a prospective forfeiture claim remedy to the insurer once 
the assured commits fraudulent claims. Therefore, a further remedy available for the 
insurer, in cases where the assured fails to provide sufficient material regarding the 
assessment of the nature of perils, the cause of accident, and the extent of loss, shall 
                                               
1074
 Article 251, CMC. 
1075
 Paragraph 2, article 22, CIL 2009. 
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be a prospective forfeiture of the claim. With an absence of adequate material 
provided, the insurer can decline the uncertain part, even though it is confirmed that 
the assured commits a fraud when submitting relevant evidence and information. 
Thus, the insurer is discharged from his liability of indemnification for the tainted part. 
It should be noticed that both of the above manners are prospective, and the genuine 
components of the insurer’s compensation liability shall not be effected.1076 
 
6.5.5.2. Assured’s duty of mitigation1077 
The assured’s duty of mitigating and avoiding loss in good faith is imposed by 
article 236, CMC and article 57, CIL 2009. As the current Chinese legislation states, 
in cases where the assured fails to adopt measures to mitigate/avoid or act 
according to the special instructions delivered by the insurer’s side, any extended 
loss caused would not be recovered from the insurer. 1078  Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the remedy available for the assured’s good faith breach in mitigating 
losses is prospective and the innocent component is not contaminated.  
In terms of any consequential expenses caused, article 240 of the CMC stipulates 
that the insurer shall bear necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by the 
assured for avoiding and mitigating the loss. As the legislators exemplify in this 
article, such expenses include those necessarily and reasonably caused by the 
assured’s measures for avoiding and mitigating the loss, and those incurred for 
acting on the special instructions of the insurer, as provided in previous article 236 in 
the same law. In the meanwhile, the amount of such expenses is suggested to be 
                                               
1076
 See § 6.5.6 below. 
1077
 As stated earlier, a similar duty is available from the MIA 1906, under the heading of suing and 
labouring clause, instead of under the classic utmost good faith topic. It is found that the contents of 
the assured’s duty to mitigation are similar in Chinese law and English law; both legislations require 
the assured and his agent to avert or minimize losses caused by the risks insured against, and any 
consequential expenses incurred to such measures are recoverable, which is addressed below. 
1078
 Paragraph 2, article 236, CMC. 
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separated from the indemnification to be paid with regard to the subject matter 
insured, and all the expenses referred to in article 240 shall be limited to the 
equivalent of the insured amount.1079 Similarly, the CIL 2009 provides another clear 
requirement. In accordance with article 57 of the CIL 2009, any expenses necessarily 
and reasonably caused by the assured’s efforts made, to prevent or mitigate further 
loss or damage of the subject matter of the insurance after the occurrence of the 
insured event are borne by the insurer. Additionally, the amount of expenses shall be 
calculated separately from the indemnity for the loss of the subject matter of the 
insurance and it shall not exceed the sum insured.  
 
6.5.6. Remedies available for fraudulent claims 
Article 242, CMC and article 27, CIL 2009 both intend to ban the assured to 
propose fraudulent claims by awarding the right of severe sanction to the injured 
insurer. Several examples of fraudulent claim are found to be exemplified, with 
correspondent remedies provided, by the current Chinese insurance legislation.  
Firstly, as CMC and CIL 2009 provide, 1080  one remarkable example of the 
assured’s fraud at the claiming stage is the assured’s deliberateness. It is further 
clarified that any claims caused by the assured’s intention is not recoverable from the 
insurer. 1081  Apparently, once the assured causes loss to the insured subject 
                                               
1079
 In addition to the reasonable expenses caused by the assured’s performance of the duty of 
mitigation, paragraph 1, article 240 of CMC also states the reasonable expenses for survey and 
assessment of the value, for the purpose of ascertaining the nature and extent of the peril insured 
against, shall also be borne by the insurer and separately calculated.   
1080
 Article 242, CMC and paragraph 2, article 27 of CIL 2009. 
1081
 A similar statement is found in English law as well. In English law, specifically the MIA 1906, 
section 55 is legislated to define losses included and excluded by general marine insurance contracts. 
As section 55(2) stipulates, ‘the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct of 
the assured, but, unless the policy otherwise provides, he is liable for any loss proximately caused by 
a peril insured against, even though the loss would not have happened but for the misconduct or 
negligence of the master or crew’. 
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intentionally,1082 but he still submits such claims hoping to have indemnification paid 
by the insurer, the assured’s claim is not valid but forged by himself. The 
consequence is a prospective forfeiture remedy, discharging the insurer from his 
indemnification liability regarding the contaminated part. In addition to the forfeiture 
remedy, the assured would be deprived of the return of premium. It is noticeable that 
the seizure of the assured’s payment of premium does not apply to life insurance, 
since the latter is really unique in practice.1083 The second example of the assured’s 
fraud at the claiming stage is fabrication. 1084  In cases where the assured or 
beneficiary fabricates an accident under the insurance policy, which has not really 
been incurred, the assured is judged to be committing a fraudulent claim. 
Consequentially, the insurer is entitled to repudiate the insurance contract without 
returning payment of premium from the assured. Another factor exemplified by CIL 
2009 is the assured’s use of fraudulent manners in order to advance claims. As 
paragraph 3, article 27 stipulates, in cases where the assured adopts fraudulent 
devices, such as falsified evidence, material, or some other information, to improve 
genuine claims, the remedy available for the insurer is also the forfeiture of claims 
which are tainted. Also under this paragraph, the fourth type of fraud is defined as an 
exaggeration of genuine claims. According to the second sentence of this paragraph, 
the insurer is discharged from his indemnification liability or insured benefit payment 
for the exaggerated component. This can be said to be a prospective remedy as well.  
                                               
1082
 For instance, the assured sets a fire to insured cargo or vessel intentionally.  
1083
 Article 43, CIL 2009. In this article, it is stipulated that: 
  ‘In the event that the applicant or the beneficiary has intentionally caused the death, 
disability or illness of the insured, the insurer shall bear no obligation for payment of the 
insurance benefits. In the event that the applicant has paid premiums for two years or more, 
the insurer shall, in accordance with the contract, return the cash value of the policy to 
other beneficiaries, if any. 
  If the beneficiary has intentionally caused the death or disability of the insured, or 
attempted to cause the death of the insured or the beneficiary shall lose his/her right to 
claim the insurance benefits.’ 
1084
 Paragraph 1, article 27, CIL 2009. 
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Finally, paragraph 4, article 27, CIL 2009 concludes that the abovementioned 
examples of fraud could give rise to the remedy of any influential payment from the 
defaulting assured. 
 
6.5.7. Remedies for the insurer’s failure of handling claims in good faith 
The remedy available for the insurer’s failure of handling claims in good faith is 
clarified by article 23(2), CIL 2009, which provides that once the insurer fails to 
perform his obligation to handle claims and commit payment for compensation within 
a reasonable time, the insurer is liable for any losses caused by such failure. 
Of course, this legal resort is going to be invoked with an absence of a clarified 
clause under the insurance policy and becomes a default manner which is implied by 
law. It is allowed, technically, to cover and specify such issue under an insurance 
policy in advance, by regulating the insurer’s reasonable claims handling obligation 
and contractual damages attached. However, the assured and insurer are in unequal 
positions, and the assured, in the majority of cases, has no option but to accept the 
standard form insurance contract provided by the insurance company, with this issue 
contained,1085 also in some cases, without. In that case, the default rule implied by 
CIL 2009 becomes the last resort awarded to the assured to ensure his benefits. In 
terms of the legal nature of the above circumstances, the conclusion is quite 
apparent since the former is implied by law and the latter is contractual damages.           
 
6.6. Conclusion 
After a closer observation, it can be concluded that, firstly, identical to the 
circumstance of the pre-contractual duty of good faith in Chinese law, the basic 
                                               
1085
 For example, clause 8, Hull Insurance Clauses 2009. 
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principles of marine insurance is well established in English law, although the 
wordings are slightly different.1086 
Secondly, compared with the restrictive ‘all to gain’ and ‘nothing to lose’ remedy 
for any breach of utmost good faith in English law, possible remedies in Chinese law 
are more flexible and reasonable. As examined previously, in Chinese law, the 
termination of insurance contract (such as those for intentional non-disclosure of 
material circumstances), prospective forfeiture of claim (including those for 
unintentional breach of good faith), and contractual damages (for instance, those 
clarified by insurance clauses) are provided. Besides, in the absence of any 
specialized provisions in CMC and CIL 2009, general clauses in Contract Law and 
General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC are legally recognized to be invoked in an 
order of priority.1087 
Thirdly, different from the limited resource regarding utmost good faith provided by 
section 17, MIA 1906, more case examples of good faith are concisely specified by 
CMC and CIL 2009, but not in much depth. For instance, the assured’s duty of good 
faith in cases of the amendments and renewals of insurance,1088 the duty of notifying 
significant increased risks,1089 the duty of loss notification and mitigation,1090 the duty 
of documents submission,1091 the duty to promote honest claims,1092 the insurer’s 
duty of handling claims in good faith and paying indemnification timely.1093 Although it 
could be argued that all the regarded details are based on the scholars’ wishful 
thinking which is derived from one fragment of the principal articles, such as article 5 
                                               
1086
 L. Li, ‘The Maritime code of the People’s Republic of China’, (1993) LMCLQ, p. 215. For statutory 
examples, articles 222 and 223, CMC and sections 17-20, MIA 1906. 
1087
 See chapter 4 above.    
1088
 Article 20, CIL 2009. 
1089
 Article 52, CIL 2009. 
1090
 Article 236, CMC; articles 21 and 57, CIL 2009. Also see section 58, MIA 1906 for English law. 
1091
 Article 22, CIL 2009. 
1092
 Article 242, CMC; article 27, CIL 2009. 
1093
 Articles 237-240, 243, 244, CMC; article 23, CIL 2009. 
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of CIL 2009, article 6 of Chinese Contract Law and article 4 of the General Principles 
of Civil Law, the proposed challenge indicates that a statutory reform is expected to 
be carried out with detailed circumstances expressly specified.  
Fourthly, in the light of the fact that the assured is occasionally abused by the 
insurer in practice, for example, by avoiding the clauses regarding the insurer’s 
obligation to handle claims and commit payment in good faith, a default insurance 
policy is strongly recommended.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ASSURED’S BROKER IN ENGLISH LAW: UTMOST GOOD FAITH AND 
OTHER ISSUES 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The intermediary’s fraud or negligence in the transmission of pre-contract 
information to the insurer leads to a significant percentage (13%) of insurance 
allegations pursued with the FOS.1094 Judging from the last 100-year-experience, 
however, no more than 20 reported cases invoked the insurance agent’s duty of 
utmost good faith underlying section 19, MIA 1906.1095 As a matter of fact, in addition 
to the MIA 1906, the insurance intermediaries’ act is also governed by the general 
common law and other practical codes. Within the UK, selected legislations 
regarding the intermediaries include the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 
(which was repealed by the FiSMA 2000), FiSMA 2000, 1096  and the Financial 
Services Act 2012.1097 In the FiSMA 2000, the FSA was confirmed to be the regulator 
for insurance, investment business and banking; however, this act was further 
amended by the Financial Services Act 2012, which stipulates that FCA is the 
                                               
1094
 The Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – Policy Statement: The Status of 
Intermediaries (For whom does an intermediary act in transmitting pre-contract information from 
consumer to insurer?), (March 2009), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/, accessed in 
January 2013, p. 2. In this statement, up to 2007, 25 out of 190 allegations decided by the 
Ombudsman were revealed to be about the intermediary’s action when effecting the insurance 
policies.  
1095
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance 
Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3), p. 89.  
1096
 Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/contents, accessed in January 2013. 
1097
 Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/contents/enacted, accessed in August 
2013. 
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insurance regulator.1098 Recently, the publication of the FCA Handbook, ICOBS,1099 
strengthens the FCA’s overwhelming ‘regulator’ position in general insurance within 
the UK. In addition to the FCA and PRA, the FOS also regulates insurance 
companies. Another institution, the ABI, also contributes to the supervision and 
regulation of insurance in the UK with the help of its General Insurance Codes & 
Guidance Notes.1100 At the European Union level, the Insurance Mediation Directive 
enacted by the European Parliament and the Council of European Union provides 
another example of intermediary legislation.1101 Such phenomenon illustrates that the 
current law concerning the intermediary’s duty is confusing and there are 
unconquered obstacles in applying statutory codes to a complex commercial practice.  
In order to determine the main differences between the current law in the UK and 
its application in practice, and to restructure a more efficient legal mechanism to 
govern the insurance agent’s duty of utmost good faith in the UK, this part is 
extended to several sections below. These include, the intermediary’s position in 
three-party-situations (for instance, whether on the behalf of the insurer or assured), 
and, the insurance broker’s duties in section 19 of the MIA 1906 and its statutory 
application in practice (for example, the information and agents included).1102 In order 
to echo with the reforming act launched by the Law Commission, selected 
controversial issues are discussed in the second half of this chapter.  
                                               
1098
 Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/contents/enacted, accessed in August 
2013. However, FCA and PRA are obliged to follow the duty of good corporate governance (section 
3c, Chapter 3, Part 1A, Part 2 of the Financial Services Act 2012), functioning  as appropriate 
regulators.    
1099
 Available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/ICOBS, accessed in August 2013. 
1100
 Available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Information/Codes_and_Guidance_Notes/General_Insurance_ 
Codes_and_Guidance_Notes.aspx, accessed in January 2013. 
1101
 The European Parliament and the Council of European Union, Directive 2002/92/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance mediation, (15/01/2003 P. 
0003 – 0010, Official Journal L 009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=CELEX:32002L0092:EN:HTML, accessed in January 2013. 
1102
 Please notice that in the recently enacted Consumer Insurance (Dispute and Representations) Act 
2012, the consumer assured’s duty of disclosure is abolished.  
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7.2. For whom is the broker acting: the insurer or assured? 
An insurance agent may be employed either by the insurer to effect an insurance, 
or the assured to subscribe to the insurance policy.1103 For whom the intermediary is 
acting at the time of effecting insurance, therefore, is crucial for deciding which party 
shall bear the liability for the broker’s negligence or fraud when it is revealed.1104 
If the broker is acting for the insurer to sell insurance policies, and the insurance is 
spoiled because of the broker’s fault in exercising utmost good faith at the 
contemplation of a contract, then in accordance with the general agency rules 
specifying that an intermediary’s actions and state of mind are imputed to the 
principal, the insurer is assumed to know any relevant information which has been 
known by the intermediary,1105 and the insurer would be responsible for their poor 
advice. 1106  Logically, if the broker is acting for the assured when placing the 
                                               
1103
 ‘Agent’ occasionally emerges together with another two confusing terms – broker and intermediary, 
and sometimes, ‘consultant’, ‘adviser’, ‘service’ emerges as popular descriptions as well. For a 
detailed discussion, see Right Honourable Lord Mance, et al., Insurance Disputes (3
rd
 ed., London: 
Informa, 2011), chapter 8. 
    In the Glossary of Terms and Main Texts list of the Consultation Paper 3, a broker is defined as ‘an 
individual or firm who arranges the sale or purchase of insurance’, an insurance intermediary is 
defined as ‘someone through whom insurance is brought or sold, usually a broker’, and the placing 
broker and producing are defined as ‘a broker who places insurance cover on behalf of its client with 
an underwriter’ and ‘a broker who introduces a proposal for insurance or reinsurance to its own 
broking firm or another broking firm’ respectively. See the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of 
Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3), p. xii. 
    In this thesis, in order to avoid confusion, based on the definitions adopted by the Law 
Commissions in the Joint Consultation Paper 3, this author intends to consider the agent, broker and 
intermediary as working on behalf of the assureds. 
1104
 The importance of a broker’s position in a three-party situation was observed in,the Law 
Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – Policy Statement: The Status of Intermediaries 
(For whom does an intermediary act in transmitting pre-contract information from consumer to 
insurer?); Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, chapter 7; Mance, et al., 
Insurance Disputes, chapter 8; the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint 
Consultation Paper, Insurance Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law 
of Warranties (CP 3).  
1105
 The Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – Policy Statement: The Status of 
Intermediaries (For whom does an intermediary act in transmitting pre-contract information from 
consumer to insurer?), pp. 4-5; Whitlam v Hazel [2004] EWCA Civ 160 (CA). 
1106
 In practice, in most consumer insurance cases, the intermediary is selling insurance on behalf of 
insurers. In such cases, the first priority ofthe assured is making a claim.Subsequently, if the claims 
are rejected by the insurer for the intermediary’s negligence or fraud, the assured can refer his 
complaint to the FOS. 
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insurance policy, then the assured is assumed to be responsible for their actions, for 
example, the broker’s misrepresentation and non-disclosure. It has been described 
by some leading academics to be a danger area to discuss the issue regarding the 
agent’s position in this type of triple-party situation1107 with an absence of clarification 
under the insurance policies. This ‘danger area’ has been analysed by the Law 
Commission in various reports, 1108  and currently, the Law Commissioners have 
decided to give up their initial proposal to introduce a bright line test to identify 
whether the intermediary in question is acting on behalf of the insurer or insured, and 
have put forward default rules.1109 In one report, the Law Commission lists three 
exceptional cases where the intermediary acts for the insurer. These are, (A) the 
intermediary has authority to bind the insurer to cover, (B) the intermediary is the 
appointed representative of the insurer, and (C) the intermediary has actual express 
authority from the insurer to collect pre-contract information on its behalf. 
Furthermore, they also stated other cases where it is implied that the intermediary is 
acting for the consumer.1110 
These principles, however, should be finally attributed to be implied by facts. In the 
light of the above rules discussed, it is principally established that the agent is the 
assured’s agent. This default rule is extracted not only from statutes1111 and case 
                                               
1107
 Mance, et al., Insurance Disputes, chapter 8.  
1108
 For example, the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, 
Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the Insured (CP 1); the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance Contract Law: 
The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3); and the Law 
Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – Policy Statement: The Status of Intermediaries 
(For whom does an intermediary act in transmitting pre-contract information from consumer to 
insurer?). 
1109
 The Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – Policy Statement: The Status of 
Intermediaries (For whom does an intermediary act in transmitting pre-contract information from 
consumer to insurer?), pp. 25-28. 
1110
 Ibid, pp. 25-28. 
1111
 For statutory examples, see section 19, MIA 1906. 
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law,1112 but also authorities, especially in the business insurance industry (such as 
marine insurance).1113 Keeping in mind that it is a default rule to impliedly treat an 
insurance broker, especially a business insurance broker, as acting on behalf of the 
assured, it is much easier to expound the analysis below concerning section 19, MIA 
1906 and its application in practice.        
 
7.3. Marine insurance broker: legal liability and section 19, Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 
The insurance broker’s duty of utmost good faith is principally regulated by section 
19, MIA 1906. The section which is entitled as ‘Disclosure by Agent effecting 
Insurance’ states:  
‘Subject to the provisions of the preceding section as to circumstances 
which need not be disclosed, where an insurance is effected for the assured 
by an agent, the agent must disclose to the insurer –  
(a). Every material circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to 
insure is deemed to know every circumstance which in the ordinary course 
of business ought to be known by, or to have been communicated to, him; 
and 
(b). Every material circumstance which the assured is bound to disclose, 
unless it come to his knowledge too late to communicate it to the agent.’1114 
 
Furthermore, section 20 of the MIA 1906, provides regulations regarding the 
agent’s duty of utmost good faith. Section 20(1) states that the assured or his agent 
is required to make honest representation at the contemplation of the insurance 
policy, otherwise the whole insurance contract is avoidable. In Blackburn Low & Co v 
                                               
1112
 For case-law examples; see Empress Ass Corp Ltd v CT Bowring & Co Ltd (1904) 11 Com Cas 
107; Rozanes v Bowen (1928) 32 L1 LR 98, 101; Anglo-African Merchants Ltd v Bayley [1970] 1 QB 
311; North & South Trust Co v Berkeley [1971] 1 WLR 470; McNealy v The Pennine Insurance Co Ltd 
[1978] 2 LLR 18 (CA); Roberts v Plaisted [1989] 2 LLR 341; Winter v Irish Life Assurance plc [1995] 2 
LLR 274, etc. 
1113
 For authorities in marine insurance law, see Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and 
Average, chapter 7, para. 7.06; Mance, et al., Insurance Disputes, chapter 8, para. 12.23; Rose, 
Marine Insurance: Law and Practice, para. 4.40.  
1114
 Section 19, MIA 1906.  
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Vigors,1115 it was firstly held that ‘neither the plaintiffs nor the agent through whom 
the policy was effected had any knowledge of the material fact the concealment or 
non-disclosure of which is relied on as vitiating the policy’. Later in Blackburn Low v 
Haslam, 1116  it was further stated that the policy was void on the ground of 
concealment of material facts by the agents of the assured.1117 It is believed that the 
early form of section 19, MIA 1906 is derived from these two fundamental judgments, 
especially the former one. In the view of this author, the wording of judicial decision 
in Blackburn Low v Haslam also contributes to the defects currently underlying 
section 19’s application, since included agents were limited to the ‘effecting agent’, 
which is addressed below. Based on the statutory codes and English case-law, the 
following concerns are worthy of investigation.  
 
7.3.1. Legal nature of the broker’s duties 
As stated earlier, the status of an insurance agent is flexible and may be changed 
during the process of insurance. For instance, at the claiming stage, on the one hand, 
the agent assists with his assured to make claims by providing professional advice, 
but afterwards, the agent should communicate information to the assessor or 
investigator from the insurer’s side to complete the claiming investigation, even 
though some of the information is confidential. There seems to be a conflict of 
interest1118 here since the insurance agent is at the time working for both his principal 
                                               
1115
 (1887) LR 12 App. Cas 531, (CA). 
1116
 (1888) LR 21, QBD 144. 
1117
 This case is then mentioned by Quinn Direct Insurance Ltd v Law Society of England and Wales 
[2010] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 655; Group Josi Re Co SA v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
345; PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 241; Holts Motors Ltd v South-East 
Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd (1930) 37 Ll. L. Rep. 1. 
1118
 According to the general principles of the law of agency, an agent should not allow himself to be in 
a position where there is a conflict of interest between the duty to his principal and himself, or the third 
party. For authority, see Rose, Marine Insurance: Law and Practice, chapter 4. 
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and the underwriter. 1119  Another notable example which can illustrate the subtle 
position of an insurance broker during the three-party situation, is the case of the 
Zephyr,1120 in which the brokers were in charge of both the direct insurance contracts 
(between the assured and primary insurers), and also the reinsurance contracts 
(between the primary insurers and reinsurers). Thus, in order to avoid the ‘danger 
area’, the leading market models in the UK choose to treat the agent as impliedly 
acting for an assured.1121 However, the general agency law also applies, especially 
in terms of the insurance agent’s duty of care owed to his employer in both 
employment law and tort law.  
Thus, one aspect is, that according to sections 19 and 20, MIA 1906, an insurance 
agent is required to make material representation and disclosure to the insurer at the 
contemplation of the insurance policy. Based on the statutory language of these two 
sections only, especially the leading section 19, it is revealed that little obligation is 
added compared with sections 17 and 18 under the same Act. For that reason, 
section 19 of MIA 1906 is only described as an extension of section 18, since no 
extra new obligations are created except for the extension of an assured’s duties of 
disclosure and honest representation to his agent. 
On the other side, in accordance with the general agency rules, a professional 
broker owes a duty of care to his assured in tort.1122 In other words, English case law 
denotes that the parallel standing of a professional agent leads them to owe tortious 
                                               
1119
 This is also the Lloyd’s Market usage. See Ibid. 
1120
 General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation and Others v Peter William Tanter and 
Others (The Zephyr) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 58; [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 529. 
1121
 The Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – Policy Statement: The Status of 
Intermediaries (For whom does an intermediary act in transmitting pre-contract information from 
consumer to insurer?). 
1122
 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher [1988] 1 LLR 19; Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd 
(Superhulls Cover Case) (No. 2) [1992] 1 LLR 7; Punjab National bank v De Boinville [1995] 2 AC 145, 
quoted by Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, note 37. 
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duties to his employer and the assured, as well as fulfilling the duty of care in the 
negotiation of an insurance policy. 
Last but not the least, the relationship between the assured and insurance broker 
is also embodied by the agency agreements. It is recommended to bind both parties 
through a written agreement, but the written agreement is not essential.1123 Of course, 
clarified clauses in terms of the broker’s duties shall be firstly invoked. Nevertheless, 
in an absence of such expressed clauses, sections 19 and 20 of MIA 1906 and other 
relevant rules shall apply, such as, FOS rules and some other self-regulations. For 
that reason, it happens in practice that the broker may be involved in both a 
contractual breach as well as tortuous liability. In the view of this author, the 
coexisting contractual and tortuous liabilities raise another issue concerning whether 
the intermediary should bear any legal liabilities for his fault, which is addressed 
below. 
 
7.3.2. Information included and exceptions 
After clarifying the insurance broker’s overwhelming position to act on behalf of the 
assured, the analysis of information needed to be disclosed and represented in terms 
of utmost good faith is supplemented on a sound basis below.  
According to section 19(a), MIA 1906, the agent is obliged to transmit material 
information he knows, or ought to know, in the ordinary course of business to the 
insurer before effecting insurance policies. The following factors are expounded. 
Firstly, based on the statute law, the extent to which information is obliged to be 
transmitted to the insurer at the contemplation of an insurance contract is analysed. 
Judging from the statutory language of sections 19 and 20, MIA 1906, the materiality 
                                               
1123
 There is no requirement to the formality of a contract in English case law. Therefore, the contract 
may be written, oral, or confirmed through contractual parties’ conducts. 
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test applies here as well. Therefore, as section 20(2) states, information which would 
influence the prudent insurer’s determination in fixing the premium or accepting the 
risk is material to be disclosed and represented to the insurer, for example, with 
regard to the navigation area and classification of an assured vessel. At English case 
law, a reasonable agent is required to know what information is material and 
immaterial.1124 Arnould exemplifies the circumstances which need to be passed on to 
the insurer by the agent when placing the insurance policies,1125 for instance, the 
time of sailing,1126 the principal’s previous insurances and losses which serve as the 
basis of the contract, 1127  the ownership of insured subject, 1128 and the material 
information in reinsurance.1129 
The second factor which is worthwhile to be addressed here is which type of 
information is material enough to be passed on to the insurer? The answer to this 
query is available from both primary legislation and English precedents. The statutory 
answer is in sections 19 and 20, MIA 1906, providing that the ‘prudent insurer’ test 
applies in the context of the insurance broker’s non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
during the negotiation of insurance policies.1130 Apart from the ‘prudent insurer’ test 
of materiality, the ‘actual inducement’ test was subsequently created by English 
case-law, 1131  which has been elaborated in previous parts regarding assured’s 
utmost good faith in performing his obligations. 1132  On the other hand, the 
                                               
1124
 Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, paras. 7-10. 
1125
 Ibid, chapter 7, notes 68 and 69. 
1126
 Seller v Work (1801) Marshall on Ins. 243, vol2, p.202; see Ibid, chapter 7, note 68. 
1127
 Rozanes v Bowen (1928) Vol.32 L1 LR, 98. 
1128
 Total Graphics Ltd v AGF Insurance Ltd [1997] 1 LLR 599. 
1129
 Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins [1999] LRIR 565. 
1130
 Especially section 20(2), MIA 1906, reads that: ‘[a] representation is material which would 
influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take 
the risk’. 
1131
 The same as the ‘actual inducement’ test of the assured’s utmost good faith. As to the insurance 
broker’s utmost good faith, the ‘actual inducement’ test was repeated by Cresswell J in his judgment 
of Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins [1999] LRIR 565. 
1132
 See chapters 2-5 above.  
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‘inducement’ test in insurance is confirmed to be an extension of the general 
common law rules concerning actionable misrepresentation in contract law.1133 
What information a broker ‘knows’ or ‘ought to know’ is the third factor which shall 
be elaborated to crystallize the exact scope of material circumstances included by 
such obligation.1134 The wording of section 19, MIA 1906, is apparently inadequate 
for its enforcement. Therefore, in addition to the events summarized from English 
case law, the Law Commissioners further supplemented its test based on a 
theoretical standing. 1135  In accordance with the Law Commission’s Consultation 
Paper, the terms ‘knows’ or ‘ought to know’ present a powerful condition that, 
regardless of the capacity of the insurance broker, any information that is received, 
or ought to be supplied to the broker in an ordinary course of business, must be 
disclosed or truly represented to the insurer before the making of insurance contracts. 
Failure of this indicates that the underwriter is awarded the right to avoid the whole 
insurance. To be more specific, even though it is the principal’s fault, if material 
information is hidden from both his agent and insurance company, the whole 
insurance is voidable.1136 This rule is also confirmed to apply to reinsurance events 
and renewals/amendments to insurance. 1137  In the end, the Law Commission 
proposed an interpretation of the current law to be that section 19, MIA 1906, only 
applies to information which is received or held by agents in their capacity for the 
particular policyholder, but not for the other clients served.1138 
                                               
1133
 MacIntyre, Essentials of Business Law, according to general common law, ‘inducement’ is one 
requirement to ‘actionable misrepresentation’.  
1134
 Section 19(a), MIA 1906. 
1135
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance 
Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3), pp. 93-95. 
1136
 EI Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc [1994] BCC 143, p. 156, per Hoffmann LJ; Societe Anonyme 
d’Intermediaries Luxembourgeois (SAIL) v Farex Gie [1994] CLC 1094, p. 1111, per Hoffmann LJ, see 
Ibid. 
1137
 Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, chapter 16. 
1138
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance 
Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3), p. 95. 
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It can be argued that it is difficult to prove whether or not the material information 
in question has been communicated to the broker by the assured, and it is unfair to 
rely on the broker’s utmost good faith breach since it is not always his fault. 
Nevertheless, this issue can be resolved quite promptly. The main reason is that, 
apart from the avoidance remedy awarded to the injured insurer, the MIA 1906 does 
not blame the insurance broker for his, or his principal’s, concealment or 
misrepresentation by entitling the assured any right to damages. Therefore, whether 
the intermediary bears any legal liabilities for his action is not certain immediately, as 
this would need to be established through tort of negligence. On the one hand, the 
lack of a damage remedy in the MIA 1906 closes the floodgates. The determination 
of the broker’s knowledge is included regardless of the capacity in which it was 
received, and this inevitably raises difficulties in the understanding of section 19(b), 
MIA 1906. At the claiming stage, since the final result of the assured and his agent’s 
post-contract good faith breach would be the same (an avoidance of the whole 
insurance contract), and the real story between the agent and the principal would be 
left to the general agency law to deal with, then there is no need to identify the 
defaulting party among the agent and principal at an early stage. 
Section 19(b), MIA 1906, further requires the insurance agent to disclose every 
material circumstance supplied by the principal, unless it is too late to be 
communicated. After a close observation, it is revealed not only by this author, but 
also by the Law Commissioners, that this term is superfluous.1139 Section 18 firstly 
obliges the assured to disclose and honestly represent material information in his 
possession to the underwriter at the contemplation of insurance policies. Sections 
19(a) and 20(2) subsequently extend such obligation beyond to the assured’s broker. 
                                               
1139
 Ibid. 
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As a result, the material information which is held by either the assured or the agent 
should be passed on to the insurer but this is not rebuttable by an untimely 
communication (since the principal is obliged to be liable for his agent’s conducts).     
Finally, the issue as to who are the agents to whom section 19 applies is also 
considered as a problematic one. Based on the ground of the legislative language of 
section 19(a), the broker effecting insurance for the assured must disclose material 
information he knows, or ought to know, in the ordinary course of business to the 
insurer. The reading of this term was firstly supported by the judiciary seated in PCW 
Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers.1140 According to Saville LJ’s judgment in this case, he 
agreed with Waller LJ’s conclusion from the reading of the words used in section 19, 
alleging that the agent included by this code only ‘encompasses those who actually 
deal with the insurers concerned and make the contract in question’. 1141 
Nevertheless, in the same case, Staughton LJ expressed his disagreement to this 
point by quoting authority that at times: 
‘[I]nstead of dealing direct with the underwriter, the agent employed to effect 
an insurance acts through an intermediate agent or agents, and in such 
cases the concealment of a material fact within the knowledge of any agent 
through whose agency, whether mediately or directly, the insurance has 
been effected, vitiates the policy.’1142 
 
Judging from the above insurance practice, one might have the view that there is 
no need to confine the application of section 19 to agent ‘agent to insure’, but rather 
one could include all agents.  
In the view of this author, the main reasoning arises partially from the boundary of 
the broker’s knowledge required to be transmitted to the underwriter. As discussed 
earlier, as long as either the broker or the assured processes material information, 
                                               
1140
 [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 241. 
1141
 PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 241, per Saville LJ, and 1148 D,E, 
Rose LJ. 
1142
 Ibid, p. 257, per Staughton LJ. 
300 
 
and regardless whether it has been communicated successfully to the broker or not, 
the insurance contract can be avoided for the broker’s failure of disclosure or 
dishonest representation to the underwriter. The law of tort will then be used to figure 
out if the broker is in a breach.1143 The same logic can apply here, by stating that as 
long as the material information is held by the assured’s side, if any non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation is revealed, the insurance can be voided because of the assured’s 
or his broker’s breach of utmost good faith. Subsequently, the assured can reclaim 
any damages from the defaulting broker in tort law or contract law. However, if the 
assured himself is at fault, he will have no remedy. Although these circumstances 
described above are founded on a theoretical basis, they are fully supported by 
English case law,1144 law reformers1145 and some leading academics.1146 
Some exceptions from the preceding section 18, MIA 1906, are expressly 
extended beyond the broker’s utmost good faith duty.1147 For this reason, it can be 
confirmed that an insurance broker is exempted from disclosing the risk diminution 
and waiver by the insurer.1148 
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 For example, Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145. In this fundamental House of 
Lords case, it was established that ‘the duty of exercising reasonable skill and care exists where a 
person undertakes to perform professional or quasi professional services for another… [and] the 
undertaking of such duties, together with a reliance on them is sufficient to give rise to a duty of care 
in tort, unless this is precluded by contractual agreement between the parties’. It was further cited by 
Fashion Brokers Ltd v Clarke Hayes [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 398; and followed by Titan Steel Wheels 
Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 92. 
1144
 For instance, in GMA v Unistorebrand International Insurance [1995] LRLR 333, it was held that 
section 19 applies to an intermediate agent as well. In Baker v Lombard Continental Insurance Plc 
(unreported) 24 January 1997, Coleman J believed that the majority of the Court of Appeal in Group 
Josi Re v Walbrook Ins Co Ltd [1996] 1 LR 345 had held that section 19 required an intermediate 
agent to be included in such situation, cited by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of 
Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3), p. 93. 
1145
 Ibid, p. 93. 
1146
 For example, Gilman, et al., Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, chapter 7; Earl of 
Halsbury, et al., Halsbury's Laws of England (1
st
 ed., Butterworths,1911), vol. 17, p. 407, para. 796, 
cited by Staughton LJ in PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers [1996] 1 WLR. 
1147
 Section 19, MIA 1906, ‘Subject to the provisions of the preceding section as to circumstances 
which need not be disclosed, where an insurance is effected for the assured by an agent, the agent 
must disclose to the insurer  - …’ 
1148
 Section18(3), MIA 1906, stipulates that: 
‘In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, namely: -  
301 
 
7.4. Legal consequence of broker’s utmost good faith breach: should the 
intermediary bear any legal liabilities for his fault? 
After a close examination of sections 17-20 of the MIA 1906, it can be said that the 
insurance is also avoidable if the assured’s broker fails to perform his duty of utmost 
good faith. Some authorities from the insurance industry suggested that in addition to 
the avoidance remedy available for the insurer, a right to damages against his broker 
should also be provided to the assured to indemnify his loss caused by the broker’s 
fault.1149 The Law Commissioners declined this suggestion and gave up proceeding 
with the reform on this topic.1150 The decision is understandable, as, in the first place, 
the avoidance remedy in such circumstance is awarded not because of the broker’s 
negligent or intentional concealment/misrepresentation, but the assured’s 
concealment of material information or inappropriate instructions to his broker. 
Accordingly, it is unfair to blame the broker and force him to bear liabilities for his 
employer’s utmost good faith breach. Avoiding this problematical issue under 
insurance legislation makes the whole system concise without being tame and 
unambiguous. 
In the next instance, refraining from touching ambiguous damages for the assured 
in cases where the insurer defends successfully on the broker’s utmost good faith, 
does not mean that the draftsman is encouraged to ignore this issue, but to leave it 
to the general agency law with a broader application scope. Up to now, it is explicit to 
                                                                                                                                                  
(a) Any circumstance which diminishes the risk; 
(b) Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The insurer 
is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, and matters which an 
insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, ought to know; 
(c) Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer; 
(d) Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any express or 
implied warranty.’ 
1149
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance 
Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3), p. 97.  
1150
 This is also the initial plan presented by the Law Commissions after observing responses from 
insurance professionals; see Ibid. 
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point out that principally, an agent owes his principal a duty to exercise reasonable 
care and skill in fulfilling his duties,1151 and any loss caused because of the broker’s 
fault can be recovered from the broker according to the law of tort or even through 
other mechanisms.1152 Indeed, the reality that there is also a contractual relationship 
between the assured and his broker, which is protected by contract law, also 
supplies another possible contractual damage to the innocent assured. The dual-
insurance provided by the current law is sufficient to guarantee the assured’s 
interests under an employment contract, and similar legislation in MIA 1906 thereby 
becomes unhelpful and confusing. 
As a result of the two main reasons stated above, the law reformers recently gave 
up proceeding with any future amendments regarding the right of the assured to 
claim damages against the broker at fault, based on sections 17-20, MIA 1906, 
deciding it was currently sufficient to leave it to the present general rules.1153 
 
7.5. Reform proposal from the Law Commission– a new statutory code 
Keeping all concerns addressed earlier in mind, the Law Commission made 
proposals in several papers to proceed with reforms concerning the broker’s utmost 
good faith. 
The history of reform in the Law Commission can be dated back to March 2007, 
and the release of its Issues Papers 3 regarding Intermediaries and Pre-contract 
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  For example, Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145; HIH Casualty and General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] LR IR 230, etc. 
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 For example, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Financial Services Act 2012, the 
FCA Handbook – Insurance Conduct of Business sourcebook; the rules apply in the Financial 
Ombudsman Service, the Associations of British Insurers rules, and the Insurance Mediation Directive 
at the EU level. 
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 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, A Joint Consultation Paper, Insurance 
Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3). 
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Information.1154 In this report, the Law Commissioners put forward their reforming 
suggestions in an early form, including the preservation of section 19, MIA 1906, in 
consumer business and, subsequently, the Law Commissioners raised enquiries 
regarding an extended duty under section 19, MIA 1906.1155 Two years later, the Law 
Commission issued another document in terms of the legal position of intermediaries 
and the transmission of pre-contract information to the insurer. 1156 The second 
landmark that needs to be mentioned here is the Joint Consultation Papers (CP 1 
and CP 2) delivered by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 
relating to both pre-contract information1157 and post contract duties.1158 However, all 
the original recommendations for a statutory reform regarding the role of the agent in 
these papers are finally affirmed by the current Consultation Paper.1159 
According to the Law Commission’s recently launched Consultation Paper (CP 
3),1160 the consultees are invited to reply to the planned proposals. These include, 
whether there is a need to clarify the scope and nature of section 19(a) of the MIA 
1906; whether there is a need to clarify that the amended section 19(a) should apply 
to all agents and confine the scope of information possessed by that agent in its 
                                               
1154
 The Law Commission, Issues Paper 3, Intermediaries and Pre-contract Information. 
1155
 Ibid, pp. 51-52. 
    In accordance with this Issues Paper 3, the Law Commissioners asked ‘whether there are reasons 
to preserve an extended duty under section 19(a):  
‘(1) Should the remedy lie in damages against the intermediary, rather than in avoidance 
against the insured? 
(2) Should any information given in confidence by a third party be excepted from the scope 
of the duty? 
(3) Should the duty be curtailed to information received in the course of the relevant 
transaction?’  
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 The Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – Policy Statement: The Status of 
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Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (CP 3). 
1160
 Ibid. 
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capacity as agent for that policyholder, even though the information is avoided 
intentionally by the broker; whether the insurer should be awarded with any damage 
against the assured on his misrepresentations if the broker fails to disclose material 
information; and finally, whether section 19(b) should be retained.1161 This evidence 
suggests that the Law Commissioners are proposing a new statutory code in 
business insurance. 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
Judging from the conflicts between the current law and its application in practice, 
in terms of the insurance broker’s duties, it has been proved that a new statutory 
code is the only resort to have them resolved. At present, with new methods 
introduced to selling insurance, such as the increasingly popular price comparison 
websites, and a significant reduction in the number of traditional small consumer 
insurance intermediaries providing advice, traditional intermediaries are not in an 
unshakable position anymore. Nevertheless, the current law needs to be injected 
with more flexibility to deal with rapid change and unpredictability, which are 
promoted by new technologies and changing commercial relationships.1162 
In relation to business insurance, the MIA 1906 is functioning appropriately with 
the coverage of general law.1163 However, some legislative pitfalls still need further 
clarification to make the current insurance legislation more concise. The Law 
Commission’s proposal is based on the responses received from the consultees, 
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 Ibid. The author’s opinions about the above proposed reform have been expressed in § 7.3.2 
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judiciary, and leading academics, therefore, the proposal is reliable because of its 
sound basis. However, whether the Proposal Bill will be presented to the Parliament 
successfully and obtain approval in the end is still a matter of conjecture. 
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CHAPTER 8 
INSURANCE AGENCIES AND GOOD FAITH IN CHINESE LAW 
 
8.1. General Remarks 
Currently in China, there is no principal article revealed from CMC, regulating a 
marine insurance agent or broker’s good faith during the transaction and currency of 
insurance. Relevant provisions are indeed available from general insurance law and 
civil or tort law codes in China, yet, only limited and general resources are 
found. 1164 Meanwhile, another resort which could be invoked to scrutinize the 
insurance market in China is provided by the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, functioning as a governmental regulator of insurance practice. 1165 
Therefore, the current status of legislation governing insurance agencies in China is 
similar to that in English law, since the statutory legislation and practical rules coexist 
to secure the commercial transaction order in both countries.   
 
8.2. Insurance agent and good faith 
In China, intermediaries are becoming more and more popular in the insurance 
market, particularly for average individual consumers. For business insurance, 
especially marine insurance, the majority of big insurance companies prefer 
delegating professional agents who are acting on behalf of the insurers themselves 
                                               
1164
CIL 2009, the General Principles of Civil Law, and Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Chinese Tort Law). 
1165
 For more details about the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, see information available at 
http://www.circ.gov.cn, accessed in January 2013. 
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to transact insurance business. Under these circumstances, the insurance agents 
are employed by the insurers and collect handling fees therefrom.1166 In order to 
facilitate the research underlying chapter 7 and current trading practice, 1167  this 
chapter is focused on the agent effecting insurance on behalf of the assured, which 
is defined as, ‘an entity which, based on the interests of the applicant, provides 
intermediary services between the applicant and the insurer so that they enter into an 
insurance contract and receive a commission in accordance with laws’. 1168  Its 
definition is further extended to the professional insurance agencies and 
branches.1169 
Although the CMC is silent on the agent’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure, it is 
covered in the CIL 2009. As stated by article 131 of CIL 2009, during the insurance 
transactions, the insurance broker, agent and any other personnel must not deceive 
the assured or beneficiary, 1170 conceal any material information affecting the 
insurance,1171 prevent or induce the assured from performing the duty of disclosure 
as regulated by this law, 1172  forge or amend an insurance contract without the 
permission of the other parties, provide fraudulent evidence for the insurance 
parties, 1173 or disclose the assured’s confidential information. 1174 In the general 
Chinese Contract Law and General Principles of Civil Law, in addition to the principal 
                                               
1166
 For a detailed definition of ‘insurance agent’, see article 117, CIL 2009. With respect to the 
insurance agent acting for the insurance company, both general legislation and the Chinese Insurance 
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th
 September 2009, and became 
effective on 1
st
 October 2012. 
1167
 See § 7.2 and attached notes above. 
1168
 Article 118, CIL 2009. 
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1174
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articles of the general good faith requirement, no such provisions for insurance 
agents are revealed.1175 
A similar principal article is also provided by the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission’s Regulations on Supervision of Professional Insurance Agencies 
(Regulations). According to article 3 of the Regulations, the professional insurance 
agencies are required to act in good faith and fairness. The examples of prohibitive 
behaviours, including the insurance broker’s non-disclosure and fraud of insurance 
contained in article 131, CIL 2009, are also adopted by articles 46 and 47 of the 
Regulations. However, as with English law, the above analysis indicates that the 
mechanism ruling insurance agencies is confusing and difficult to be invoked.  
Besides the inadequate legislation particular to the insurance agent’s duty of good 
faith, another legislative defect revealed is the uncertainty about the scope of 
information needed to be disclosed by an agent. Nevertheless, further clarification 
can refer to the scope adopted by the MIA 1906, since marine insurance is a global 
business governed by international conventions, international trading custom and 
practice.1176 
 
8.3. Consequences of noncompliance and extra damages 
Currently, remedies relating to the insurance agent’s noncompliance with good 
faith in Chinese law are observed to be concentrated on civil liabilities, administration 
and criminal sanctions. 
According to article 128, CIL 2009, if the assured or applicant suffers any loss 
caused by the insurance agent’s fault, the defaulting agent shall be liable for 
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damages or losses caused. Unfortunately, the exact extent of the damages entitled is 
still ambiguous. In particularly, it is not clarified whether any extra retrospective 
avoidance or prospective forfeiture of claims is available. After consultations with 
some practitioners1177 from the China shipping market, it is found that in current 
practice, the only way to deal with the agent’s non-disclosure is by terminating the 
insurance contract, which can be done on the basis of articles 222 and 223 of CMC. 
Therefore, the insurer has the right to terminate the insurance contract upon the 
assured, or his agent’s intentional non-disclosure of material circumstances without 
refunding the premium. At the same time, the insurer shall not be liable for any loss 
arising from the perils insured against before the contract is terminated. Accordingly, 
the insurer has the right to terminate the contract or to demand a corresponding 
higher premium upon the assured or his agent’s unintentional non-disclosure of 
material circumstances. If, the insurance contract is terminated by the insurer, the 
insurer is still liable for the loss arising from the perils insured against which occurred 
prior to the termination of the contract, except where the material circumstances 
concealed have an impact on the occurrence of such perils. It can be said that, 
acting on behalf of the assured, the insurance agent’s material non-disclosure has 
the same legal effect on the insurance contract as the assured’s good faith breach, 
both intentional and unintentional.1178 
On the basis of the above discussion, regardless of the assured’s contribution to 
his agent’s good faith breach, the insurance contract could be avoided, both 
retrospectively and prospectively. This results in the focus being diverted to 
distinguish the innocent assured cases from the deliberate assured cases, in order to 
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 Personal discussions with one broker, one lawyer, and one manager of the insurance department 
of the Sinotrans Ship Management Ltd – Hong Kong on 15
th
 October 2012. 
1178
 In English law, instead of intentional and unintentional misconducts, the deliberate/reckless and 
careless misconducts are distinguished to indicate the main categories of the assured’s 
misrepresentations. See section 5, Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012.  
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comprehend the way in which the insurance agent’s good faith is regulated. First of 
all, in addition to the civil liability underlying article 128 of CIL 2009, article 166 in the 
same law further stipulates the consequence of the insurance agent’s good faith 
breach which is listed in article 131. As this article provides, severe violations of 
article 131 would cause administrative and criminal sanctions, including rectification 
upon the insurance regulatory department’s discretion and a fine between RMB 
50,000 and RMB 300,000. Where the violations are severe, the wrongdoer’s licence 
shall be withdrawn.1179 Additional manners are provided by Chinese Tort Law and 
the regulations enacted by the Chinese insurance regulator, the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission. Therefore, if the assured has no contribution to the agent’s 
good faith breach, tortious damages could be claimed according to articles 6, 7 and 
15, Chinese Tort Law.1180 At the same time, the innocent assured is also entitled to 
report to the regulatory department to issue administrative sanctions for the assured. 
As article 71 of the Regulations on Supervision of Professional Insurance Broker 
Institutions provides, if the insurance agencies violate the duty of good faith 
underlying article 46 of the same Regulations (including the duty of disclosure and to 
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 Article 166, CIL 2009. In the same law, articles 178, 179, 181 stipulate more sanctions for severe 
violations, which are limited to the administrative and criminal level.  
1180
 Article 6, Chinese Tort Law, notes that: 
‘If an actor, through his/her/its own fault, infringes upon the civil rights or interests of 
another, he/she/it shall bear tort liability. If, pursuant to the law, an actor is presumed to be 
at fault and he/she/it is unable to show that he/she/it was not at fault, he/she/it shall bear 
tort liability.’ 
    Article 7, Chinese Tort Law, provides that: 
‘If an actor prejudices the civil rights or interests of another and laws provide that he/she/it 
is required to bear tort liability, such provisions shall apply regardless of whether or not 
he/she/it was at fault.’ 
    Article 15, Chinese Tort Law, stipulates that: 
‘The principal means of bearing tort liability are set forth below: 
(1) cessation of the tort； 
(2) elimination of the obstruction;  
(3) eradication of the danger;  
(4) return of the property;  
(5) restoration to the original state;  
(6) indemnification of the loss;  
(7) apologising; and/or  
(8) elimination of the effect and restoration of reputation.  
The aforementioned means of bearing tort liability may be applied singly or in combination.’ 
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provide honest evidence), the China Insurance Regulatory Commission could issue a 
warning; if there are no illegal gains obtained, a fine shall be imposed of no more 
than RMB 10,000; if there are any illegal gains obtained, a fine shall be imposed of 
no more than three times of the illegal gains; additionally, a warning note and a fine 
of no more than RMB 10,000 would be imposed on the directors and other relevant 
people who are liable.  
Under the second circumstance, if the assured himself contributes to the agent’s 
good faith breach, the former party shall bear the joint liability with the latter. As 
article 66(1) of the General Principles of the PRC provides, if the principal is aware 
that a civil act is being executed in his name but fails to repudiate it, his consent shall 
be deemed to have been given, which cause a joint liability to be undertaken. Similar, 
joint liability articles are also available in Chinese Tort Law, for example, articles 8 
and 26 regarding joint tortious liabilities.1181 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
After a comprehensive examination of the current Chinese law, it can be 
concluded that there is a definite shortage of clear legislation regarding the insurance 
agent’s good faith and the legal effect of its noncompliance (particularly in terms of 
the civil liability caused), which can be deemed as a vital defect in terms of a civil law 
country. In practice, with the absence of a statutory remedy available, articles 222 
and 223 of CMC, are extended, with additional remedies provided by general codes 
(including CIL 2009, Chinese Contract Law, General Principles of Civil Law and 
                                               
1181
 Article 8, Chinese Tort Law, stipulates that ‘[i]f two or more persons jointly commit a tortious act, 
thereby causing injury to another, they shall bear joint and several liability’. In article 26, Chinese Tort 
Law, it is provided that ‘[i]f the injured person was also at fault in the occurrence of the injury, the 
liability of the wrongdoer may be reduced’. 
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Chinese Tort Law) and regulations (such as Regulations on Supervision of 
Professional Insurance Broker Institutions). If the assured himself is innocent and 
has made no contribution to the good faith breach, then he is allowed to claim 
compensation from the defaulting agent on the basis of articles 128, 131 and 166, 
CIL 2009, and also relevant articles in the General Principles of Civil Law and 
Chinese Tort Law. Additionally, the injured assured could have the circumstances 
dealt with by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission.1182 If both the assured 
and his agent have committed misconducts which could be considered as a good 
faith breach, they shall bear joint liabilities mainly based on Chinese Tort Law. 
Nevertheless, its enforcement in practice in China is really inadequate, since it is 
hard to prove whether there is a direct causal link between the agent’s good faith 
breach and the termination of contract, or the innocent assured’s sufferings.1183 
                                               
1182
 Articles 3, 46, 82, Regulations on Supervision of Professional Insurance Broker Institutions. 
1183
 Personal discussions with practitioners in shipping industry, on 15
th
 October 2012. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Comprehensive Overview 
The operation of the doctrine of utmost good faith, in both English and Chinese 
law, is fundamentally inefficient. This thesis addressed the fact that at English law, 
sections 17-20 of the MIA 1906 function as an overarching resource of utmost good 
faith for both marine and non-marine insurance. This includes its nature of reciprocity, 
its material requirements (the prudent insurer actual inducement test), and the 
avoidance ab initio remedy for its noncompliance, regardless of the assured’s degree 
of fault (which applies to deliberate/reckless and careless/negligent misconducts).1184 
Despite the fact that the duty of utmost good faith is essentially only applied to the 
assured, the behaviour of the insurer and the insurance agent (acting on behalf of 
the assured) is scrutinized, and noncompliance with the duty of utmost good faith 
may give rise to legal effects accordingly. 1185  Judging from the reforming 
achievements obtained by the Law Commissions in consumer insurance, it is found 
that the law of pre-contract information has been improved by abolishing the 
consumer assured’s voluntary duty of disclosure, strengthening the duty of honest 
representation, adopting a ‘reasonable assured’ test instead of the traditional 
‘reasonable insurer’ test, and, by introducing a proportionate remedy for innocent 
misrepresentations.1186 The success achieved in consumer insurance could be a 
lesson to the coming statutory reform in business insurance, which includes marine 
insurance. It has been identified that the continuing duty of utmost good faith may be 
extended to various post-contract events (including post-contract disclosure and 
                                               
1184
 See chapters 1 and 2. 
1185
 See chapters 1, 2 and 7. 
1186
 See chapter 3.  
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good faith at the claiming stage). Despite the controversial issues regarding its legal 
basis and elusive degrees of good faith, the insurance parties are required to act with 
utmost good faith or average good faith at various stages, and accordingly, the 
difficulties in dealing with the remedy issue.1187 
In Chinese law, although there is an absence of the term utmost good faith, good 
faith is provided by leading codes and practicality, meaning that extreme good faith is 
required. Distinguished from the doctrine of utmost good faith at English law, the pre-
contract mechanism in the Chinese marine insurance legal system is confined to a 
voluntary duty of disclosure. In order to protect the innocent assured, Chinese law 
distinguishes intentional misconduct from innocent misconduct and provides different 
remedies accordingly (a retrospective termination of insurance contract for intentional 
misconducts and a prospective termination insurance contract for innocent 
misconducts). Additionally, a materiality test (a prudent insurer decisive actual 
inducement test) is established to judge whether the defaulting party’s good faith 
breach is material or not.1188 At the claiming stage, Chinese law prefers providing a 
prospective forfeiture of fraudulent claims, rather than avoidance ab initio. 1189 
Subsequently, good faith applies to the insurer and insurance agent during the three-
party situations since it is a mutual obligation in insurance.1190 With legislative defects 
being revealed in Chinese law, leading authorities intend to replicate the utmost good 
faith doctrine from English law to Chinese marine insurance legislation, by adopting 
section 17 of the MIA 1906 as a principal article in the statutory reform.1191 
 
                                               
1187
 See chapter 5. 
1188
 See § 4.3.4. 
1189
 See § 6.5.6. 
1190
 See chapters 4 and 8. 
1191
 This is criticised below under the heading, ‘Should the English duty of Utmost Good Faith be 
adopted by Chinese marine insurance law at once or incrementally?’ 
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Comparisons and recommendations for marine insurance 
(1). Pre-contract stage 
A. Nature of the duty of disclosure and not to misrepresent 
In English law, it is required that the duty of utmost good faith is observed with full 
honesty by both parties during insurance transactions.1192 As one principle derived 
from the doctrine of utmost good faith, it is demanded that the duty of disclosure 
achieves the same standard imposed on the duty of utmost good faith, namely, the 
highly strict ‘utmost’ standard. Therefore, based on section 18 of MIA 1906 and 
subject to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, all 
the material information needs to be fully disclosed to the insurer by the insured, 
otherwise, the injured insurer could invoke the applicable remedies.1193 Therefore, 
this duty requires the insured to disclose all the material circumstances to the insurer 
voluntarily.1194 Before the enactment of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012, the MIA 1906 applied equally to both marine and non-
marine areas. Therefore, it can be concluded that even in general insurance law, it is 
required that the duty of disclosure is achieved unlimitedly. However, the situation 
has changed dramatically following the new Act, which governs consumer 
insurance.1195 According to the latest statutory reform, the traditional voluntary duty 
                                               
1192
 Section 17, MIA 1906. 
1193
 Sections 17-19, MIA 1906. 
1194
 The commonly cited definition of utmost good faith is ‘a positive duty to voluntarily disclose, 
accurately and fully, all facts material to the risk being proposed, whether asked for them or not’, cited 
by Rob Thoyts, Insurance Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 33; Zhen, ‘Insured’s 
duty of disclosure and test of materiality in marine and non-marine insurance laws in China’, in JBL, 
pp. 681-704. 
Section 18(3) of MIA 1906 also lists some exceptions where the insured is not required to disclose 
all information in the absence of inquiry, including the diminishing of the risks, the knowledge which is 
known or presumed to be known to the insurer, any circumstances waived by the insurer, and 
information covered by warranties. 
1195
 For detailed alterations, see chapter 3. 
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of disclosure is going to be abolished in consumer insurance and replaced by the 
duty not to misrepresent, based on inquiries.1196 
In Chinese law, the assured’s duty of disclosure is specialized in marine insurance, 
and is distinguished from general insurance. As stated in chapter 4, based on article 
222 of CMC, the duty of disclosure is also voluntary and unlimited in marine 
insurance. However, in general insurance, this duty is inquiries-based, which echoes 
the nature of the average consumer assured’s duty not to misrepresent in the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 in English law.1197 
 
B. The insurer’s duty of lawful operation and explanation 
In English law, apart from the implied warranty of legality imposed on the 
assured,1198 no statutory obligation of the insurance company’s lawful operation is 
revealed in the MIA 1906 and English case law. However, self-regulation provides 
other resorts for this issue at the practical level,1199 which are not preferred by the 
judiciary. The insurer’s duty of explanation is not required by MIA 1906 for insurance, 
which is supported by some leading academics.1200 However, self-regulations such 
as the ICOBS of the FCA Handbook, requires the insurer to explain the duty of 
                                               
1196
 Section 2, Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. For business 
insurance, see section 20, MIA 1906. 
1197
 See § 4.2.3 for details. Also see Zhen, ‘Insured’s duty of disclosure and test of materiality in 
marine and non-marine insurance laws in China’, in JBL, pp. 681-704. In Jing Zhen’s article, it is 
summarized that in Chinese practice, there is no chance for the average consumer to commit 
voluntary disclosure, and the only practical form of this duty is asking the applicant to fill in the 
proposal form honestly.  
1198
 Section 41, MIA 1906. 
1199
 For example, the original FSA Rules, FCA Handbook, FOS scheme, and ABI Code of Practice. 
1200
 For example, Eggers, et al., Good Faith and Insurance Contract, paras.12.34-8. See § 4.3.3.3 for 
details. 
    When it comes to the general contract law, if the exclusion clauses are not communicated to the 
offeree before the conclusion of a contract, then such clauses shall not be enforceable. However, 
there are four circumstances in which the exclusion clauses can be incorporated into the contract 
afterwards, one of which is incorporation through sufficient notice or reference. (In English law, based 
on old precedents, the exclusion clauses can be incorporated into a contract through signature, 
notice/reference, previous dealings and trade customs, see MacIntyre, Business Law). 
317 
 
disclosure to the customer.1201 In the view of this author, the insurer’s explanation 
duty should vary in different situations, but not function as a mandatory rule.1202 
In Chinese law, there is clear statutory legislation providing for the insurer’s duty of 
lawful operation and explanation of standard forms based on inquiries.1203 However, 
the model example of a clear explanation and the legal effect of its non-compliance 
are still uncertain in Chinese law. 1204  In order to deal with such issues, taking 
relevant general legislation into consideration,1205 the remedies available in Chinese 
law for the insurer’s failure of explanation include requesting the courts or arbitration 
institution to have the contract modified or rescinded if there is no compromise 
achieved in the end. Additionally, if the contract is avoided, the paid premium is 
returnable. Also, if it is proved that the assured has suffered loss because of the 
insurer’s breach of this duty, then he can claim damages.1206 
 
C. Test of material circumstances 
In English law, as early case law established, both parties are required to disclose 
and represent material circumstances which would influence the prudent insurer’s 
decision and have actually induced the conclusion of an insurance contract, 
otherwise, the insurance contract may be avoided ab initio.1207 The above operation 
                                               
1201
 According to para. 5.1.4G of the ICOBS, a firm should bear in mind the restriction on rejecting 
claims for non-disclosure (ICOBS 8.1.1R (3)). Ways of ensuring a customer knows what he must 
disclose include, (1) explaining the duty to disclose all circumstances material to a policy, what needs 
to be disclosed, and the consequences of any failure to make such a disclosure, or (2) ensuring that 
the customer is asked clear questions about any matter material to the insurance undertaking. 
1202
 See § 4.3.3.3. 
1203
 For the insurer’s duty of lawful operation, see articles 4, 5, 6, 9 of CIL 2009 for example. For the 
insurer’s duty of explanation, see article 17 of CIL 2009 and article 39 of Chinese Contract Law. See § 
4.3 for details. Also see § 4.3.6.1.1for legal effects of the insurer’s noncompliance with the duty of 
lawful operation, especially regarding its administrative liabilities.  
1204
 See § 4.3.6.1.3. 
1205
 Article 17, CIL 2009 and articles 54 and 58 of Chinese Contract Law. 
1206
 Article 58, Chinese Contract Law. See § 4.3.6.1.3. 
1207
 See chapters 1and 2. A similar test is adopted by § 3-1, Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan 1996, 
version 2010. The full text is available at http://www.norwegianplan.no/eng/index.htm, accessed in 
January 2013. As paragraph 1, § 3-1 provides, ‘[t]he person effecting the insurance shall, at the time 
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was confirmed to be functioning in both business and consumer insurance. However, 
after the approval of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012, selected influential changes are made to abolish the average consumer 
assured’s voluntary duty of disclosure and to replace the classic prudent insurer test 
with a reasonable assured test, 1208  which may constitute lessons to business 
insurance. Therefore, according to the current legislation, marine insurance (both 
consumer and business insurance) is still governed by MIA 1906. However, after the 
full enforcement of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012, consumer marine insurance will be governed by the new Act, while the MIA 
1906 will continue to direct business marine insurance. 
The prudent insurer test is continued in Chinese marine insurance law, coexisting 
with the actual inducement test and decisive test.1209 This author has addressed 
concerns in terms of the necessity of a decisive test under these circumstances.1210 
 
D. Extent of actual knowledge needs to be disclosed 
In English law, case examples of physical and moral hazard indicate the extent of 
actual knowledge needed to be disclosed to the insurer.1211 
On the contrary, without further limitations and adjustments provided by 
subsequent cases, Chinese law is uncertain as to the boundary of the assured’s 
actual knowledge. In the view of this author, since marine insurance is a globalized 
industry and the classic maritime legislation in China is founded on a set of 
                                                                                                                                                  
the contract is concluded, make full and correct disclosure of all circumstances that are material to the 
insurer when deciding whether and on what conditions he is prepared to accept the insurance’.  
1208
 See chapter 3 above. 
1209
 See § 4.3.4.  
1210
 See § 4.3.4.3. 
1211
 See § 1.3.4 for detailed case examples. 
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international trade customs and practices, practical examples from the English legal 
system can become lessons for future Chinese legislation.  
 
E. Limits on disclosure 
The duty of material circumstances disclosure in both the English and Chinese 
legal systems is not endless. According to UK legislation, MIA 1906 lists out 
exceptions which do not need to be disclosed.1212 In Chinese law, the only exception 
expressed is that the insurer has known of or ought to have knowledge of in his 
ordinary business practice if the insurer made no inquiry,1213 which is contained as 
one of the exceptions listed in MIA 1906, which is totally inadequate in practice.1214 In 
the view of this author, the exceptional cases in English law can be extended to 
Chinese legislation since they are codified after a detailed observation of 
authoritative case reports.    
 
F. Remedies available for pre-contract good faith breach 
With regard to English marine insurance law, the ‘all or nothing remedy’ is the only 
statutory provision available for the utmost good faith breach, which is mainly made 
available to the injured insurer in practice.1215 The crucial pitfall of the avoidance ab 
                                               
1212
 Section 18(3), MIA 1906. See § 1.3.5 for detailed exceptions of the duty of disclosure in English 
law. 
1213
 Article 222, CMC. 
1214
 See § 4.3.5. 
1215
 See chapters 1 and 2 above. A similar manner is adopted by the Norwegian Marine Insurance 
Plan 1996, version 2010, § 3-2 - § 3-4, by entitling the right to cancel the insurance contract to the 
insurer, both fraudulent and innocent non-disclosure, with notice given.  
    Chapter 3 defined the following as: 
‘§ 3-2. Fraudulent misrepresentation 
    If the person effecting the insurance has fraudulently failed to fulfill his duty of disclosure, 
the contract is not binding on the insurer. 
    The insurer may also cancel other insurance contracts he has with the person effecting 
the insurance by giving fourteen days’ notice. 
§ 3-3.  Other failure to fulfil of the duty of disclosure 
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initio remedy is that it can be invoked by the injured party in consequence of the 
defaulting party’s trivial and vital non-disclosure and misrepresentation, which is not 
appropriate. Therefore, the Law Commissioners proposed to introduce a 
proportionate remedy to protect innocent assureds. 1216  The current achievement 
regarding this issue is embodied by the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012, which provides that a proportionate remedy is available 
for careless/negligent misrepresentation,1217  instead of the classic ‘all or nothing’ 
remedy.1218 However, some leading academics intend to maintain the restrictions in 
business marine insurance since it is claimed that the adoption of a proportionate 
remedy may encourage the assured’s negligence since no penalties would be made 
available.1219 
In Chinese law, despite the use of different terms to describe the clarifications of 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation, misconducts with honesty are distinguished 
from those with fraud, namely, intentional and unintentional misconducts. 1220 
Accordingly, on the basis of CMC, remedies available for the assured’s non-
                                                                                                                                                  
    If the person effecting the insurance has, at the time the contract is concluded, in any 
other way failed to fulfil his duty of disclosure, and it must be assumed that the insurer 
would not have accepted the insurance if the person effecting the insurance had made 
such disclosure as it was his duty to make, the contract is not binding on the insurer. 
    If it must be assumed that the insurer would have accepted the insurance, but on other 
conditions, he shall only be liable to the extent that it is proved that the loss is not 
attributable to such circumstances as the person effecting the insurance should have 
disclosed. Liability is limited in the same manner if the person effecting the insurance has 
been in breach of the duty of disclosure after the contract was concluded, unless it is 
proved that the loss occurred before the person effecting the insurance was able to correct 
the information supplied by him. 
    In the cases referred to in paragraph 2, the insurer may cancel the insurance by giving 
fourteen days’ notice. 
§ 3-4. Innocent breach of the duty of disclosure 
    If the person effecting the insurance has given incorrect or incomplete information 
without any blame attaching to him, the insurer is liable as if correct information had been 
given, but he may cancel the insurance by giving fourteen days’ notice.’ 
1216
 See chapter 3. 
1217
 Also, according to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, two types 
of qualifying misrepresentations are provided, namely, deliberate/reckless misrepresentation and 
careless/negligent misrepresentation. See chapter 3 for details. 
1218
 See chapter 3. 
1219
 Ibid. 
1220
 See § 4.3. 
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disclosure vary in different cases. After a close examination, it can be concluded that 
the assured’s intentional non-disclosure could lead to the insurance contract being 
terminated retrospectively, but the assured’s unintentional non-disclosure only 
causes a prospective termination.1221 Under the first circumstance, the defaulting 
party’s dishonesty would also lead to the premium being unrecoverable. Compared 
to the classic all or nothing remedy in English law, the mechanism in Chinese law 
injects more flexibility to protect the innocent assured, which is also preferred by the 
draftsman in English consumer insurance.  
 
(2). Post-contract stage 
A. Remedies available for post-contract events 
i. Amendments and renewals of insurance contracts and the held covered 
clauses 
In English law, despite of the hindrances caused by the statutory avoidance ab 
initio remedy provided by MIA 1906 to govern post-contract utmost good faith, the 
judiciary prefer to limit the avoidance to contract variations/renewals and the 
alterations made in terms of the held covered clause only.1222 
In Chinese law, it is found that a detailed format requirement of agreed 
amendments and renewals is imposed by CIL 2009, which requests a written 
agreement.1223 In order to avoid potential disputes in terms of a vague amendment 
clause, the current Chinese law prefers declining the validity of the alteration in 
question, with the absence of a written agreement, which logically spreads to 
                                               
1221
 Articles 222 and 223, CMC. See § 4.3.6.2. 
1222
 For example, K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters (The Mercandian 
Continent) [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563, CA, p. 574, per Longmore LJ. See § 5.2.3 for details. 
1223
 See § 6.5.1. 
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contract renewals. Therefore, it can be concluded that in doing this, difficulties of the 
remedy issue regarding contract amendments and renewals are efficiently resolved 
by confining its extent to invalid variations and renewals only. In Chinese law, the 
held covered clause is also popularly adopted by main insurance clauses in practice, 
and an automatic termination of insurance contract could be awarded with an 
absence of prompt notice. This means that the insurance contract is repudiated 
immediately at the breach of the assured’s good faith under the held covered clause 
without affecting the previous effect of the contract.  
 
ii. Alteration of risks 
Similarities are recognized between Chinese law and English case law in terms of 
the assured’s failure in the duty of alteration of risk notification. Sections 45, 46 and 
48 of MIA 1906 specify the remedies available for the insurer in cases where the 
assured fails to perform this duty under the circumstances including the change of 
voyage, deviation and a delay in voyage. 1224  Apart from the abovementioned 
circumstances, no other continuing duty of disclosure is required since the judiciary 
are reluctant to impose an endless duty on the assured. Judging from the above 
English statutory legislation, after the making of an insurance contract, the remedies 
available for the assured’s good faith breach regarding alterations of risks are 
preferred to be a prospective forfeiture of claims caused by the concealment.  
In Chinese law, the assured’s duty of disclosing significantly increased risks is 
embodied by an express term in practice, but this is not a mandatory obligation. On 
                                               
1224
 While, in the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan 1996, version 2010, paragraph 2 of § 3-8 
stipulates that ‘[a] change of the State of registration, the manager of the ship or the company which is 
responsible for the technical/maritime operation of the ship shall be deemed to be an alteration of the 
risk as defined by paragraph 1’, which applies to ‘a change of classification society’. 
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the basis of an expressed notification clause, the assured’s noncompliance with this 
duty may invoke extra premium and/or an immediate termination of insurance.1225 
 
iii. Fraudulent claims 
In the UK, Misrepresentation Act 1967, MIA 1906, English case law and other 
practical codes provide different manners for the assured’s fraudulent claims, namely, 
avoidance ab initio and forfeiture of claim(s).1226 
It is revealed that compared with English case law, Chinese insurance legislation 
provides a set of flexible remedies available for the assured’s fraudulent claims, 
particularly upon its legal nature. After a deep analysis, it can be concluded that there 
is zero tolerance of any fraud in insurance. Nevertheless, the remedy or forfeiture 
awarded to the defaulting insurer is prospectively confined to the contaminated 
claims only. In order to express their decisions to forbid any fraud in insurance and 
encourage commercial transactions based on good faith, Chinese legislators allow 
the insurer to keep any premium paid from the assured, as a sanction.1227 
 
B. Insurer’s late payment 
In Chinese law, paragraph 2, article 23 of CIL 2009, provides that in cases where 
the insurer fails to fulfil the obligation of making reasonable indemnifications in time, 
the insurer shall compensate the assured or the beneficiary for any damage incurred 
as a remedy in addition to the payment of compensation. Furthermore, based on 
paragraph 3 of this article, the insurer’s obligation for indemnity or payment of the 
                                               
1225
 See § 6.2.2.2. 
1226
 Under the second circumstance, if there are several claims promoted by the assured in total, a 
forfeiture remedy is applied to the contaminated claim(s) only but not the genuine ones; if there is only 
one claim promoted by the assured, a forfeiture remedy is applied to the whole fraudulent claim, but 
not to the insurance contract. See § 5.3.4. 
1227
 See § 6.5.6. 
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insurance benefits is defined as a legal obligation, and it is illegal for any entity or 
individual to interfere with the insurer’s obligation for indemnity or payment of the 
insurance benefits, or to hinder the assured’s right to receive the payment.  
In current English case law, the judiciary is extremely reluctant to award any 
compensation for the marine insurer’s rejection of valid claims or unreasonable delay 
in indemnifying the assured’s claims.1228 However, the Law Commissioners proposed 
to introduce the existing FOS and the original FAS rules in England and Wales in 
consumer insurance to business insurance, in order to govern the business insurer’s 
performance of reasonable indemnification liabilities.1229 
 
(3). Agent’s good faith: recommendations 
In English law, the duty of disclosure is also imposed on the insurance agent. On 
the basis of section 19 of the MIA 1906, an agent must disclose any material 
circumstance which is known by himself, and that is deemed to be known or that has 
been communicated to him in the ordinary course of business.1230 Furthermore, this 
section also stipulates that every material circumstance which the assured is bound 
to disclose must be disclosed by the agent to the insurer as well, unless it comes to 
his knowledge too late.1231 In fact, extending the agent’s duty of disclosure regime 
from English law to Chinese law is not inappropriate since now the shipping industry 
has been advanced to a worldwide and flourishing industry.  
In Chinese law, the scope of information that needs to be disclosed by the agent is 
still uncertain. However, the MIA 1906 could be applied to offer a solution by defining 
that the scope of information that needs to be disclosed by the agent as the 
                                               
1228
 But this is not applied to consumer insurance. See § 5.4 for details. 
1229
 CP 2. See § 5.5 for details. Of course, the original FSA rules are replaced by the FCA Handbook, 
which is mainly governing insurance practice in the UK, cooperating with the PRA.  
1230
 Section 19(1), MIA 1906. 
1231
 Section 19(2), MIA 1906. 
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knowledge which is known, or ought to be known in the ordinary course of business, 
and the information which the assured is bound to disclose and has been 
communicated to the agent in due course. However, one leading scholar asserts that 
in Chinese law, the agent shall undertake an independent duty to disclose 
information or knowledge based on himself, but not the information transferred from 
the insured. 1232  This issue is still left for further clarification through judicial 
interpretations. 
 
Initiatives at the European Union level 
At the European level, the EU Project Group ‘Restatement of European Insurance 
Contract Law’ was created to draft a Restatement of European Insurance Contract 
Law (Restatement), which is functioning as a Model Law in general insurance for the 
European and other national legislators.1233 One recent significant achievement is 
the publication of ‘Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)’ in 
2009,1234 which was adopted as a fundamental element of an Optional Instrument 
including Insurance Contract Law in 2011.1235 Although it is found that there are not 
special rules for individual branches of insurance law, such as marine insurance, the 
initiatives relating to good faith from the Restatement could still provide lessons for 
both English and Chinese marine insurance law reform.1236 
 
                                               
1232
 Pengnan Wang, ‘The duty of disclosure and the legal consequences of its breach’, in ACML, p. 
161. 
1233
 For a brief introduction of this European project, see § 3.2.1. 
1234
 Project Group Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law, Principles of European 
Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, October 2009). 
1235
 European Parliament, Resolution on policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law 
for consumers and businesses, (2011, 2011/2013(INI)). 
1236
 See § 3.2.1 for detailed discussion.  
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Should the English duty of utmost good faith be adopted by Chinese marine 
insurance law at once or incrementally? 
As previously discussed, because of the influences made by the doctrine of 
binding precedent in English law, and the unchallengeable position of London in the 
global marine industry, there is a tendency to extend the regime of utmost good faith 
to Chinese law. The issue of Recommendations by the Project Team is a 
conspicuous example.1237 
However, this recommendation has been doubted for its feasibility and 
scrutiny.1238 In the view of this author, the adoption of the typical English duty of 
utmost good faith in China is still a distant task. The fundamental reason for this 
author’s presumption is lying in the characterics of a civil law system, and specifically 
in Chinese law.1239 Apart from the general characters of the civil law system, the 
uniquenesses of Chinese legislation is worthwhile to be introduced here. In China, 
law is enacted by the National People’s Congress and local governments or 
authorities. In an absence of adequate legislation, the Supreme People’s Courts and 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate are allowed to issue ‘judicial interpretations’ on 
point of law.1240 Actually, ‘juidicial interpretations’ can be divided into interpretations, 
regulations, replies and decisions, depending on relevant codes in question.1241 Of 
course, High People’s Courts, People’s Procuratorates and authorized Speicialized 
Courts are endowed with the power to make a proposal, ask for instructions or make 
suggestions in terms of judicial interpretations, and the Supreme People’s 
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Procuratorate will make the final decision.1242 Combined with the typical nature of a 
civil law system relying more on scholarly literatures rather than judicial decisions, it 
can be concluded that as distinct from English law, case law is not considered as a 
main resource in the Chinese legal system. 
Additionally, there are also some other considerable factors. Firstly, as explained 
in previous paragraphs, the utmost good faith doctrine would not be legally 
recognized by Chinese courts until its legal status is confirmed by the issue of a new 
statute or judicial interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court or the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorare of the PRC, or clarified by express contract clauses. In China, 
as stated earlier, the only remedy for current legislative defects is a new statutory 
legislation or judicial interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the PRC (incluing local authorities), or 
alternatively, amendments of existing laws. Even though this recommendation is 
adopted by China, judging from what has been accomplished so far, there is, as yet, 
no fast-track solution. 
Secondly, inevitable theoretical barriers would put this thought of adopting the 
whole package of English duty of utmost good faith at the forefront of efforts to 
enforce the same doctrine in China, in particular the distinct legal natures of civil law 
and common law systems.1243 Obviously, the doctrine of good faith is a subjective 
theory but not a concrete concept, and the concept of utmost good faith seems to be 
too challenging and intangible to be enforced correctly. Although English courts have 
established a series of standards to balance and scrutinize its enforcement (for 
instance, the ‘prudent insurer actual inducement’ test for materiality and rescission of 
an insurance contract, and the confirmation of its mutuality during insurance 
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transactions, and also the mechanism governing post-contract events), it is still one 
of the most controversial legal topics because of its complexity and controversy. The 
precedent doctrine is an ideal supporting tool to fix any defects caused by vulnerable 
or vague legislation, but judicial precedent only works appropriately in a common law 
system and only has a mere persuasive role in a civil law system. Therefore, 
‘certainty’ becomes a necessary element for civil law legislation, and all of the 
subsequent limitations and interpretations established by judgements actually have 
no direct effect for the validity of current Chinese legislation. In the case of a 
theoretical utmost good faith doctrine, English law proves its flexibility which is a 
characteristic of a system based on precedent. 
Furthermore, some practical difficulties would set a higher threshold for its 
enforcement, especially in the absence of comprehensive legislation and scrutiny in 
Chinese law. On the one hand, the complexity of the theoretical doctrine leads to the 
occurrence of uncertainty, which is not acceptable by China as a civil law country. 
The inevitable defects, on the other hand, are difficult to be fixed through further 
judicial cases in China. For instance, how does one avoid that the insurance 
companies use this as a technical defence to release themselves from further 
liabilities after the occurrence of an accident?1244 At common law, further restrictions 
can be imposed through judicial precedents, but not in a civil law country.           
Finally, section 17 of the MIA 1906 itself is in a very difficult situation in English law 
at present. The duty of utmost good faith has been standing for around two centuries; 
however, there are increasing calls for reform. One reason is that the MIA 1906 is 
itself now outdated in view of technological advances. There are several pressing 
aspects for pre-contract information reform in the England sytem. Firstly, the range of 
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information needed to be disclosed should be adjusted since the voluntary duty of 
disclosure is addressed mainly to the assured. Secondly, it needs to be questioned 
whether the ‘prudent insurer’ test requires modification. Thirdly, the avoidance 
remedy is criticized to be too harsh for the defaulting party in breach, especially for 
the wholly innocent assureds. Finally, the ‘proportionality approach’ in statute law1245 
can be extended to marine insurance, and also the legal basis of utmost good faith in 
post-contract events. Apart from the revolutionary and material movements 
conducted in the UK, some other countries are also interested in the development of 
their own marine insurance legislation, especially the review of MIA 1909 made by 
the Australian Law Commission.1246 All these movements just prove that the status of 
the MIA 1906 in business insurance is likely to be challenged in the near future, 
including the duty of utmost good faith. In the view of this author, the proposed 
changes in English law need to be taken into account.      
After evaluating the enforceability and difficulties of adopting section 17 of MIA 
1906 in Chinese marine insurance industry, it is found that more issues are revealed. 
On the one hand, it seems to be challenged on the grounds that social, economic 
and technical change, and even political change, have reversed the informational 
asymmetry between the insurer and assured at the beginning of their relationship. 
This factor also seems to be strong enough to shake the foundation of this doctrine. 
In addition to the enquiries regarding its fundamentals, this doctrine has been 
criticised on its detailed application rules. Therefore, in the view of this thesis, it is not 
right to simply duplicate the whole package of the English utmost good faith doctrine 
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into Chinese law. Imminent and proposed changes in English law, however, need to 
be taken into account. 
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Appendix 1 
Marine Insurance Act 19061247  
1906 CHAPTER 41 6 Edw 7 
An Act to codify the Law relating to Marine Insurance. 
1. MARINE INSURANCE DEFINED 
A contract of marine insurance is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to 
indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby by agreed, against 
marine losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure. 
2. MIXED SEA AND LAND RISKS  
1. A contract of marine insurance may, by its express terms, or by usage of trade, 
be extended so as to protect the assured against losses on inland waters or 
on any land risk which may be incidental to any sea voyage.  
2. Where a ship in course of building, or the launch of a ship, or any adventure 
analogous to a marine adventure, is covered by a policy in the form of a 
marine policy, the provisions of this Act, in so far as applicable, shall apply 
thereto; but, except as by this section provided, nothing in this Act shall alter 
or affect any rule of law applicable to any contract of insurance other than a 
contract of marine insurance as by this Act defined.  
3. MARINE ADVENTURE AND MARITIME PERILS DEFINED  
1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, every lawful marine adventure may be the 
subject of a contract of marine insurance.  
2. In particular there is a marine adventure where—  
a. Any ship, goods or other moveables are exposed to maritime perils. 
Such property is in this Act referred to as "insurable property";  
b. The earning or acquisition of any freight, passage money, commission, 
profit, or other pecuniary benefit, or the security for any advances, loan, 
or disbursements, is endangered by the exposure of insurable property 
to maritime perils;  
c. Any liability to a third party may be incurred by the owner of, or other 
person interested in or responsible for, insurable property, by reason of 
maritime perils.  
"Maritime perils" means the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation of 
the sea, that is to say, perils of the sea, fire, war perils, pirates, rovers, thieves, 
                                               
1247
 Please note that amendments effected by the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012 are not included as the thesis reflects position in February 2013. 
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captures, seizures, restraints, and detainments of princes and peoples, jettisons, 
barratry, and any other perils, either of the like kind or which may be designated by 
the policy. 
Insurable Interest 
4. AVOIDANCE OF WAGERING OR GAMING CONTRACTS  
1. Every contract of marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering is void.  
2. A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming or wagering 
contract—  
a. Where the assured has not an insurable interest as defined by this Act, 
and the contract is entered into with no expectation of acquiring such 
an interest; or  
b. Where the policy is made "interest or no interest", or "without further 
proof of interest than the policy itself", or "without benefit of salvage to 
the insurer", or subject to any other like term:  
Provided that, where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may be 
effected without benefit of salvage to the insurer. 
5. INSURABLE INTEREST DEFINED  
1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, every person has an insurable interest 
who is interested in a marine adventure.  
2. In particular a person is interested in a marine adventure where he stands in 
any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at 
risk therein, in consequence of which he may benefit by the safety or due 
arrival of insurable property, or may be prejudiced by its loss, or damage 
thereto, or by the detention thereof, or may incur liability in respect thereof.  
6. WHEN INTEREST MUST ATTACH  
1. The assured must be interested in the subject-matter insured at the time of the 
loss though he need not be interested when the insurance is effected: 
Provided that where the subject-matter is insured "lost or not lost", the 
assured may recover although he may not have acquired his interest until 
after the loss, unless at the time of effecting the contract of insurance the 
assured was aware of the loss, and the insurer was not.  
2. Where the assured has no interest at the time of the loss, he cannot acquire 
interest by any act or election after he is aware of the loss.  
7. DEFEASIBLE OR CONTINGENT INTEREST  
1. A defeasible interest is insurable, as also is a contingent interest.  
2. In particular, where the buyer of goods has insured them, he has an insurable 
interest, notwithstanding that he might, at his election, have rejected the 
goods, or have treated them as at the seller’s risk, by reason of the latter’s 
delay in making delivery or otherwise.  
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8. PARTIAL INTEREST 
A partial interest of any nature is insurable. 
9. RE-INSURANCE  
1. The insurer under a contract of marine insurance has an insurable interest in 
his risk, and may re-insure in respect of it.  
2. Unless the policy otherwise provides, the original assured has no right or 
interest in respect of such re-insurance.  
10. BOTTOMRY 
The lender of money on bottomry or respondentia has an insurable interest in 
respect of the loan. 
11. MASTER'S AND SEAMEN'S WAGES 
The master or any member of the crew of a ship has an insurable interest in respect 
of his wages. 
12. ADVANCE FREIGHT 
In the case of advance freight, the person advancing the freight has an insurable 
interest, in so far as such freight is not repayable in case of loss. 
13. CHARGES OF INSURANCE 
The assured has an insurable interest in the charges of any insurance which he may 
effect. 
14. QUANTUM OF INTEREST  
1. Where the subject-matter insured is mortgaged, the mortgagor has an 
insurable interest in the full value thereof, and the mortgagee has an insurable 
interest in respect of any sum due or to become due under the mortgage.  
2. A mortgagee, consignee, or other person having an interest in the subject-
matter insured may insure on behalf and for the benefit of other persons 
interested as well as for his own benefit.  
3. The owner of insurable property has an insurable interest in respect of the full 
value thereof, notwithstanding that some third person may have agreed, or be 
liable, to indemnify him in case of loss.  
15. ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST 
Where the assured assigns or otherwise parts with his interest in the subject-matter 
insured, he does not thereby transfer to the assignee his rights under the contract of 
insurance, unless there be an express or implied agreement with the assignee to that 
effect. 
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But the provisions of this section do not affect a transmission of interest by operation 
of law. 
Insurable Value 
16. MEASURE OF INSURABLE VALUE 
Subject to any express provision or valuation in the policy, the insurable value of the 
subject-matter insured must be ascertained as follows—  
1. In insurance on ship, the insurable value is the value, at the commencement 
of the risk, of the ship, including her outfit, provisions and stores for the 
officers and crew, money advanced for seamen’s wages, and other 
disbursements (if any) incurred to make the ship fit for the voyage or 
adventure contemplated by the policy, plus the charges of insurance upon the 
whole; 
The insurable value, in the case of a steamship, includes also the machinery, 
boilers, and coals and engine stores if owned by the assured, and, in the case 
of a ship engaged in a special trade, the ordinary fittings requisite for that 
trade;  
2. In insurance on freight, whether paid in advance or otherwise, the insurance 
value is the gross amount of the freight at the risk of the assured, plus the 
charges of insurance;  
3. In insurance on goods or merchandise, the insurable value is the prime cost of 
the property insured, plus the expenses of and incidental to shipping and the 
charges of insurance upon the whole;  
4. In insurance on any other subject-matter, the insurable value is the amount at 
the risk of the assured when the policy attaches, plus the charges of insurance.  
Disclosure And Representations 
17. INSURANCE IS UBERRIMAE FIDEI 
A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if 
the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided 
by the other party. 
18. DISCLOSURE BY ASSURED  
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the 
insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is 
known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every 
circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by 
him. If the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the 
contract.  
2. Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a 
prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the 
risk.  
3. In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, 
namely:—  
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a. Any circumstance which diminishes the risk;  
b. Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the 
insurer. The insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety 
or knowledge, and matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of 
his business, as such, ought to know;  
c. Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer;  
d. Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any 
express or implied warranty.  
4. Whether any particular circumstance, which is not disclosed, be material or 
not is, in each case, a question of fact.  
5. The term "circumstance" includes any communication made to, or information 
received by, the assured.  
19. DISCLOSURE BY AGENT EFFECTING INSURANCE 
Subject to the provisions of the preceding section as to circumstances which need 
not be disclosed, where an insurance is effected for the assured by an agent, the 
agent must disclose to the insurer— 
a. Every material circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to 
insure is deemed to know every circumstance which in the ordinary 
course of business ought to be known by, or to have been 
communicated to, him; and  
b. Every material circumstance which the assured is bound to disclose, 
unless it come to his knowledge too late to communicate it to the agent.  
20. REPRESENTATIONS PENDING NEGOTIATION OF CONTRACT  
1. Every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer 
during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, 
must be true. If it be untrue the insurer may avoid the contract.  
2. A representation is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent 
insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.  
3. A representation may be either a representation as to a matter of fact, or as to 
a matter of expectation or belief.  
4. A representation as to matter of fact is true, if it be substantially correct, that is 
to say, if the difference between what is represented and what is actually 
correct would not be considered material by a prudent insurer.  
5. A representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is true if it be made in 
good faith.  
6. A representation may be withdrawn or corrected before the contract is 
concluded.  
7. Whether a particular representation be material or not is, in each ease, a 
question of fact.  
21. WHEN CONTRACT IS DEEMED TO BE CONCLUDED 
A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be concluded when the proposal of the 
assured is accepted by the insurer, whether the policy be then issued or not; and, for 
the purpose of showing when the proposal was accepted, reference may be made to 
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the slip or covering note or other customary memorandum of the contract, [although 
it be stamped]. 
NOTE: 
[Words in italics] deleted by the Finance Act 1959, s 37(5), Sch 8, Pt II. 
22. CONTRACT MUST BE ENBODIED IN POLICY 
Subject to the provisions of any statute, a contract of marine insurance is 
inadmissible in evidence unless it is embodied in a marine policy in accordance with 
this Act. The policy may be executed and issued either at the time when the contract 
is concluded, or afterwards. 
23. WHAT POLICY MUST SPECIFY 
A Marine policy must specify—  
1. The name of the assured, or of some person who effects the insurance on his 
behalf:  
2. The subject-matter insured and the risk insured against;  
3. The voyage, or period of time, or both , as the case may be, cover3ed by the 
insurance;  
4. The sum or sums insured;  
5. The name or names of the insurers.  
NOTE: 
Sub-ss (2)–(5): repealed by the Finance Act 1959, ss 30(5), (7), 37(5), Sch 8, Pt II. 
24. SIGNATURE OF INSURER  
1. A marine policy must be signed by or on behalf of the insurer, provided that in 
the case of a corporation the corporate seal may be sufficient, but nothing in 
this section shall be construed as requiring the subscription of a corporation to 
be under seal.  
2. Where a policy is subscribed by or on behalf of two or more insurers, each 
subscription, unless the contrary be expressed, constitutes a distinct contract 
with the assured.  
25. VOYAGE AND TIME POLICIES  
1. Where the contract is to insure the subject-matter "at and from", or from one 
place to another or others, the policy is called a "voyage policy", and where 
the contract is to insure the subject-matter for a definite period of time the 
policy is called a "time policy". A contract for both voyage and time may be 
included in the same policy.  
2. Subject to the provisions of s 11 of the Finance Act, 1901, a time policy which 
is made for any time exceeding 12 months is invalid.  
NOTE: 
Sub-s (2): repealed by the Finance Act 1959, ss 30(5), (7), 37(5), Sch 8, Pt II. 
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26. DESIGNATION OF SUBJECT-MATTER  
1. The subject-matter insured must be designated in a marine policy with 
reasonable certainty.  
2. The nature and extent of the interest of the assured in the subject-matter 
insured need not be specified in the policy.  
3. Where the policy designates the subject-matter insured in general terms, it 
shall be construed to apply to the interest intended by the assured to be 
covered.  
4. In the application of this section regard shall be had to any usage regulating 
the designation of the subject-matter insured.  
27. VALUED POLICY  
1. A policy may be either valued or unvalued.  
2. A valued policy is a policy which specifies the agreed value of the subject-
matter insured.  
3. Subject to the provisions of this Act, and in the absence of fraud, the value 
fixed by the policy is, as between the insurer and assured, conclusive of the 
insurable value of the subject intended to be insured, whether the loss be total 
or partial.  
4. Unless the policy otherwise provides, the value fixed by the policy is not 
conclusive for the purpose of determining whether there has been a 
constructive total loss.  
28. UNVALUED POLICY 
An unvalued policy is a policy which does not specify the value of the subject-matter 
insured, but, subject to the limit of the sum insured, leaves the insurable value to be 
subsequently ascertained, in the manner hereinbefore specified. 
29. FLOATING POLICY BY SHIP OR SHIPS  
1. A floating policy is a policy which describes the insurance in general terms, 
and leaves the name of the ship or ships and other particulars to be defined 
by subsequent declaration.  
2. The subsequent declaration or declarations may be made by indorsement on 
the policy, or in other customary manner.  
3. Unless the policy otherwise provides, the declarations must be made in the 
order of dispatch or shipment. They must, in the case of goods, comprise all 
consignments within the terms of the policy, and the value of the goods or 
other property must be honestly stated, but an omission or erroneous 
declaration may be rectified even after loss or arrival, provided the omission or 
declaration was made in good faith.  
4. Unless the policy otherwise provides, where a declaration of value is not made 
until after notice of loss or arrival, the policy must be treated as an unvalued 
policy as regards the subject-matter of that declaration.  
30. CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS IN POLICY  
354 
 
1. A policy may be in the form in the First Schedule of this Act.  
2. Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the context of the policy 
otherwise requires, the terms and expressions mentioned in the First 
Schedule to this Act shall be construed as having the scope and meaning in 
that schedule assigned to them.  
31. PREMIUM TO BE ARRANGED  
1. Where an insurance is effected at a premium to be arranged, and no 
arrangement is made, a reasonable premium is payable.  
2. Where an insurance is effected on the terms that an additional premium is to 
be arranged in a given event, and that event happens but no arrangement is 
made, then a reasonable additional premium is payable.  
Double Insurance 
32. DOUBLE INSURANCE  
1. Where two or more policies are effected by or on behalf of the assured on the 
same adventure and interest or any part thereof, and the sums insured 
exceed the indemnity allowed by this Act, the assured is said to be over-
insured by double insurance.  
2. Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance—  
a. The assured, unless the policy otherwise provides, may claim payment 
from the insurers in such order as he may think fit, provided that he is 
not entitled to receive any sum in excess of the indemnity allowed by 
this Act;  
b. Where the policy under which the assured claims is a valued policy, the 
assured must give credit as against the valuation for any sum received 
by him under any other policy without regard to the actual value of the 
subject-matter insured;  
c. Where the policy under which the assured claims is an unvalued policy 
he must give credit, as against the full insurable value, for any sum 
received by him under any other policy;  
d. Where the assured receives any sum in excess of the indemnity 
allowed by this Act, he is deemed to hold such sum in trust for the 
insurers, according to their right of contribution among themselves.  
Warranties, Etc. 
33. NATURE OF WARRANTY  
1. A warranty, in the following sections relating to warranties, means a 
promissory warranty, that is to say, a warranty by which the assured 
undertakes that some particular thing shall or shall not be done, or that some 
condition shall be fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of 
a particular state of facts.  
2. A warranty may be express or implied.  
3. A warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly complied 
with, whether it be material to the risk or not. If it be not so complied with, then, 
355 
 
subject to any express provision in the policy, the insurer is discharged from 
liability as from the date of the breach of warranty, but without prejudice to any 
liability incurred by him before that date.  
34. WHEN BREACH OF WARRANTY EXCUSED  
1. Non-compliance with a warranty is excused when, by reason of a change of 
circumstances, the warranty ceases to be applicable to the circumstances of 
the contract, or when compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by 
any subsequent law.  
2. Where a warranty is broken, the assured cannot avail himself of the defence 
that the breach has been remedied, and the warranty complied with, before 
loss.  
3. A breach of warranty may be waived by the insurer.  
35. EXPRESS WARRANTIES  
1. An express warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to 
warrant is to be inferred.  
2. An express warranty must be included in, or written upon, the policy, or must 
be contained in some document incorporated by reference into the policy.  
3. An express warranty does not exclude an implied warranty, unless it be 
inconsistent therewith.  
36. WARRANTY OF NEUTRALITY  
1. Where insurable property, whether ship or goods, is expressly warranted 
neutral, there is an implied condition that the property shall have a neutral 
character at the commencement of the risk, and that, so far as the assured 
can control the matter, its neutral character shall be preserved during the risk.  
2. Where a ship is expressly warranted "neutral" there is also an implied 
condition that, so far as the assured can control the matter, she shall be 
properly documented, that is to say, that she shall carry the necessary papers 
to establish her neutrality, and that she shall not falsify or suppress her papers, 
or use simulated papers. If any loss occurs through breach of this condition, 
the insurer may avoid the contract.  
37. NO IMPLIED WARRANTY OF NATIONALITY 
There is no implied warranty as to the nationality of a ship, or that her nationality 
shall not be changed during the risk. 
38. WARRANTY OF GOOD SAFETY 
Where the subject-matter insured is warranted "well" or "in good safety" on a 
particular day, it is sufficient if it be safe at any time during that day. 
39. WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS OF SHIP  
356 
 
1. In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the commencement of 
the voyage the ship shall be seaworthy for the purpose of the particular 
adventure insured.  
2. Where the policy attaches while the ship is in port, there is also an implied 
warranty that she shall, at the commencement of the risk, be reasonably fit to 
encounter the ordinary perils of the port.  
3. Where the policy relates to a voyage which is performed in different stages, 
during which the ship requires different kinds of or further preparation or 
equipment, there is an implied warranty that at the commencement of each 
stage the ship is seaworthy in respect of such preparation or equipment for 
the purposes of that stage.  
4. A ship is deemed to be seaworthy when she is reasonably fit in all respects to 
encounter the ordinary perils of the seas of the adventure insured.  
5. In a time policy there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy at 
any stage of the adventure, but where, with the privity of the assured, the ship 
is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss 
attributable to unseaworthiness.  
40. NO IMPLIED WARRANTY THAT GOODS ARE SEAWORTHY  
1. In a policy on goods or other moveables there is no implied warranty that the 
goods or moveables are seaworthy.  
2. In a voyage policy on goods or other moveables there is an implied warranty 
that at the commencement of the voyage the ship is not only seaworthy as a 
ship, but also that she is reasonably fit to carry the goods or other moveables 
to the destination contemplated by the policy.  
41. WARRANTY OF LEGALITY 
There is an implied warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful one, and that, so 
far as the assured can control the matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a 
lawful manner. 
The Voyage 
42. IMPLIED CONDITION AS TO COMMENCEMENT OF RISK  
1. Where the subject-matter is insured by a voyage policy "at and from" or "from" 
a particular place, it is not necessary that the ship should be at that place 
when the contract is concluded, but there is an implied condition that the 
adventure shall be commenced within a reasonable time, and that if the 
adventure be not so commenced the insurer may avoid the contract.  
2. The implied condition may be negatived by showing that the delay was 
caused by circumstances known to the insurer before the contract was 
concluded, or by showing that he waived the condition.  
43. ALTERATION OF PORT OF DEPARTURE 
Where the place of departure is specified by the policy, and the ship instead of 
sailing from that place sails from any other place, the risk does not attach. 
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44. SAILING FOR DIFFERENT DESTINATION 
Where the destination is specified in the policy, and the ship, instead of sailing for 
that destination, sails for any other destination, the risk does not attach. 
45. CHANGE OF VOYAGE  
1. Where, after the commencement of the risk, the destination of the ship is 
voluntarily changed from the destination contemplated by the policy, there is 
said to be a change of voyage.  
2. Unless the policy otherwise provides, where there is a change of voyage, the 
insurer is discharged from liability as from the time of change, that is to say, as 
from the time when the determination to change it is manifested; and it is 
immaterial that the ship may not in fact have left the course of voyage 
contemplated by the policy when the loss occurs.  
46. DEVIATION  
1. Where a ship, without lawful excuse, deviates from the voyage contemplated 
by the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the time of 
deviation, and it is immaterial that the ship may have regained her route 
before any loss occurs.  
2. There is a deviation from the voyage contemplated by the policy—  
a. Where the course of the voyage is specifically designated by the policy, 
and that course is departed from; or  
b. Where the course of the voyage is not specifically designated by the 
policy, but the usual and customary course is departed from.  
3. The intention to deviate is immaterial; there must be a deviation in fact to 
discharge the insurer from his liability under the contract.  
47. SEVERAL PORTS OF DISCHARGE  
1. Where several ports of discharge are specified by the policy, the ship may 
proceed to all or any of them, but, in the absence of any usage or sufficient 
cause to the contrary, she must proceed to them, or such of them as she goes 
to, in the order designated by the policy. If she does not there is a deviation.  
2. Where the policy is to "ports of discharge", within a given area, which are not 
named, the ship must, in the absence of any usage or sufficient cause to the 
contrary, proceed to them, or such of them as she goes to, in their 
geographical order. If she does not there is a deviation.  
48. DELAY IN VOYAGE 
In the case of a voyage policy, the adventure insured must be prosecuted throughout 
its course with reasonable dispatch, and, if without lawful excuse it is not so 
prosecuted, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the time when the delay 
became unreasonable. 
49. EXCUSES FOR DEVIATION OR DELAY  
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1. Deviation or delay in prosecuting the voyage contemplated by the policy is 
excused—  
a. Where authorised by any special term in the policy; or  
b. Where caused by circumstances beyond the control of the master and 
his employer; or  
c. Where reasonably necessary in order to comply with an express or 
implied warranty; or  
d. Where reasonably necessary for the safety of the ship or subject-matter 
insured; or  
e. For the purpose of saving human life, or aiding a ship in distress where 
human life may be in danger; or  
f. Where reasonably necessary for the purpose of obtaining medical or 
surgical aid for any person on board the ship; or  
g. Where caused by the barratrous conduct of the master or crew, if 
barratry be one of the perils insured against.  
2. When the cause excusing the deviation or delay ceases to operate, the ship 
must resume her course, and prosecute her voyage, with reasonable dispatch.  
Assignment of Policy 
50. WHEN AND HOW POLICY IS ASSIGNABLE  
1. A marine policy is assignable unless it contains terms expressly prohibiting 
assignment. It may be assigned either before or after loss.  
2. Where a marine policy has been assigned so as to pass the beneficial interest 
in such policy, the assignee of the policy is entitled to sue thereon in his own 
name; and the defendant is entitled to make any defence arising out of the 
contract which he would have been entitled to make if the action had been 
brought in the name of the person by or on behalf of whom the policy was 
effected.  
3. A marine policy may be assigned by indorsement thereon or in other 
customary manner.  
51. ASSURED WHO HAS NO INTEREST CANNOT ASSIGN 
Where the assured has parted with or lost his interest in the subject-matter insured, 
and has not, before or at the time of so doing, expressly or impliedly agreed to assign 
the policy, any subsequent assignment of the policy is inoperative: 
Provided that nothing in this section affects the assignment of a policy after loss. 
The Premium 
52. WHEN PREMIUM PAYABLE 
Unless otherwise agreed, the duty of the assured or his agent to pay the premium, 
and the duty of the insurer to issue the policy to the assured or his agent, are 
concurrent conditions, and the insurer is not bound to issue the policy until payment 
or tender of the premium. 
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53. POLICY EFFECTED THROUGH BROKER  
1. Unless otherwise agreed, where a marine policy is effected on behalf of the 
assured by a broker, the broker is directly responsible to the insurer for the 
premium, and the insurer is directly responsible to the assured for the amount 
which may be payable in respect of losses, or in respect of returnable 
premium.  
2. Unless otherwise agreed, the broker has, as against the assured, a lien upon 
the policy for the amount of the premium and his charges in respect of 
effecting the policy; and, where he has dealt with the person who employs him 
as a principal, he has also a lien on the policy in respect of any balance on 
any insurance account which may be due to him from such person, unless 
when the debt was incurred he had reason to believe that such person was 
only an agent.  
54. EFFECT OF RECEIPT ON POLICY 
Where a marine policy effected on behalf of the assured by a broker acknowledges 
the receipt of the premium, such acknowledgment is, in the absence of fraud, 
conclusive as between the insurer and the assured, but not as between the insurer 
and broker. 
Loss and Abandonment 
55. INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED LOSSES  
1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, 
the insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, 
but, subject as aforesaid, he is not liable for any loss which is not proximately 
caused by a peril insured against.  
2. In particular—  
a. The insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct 
of the assured, but unless the policy otherwise provides, he is liable for 
any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, even though the 
loss would not have happened but for the misconduct or negligence of 
the master or crew;  
b. Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer on ship or goods is 
not liable for any loss proximately caused by delay, although the delay 
be caused by a peril insured against;  
c. Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer is not liable for 
ordinary wear and tear, ordinary leakage and breakage, inherent vice 
or nature of the subject-matter insured, or for any loss proximately 
caused by rats or vermin, or for any injury to machinery not proximately 
caused by maritime perils.  
56. PARTIAL AND TOTAL LOSS  
1. A loss may be either total or partial. Any loss other than a total loss, as 
hereinafter defined, is a partial loss.  
2. A total loss may be either an actual total loss, or a constructive total loss.  
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3. Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the policy, an insurance 
against total loss includes a constructive, as well as an actual, total loss.  
4. Where the assured brings an action for a total loss and the evidence proves 
only a partial loss, he may, unless the policy otherwise provides, recover for a 
partial loss.  
5. Where goods reach their destination in specie, but by reason of obliteration of 
marks, or otherwise, they are incapable of identification, the loss, if any, is 
partial, and not total.  
57. ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS  
1. Where the subject-matter insured is destroyed, or so damaged as to cease to 
be a thing of the kind insured, or where the assured is irretrievably deprived 
thereof, there is an actual total loss.  
2. In the case of an actual total loss no notice of abandonment need be given.  
58. MISSING SHIP 
Where the ship concerned in the adventure is missing, and after the lapse of a 
reasonable time no news of her has been received, an actual total loss may be 
presumed. 
59. EFFECT OF TRANSSHIPMENT, ETC. 
Where, by a peril insured against, the voyage is interrupted at an intermediate port or 
place, under such circumstances as, apart from any special stipulation in the contract 
of affreightment, to justify the master in landing and re-shipping the goods or other 
moveables or in transshipping them, and sending them on to their destination, the 
liability of the insurer continues, notwithstanding the landing or transshipment. 
60. CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS DEFINED  
1. Subject to any express provision in the policy, there is a constructive total loss 
where the subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its 
actual total loss appearing to be unavoidable, or because it could not be 
preserved from actual total loss without an expenditure which would exceed 
its value when the expenditure had been incurred.  
2. In particular, there is a constructive total loss—  
i. Where the assured is deprived of the possession of his ship or goods 
by a peril insured against, and (a) it is unlikely that he can recover the 
ship or goods, as the case may be, or (b) the cost of recovering the 
ship or goods, as the case may be, would exceed their value when 
recovered; or  
ii. In the case of damage to a ship, where she is so damaged by a peril 
insured against that the cost of repairing the damage would exceed the 
value of the ship when repaired.  
In estimating the cost of repairs, no deduction is to be made in respect 
of general average contributions to those repairs payable by other 
interests, but account is to be taken of the expense of future salvage 
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operations and of any future general average contributions to which the 
ship would be liable if repaired; or  
iii. In the case of damage to goods, where the cost of repairing the 
damage and forwarding the goods to their destination would exceed 
their value on arrival.  
61. EFFECT OF CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS 
Where there is a constructive total loss the assured may either treat the loss as a 
partial loss, or abandon the subject-matter insured to the insurer and treat the loss as 
if it were an actual total loss. 
62. NOTICE OF ABANDONMENT  
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, where the assured elects to abandon 
the subject-matter insured to the insurer, he must give notice of abandonment. 
If he fails to do so the loss can only be treated as a partial loss.  
2. Notice of abandonment may be given in writing, or by word of mouth, or partly 
in writing and partly by word of mouth, and may be given in terms which 
indicate the intention of the assured to abandon his insured interest in the 
subject-matter insured unconditionally to the insurer.  
3. Notice of abandonment must be given with reasonable diligence after the 
receipt of reliable information of the loss, but where the information is of a 
doubtful character the assured is entitled to a reasonable time to make inquiry.  
4. Where notice of abandonment is properly given, the rights of the assured are 
not prejudiced by the fact that the insurer refuses to accept the abandonment.  
5. The acceptance of an abandonment may be either express or implied from the 
conduct of the insurer. The mere silence of the insurer after notice is not an 
acceptance.  
6. Where a notice of abandonment is accepted the abandonment is irrevocable. 
The acceptance of the notice conclusively admits liability for the loss and the 
sufficiency of the notice.  
7. Notice of abandonment is unnecessary where, at the time when the assured 
receives information of the loss, there would be no possibility of benefit to the 
insurer if notice were given to him.  
8. Notice of abandonment may be waived by the insurer.  
9. Where an insurer has re-insured his risk, no notice of abandonment need be 
given by him.  
63. EFFECT OF ABANDONMENT  
1. Where there is a valid abandonment the insurer is entitled to take over the 
interest of the assured in whatever may remain of the subject-matter insured, 
and all proprietary rights incidental thereto.  
2. Upon the abandonment of a ship, the insurer thereof is entitled to any freight 
in course of being earned, and which is earned by her subsequent to the 
casualty causing the loss, less the expenses of earning it incurred after the 
casualty; and, where the ship is carrying the owner's goods, the insurer is 
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entitled to a reasonable remuneration for the carriage of them subsequent to 
the casualty causing the loss.  
Partial Losses 
(Including Salvage & General Average  
& Particular Charges) 
64. PARTICULAR AVERABE LOSS  
1. A particular average loss is a partial loss of the subject-matter insured, caused 
by a peril insured against, and which is not a general average loss.  
2. Expenses incurred by or on behalf of the assured for the safety or 
preservation of the subject-matter insured, other than general average and 
salvage charges, are called particular charges. Particular charges are not 
included in particular average.  
65. SALVAGE CHARGES  
1. Subject to any express provision in the policy, salvage charges incurred in 
preventing a loss by perils insured against may be recovered as a loss by 
those perils.  
2. "Salvage charges" means the charges recoverable under maritime law by a 
salvor independently of contract. They do not include the expenses of services 
in the nature of salvage rendered by the assured or his agents, or any person 
employed for hire by them, for the purpose of averting a peril insured against. 
Such expenses, where properly incurred, may be recovered as particular 
charges or as a general average loss, according to the circumstal1ces under 
which they were incurred.  
66. GENERAL AVERAGE LOSS  
1. A general average loss is a loss caused by or directly consequential on a 
general average act. It includes a general average expenditure as well as a 
general average sacrifice.  
2. There is a general average act where any extraordinary sacrifice or 
expenditure is voluntarily and reasonably made or incurred in time of peril for 
the purpose of preserving the property imperilled in the common adventure.  
3. Where there is a general average loss, the party on whom it falls is entitled, 
subject to the conditions imposed by maritime law, to a rateable contribution 
from the other parties interested, and such contribution is called a general 
average contribution.  
4. Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has incurred 
a general average expenditure, he may recover from the insurer in respect of 
the proportion of the loss which falls upon him; and, in the case of a general 
average sacrifice, he may recover from the insurer in respect of the whole loss 
without having enforced his right of contribution from the other parties liable to 
contribute.  
5. Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has paid, or 
is liable to pay, a general average contribution in respect of the subject 
insured, he may recover therefor from the insurer.  
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6. In the absence of express stipulation, the insurer is not liable for any general 
average loss or contribution where the loss was not incurred for the purpose 
of avoiding, or in connection with the avoidance of, a peril insured against.  
7. Where ship, freight, and cargo, or any two of those interests, are owned by the 
same assured, the liability of the insurer in respect of general average losses 
or contributions is to be determined as if those subjects were owned by 
different persons.  
Measure of Indemnity 
67. EXTENT OF LIABILITY OF INSURER FOR LOSS  
1. The sum which the assured can recover in respect of a loss on a policy by 
which he is insured, in the case of an unvalued policy to the full extent of the 
insurable value, or, in the case of a valued policy to the full extent of the value 
fixed by the policy, is called the measure of indemnity  
2. Where there is a loss recoverable under the policy, the insurer, or each 
insurer if there be more than one, is liable for such proportion of the measure 
of indemnity as the amount of his subscription bears to the value fixed by the 
policy in the case of a valued policy, or to the insurable value in the case of an 
unvalued policy.  
68. TOTAL LOSS 
Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any express provision in the policy, where 
there is a total loss of the subject-matter insured,—  
1. If the policy be a valued policy, the measure of indemnity is the sum fixed by 
the policy;  
2. If the policy be an unvalued policy, the measure of indemnity is the insurable 
value of the subject-matter insured.  
69. PARTIAL LOSS OF SHIP 
Where a ship is damaged, but is not totally lost, the measure of indemnity, subject to 
any express provision in the policy, is as follows:—  
1. Where the ship has been repaired, the assured is entitled to the reasonable 
cost of the repairs, less the customary deductions, but not exceeding the sum 
insured in respect of any one casualty;  
2. Where the ship has been only partially repaired, the assured is entitled to the 
reasonable cost of such repairs, computed as above, and also to be 
indemnified for the reasonable depreciation, if any, arising from the unrepaired 
damage, provided that the aggregate amount shall not exceed the cost of 
repairing the whole damage, computed as above;  
3. Where the ship has not been repaired, and has not been sold in her damaged 
state during the risk, the assured is entitled to be indemnified for the 
reasonable depreciation arising from the unrepaired damage, but not 
exceeding the reasonable cost of repairing such damage, computed as above.  
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70. PARTIAL LOSS OF FREIGHT 
Subject to any express provision in the policy, where there is a partial loss of freight, 
the measure of indemnity is such proportion of the sum fixed by the policy in the case 
of a valued policy, or of the insurable value in the case of an unvalued policy, as the 
proportion of freight lost by the assured bears to the whole freight at the risk of the 
assured under the policy. 
71. PARTIAL LOSS OF GOODS, MERCHANDISE, ETC. 
Where there is a partial loss of goods, merchandise, or other moveables, the 
measure of indemnity, subject to any express provision in the policy, is as follows:—  
1. Where part of the goods, merchandise or other moveables insured by a 
valued policy is totally lost, the measure of indemnity is such proportion of the 
sum fixed by the policy as the insurable value of the part lost bears to the 
insurable value of the whole, ascertained as in the case of an unvalued policy;  
2. Where part of the goods, merchandise, or other moveables insured by an 
unvalued policy is totally lost, the measure of indemnity is the insurable value 
of the part lost, ascertained as in case of total loss;  
3. Where the whole or any part of the goods or merchandise insured has been 
delivered damaged at its destination, the measure of indemnity is such 
proportion of the sum fixed by the policy in the case of a valued policy, or of 
the insurable value in the case of an unvalued policy, as the difference 
between the gross sound and damaged values at the place of arrival bears to 
the gross sound value;  
4. "Gross value" means the wholesale price or, if there be no such price, the 
estimated value, with, in either case, freight, landing charges, and duty paid 
beforehand; provided that, in the case of goods or merchandise customarily 
sold in bond, the bonded price is deemed to be the gross value. "Gross 
proceeds" means the actual price obtained at a sale where all charges on sale 
are paid by the sellers.  
72. APPORTIONMENT OF VALUATION  
1. Where different species of property are insured under a single valuation, the 
valuation must be apportioned over the different species in proportion to their 
respective insurable values, as in the case of an unvalued policy. The insured 
value of any part of a species is such proportion of the total insured value of 
the same as the insurable value of the part bears to the insurable value of the 
whole, ascertained in both cases as provided by this Act.  
2. Where a valuation has to be apportioned, and particulars of the prime cost of 
each separate species, quality, or description of goods cannot be ascertained, 
the division of the valuation may be made over the net arrived sound values of 
the different species, qualities, or descriptions of goods.  
73. GENERAL AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS AND SALVAGE CHARGES  
1. Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has paid, or 
is liable for, any general average contribution, the measure of indemnity is the 
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full amount of such contribution, if the subject-matter liable to contribution is 
insured for its full contributory value; but, if such subject-matter be not insured 
for its full contributory value, or if only part of it be insured, the indemnity 
payable by the insurer must be reduced in proportion to the under insurance, 
and where there has been a particular average loss which constitutes a 
deduction from the contributory value, and for which the insurer is liable, that 
amount must be deducted from the insured value in order to ascertain what 
the insurer is liable to contribute.  
2. Where the insurer is liable for salvage charges the extent of his liability must 
be determined on the like principle.  
74. LIABILITIES TO THIRD PARTIES 
Where the assured has effected an insurance in express terms against any liability to 
a third party, the measure of indemnity, subject to any express provision in the policy, 
is the amount paid or payable by him to such third party in respect of such liability. 
75. GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO MEASURE OF INDEMNITY  
1. Where there has been a loss in respect of any subject-matter not expressly 
provided for in the foregoing provisions of this Act, the measure of indemnity 
shall be ascertained, as nearly as may be, in accordance with those 
provisions, in so far as applicable to the particular case.  
2. Nothing in the provisions of this Act relating to the measure of indemnity shall 
affect the rules relating to double insurance, or prohibit the insurer from 
disproving interest wholly or in part, or from showing that at the time of the 
loss the whole or any part of the subject-matter insured was not at risk under 
the policy.  
76. PARTICULAR AVERAGE WARRANTIES  
1. Where the subject-matter insured is warranted free from particular average, 
the assured cannot recover for a loss of part, other than a loss incurred by a 
general average sacrifice, unless the contract contained in the policy be 
apportionable; but, if the contract be apportionable, the assured may recover 
for a total loss of any apportionable part.  
2. Where the subject-matter insured is warranted free from particular average, 
either wholly or under a certain percentage, the insurer is nevertheless liable 
for salvage charges, and for particular charges and other expenses properly 
incurred pursuant to the provisions of the suing and labouring clause in order 
to avert a loss insured against.  
3. Unless the policy otherwise provides, where the subject-matter insured is 
warranted free from particular average under a specified percentage, a 
general average loss cannot be added to a particular average loss to make up 
the specified percentage.  
4. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the specified percentage has been 
reached, regard shall be had only to the actual loss suffered by the subject-
matter insured. Particular charges and the expenses of and incidental to 
ascertaining and proving the loss must be excluded.  
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77. SUCCESSIVE LOSSES  
1. Unless the policy otherwise provides, and subject to the provisions of this Act, 
the insurer is liable for successive losses, even though the total amount of 
such losses may exceed the sum insured.  
2. Where, under the same policy, a partial loss, which has not been repaired or 
otherwise made good, is followed by a total loss, the assured can only recover 
in respect of the total loss:  
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the liability of the insurer 
under the suing and labouring clause. 
78. SUING & LABOURING CLAUSE  
1. Where the policy contains a suing and labouring clause, the engagement 
thereby entered into is deemed to be supplementary to the contract of 
insurance, and the assured may recover from the insurer any expenses 
properly incurred pursuant to the clause, notwithstanding that the insurer may 
have paid for a total loss, or that the subject-matter may have been warranted 
free from particular average, either wholly or under a certain percentage.  
2. General average losses and contributions and salvage charges, as defined by 
this Act, are not recoverable under the suing and labouring clause.  
3. Expenses incurred for the purpose of averting or diminishing any loss not 
covered by the policy are not recoverable under the suing and labouring 
clause.  
4. It is the duty of the assured and his agents, in all cases, to take such 
measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising a 
loss.  
Rights of Insurer on Payment 
79. RIGHT OF SUBROGATION  
1. Where the insurer pays for a total loss, either of the whole, or in the case of 
goods of any apportionable part, of the subject-matter insured, he thereupon 
becomes entitled to take over the interest of the assured in whatever may 
remain of the subject-matter so paid for, and he is thereby subrogated to all 
the rights and remedies of the assured in and in respect of that subject-matter 
as from the time of the casualty causing the loss.  
2. Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the insurer pays for a partial loss, 
he acquires no title to the subject-matter insured, or such part of it as may 
remain, but he is thereupon subrogated to all rights and remedies of the 
assured in and in respect of the subject-matter insured as from the time of the 
casualty causing the loss, in so far as the assured has been indemnified, 
according to this Act, by such payment for the loss.  
80. RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION  
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1. Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance, each insurer is bound, 
as between himself and the other insurers, to contribute rateably to the loss in 
proportion to the amount for which he is liable under his contract.  
2. If any insurer pays more than his proportion of the loss, he is entitled to 
maintain an action for contribution against the other insurers, and is entitled to 
the like remedies as a surety who has paid more than his proportion of the 
debt.  
81. EFFECT OF UNDER INSURANCE 
Where the assured is insured for an amount less than the insurable value or, in the 
case of a valued policy, for an amount less than the policy valuation, he is deemed to 
be his own insurer in respect of the uninsured balance. 
Return of Premium 
82. ENFORCEMENT OF RETURN 
Where the premium or a proportionate part thereof is, by this Act, declared to be 
returnable,— 
a. If already paid, it may be recovered by the assured from the insurer; 
and  
b. If unpaid, it may be retained by the assured or his agent.  
83. RETURN BY AGREEMENT 
Where the policy contains a stipulation for the return of the premium, or a 
proportionate part thereof, on the happening of a certain event, and that event 
happens, the premium, or, as the case may be, the proportionate part thereof, is 
thereupon returnable to the assured. 
84. RETURN FOR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION  
1. Where the consideration for the payment of the premium totally fails, and 
there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured or his agents, 
the premium is thereupon returnable to the assured.  
2. Where the consideration for the payment of the premium is apportionable and 
there is a total failure of any apportionable part of the consideration, a 
proportionate part of the premium is, under the like conditions, thereupon 
returnable to the assured.  
3. In particular—  
a. Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the insurer as from the 
commencement of the risk, the premium is returnable, provided that 
there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured; but if the 
risk is not apportionable, and has once attached, the premiun1 is not 
returnable;  
b. Where the subject-matter insured, or part thereof, has never been 
imperilled, the premium, or, as the case may be, a proportionate part 
thereof, is returnable:  
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Provided that where the subject-matter has been insured "lost or not 
lost" and has arrived in safety at the time when the contract is 
concluded, the premium is not returnable unless, at such time, the 
insurer knew of the safe arrival.  
c. Where the assured has no insurable interest throughout the currency of 
the risk, the premium is returnable, provided that this rule does not 
apply to a policy effected by way of gaming or wagering;  
d. Where the assured has a defeasible interest which is terminated during 
the currency of the risk, the premium is not returnable;  
e. Where the assured has over-insured under an unvalued policy, a 
proportionate part of the premium is returnable;  
f. Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the assured has over-
insured by double insurance, a proportionate part of the several 
premiums is returnable:  
Provided that, if the policies are effected at different times, and any 
earlier policy has at any time borne the entire risk, or if a clainm has 
been paid on the policy in respect of the full sum insured thereby, no 
premium is returnable in respect of that policy, and when the double 
insurance is effected knowingly by the assured no premium is 
returnable.  
Mutual Insurance 
85. MODIFICATION OF ACT IN CASE OF MUTUAL INSURANCE  
1. Where two or more persons mutually agree to insure each other against 
marine losses there is said to be a mutual insurance.  
2. The provisions of this Act relating to the premium do not apply to mutual 
insurance, but a guarantee, or such other arrangement as may be agreed 
upon, may be substituted for the premium.  
3. The provisions of this Act, in so far as they may be modified by the agreement 
of the parties, may in the case of mutual insurance be modified by the terms of 
the policies issued by the association, or by the rules and regulations of the 
association.  
4. Subject to the exceptions mentioned in this section, the provisions of this Act 
apply to a mutual insurance.  
Supplemental 
86. RATIFICATION BY ASSURED 
Where a contract of marine insurance is in good faith effected by one person on 
behalf of another, the person on whose behalf it is effected may ratify the contract 
even after he is aware of a loss. 
87. IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS VARIED BY AGREEMENT OR USAGE  
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1. Where any right, duty, or liability would arise under a contract of marine 
insurance by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express 
agreement, or by usage, if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the 
contract.  
2. The provisions of this section extend to any right, duty, or liability declared by 
this Act which may be lawfully modified by agreement.  
88. REASONABLE TIME, ETC., A QUESTION OF FACT 
Where by this Act any reference is made to reasonable time, reasonable premium, or 
reasonable diligence, the question what is reasonable is a question of fact. 
89. SLIP AS EVIDENCE 
Where there is a duly stamped policy, reference may be made, as heretofore, to the 
slip or covering note, in any legal proceeding. 
90. INTERPRETATION OF TERMS 
In this Act, unless the context or subject-matter otherwise requires,— 
"Action" includes counter-claim and set off: 
"Freight" includes the profit derivable by a shipowner from the employment of his 
ship to carry his own goods or moveables, as well as freight payable by a third party, 
but does not include passage money: 
"Moveables" means any moveable tangible property, other than the ship, and 
includes money, valuable securities, and other documents: 
"Policy" means a marine policy. 
91. Savings  
1. Nothing in this Act, or in any repeal effected thereby, shall affect—  
a. The provisions of the Stamp Act 1891, or any enactment for the time 
being in force relating to the revenue:  
b. The provisions of the Companies Act 1862, or any enactment 
amending or substituted for the same;  
c. The provisions of any statute not expressly repealed by this Act.  
2. The rules of the common law including the law merchant, save in so far as 
they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, shall continue to 
apply to contracts of marine insurance.  
92. REPEALS 
The enactments mentioned in the Second Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed 
to the extent specificed in that schedule. 
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NOTE: 
Repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1927. 
93. COMMENCEMENT 
This Act shall come into operation on the first day of January, 1907. 
NOTE: 
Repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1927. 
94. SHORT TITLE 
This Act may be cited as the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
SCHEDULES 
FIRST SCHEDULE (s 30) 
Form of policy 
BE IT KNOWN THAT … as well in … own name as for and in the name and names 
of all and every other person or persons to whom the same doth, may, or shall 
appertain, in part or in all doth make assurance and cause … and them, and every 
one of them, to be insured lost or not lost, at and from … 
Upon any kind of goods and merchandise, and also upon the body, tackle, apparel, 
ordnance, munition, artillery, boat, and other furniture, of and in the good ship or 
vessel called the … whereof is master under God, for this present voyage, … or 
whosoever else shall to for master in the said ship, or by whatsoever other name or 
names the said ship, or the master thereof, is or shall be named or called; beginning 
the adventure upon the said goods and merchandises from the loading thereof 
aboard the said ship. 
upon the said ship, etc. 
and so shall continue and endure, during her abode there,. upon the said ship, etc. 
And further, until the said ship, with all her ordnance, tackle, apparel; etc., and goods 
and merchandises whatsoever shall be arrived at …  
upon the said ship, etc., until she hath moored at anchor twenty-four hours in good 
safety; and upon the goods and merchandises, until the same be there discharged 
and safely landed. And it shall be lawful for the said ship, etc., in this voyage to 
proceed and sail to and touch and stay at any ports or places whatsoever. 
without prejudice to this insurance. The said ship, etc., goods and merchandises, etc., 
for so much as concerns the assured by agreement between the assured and 
assurers in this policy, are and shall be valued at …  
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Touching the adventures and perils which we the assurers are contented to bear and 
do take upon us in this voyage: they are of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, 
pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, letters of mart and countermart, surprisals, takings 
at sea, arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, and people, of what 
nation, condition, or quality soever, barratry of the master and mariners, and of all 
other perils, losses, and misfortunes, that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, 
or damage of the said goods and merchandises, and ship, etc., or any part thereof. 
And in case of any loss or misfortune it shall be lawful to the assured, their factors, 
servants and assigns, to sue, labour, and travel for, in and about the defence, 
safeguards, and recovery of the said goods and merchandises, and ship, etc., or any 
part thereof, without prejudice to this insurance; to the charges whereof we, the 
assurers, will contribute each one according to the rate and quantity of his sum 
herein assured. And it is especially declared and agreed that no acts of the insurer or 
insured in recovering, saving, or preserving the property insured shall be considered 
as a waiver, or acceptance of abandonment. And it is agreed by us, the insurers, that 
this writing or policy of assurance shall be of as much force and effect as the surest 
writing or policy of assurance heretofore made in Lombard Street, or in the Royal 
Exchange, or elsewhere in London. And so we, the assurers, are contented, and do 
hereby promise and bind ourselves, each one for his own part, our heirs, executors, 
and goods to the assured, their executors, administrators, and assigns, for the true 
performance of the premises, confessing ourselves paid the consideration due unto 
us for this assurance by the assured, at and after the rate of …  
IN WITNESS whereof we, the assurers, have subscribed our names and sums 
assured in London. 
N.B. — Corn, fish, salt, fruit, flour, and seed are warranted free from average, unless 
general, or the ship be stranded — sugar, tobacco, hemp, flax, hides and skins are 
warranted free from average, under five pounds per cent., and all other goods, also 
the ship and freight, are warranted free from average, under three pounds per cent. 
unless general, or the ship be stranded. 
Rules for construction of policy 
The following are the rules referred to by this Act for the construction of a policy in 
the above or other like form, where the context does not otherwise require:—  
1. Where the subject-matter is insured "lost or not lost", and the loss has 
occurred before the contract is concluded, the risk attaches, unless at such 
time the assured was aware of the loss, and the insurer was not.  
2. Where the subject-matter is insured "from" a particular place, the risk does not 
attach until the ship starts on the voyage insured.  
3.  
a. Where a ship is insured "at and from" a particular place, and she is at 
that place in good safety when the contract is concluded, the risk 
attaches immediately.  
b. If she be not at that place when the contract is concluded, the risk 
attaches as soon as she arrives there in good safety, and, unless the 
policy otherwise provides, it is immaterial that she is covered by 
another policy for a specified time after arrival.  
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c. Where chartered freight is insured "at and from" a particular place, and 
the ship is at that place in good safety when the contract is concluded 
the risk attaches immediately. If she be not there when the contract is 
concluded, the risk attaches as soon as she arrives there in good 
safety.  
d. Where freight, other than chartered freight, is payable without special 
conditions and is insured "at and from" a particular place, the risk 
attaches pro rata as the goods or merchandise are shipped; provided 
that if there be cargo in readiness which belongs to the shipowner, or 
which some other person has contracted with him to ship, the risk 
attaches as soon as the ship is ready to receive such cargo.  
4. Where goods or other moveables are insured "from the loading thereof", the 
risk does not attach until such goods or moveables are actually on board, and 
the insurer is not liable for them while in transit from the shore to ship.  
5. Where the risk on goods or other moveables continues until they are "safely 
landed", they must be landed in the customary manner and within a 
reasonable time after arrival at the port of discharge, and if they are not so 
landed the risk ceases.  
6. In the absence of any further licence and usage, the liberty to touch and stay 
"at any port or place whatsoever" does not authorise the ship to depart from 
the course of her voyage from the port of departure to the port of destination.  
7. The term "perils of the seas" refers only to fortuitous accidents or casualties of 
the seas. It does not include the ordinary action of the winds and waves.  
8. The term "pirates" includes passengers who mutiny and rioters who attack the 
ship from the shore.  
9. The term "thieves" does not cover clandestine theft or a theft committed by 
any one of the ship's company, whether crew or passengers.  
10. The term "arrests, etc., of kings, princes, and people" refers to political or 
executive acts, and does not include a loss caused by riot or by ordinary 
judicial process.  
11. The term "barratry" includes every wrongful act wilfully committed by the 
master or crew to the prejudice of the owner, or, as the case may be, the 
charterer.  
12. The term "all other perils" includes only perils similar in kind to the perils 
specifically mentioned in the policy.  
13. The term "average unless general" means a partial loss of the subject-matter 
insured other than a general average loss, and does not include "particular 
charges".  
14. Where the ship has stranded, the insurer is liable for the excepted losses, 
although the loss is not attributable to the stranding, provided that when the 
stranding takes place the risk has attached and, if the policy be on goods, that 
the damaged goods are on board.  
15. The term "ship" includes the hull, materials and outfit, stores and provisions 
for the officers and crew, and, in the case of vessels engaged in a special 
trade, the ordinary fittings requisite for the trade, and also, in the case of a 
steamship, the machinery, boilers, and coals and engine stores, if owned by 
the assured.  
16. The term "freight" includes the profit derivable by a shipowner from the 
employment of his ship to carry his own goods or moveables, as well as 
freight payable by a third party, but does not include passage money.  
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17. The term "goods" means goods in the nature of merchandise, and does not 
include personal effects or provisions and stores for use on board. 
In the absence of any usage to the contrary, deck cargo and living animals 
must be insured specifically, and not under the general denomination of goods.  
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Appendix 2 
List of Interviewees 
1. Dr. Min – Claims Handler, Sinotran Shipping Ltd, Hong Kong, China (interviewing 
time: 10th Sep. 2012) 
2. Mr. Li – Founder, Shanghai Logistics Company, Shanghai, China (interviewing 
time: Oct. 2012) 
 
 
 
